have received their notice to keep on going even after the troop movements started, in order to preserve the secrecy. Mr. SIKES. But there has to be a build-up of men, materials, equipment, and fuel in order to keep an operation rolling. Surely our Intelligence can spot those things. Secretary JOHNSON. The Intelligence did spot them and reported Sunday morning raids for a year or so, and that a build-up had existed there for a period of a year or so. Mr. SIKES. Was there no report of such a build-up just prior to the actual attacks in Korea? Secretary JOHNSON. None of a special nature. Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Secretary, I have no intention of going into the details of the budget, but there are two items under the heading of the Office of the Secretary of Defense that come under your direct control and supervision which I think should be explained by you personally. CONTINGENCIES The first item of the budget estimate reads as follows: Contingencies. For emergencies and extraordinary expenses arising in the Department of Defense, to be expended on the approval or authority of the Secretary of Defense and such expenses may be accounted for solely on his certificate that the expenditures were necessary for confidential military purposes; $50,000,000. Can you give us, either on or off the record, some explanation of that? Secretary JOHNSON. I have an outline of the basis upon which Mr. McNeil put the figures in. The President and the Budget allowed them. I would rather not put them in the record. (Discussion off the record.) EMERGENCY FUND Mr. ENGEL. The second item is For transfer by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the Bureau of the Budget, to any appropriation for military functions under the Department of Defense available for research and development or industrial mobilization * From where would you transfer that? Would you transfer it from any place that you found it available in the Army? Mr. MONEIL. It is an appropriation request for $190,000,000; $120,000,000 was earmarked for research and development, and $70,000,000 for industrial mobilization, subject to being transferred to the appropriation for those purposes in any one or all of the three military departments as the industrial mobilization program and the research and development program needs develop during the current fiscal year. Mr. ENGEL. It is a direct appropriation for $190,000,000, which can be transferred to any of the three services for research and development or industrial mobilization, as the need requires. Mr. MCNEIL. Apportioned by the Secretary of Defense to any one, two, or all of the military departments. Mr. ENGEL. Such transfer being made by the Secretary of Defense? Mr. MCNEIL. That is correct. Secretary JOHNSON. I just received notice that I must attend a Cabinet meeting at 4 o'clock this afternoon. With your permission, I would appreciate it very much if I could be excused. Mr. MAHON. You may be excused, Mr. Secretary. Mr. MCNEIL. General Bradley is available and has a short prepared statement. STATEMENT OF GEN. OMAR BRADLEY General BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I do not know just how much ground has been covered by the questions, because I was not here to hear some of them. I have a short statement prepared which can be used as the basis of questions, or I can skip that and answer any additional questions that you have, whichever you prefer. Mr. MAHON. If your statement is not long, you may read it. General BRADLEY. It is now apparent that the aggression in Korea was well planned and well prepared, and that militant international communism inspired the northern invaders. It is also apparent that communism is willing to use arms to gain its ends. This is a fundamental change, and it has forced a change in our estimate of the military needs of the United States. We have come to the only conclusion possible to a free people. We have had enough of aggression, and we have finally drawn the line across its path. We may, in this way, in this way, succeed in forcing the respect which we now know conciliation, appeasement, and weakness can never bring. The cost will be heavy, but not as heavy as the war which we are now convinced would follow our failure to arm. We are planning to speed up our military requirements in an orderly fashion. Certainly, we will not go so slowly that we fail to achieve our aim. On the other hand, we are trying to follow the old adage, “Make haste slowly." We will build rapidly, firmly, and permanently, for as long as the need exists. PRESENT MILITARY REQUIREMENTS We are faced with three requirements. First, in order to win the war in Korea, we must get more men and equipment over there as soon as possible. This means that the pipeline of essential supplies and personnel must be started flowing, and it must be kept flowing for as long as may be necessary. Second, although the forces we have sent to meet the immediate threat in Korea still may be considered as part of our over-all defense, the effect is a reduction in that defense. We must therefore replace those units sent from other areas, particularly the United States, and thus restore our military capabilities. Third, it is now evident that we must have an even great flexibility of military power in the United States itself. Not only for our own protection, but also to give us a ready, highly mobile stand-by force which we can bring to bear at any threatened point in the minimum time. Mr. Johnson, the Secretary of Defense, has presented the over-all manpower and production needs of the Armed Forces. General Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army; General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force; and Admiral Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, will give you detailed breakdowns of the forces and matériel needed by the respective services. As a background to their presentations, I would like to analyze for your consideration the force requirements of the present situation. The first requirement is to build up the present forces in Korea to war strength and battle capability. For example, the infantry regiments fighting there have only two battalions. A third will be supplied as quickly as possible. Second, the divisions in the United States which have furnished battalions to Korea, and new units activated under this authorization, will require replacement units of their own. For example, the tank battalions taken out of the armored division must be replaced. Third, units overseas will be built up to war strength. Most of them have been running at 65 percent in general, even in the regiments and battalions that have been part of the reduced divisions. Fourth, the units in the United States which have been kept at approximately 60-percent strength will be built up to the 85-percent strength that is essential for a state of readiness. You all know that there are many military occupations within a division that need not be filled on zone-of-interior duty. While serving in the United States, for example, artillery sections do not need the full ammunition crews that they would need in battle. I have already pointed out that the pipeline from the United States to the units overseas and to those fighting in Korea will also have to be filled. I have used Army examples in this discussion. But the same applies to the Air Force and the Navy, all the way from the front lines back to the units operating with reduced complements inside our continental limits. Similarly, in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the equipment and matériel for these units have to be brought up to strength-battle strength, including sufficient additional equipment for battle losses, in the combat zone; war strength for those top priority units overseas; and approximately 85 percent for those units in the zone of the interior. I would like to emphasize that this program of requirements has not devised on short order. