that the fiscal considerations were equally as important as the military. The substance of that decision has been repeatedly ratified by the President, his advisers in the executive branch of the Government, and the Congress, all of whom reflected the will of the people of the United States.

At the outset of my remarks today, I quoted from my testimony of April 26. You will recall that my concluding remarks on April 26 dealt with the same dilemma I have just been discussing. On that occasion, I said:

this year's budget for the Military Establishment, with very little variation, has received the approval of the Executive Office of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Appropriations Committees of the Congress, and other responsible persons such as General Eisenhower. In other words, there has been substantial unanimity of opinion on a vital point-namely, the fact that the world in which we live requires military expenditures of approximately the amount which the President submitted to the Congress last January. Consider for a moment how unusual it is to find that all of the responsible authorities who have spoken to this subject have been in complete agreement on more than 95 percent of the military budget. The House Appropriations Committee has suggested some reductions; General Eisenhower has suggested the possibility of some increases. But even taking the maximum of these suggestionsboth on the minus and on the plus side-there has been no suggested variation which would affect the military budget in an amount greater than 4 percent. I call this fact to your attention * because I think that it constitutes the best argument that I could possibly present as to the fundamental soundness of the budget * *

One month ago the Republic of Korea was invaded. The action of the United Nations, supported by the United States, called for the use of troops, ships, and aircraft to repel this criminal aggression which threatened the peace of the world and the security of our own country. In the light of the actual fighting that is now in progress, we have reached the point where the military considerations clearly outweigh the fiscal considerations.

However, in our efforts to get the most efficient use of our military appropriations, we have not had to deal with the same sort of competing considerations as those I have just been discussing. For all of us were equally determined to get maximum preparedness out of every dollar appropriated-and this determination to get the maximum return on the defense dollar will continue to govern our actions. In enacting the National Security Act amendments of 1949, the Congress added language specifically addressed to this point, and required the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress, twice each year, "itemized statements showing the savings of public funds and the eliminations of unnecessary duplications and overlappings that have been accomplished pursuant to the provisions of this act." Carrying out this congressional mandate has been the steadfast policy of the Department of Defense, and a prime condition of our efforts in this regard has been the elimination of unnecessary overhead, with a simultaneous improvement in the combat potential of the Armed Forces. Indeed, the over-all combat potential of our Armed Forces was at a higher level on June 25-the day the Republic of Korea was invaded-than had been the case at any time since postwar demobilization was completed.

I realize that the foregoing sentence could be regarded as a fine, glittering generality; so, I would like to make it concrete. For that purpose, I will use specific illustrations.

In the case of the Navy, what the fleet is doing today would not have been possible 2 years ago. In March of 1948, just after the Communists staged a coup in Czechoslovakia, Secretary of Defense Forrestal was gravely concerned about the readiness of the active fleet. In a memorandum which he received on March 23, 1948, the following significant statement appears:

As of 22 March, there are 111 vessels of the active fleet immobilized and 66 reduced to limited operations (or a total of 177) by insufficient personnel. * * In addition, most of the operating active-fleet vessels are under peacetime allow

ance.

The situation was one of the factors which led Secretary Forrestal to request the supplemental appropriation of $3,481,000,000, which I have already discussed above. This situation was also one of the factors which has led the Department of Defense to advocate a greater fighting strength for each ship, even at the expense of reducing the total number of ships in the active fleet. The ships we need are ships that can float and fight. A ship that only floats is a liability instead of an asset. On June 25, when the Republic of Korea was invaded, every ship in the active fleet was capable of getting under way and moving into action. Off the shores of Korea, we are being provided with daily illustrations of the readiness of the ships in our active fleet. In the semiannual report which I recently submitted to the Congress, I discussed the general situation I have been describing above in these words:

Over-all, the readiness of the Navy has been improved and the active fleet is "ready to go." It is manned at 67 percent of wartime strength with trained personnel who seek to make a career of the Navy. This represents a substantial improvement over the situation 18 months ago when a larger active fleet in number of men and ships was manned at only 61 percent of wartime strength with many of the ships either immobilized or in a reduced operational status because of heavy turn-over of personnel and a serious imbalance in the skills and occupations represented.

