Mr. PODESTA. The single question that bugs me most, coming from private business is, "why does it take so long?" We are looking at it every day. Every time a process comes up for review, we, in effect, say: "Is this trip necessary? Why do we do it? Why does it take so long?"

Mr. Blunt, the chief counsel, is reviewing all of our legal requirements which tend in any agency to remain unchanged for years and years. He has a team looking at each one of them.

We do have to tag a lot of bases, the civil rights requirements and others. One of the things that I would like to point out about EDA public works projects is that they take a long time between initial approval and the finished turnkey operation.

Incidentally, we are very proud of our construction management. I have tried to get anybody who is interested to come and look at it. But a public works project takes an average 22 months to complete so that even in a disaster area we are not going to solve anybody's problem in 2 or 3 weeks.

The process, unfortunately, in the nature of things and under the most favorable conditions takes longer than we would like it to.

Senator GRAVEL. Just as a comparison and also on the question of whether you employed the same methods in this disaster and the one we experienced in Alaska, SBA had difficulties in approving loans because of bureaucratic redtape. One of the ways they got by the problem was with personnel-bringing people from all over the country and setting up offices for a period of time, to essentially knock off the caseload that had been created by the disaster.

Have you employed this vehicle?

Mr. PODESTA. We have not employed that. Our approach is more technical than SBA. We would have to have an education process before people could do it.

This is not the kind of procedure where you can suddenly draft 15 lawyers and speed it up.

What we did was clear the way within our agency.

Senator GRAVEL. But isn't one of the problems to get the locals in question to have immediate sophistication in dealing with the Federal Government and putting forth the necessary applications?

Couldn't you readily have a team of specialists go in there and take the side of the city, take their position, and push the Federal Government from that direction, using all of their sophistication and expertise as if they were sitting on a council?

Mr. PODESTA. That is exactly what we did in Camille. We have this district organization that I mentioned in my statement, the local district composed of multicounty agencies. They have a facility.

We gave them additional money so they could hire additional men. We sent our own team down to help. That is exactly the way we do proceed in a case of this kind. That is why we were able to short-circuit or shorten the time as much as we have.

Senator GRAVEL. Then you will provide the committee with a chart both on the $5.5 million for public works and also the $9 million of model projects that have been requested, with the dates, so we will have a complete compendium?

Mr. PODESTA. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAVEL. There was mention of a $6 million plant for the gulf coast, and also $6 million in business loans.

Mr. PODESTA. Those are the same.

Senator GRAVEL. Thank you very much.

Mr. PODESTA. Thank you.

Senator GRAVEL. Our next witness is Mr. Frank Carlucci.

STATEMENT OF FRANK CARLUCCI, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

Mr. CARLUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to appear before you today on behalf of the Office of Economic Opportunity to speak briefly of the Agency's role in Hurricane Camille and our views about disaster

assistance.

We, in the Office of Economic Opportunity, are admittedly novices when it comes to planning for or responding to major disasters.

On a few occasions, such as the Alaskan quake of 1964, agency personnel have participated in recovery operations, but such involvement was spontaneous, limited, and never considered an agency function. Apparently, it was not perceived that the Office of Economic Opportunity had a role to play in an emergency or disaster

situation.

The infamous Camille has changed all this. Camille's magnitude and the havoc which she wrought sharply awakened us to our responsibilities.

It was clear from the first moment that Hurricane Camille struck n Mississippi many of the people struggling to survive and in dire need of assistance were poor-the very same poor whom the agency had been created to represent.

Before retracing the steps which our Agency took on behalf of its constituents in the areas devastated by Camille, I should like to note that there was ample legislative basis for its involvement.

The Economic Opportunity Act gave the Agency a broad mandate to reduce the incidence and impact of poverty in our generally affluent society. It declared that "poverty in the midst of plenty" was a paradox which should be eliminated by a policy of "opening to everyone the opportunity for education and training, the opportunity to work, and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity."

