he did discuss with them the question of recognition, and he indicated to them the points to which they must direct their attention in [52] the discussion of the subject. He also *listened to their views in response thereto; and when on the termination of the interview they informed him "that they should remain in London for the present, in the hope that the recognition of the Southern Confederacy would not be long delayed." he interposed no objections to such a course, and suggested no improbability of such a recognition. On the 5th of May the steamship Persia arrived at Liverpool with advices from New York to the 25th of April. Lord John Rus- Communication sell stated on Monday, the 6th of May, in a communication with the French to Lord Cowley,1 "that Her Majesty's Government received Government. no dispatches from Lord Lyons by the mail which has just arrived, [the Persia,] the communication between Washington and New York being interrupted." In the same dispatch Lord Cowley is informed "that Her Majesty's Government cannot hesitate to admit that such Confederacy is entitled to be considered as a belligerent, and as such invested with all the rights and prerogatives of a belligerent," and he is instructed to invite the French Government to a joint action, and a line of joint policy with the British Government, toward the United States. Lord Cowley, [53] under these instructions, had an interview on the 9th of May *with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Tribunal may infer from the published correspondence that it was assumed at this interview that the two Governments should act together, and that the letters of marque which might be issued by the insurgents should be Answer of the respected. Lord Cowley reported that "His Excellency French Government. said further that in looking for precedents it had been discovered that Great Britain, although treating at the commencement of the American war letters of marque as piracy, had, after a time, recognized the belligerent rights of the States in rebellion against her." The answer to these instructions was received at the Foreign Office on the 11th of May. The United States are firmly convinced that no correct or complete copy of the President's Proclamation could have been received there in advance of it. It is known that the official copy forwarded by Lord Lyons to his Government reached London on the 14th of May. The official copy sent by Mr. Seward to Mr. Dallas reached Southampton on the evening of the 9th of May, and London on the 10th. It is stated in the British notes on Mr. Fish's instruction of September 25, 1869, to Mr. Motley, that the Proclamation was communicated officially by Mr. Dallas [54] to Lord *John Russell on the 11th. There is no evidence of this fact in the archives of the Legation of the United When the PresiStates at London, or at the Department of State at Wash- dent's Proclamation ington. But even if the statement in the notes be correct, still the British Government received in the afternoon of the 11th of May, 1861, its first complete and official copy of the President's Proclamation, ten days after Lord John Russell had decided to award the rights of belligerency on the ocean to the insurgents, eight days after the subject had been referred to the Law Officers for their opinion, and five days after the decision of Her Majesty's Government upon that opinion had been announced in the House of Commons, as hereinafter set forth. was received by Great Britain. On the same day on which Lord John Russell wrote Lord Cowley (May 6th) he wrote to Lord Lyons, calling the United States "the 4 1 Vol. I, page 36; see also same volume, page 48. 3 British Blue Book on the Blockade, 1861, page 1. 2 Vol. I, page 49. northern portion of the late Union," and reiterating that Her Majesty's Government "cannot question the right of the Southern States to be recognized as a belligerent;" and in the House of Commons, on the same evening, he announced that the Attorney and Solicitor General, the Queen's Advocate, and the Government had come to the conclusion that the Southern Confederacy of America must be treated as a belligerent. On the same evening, Lord Palm*erston said in the [55] House of Commons,1 "No one can regret more than I do the intelligence which has been received within the last few days from America; but at the same time, any one must have been short-sighted and little capable of anticipating the probable course of human events, who had not for a long time foreseen events of a similar character to those we now deplore. From the commencement of this unfortunate quarrel between the two sections of the United States, it is evident that the causes of disunion were too deeply seated to make it possible that separation would not take place, and it was also obvious that passions were so roused on both sides as to make it highly improbable that such separation could take place without a contest." Effect of recogni A question was asked in the House of Commons on the 7th of May,2 the next evening, as to the extent of the belligerent rights tion of a state of at sea which would be acquired by the South, to which Lord Palmerston declined to make answer "until the Government should be in a condition, after consulting its legal advisers, to make some distinct communication on the subject." war. On the 9th of May, Sir George Lewis an*nounced that a pro- [56] clamation would be issued, stating "the general effect of the common and statute law on the matter;" and on the 10th, Lord Granville3 repeated the declaration in the House of Lords. In the discussion there it was assumed by all the speakers that the insurgent Government might lawfully issue letters of marque. * It is believed by the United States that it was well known to Her Majesty's Government during all this time, that Mr. Adams was about to arrive with instruction from the new administration, and that he came possessed of its most confidential views on these important questions. On the 2d May Mr. Dallas wrote Mr. Seward thus: "The solicitude felt by Lord John Russell as to the effect of certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by