In the case of the Air Force, there has been a substantial increase in our actual_combat potential. In chapter IV of the semiannual report which I submitted to Congress last February, I discussed this point in the following words:

*

*

it is worth noting that on January 1, 1948, the Finletter Commission recommended 70 groups manned by 401,000 men. On that date the report also noted that the Air Force stood at 337,000 men for 55 programed groups. The size of a "group" is subject to change. As President Truman has pointed out, "The number of groups is a somewhat misleading measure of airpower, since the character, size, number of aircraft, and other elements of the group are not fixed but constantly change as conditions require." An example of the type of change to which the President referred is the programed size of each B-36 heavy bombardment group, which stood at 18 planes per group less than a year ago, and which stands at 30 planes per group today. In this connection it should also be noted that the programed size of nine groups which stood at 30 B-29's or B-50's per group 2 years ago stand at 45 today. In addition, these groups include 20 B-29-type tankers which increase the effective range of each individual bomber.

In our Air Force of today and as planned for 1951, we have 416,000 men manning 48 groups, but, due to the organizational changes noted above, these 48 groups, according to Air Force estimates, are equivalent to 522 groups of the size envisaged in the previous concept of the 70-group program.

Mr. PLUMLEY. What have you said about interruptions?

Mr. MAHON. I said this, Mr. Plumley: That we will let the witnesses complete their statements before questions are asked, and then we will

pass the witness around to the various members without interruption. I think it will be best.

Mr. PLUMLEY. O. K. That will be a real job for us.

Secretary JOHNSON. I should like also to comment briefly on the situation with respect to the Army. In March of 1948, the Army's strength was 542,000. The Army's budgeted strength for the current fiscal year was 630,000, prior to the supplemental request which the President submitted to Congress yesterday. In addition to this increase in numbers, there has been a further increase arising out of the fact that proportionately more men are now in combat units, and proportionately less men are in noncombat categories. In my semiannual report, I pointed out that "this increase in combat effectiveness was made possible by savings in the use of undue numbers of personnel for administrative and overhead purposes." Between March 1948 and June 1950 the actual manpower strength of the Army's mobile striking force in the continental United States-the general reserve-has increased by 165 percent.

As this committee knows, all of the top officials of the Department of Defense-both civilians and military-have been seriously concerned lest even the increased strengths I have been describing should be inadequate to meet the needs of world conditions. In order to do everything possible to meet this situation, we set up a Defense Department management committee immediately after the enactment of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. To assist this committee in carrying out the recommendations of the Hoover Commission with respect to the Department of Defense, we employed the management engineering firm of Robert Heller & Associates. The first paragraph of the directive of the management committee reads as follows:

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the National Security Act of 1947 as amended, I have established a Defense Management Committee. The mission of the Committee is to bring about progressively better use of defense dollars through elimination of nonessential expenditures, and through improved management, in order to release funds for increasing combat effectiveness, and to provide opportunities to curtail over-all costs.

The expanded program which the President submitted to Congress yesterday makes it all the more necessary that we obtain the maximum return for every dollar that we are investing in our national defense. This gives added point to a matter I mentioned here on April 26, when I said: "Our mobilization in time of emergency depends for its success upon the soundness of the forces in being which constitute our mobilization base."

The forces in being which make up our Army, Navy, and Air Force constitute a sound base. To that base, we recommend that you now add a total active duty strength in the neighborhood of 600,000 menmaking a total of some 2,100,000 men.

Earlier this year this Committee considered requests for a program covering all activities of the Department of Defense, approximating 13.3 billion dollars. Yesterday the President submitted a supplemental estimate in the amount of 10.5 billion dollars. The recommended revised budget, in the aggregate amount of 23.8 billion dollars, would accomplish the purpose of financing the costs of the Korean campaign, as well as providing for the early expansion of the military forces to cope with the present international situation.

The supplemental estimate includes $3,063,000,000 for the Army, $2,649,000,000 for the Navy, $4,535,000,000 for the Air Force, and $240,000,000 for establishment-wide activities of the Defense Department. Mr. McNeil will break that down in detail.

About 59 percent of the supplemental request, or 6.2 billion dollars, has been included for guns, tanks, ships, aircraft, ammunition, and other major procurement items. (Of this total about $3,344,000,000 is for aircraft-$40,000,000 for the Army, $620,000,000 for the Navy, $2,684,000,000 for the Air Force and $185,000,000 is for shipbuilding.)