The stated purpose of the act was "to strengthen and supplement and coordinate efforts in furtherance of that policy."

THE PLIGHT OF THE POOR IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER HURRICANE CAMILLE

One of the first reports which the agency received from the area. hit by Camille in Mississippi described in graphic, cogent terms the plight of the poor, the urgency of their needs, and the thrust which the Agency's contribution might take.

Written by the Agency's technical assistance personnel on August 25, it said in part:

Total devastation and shock have affected all segments of the community. The poor, who comprise a major portion of the population in the disaster area, have been the hardest hit. The seriousness of the situation cannot be exaggerated.

Those who had little or nothing have not lost their homes, jobs, and in many cases, their families. Often alienated from the community at large, these persons are ill-prepared to cope with what is happening to them.

In many instances, due to their location and their lack of knowledge about available resources, the poor are the last to be reached by emergency services. The breakdown of standard mechanisms only adds to their need for information. Delivery of services to the poor was inadequate before the hurricane; it is now critical.

Families whose homes were already inadequate in terms of size, durability and sanitation have either lost their homes or are taking in relatives and neighbors.

The need for home repair for the poor is almost 100 percent. The rebuilding and repair of damaged housing must be given a high priority. Few of the poor will have been adequately covered by insurance and, in many cases, the damage done by the hurricane represents non-reimbursable loss.

In addition, the poor are more vulnerable to dishonest salesmen contracting to do repairs, which are never completed. Overcrowded conditions in both evacuation camps and private homes are severe and need to be alleviated through the provision of temporary housing. This should be installed immediately so that families who wish to can be returned to rebuild their lives.

In the matter of employment, people who had menial and domestic positions now have no jobs at all. Industry in the area has been closed down, thus depriving those under-employed persons of their meager paychecks. Welfare checks, lost in the hurricane, have not been recovered or reissued.

Because of the defeat, frustration, and disorientation of a vast number of poor families, there is an immediate need to develop opportunities whereby the poor can be meaningfully and fruitfully involved in emergency services. They should be able to participate in the long-range planning of their lives.

It is essential that there be a continuing and coordinated focus on the needs of the poor within the framework of the total disaster stricken community . . . It is a necessity if the rebuilding of the Gulf Coast is not going to be another example of poor people, already demoralized by the disaster and by their position in the community, being by-passed and excluded from the life of the community in which they live. Mechanisms must be developed immediately for their participation in the total planning process.

THE OEO CONTRIBUTION

RESOURCES IN THE AREA

With programs funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity operating in every county affected by the hurricane, the agency already was involved with the poor in Mississippi prior to Camille. The agency was represented in the area by four Community Action Agencies, operating in Harrison, Jackson, Forrest, Marion, Lamar, and Walthall Counties, and by three Limited Purpose Agencies, operating in Hancock, Pearl River, Perry, and Stone Counties.

Some, knocked out of commission, required time and outside assistance to become operational but, together, in terms of human resources, these agencies represented about 1,500 staff members organized and program-oriented to the needs of the poor.

LEGAL SERVICES

Our Office of Legal Services at Washington received telephone calls from the attorney general of Mississippi and the president of the State bar association within 48 hours after the hurricane hit the gulf coast, requesting immediate emergency relief for the poor in the form of free legal services.

In response, a $50,000 grant was quickly processed by the OEO and delivered by hand to the Governor of Mississippi for signature.

The grantee, the Mississippi State Bar Association, agreed to provide advice and counsel to those persons who came within the OEO eligibility standards and signed the standard civil rights forms. Some flexibility in the application of those standards was permitted to include those individuals who would not have met the requirements without the occurence of the disaster. Applicants for legal assistance were required to certify that their income was within the allowable limits or that they had "suffered such damage or loss of employment that they are unable to pay a reasonable attorney's fee."