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been considering the build-up of our Armed Forces as part of a long-range plan which is still in effect and which is only accelerated and enlarged by the present action in Korea. Many of these developments reflected in our present requests have been studied as part of the fiscal year 1952 budget which we have been working on since March. The overall program is balanced and will become an effective part of the longer-term plans. SUFFICIENCY OF INITIAL SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR FUNDS I would also like to point out that the forces requested here are considered adequate for the emergency situation which exists today. But possible future developments in Korea and elsewhere in the world may require early revision upward of these initial requests. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been directed by the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense to keep these matters under continuous study. We will inform the Congress as quickly as possible of any necessary revision in the requirements we are presenting now. Our goal for the remainder of fiscal year 1951 is to continue the normal programs for fiscal year 1951 which have already been_requested, to meet the requirements of the Korean situation, and to improve the global posture of the Armed Forces. It is essential that in these times our readiness should be somewhat greater than that which existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. It will include minimum essential forces for maintaining the security of Japan. It is my belief that we can build up our forces to such an extent that they will be effective insurance against a further breach of the peace. And, if they are not successful as insurance, we shall at least be that much more ready to meet a new attack. Each service, I am sure, will present in detail the increases in men and material which the supplemental appropriations may provide. However, if there are any questions which you would like to ask me, I would be glad to try to answer them. Mr. MAHON. General Bradley, may we have full and complete assurance that the Joint Chiefs will make known to the Congress and to this committee in particular any additional requirements necessary for the security of the United States? General BRADLEY. I believe that we can give that. The machinery for that, of course, is the Secretary of Defense and the President. We are the military advisers to the Secretary of Defense and the President. I am not sure whether I have the authority to come to Congress or not, but certainly we would make our thoughts known to the Secretary of Defense and the President, and I feel certain they would present those to you. Mr. MAHON. And, if you are called before the committee, you will give us the benefit of your best judgment? General BRADLEY. Yes. DISCUSSIONS OFF THE RECORD Mr. PLUMLEY. I was not satisfied with the lack of opportunity which I had to question the Secretary of Defense with reference to one matter in particular. That is with regard to the extent to which the general public should be advised concerning the matters which he repeatedly said would be off the record concerning which the American people should be advised if the American people are going to be called upon to support the program which he offers. I think, General Bradley, that you ought to offer some explanation or some reason why these matters were discussed off the record. Most of the things were discussed off the record in which the American people are vitally concerned if they are going to support your effort. General BRADLEY. Mr. Plumley, we agree that just as many things as possible should be told the American people. However, there have been a lot of things discussed here this afternoon which would very materially help an enemy and might expose many of our people to loss of life, and even expose our efforts to failure. I believe that the American people, realizing that, would willingly delegate the judgment to their leaders here, surrounding this table, and depend upon you to make the proper decision based upon information which I think they would willingly forego because of the jeopardy to our country and our boys' lives. Mr. PLUMLEY. General Bradley, I accept your statement. STRENGTH OF MILITARY FORCES ON DATE OF INVASION OF KOREA Mr. TABER. The Secretary in his statement said: The over-all combat potential of the Armed Forces was at a higher level on June 25, the day the Republic of Korea was invaded, than has been the case at any time since the postwar demobilization was completed. Upstairs on the floor just a few minutes before these hearings started I understood Mr. Vinson, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, to say that that situation was at that time at its lowest ebb. I am wondering who is correct. General BRADLEY. Mr. Taber, I think a lot depends upon the interpretation and the way this thing was figured. I would prefer that you ask Secretary Johnson himself to interpret that sentence, than for me to try to tell you what he had in mind. Mr. TABER. That was the question that I intended to ask Secretary Johnson, because, frankly, it has disturbed me to have Mr. Vinson make one statement and the Secretary another. Mr. MCNEIL. May I suggest that I submit to Mr. Johnson the question which Mr. Taber has asked, and ask him to insert the answer in the record? (The following information was furnished later by the office of the Secretary of Defense :) The applicable excerpt from the statement by Chairman Vinson of the Armed Services Committee of the House Appropriations Committee on the floor of the House in support of the bill extending enlistments was to the effect that while our sea power is greater than that of Russia and her satellites and our strategic air power is unmatched anywhere in the world, we were seriously short at this critical moment in comparison with Russia and her satellites in ground troops, tactical air, aircraft carriers, etc. Earlier in this hearing I pointed out that the over-all combat potential of our armed forces was at a higher level on June 25-the day Korea was invadedthan had been the case at any time since postwar demobilization had been completed. The two statements above are not inconsistent since Chairman Vinson was apparently comparing our present forces with those of our potential enemies, but he did not touch upon the question of whether our forces were stronger at the beginning of the Korean invasion than at any time since demobilization was completed. (Off record discussion.) Mr. MAHON. Are there any further questions of General Bradley? If not we thank you gentlemen very much. You have been very kind and patient. |