About 24 percent, or 2.5 billion dollars, would go for the operation and maintenance of the facilities and equipment for the regular operations of the Armed Forces, including the sharply increased demands for consumption-type matériel in the Korean campaign. (About onehalf of the 2.5 billion dollars would go for consumption-type matériel.)

About 13 percent, or 1.35 billion dollars, would go for the pay and allowances of military personnel, including their food, subsistence, and travel.

Of the balance, $174,000,000 is for military construction-$4,000,000 for the Army and $170,000,000 for the Air Force.

Exclusive of costs for guardsmen and Reserves on active duty, $33,000,000 has been provided for the National Guard, Officers' Reserve Corps, and the ROTC program of the Army.

$120,000,000 has been included for research and development, $70,000,000 for industrial mobilization, and $50,000,000 has been allocated for contingencies.

As the President stated in his message transmitting the supplemental request, certain program changes will undoubtedly be necessary in order properly to prosecute the campaign in Korea. For this reason authority is being requested to adjust by 10 percent any single appropriation by transfer from other appropriations. This would permit the necessary adjustments either in the Korean support or in the build-up phase contemplated by these estimates. I have instructed Assistant Secretary McNeil to keep this committee currently informed of all such actions which we find necessary.

I want to emphasize that this is not a call for full mobilization. It is a call to increase our strength in being, in order to enable us to support the United Nations' action in Korea and to build up our strength elsewhere to meet the threat to world peace.

The supplemental request before you rests on two principal factors: First, the requirements for land, naval, and air forces needed by General MacArthur successfully to prosecute the campaign in Korea; and second, the need to build up the strength of our forces over and above those committed to the Korean campaign.

The plans covering the build-up of our forces are based upon studies which began immediately after the President's announcement of the Soviet atomic explosion last September. You will recall that I discussed these studies when I testified here on April 26.

Because of the events in Korea the minimum desired forces which these studies showed to be required-normally a matter that would have been provided for in next year's budget-are being requested at this time.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in complete agreement and fully support the forces planned for the build-up in our strength, and are also in complete agreement as to the forces to be provided in support of the Korean campaign.

The action in Korea is a battle of supply and the distances involved are great. As a result, we must expect difficult problems and slow progress. The military establishment which we are asking you to expand, however, is a sounder mobilization base than the United States has ever had before.

Secretary JOHNSON. By reason of the groundwork laid by my predecessor and the efforts of officers and civilians in all the agencies of the Department of Defense-the spirit of teamwork within the Department has grown tremendously. We have today a closely knit team of land, naval, and air forces. The swift decisions during the past 4 weeks to coordinate the combat efforts of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the Far East are striknig examples of the benefits of unification in an emergency.

Our military establishment has been geared to provide a sound mobilization base and a swift striking force in case of a Third World War. In addition, we have had to be prepared to meet, to the extent that we could, the first shock of an act of calculated local aggression. The latter test has been met with unprecedented speed in Korea. We are now in the process of backing our shock troops with the necessary reinforcements. We are asking you to supply the men and equipment to replace those being used in the Far East and additional strengths to prepare for the possibility of future emergencies. I am sure that all of us will meet the challenge of the aggressor with the same undaunted spirit as that shown by our fighting men in Korea.

The witnesses who follow me will give the details of the program we recommend. It is a program designed to bring the action in Korea to a successful conclusion; it is also a program designed to promote world peace by deterring further aggression. It is the sort of program to which I referred on April 12 this year when I gave the Founder's Day speech at my alma mater, the University of Virginia. Speaking in Charlottesville that day, I said:

I have every confidence in our ultimate success. We shall face facts as they are and shall fit our defense plans and our manpower and munitions requirements to meet them. Our defense plans, however, are not rigid. They are not the laws of Medes and Persians. They are flexible and adaptable to changing conditions. They are under constant study and review. If we become convinced that our present means are insufficient to meet the exigencies of the day and the probable threats of tomorrow, we shall not be too humble to ask for more; and if we find them more than adequate we shall not be too proud to ask for less. We shall always seek for truth and we shall take fitting means to meet the truth.

Gentlemen, I shall be glad to attempt to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. MAHON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your statement. It has been very interesting and very illuminating.

Secretary JOHNSON. Mr. McNeil says the press wants to know if you are releasing this statement. That is up to you.

Mr. MAHON. It is not our custom to release statements that are made here until the hearings are printed.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)