the President, induced him to request me to call at his private residence yesterday. * * I informed him that Mr. Adams had apprised me of his intention to be on his way hither in the steamship Niagara, which left Boston on the 1st of May, and that he would probably arrive in less than two weeks, by the 12th or 15th instant. His Lordship acquiesced in the expediency of disregarding mere rumor, and waiting the full knowledge to be brought by my successor." The United States, for reasons already given, have no doubt that, before that interview, Her Majesty's Government [57] had already decided upon their course of action. Mr. Adams did The Queen's Proc- actually arrive in London on the evening of the 13th of May. The Queen's Proclamation of neutrality was issued on the lamation. ** morning of that day. A careful examination of the published correspondence and speeches of Lord John Russell shows that Her Majesty's Government Her Majesty's Gov. Was at that time by no means certain that there was a war in the United States. On the 1st of May,5 he directs the Uncertainty of ernment. 'Hansard's Debates, 3d series, Vol. CLXII, pages 1622-23. 2 Vol. IV, page 484. 4 Vol. I, page 34. 3 Vol. IV, page 486. Admiralty as to the course to be pursued with reference to the insurgent cruisers in the war which, he thinks, may "have already begun." On the 2d of May1 he asks the Law Officers of the Crown what course the Government shall pursue. On the 1st of June, however, he is in doubt on the subject, and he writes to the Lords Commissioners of the . Admiralty, informing them of the rules to be observed by the British naval forces "in the contest which appears to be imminent between the United States and the so-styled Confederate States of North America." It would seem, therefore, that on the 1st of June, 1861, Her Majesty's Government regarded only as "imminent" the hostilities which Her Majesty's Proclamation of the 13th of the previous May alleged [58] had "unhappily *commenced between the United States of America and certain States styling themselves the Confederate States of America." In point of fact, Lord John Russell's dispatch of the 1st of June described with fidelity the condition of things so far as then known in London; for at that time the intelligence of the exhilarating effect of the Queen's Proclamation upon the insurgents, and its depressing effect upon the Government and loyal population of the United States, had not reached Europe. Effect of the Whatever Lord John Russell, and his colleagues in the Government, who decided to counsel Her Majesty to issue the Proclamation of May 13th, may have thought, the debates in Parlia- Queen's Proclamament removed any excuse for ignorance as to the effect of that instrument. tion. As early as the 29th of April, in the House of Commons, an opposi tion member had said that "there could be no doubt that if the war should be continued in that country [the United States] there would be thousands of privateers hovering about those coasts;" to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Gladstone) immediately replied: "All that relates to the dangers which may arise between British merchant-ships and American or other privateers * ** I shall pretermit, not [59] because I presume to say or think that they are *insignificant, but because I feel it my duty to address myself to those points which touch more directly and more practically [the Budget] the matter in hand."4 In a debate in the House of Lords, on the 10th of May, Lord Hardwicke 5 said that he "was anxious that the House should not enter too strong a protest against that which was a natural consequence of war, namely, that vessels should be fitted out by private individuals under letters of marque. That was, no doubt, privateering, but it did not by any means follow that privateering was piracy. He believed that if privateering-ships were put in the hands of proper officers, they were not engaged in piracy any more than men-of-war. He thought that a feeble State engaged in a war with a powerful one had a right to make use of its merchant-vessels for the purpose of carrying on the contest, and there was no violation of the law of nations in such a proceeding." In the more elaborate discussion which followed on the 16th of the same month in the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor said: "If, after the publishing of the present proclamation, any English subject were to enter into the service of either of the belligerents on the other side of the Atlantic, there could be no doubt that the *person so acting would be liable to be punished for a violation of [60] 1 Vol. IV, page 482. 3 Hansard's Debates, 3d series, Vol. 4 Hansard's Debates, 3d series, Vol. 2 Vol. I, page 335. 4 the laws of his own country, and would have no right to claim any interference on the part of his Government to shield him from any consequences which might arise. There could, however, at the same time, be no doubt that, although he would be guilty of a breach of the laws of his own country, he ought not to be regarded as a pirate for acting under a commission from a State admitted to be entitled to the exercise of belligerent rights, and carrying on what might be called a justum bellum. Anybody dealing with a man under those circumstances as a pirate, and putting him to death, would, he contended, be guilty of murder." The distinguished jurist, who then sat upon the woolsack, described in that speech one legal effect of this hastily issued Proclamation with uudoubted correctness. It relieved Englishmen or foreigners in England, and Englishmen on insurgent cruisers carrying on war against the United States, from the penalties of a high class of felonies. Lord Lyndhurst, one of the most eminent predecessors of Lord Campbell, in an opinion in the House of Lords in 1853, cited with respect by Sir George Cornwall Lewis, (himself one of Lord Palmerston's Cabinet,) said: “If a number of British subjects were to combine and conspire together to excite revolt among the inhabitants of a friendly [61] State,* * * and these persons, in pursuance of that conspiracy, were to issue manifestoes and