Three full-time offices, each staffed with a permanent attorney, were opened in Gulfport, Biloxi, and Bay St. Louis, and a mobile law office was set up in a Dodge Camper truck to serve the other counties.

The availability of their services was advertised extensively in the news media and by distributing 15,000 letters signed by the president of the Mississippi Bar Association through the CAAs, the Red Cross, Salvation Army and some of government agencies.

These offices have given free legal service to more than 2,000 clients since the program began, and helped others, who were unregistered, with less formal assistance or counseling.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND THE COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCIES

When the Office of Economic Opportunity at Washington received word of the disaster, its Training and Technical Assistance division sent a task force to Mississippi to assess the socioeconomic effects of the disaster as they pertained to the poor. This task force was in the area 2 days later.

Its reports, submitted very shortly thereafter, contained valuable information and specific recommendations for programing in such areas as: manpower, child development, emergency day-care centers, elderly poor, the involvement of the poor in the CAA's in long-range planning, health, enterprise development, housing, transportation facilities, and emergency food.

Taking into account the varying capabilities of Community Action Agencies and Limited Purpose Agencies in the 10-county area, the technical assistance personnel brought together the directors of each of these agencies into a 10-county advisory committee called "TENCO".

Task force personnel also helped individual CAA's organize teams of outreach workers to work with the poor, organized a conference with other agencies' representatives present to discuss how to meet the housing needs of the poor, initiated a scholarship project with the Office of Education for university students who could no longer afford basic tuition costs due to the disaster, developed manpower training proposals, secured the temporary services of a medical team from two OEO-funded health centers, and obtained vehicles from the General Services Administration to transport people to and from facilities.

In order to provide ongoing support and coordination for the CAA's efforts in the Camille area, the OEO has maintained two technical assistants for a 1-year assignment at Gulfport.

EMERGENCY FOOD AND MEDICAL SERVICES PROGRAM

The Office of Economic Opportunity also supported emergency food and medical services programs with these same CAA's covering the 10 counties plus two additional counties, Simpson and Copiah, which were also in poor shape due to a pre-Camille tornado.

Grants totaling $325,561 were made to provide outreach services for the poor to facilitate their utilization of available Government assistance such as: the USDA food-stamp and commodity pro

grams.

With 58 outreach workers, recruited from the low-income group and trained through workshops, the local agencies disseminated information about Government programs to those in need, assisted them with application forms and helped them obtain documents required for certification in order to qualify for assistance.

Although the program admittedly was slow in getting started it has been successful. Outreach workers have discovered many cases of extreme need especially among the elderly.

THE VIRGINIA FLOODS

When Hurricane Camille flooded the waters of the James River in Virginia, the Office of Economic Opportunity quickly mobilized the resources of the Community Action Agencies in the State to provide coordinated and comprehensive assistance.

Neighboring agencies, which were relatively untouched by the disaster, stretched their programs across jurisdictional lines to give emergency assistance in areas where agencies could not respond effectively.

Staff personnel joined in evacuation efforts, took potable water to hard-hit towns, established clothing banks and participated in cleanup operations.

Additionally, the OEO granted $100,000 for Emergency Food and Medical Services to the 17 counties most severely damaged by the flood.

A representative of the mid-Atlantic Regional OEO office has reported that "the experience demonstrated a value and potential of community agencies which may not have been recognized previously."

DISCRIMINATION AND RESPONSIVENESS

Discrimination manifests itself in many different forms and from the perspective of the poor, both black and white, it may be a type of discrimination which many of us would not even recognize.

Most of the stories and rumors and complaints which emanated from Mississippi in the post-Camille days do not seem to have been about the common, everyday variety of discrimination but were about a discrimination which is mush less obvious, and in all likelihood, unintentional.

For the poor, discrimination largely was a matter of problems which they may have experienced in trying to get assistance. Often compounding their own difficulties, and in many cases illiterate, worried, fearful, or distraught, they could not comprehend instruc