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for the "overall direction of executive branch policies related to preventing conflicts of interest on the part of officers and employees of any executive agency" (5 U.S.C. App. § 402(a)), was apparently intended by Congress to be accomplished in several ways. OGE would act as a resource for executive branch ethics regulation, would promulgate uniform ethics rules, provide information and education to federal employees and officers, and provide 5/ employees and officers of the government with an advisory opinion service. Secondly, OGE would consult with, and coordinate, provide oversight, guidance and assistance to the individual executive branch agencies and their ethics officers in their enforcement of ethics rules at the agency level concerning 6/ specific conflict of interest and ethics questions. Finally, as an enforcement and oversight device, the OGE would intervene and "order" an agency or 7/ an employee to take certain action on a specific case.

The OGE would thus act as a resource and a consultant for employees and agency ethics officers, on request, on the one hand, but also have the specific statutory authority, on the other hand, to require and order specific corrective action by an agency or an individual on conflict of interest and ethics matters. See 5 U.S.C. App. § 402(b)(9). This latter authority was conferred by Congress in direct response to criticisms under the old system that the former Civil Service Commission lacked such enforcement authority

5/ See, for example, 5 U.S.C. App. § 402(b)(1),(2),(8),(14),(15).

6/ 5 U.S.C. App. § 402(b)(7),(12).

7/ 5 U.S.C. App. § 402(b)(9). "The responsibilities of the Director shall include ordering corrective action on the part of agencies and employees which the Director deems necessary."

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of interest by "ordering corrective action on the part of agencies and

employees which the Director deems necessary."

5 U.S.C. App. § 402(b)(9).

Jock 4. Mrskell

Jack H. Maskell
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
September 26, 1986

[blocks in formation]

SUBJECT :

Congressional Intent Concerning the Authority of the Office
of Government Ethics Over Individual Ethics and Conflicts
of Interest Matters

This memorandum is submitted in response to the Committee request as discussed with Rick Shapiro of the Committee staff for information on the intent of Congress regarding the role of the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) in individual conflict of interest or ethics matters of federal officers and employees, particularly in relation to OGE's enforcement and investigatory authority in matters which do not arise in the course of their financial disclosure monitoring.

The Office of Government Ethics was established in title IV of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, P.L. 95-521. The creation of the office was the legislative response to the most recent call for a centralized governmental ethics office, as part of recommendations in a report by the General Accounting Office, "Action Needed to Make the Executive Branch Financial Disclosure System Effective," February 28, 1977, FPCD77-23. [GAO Report of 1977). Earlier recommendations for a centralized ethics office with authority to coordinate ethics and conflict of interest

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to order agency action. GAO Report, supra at 24; H.R. Rpt. No. 95-800, supra at 29-30; S. Rpt. No. 95-170, supra at 30-31.

It would appear, therefore, that with respect to enforcement of the conflict of interest and ethics standards in individual cases that the OGE

has the specific statutory authority to take an active role in enforcement of such standards at the agency level on its own initiative by way of ordering agency or individual action. Budgetary constraints and agency priorities notwithstanding, the OGE does not appear to be required, nor does it appear to have been specifically intended by Congress, to play only a passive role of "resource" and "consultant" on ethics enforcement merely when requested by the agencies.

It is interesting to note that although Congress specifically granted OGE the authority to "order" agency action with respect to a particular conflict of interest matter, there is no use of the specific term "investigate" in the statutory language with regard to individual ethics cases, as there is with respect to disclosure (see 5 U.S.C. App. § 402(b) (3)), and other financial reporting matters. 5 U.S.C. App. § 402(b)(5)). Similarly, the use of the terms "monitoring" or "conducting a review" are used with respect to the Director's responsibilities concerning the financial disclosure and reporting requirements of agencies and employees (5 U.S.C. App. § 402(b)(3),(4), and (5)), but are not used when describing the responsibilities of the Director of OGE with respect to individual ethics cases. When Congress uses a term in one section or subsection of a law, but omits it from another section of that law the implication is that such omission is intentional and is done with a specific purpose in the disparate exclusion. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23

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(1983). The monitoring and investigation which OGE performs with regard to the disclosure and reporting requirements may arguably be intended by Congress, therefore, to be of a different nature and character than the oversight and enforcement activities which OGE is to perform with respect to individual conflict of interest cases.

It may seem somewhat paradoxical and inconsistent that OGE may order certain action by an agency or an individual on a specific ethics matter, but that it is not authorized to "investigate" that matter beforehand. The committees considering the Ethics in Government Act legislation indicated at various points, however, that an effective ethics agency must look into, intervene in, and even "investigate" agency or individual compliance with conflict of interest regulations and laws in the course of ordering agency or individual action (H.R. Rpt. No. 95-800, supra at 30; S. Rpt. No. 95-170, supra at 30), and it seems logically consistent and necessary for OGE to look at, examine, or conduct some kind of inquiry or study of a particular matter as a prelude to and as a concomitant part of its authority to order action by an agency or an individual, regardless of the absence of a specific statutory authority to "investigate" such matters. The executive agencies are specifically directed by statute to "furnish to the Director [of OGE] all information and records in its possession which the Director may determine to be necessary for the performance of his duties." 5 U.S.C. App. § 403. This provision would facilitate any inquiry, investigation, or study of a particular ethics or conflict of interest matter in an agency by OGE.

The legislative history of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was not particularly precise as to the extent of any independent inquiry by OGE of

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