is an important demonstration of the ability and willingness of such countries to assist constructive and well-developed programs in the less developed areas.

COOPERATIVE AID EFFORT VIEWED AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF OUR TOTAL FOREIGN POLICY

From these observations it should be apparent that the United States is not alone in its efforts to assist the underdeveloped nations of the world. Through the DAG we are combining our resources with those of the other economically advanced countries of the free world in a great constructive effort.

This effort is an essential element of our total foreign policy. It symbolizes the determination of the industrial nations of the free world to play a constructive role in assisting the less developed nations to achieve that economic growth which is essential to independence and stability. It is in sharp contrast with the Soviet activities characterized by the transparent purpose of bringing those areas within the Communist orbit.

Today, as we have pointed out, the United States is not alone in offering help to the less developed countries. In part, through the effectiveness of the Marshall plan and of our past policies toward Europe, our European friends now have the capacity to join with us in this common effort. Working together we should greatly improve the chances of the world for peace and freedom. The program before this committee today is in our view of the greatest urgency and importance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The charts referred to follow:)

ADEQUACY OF FOREIGN AID PROGRAM TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF POPULATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ball.

Your statistics on the rapid growth of the population are very dis concerting. You broke them down somewhat more completely tha I have ever seen it done before. I saw a study the other day that the gap between the advanced and underdeveloped countries is widening instead of lessening.

Mr. BALL. In some instances it is, Mr. Chairman, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the foreign aid program alone wil solve this problem?

Mr. BALL. Well, there are a lot of elements that enter into bringing countries from the stage of relatively primitive systems to more advanced systems. Industrialization itself has an impact on demog raphy, as you know, Mr. Chairman, and I would suppose that as these countries reach advanced stages, some of the rather dire predictions that are implicit in these statistics that I gave you as far as the extrapolation of demographic curves are concerned, may not be achieved. I would suppose that these curves would tend to level off as the countries reached a stage of early industrialization.

JAPANESE AND INDIAN EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THEIR POPULATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think any more direct action is required than just economic development?

Mr. BALL. Well, there is a great deal of direct action through private channels, as you know.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought there was very little. Do you know anything about the program in India?

Mr. BALL. I know they have a program that is being actively pressed by a number or at least one or two private organizations, and I believe that has some Government sponsorship.

The CHAIRMAN. The Japanese practically succeeded in stabilizing their population.

Mr. BALL. That is my understanding. The curve has almost flattened out in Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. I was told India is making similar efforts in the initial stages without making as much progress.

Mr. BALL. They have an enormous problem, of course.

MOTIVES OF COMMUNIST AID

The CHAIRMAN. Your assertion in your statement that the Communists do not primarily seek to raise the standards of living of the underdeveloped people is rather interesting. You are speaking only of their ulterior motives, I take it.

Mr. BALL. I was talking of their long-range programs, Mr. Chairman. I mean in certain cases, certainly the kind of assistance they are providing, does tend to help the development process. However, the manner in which they administer their aid and the areas and projects in which they concentrate it suggests that their objective is primarily one of influence and, in some instances, of trying to

exploit the discontent and the injustices which are often latent in systems of the political and social systems of many of the lessdeveloped countries.

SUCCESS OF SOVIET AID EFFORTS IN INDIA, EGYPT, AND IRAQ

The CHAIRMAN. Is that true with the steel mill project in India? Mr. BALL. Well, I would say that India is one of the exceptions. I think that certainly in India we have a different situation from a country like one of the smaller African States, for example. In India we have a country which has a stable government, which has a great deal of stability in its institutions and which, I think, is quite capable of absorbing resources from the Soviet Union without being subject to subversion or to endangering itself. This is certainly not true of many of the smaller nations, and one of the interesting things about the Soviet aid effort is that in many cases they tend to concentrate very large resources in very small countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say the same thing about the Aswan Dam in Egypt?

Mr. BALL. I would say that Egypt certainly has been the subject of a very considerable political offensive on the part of the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you take any credence in the recent reports in the press of the conflict between the Egyptian Government and the Russians?

Mr. BALL. I would say even though Egypt may have been the subject of a political offensive that does not necessarily mean that the offensive has been successful. But I think the objectives of the assistance which the Soviet Union supplied have been of that character. The CHAIRMAN. It is reputed that Iraq is moving away from the Communists.

Mr. BALL. Yes. Again I would say this is not an example of conspicuous success.

The CHAIRMAN. These are three of the countries in which there has been a concentration of their efforts-three of the five or six.

Mr. BALL. These are three of the countries in which there has been a very considerable concentration of their efforts; that is right. The CHAIRMAN. Are we to draw from this conclusion that their program is not succeeding from their point of view?

Mr. BALL. I would say that their program has its successes and its failures just as ours has had, although I think the motives are quite different.

SOVIET AID OBJECTIVES

The CHAIRMAN. This is the first comforting thing I have heard about this program recently.

This puzzles me a bit. Could it not be that their way of doing business is successful in achieving their objective?

Mr. BALL. I think their motives are not, perhaps, as simple as I have stated them. I have tried to state them in a relatively few words without any analysis of what they were attempting.

But they are in this situation: First of all, they have a kind of advantage in that they represent a society which has made the great