proclamations for the purpose of carrying that object into effect; above all, if they were to subscribe money for the purpose of purchasing arms to give effect to that intended enterprise, I conceive, and I state with confidence, that such persons would be guilty of a misdemeanor, and liable to suffer punishment by the laws of this country, inasmuch as their conduct would tend to embroil the two countries together, to lead to remonstrances by the one with the other, and ultimately, it might be, to war. * Foreigners resid ing in this country, as long as they reside here under the protection of this country, are considered in the light of British subjects, or rather subjects of Her Majesty, and are punishable by the criminal law precisely in the same manner, to the same extent, and under the same conditions as natural-born subjects of Her Majesty. * * * The offense of endeavoring to excite revolt against a neighboring State is an offense against the law of nations. No writer on the law of nations states otherwise. But the law of nations, according to the decision of our greatest judges, is part of the law of England."i Mr. Bright's views. [62] *The United States will close this branch of the examination by citing the language of Mr. Bright in the House of Commons, on the 13th of March, 1865.2 "Going back nearly four years, we recollect what occurred when the news arrived of the first shot having been fired at Fort Sumter. That, I think, was about the 12th of April. Immediately after that time it was announced that a new minister was coming to this country. Mr. Dallas had intimated to the Government that, as he did not represent the new President, he would rather not undertake anything of importance; but that his successor was on his way, and would arrive on such a day. When a man leaves New York on a given day you can calculate to about twelve hours when he will be in London. Mr. Adams, I think, arrived in London about the 13th of May, and when he opened his newspaper next morning he found the Proclamation of Neutrality, acknowledging the belligerent rights of the South. I say that the proper course to 1 On Foreign Jurisdiction and the Extradition of Criminals; by the Right Hon. Sir George Cornwall Lewis, Bart., M. P., London, 1859, page 66. 2 Vol. V, pages 639, 640. [63] have taken would have been to wait till Mr. Adams arrived here, and to have discussed the matter with him in a friendly manner, explaining the ground upon which the English Government had felt themselves bound to issue that proclamation, and representing that it was not done in any manner as an unfriendly act toward the United States. Government. But no *precaution whatever was taken. It was done with unfriendly haste, and had this effect: that it gave comfort and courage to the conspiracy at Montgomery and at Richmond, and caused great grief and irritation among that portion of the people of America most strongly desirous of maintaining amicable and friendly relations between their country and England." proclamation not The United States have made this review of the course The sovereign pursued by Great Britain in recognizing the insurgents as right to issue such a belligerents, with no purpose of questioning the sovereign denied. right of that Power to determine for itself whether the facts at that time justified such a recognition. Although the United States strenuously deny that the facts as they then were known to Her Majesty's Government did justify that Government in conferring upon the rebellious citizens of the United States the privilege of belligerents, and still less justified it in counseling France to do the same thing, yet they recognize and insist that (in the language of the President to Congress on the 6th day of December, 1869) a "nation is its own judge when to accord the rights of belligerency, either to a people struggling to free themselves from a government they believe to be oppressive, or to independent nations at war with each other."1 [64] But while thus firmly insisting upon the sovereign rights of independent nationality, they also maintain "that the rightfulness of such an act depends upon the occasion and the circumstances, and it is an act, like the sovereign act of war, which the morality of the public law and practice requires should be deliberate, seasonable, and just, in reference to surrounding facts;" and "they regard the concession of belligerency by Great Britain as a part of this case only so far as it shows the beginning and animus of that course of conduct which resulted so disastrously to the United States."3 And issued with an Viewed in this light, the United States, with deep and unfeigned regret, have been forced to conclude, from all the circumstances, that Her Majesty's Government was actuated at unfriendly purpose. that time by a conscious unfriendly purpose toward the United States. In the language af a continental publicist, "L'Angleterre a été bien pressée de faire usage de son droit strict pour constater Mr. Rolin-Jacquesolennellement que l'Union Américaine était ébranlée, et myns on the Queen's donner aux insurgés, ce que le monde entier a considéré * * tout au moins comme un appui moral; [65] proclamation. l'acte a été posé la veille du jour où le nouvel ambassadeur américain, M. Adams, devait débarquer à Londres, et au moment où positivement les insurgés n'existaient pas comme puisance navale, où ils n'avaient de marine et de tribunaux de prise que sur le papier."4 This precipitate and unfriendly act of Great Britain did not go forth alone. On the 6th of May, 1861, five days before the re- Unfriendly conceipt of the authentic copy of the President's Proclama- duct of Great Brittion, Lord John Russell instructed Lord Cowley, the British rations of the Con. Ambassador at Paris, to ascertain whether the Imperial 1 Annual Message of the President to Congress, 1869. 2 Mr. Fish to Mr. Motley, September 25, 1869. Vol. VI, page 4. ́ 3 Mr. Fish to Mr. Motley, May 15, 1869. Vol. VI, page 1. ain as to the decla gress of Paris. De la neutralité de la Grande-Bretagne pendant la guerrre civile américaine d'aprés M. Montague Bernard, par G. Rolin-Jacquemyns, page 11. |