on the statute books by which Congress could direct that manpower into the mines and away from the high-paying jobs at Lockheed, on the coast, and elsewhere. As a consequence, the mining people had to operate not only on a very thin supply of manpower but inefficient manpower at that. Those inefficiencies were automatically reflected in their cost and eventually they were crowded against the ceilings which made premiums absolutely essential in order to maintain and even keep their noses above water.

I predict, Mr. Gibson, that you are going to face the same problem, so eventually you are going to have to come to a policy decision about what you are going to have to do with reference to subsidies and I hope that you can do it right away.

Mr. Chairman, I have done more speech making than asking questions and I will retire at this point.

Mr. REGAN. Mr. Crawford would like to ask a few questions, but just before he does, Mr. Gibson, I think the committee would be interested in knowing how this tungsten program-and that is the only one as I understand it that has been actually completed-was handled when it came to your office from Dr. Boyd at the DMA office, recommending a floor of $63 and a ceiling of $65 per unit on tungsten. What was the process then and how long did it take to clear through your office? Will you tell the committee that so we can get an idea of how this program will work on other metals?

Mr. GIBSON. I have to think a moment. There are a number of things that pass my desk.

Mr. REGAN. Would you like to refer that to one of your assistants? Mr. GIBSON. I would rather, if I may submit a statement on that, Mr. Chairman.

Generally, without too close adherence to actual timing, when that program came in, I talked it over with the people in my office who are experienced in that and with the Vital Materials Coordinating Committee and they advised that in their opinion it should be done. Then we had the job of working out a price situation with the ESA, which took a little longer than the rest of it did.

Mr. REGAN. Were there changes made in the program formulated and sent up to you by the DMA?

Mr. GIBSON. I think not. I don't think that we changed their

program.

Mr. REGAN. If you could let the committee know just what the procedure was and how much time it took to work that out, I think they would be interested in having it.

Mr. GIBSON. May I submit that as a statement?

Mr. REGAN. At your convenience; yes.

Mr. ENGLE. Mr. Chairman, we are going to have to postpone these hearings anyway, because we can't finish them. I have always been reluctant about this business of submitting statements because we never seem to get a chance to look at them. They appear in the record, and all that.

Perhaps the witness could have that information for us when we renew these hearings later and have it presented.

Mr. GIBSON. That is all right.

Mr. REGAN. That might work best, because today is our last day scheduled for these hearings and we have not much more than scratched the surface on the objective, so sometime the latter part of

the month you may by that time have additional information on your procedure and so forth that will be of interest to the committee, so instead of your preparing anything, at the latter part of this month we might ask you to come back again.

Mr. GIBSON. Either me or my successor. We are never sure, you know, Mr. Chairman.

DISCUSSION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXECUTING THE DEFENSE MINERALS PROGRAM

Mr. CRAWFORD. You have listed your connections with what I consider some of the finest and most successful business firms that operate in the United States. The fact that you told us so much in less than four pages is a clear demonstration of your ability to say what you want to say in a few words, and I appreciate this statement very much.

I want to see if I understand what you have said here.

The President, in delegating responsibilities under the defense program, gave the DPA the power to redelegate certain powers to DMA, is that correct?

Mr. GIBSON. I am not sure of this, but I think he actually redelegated himself in the same order. They were redelegated under the authority of the order.

Mr. CRAWFORD. The power was redelegated to DMA to do what you have said here?

Mr. GIBSON. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. CRAWFORD. As the program has moved along, there was created the DPA formulating and coordinating activity, manned by the personnel which you outlined here on page 2 of your statement.

There has also been created the Defense Production Administration as related to the interagency foreign supplies that have been required?

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Is there any way that any phase of this activity or any of these agencies to which power has been redelegated-I say, is there any way any of those agencies can act independent of these other agencies, formulate a policy, reach a decision and act or must all of the wheels turn together, eventually, before the consummation of a proposal?

Let me make it clearer:

Is there any way that DMA can formulate a policy, make contracts and put them into operation without these other departments first passing on the proposition?

Mr. GIBSON. On specific cases, yes, but the program, itself, first has to be approved.

Mr. CRAWFORD. All right. They can't act independent of the other agencies because

Let's see if I am correct. In other words, does not the activity as it relates to interagency foreign supplies and requirements dovetail into that which we do for the domestic production? It all ties together, does it not?

Mr. GIBSON. It must, yes.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I don't know any way it can avoid being tied together.

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, it must.

Mr. CRAWFORD. And if it ties together, as you say it does, then that brings us to what you say on page 4 where you comment:

Expansion of supplies of most mineral materials cannot be accomplished in a few weeks or months.

I believe there is the whole story. In Government we set up these meshed operations and there is no possible way anybody can act quickly. To me it is utterly impossible for it to occur quickly. Time must enter into it. That is the reason it takes from 1 to 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 years to reach your peak on a defense program, because you are dealing with Government red tape, if you want to say it that way, but it is Government controls.

As you have just pointed out to us, perhaps a little facetiously in your expression and maybe more serious than appeared, as these things move along, men are picked up and brought into the machine and eliminated and disgorged from time to time like a sausage machine disgorges meat.

I will say to my friend from California that I do not expect any quick results from the program at this time. I don't know any way you can possibly get quick results. I don't know any way that Dr. Boyd can conclude a proposition because it ties back into all of these national and international involvements in which we find ourselves. Is that correct or not?

Mr. GIBSON. I would rather not criticize the set-up, Mr. Crawford. Mr. CRAWFORD. I am not going to press you for an answer.

Mr. GIBSON. I would like to say this: That that "few weeks and months" that I used in my statement there referred more to the financing and engineering of a mine than to the time it takes the program to be put through. I am not offering that in any way except explanation of those words.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I understand that, but the locating, manning, and financing and machining and putting into production of mines is involved in this program, is it not?

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is the program, if you want to get production. Mr. GIBSON. That is right.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Just like in your business, whether American Sugar Refining or the National Biscuit, you want to increase production by the expansion of capital facilities. You first have to locate a place where you are going to put the plant.

Mr. GIBSON. That is right.

Mr. CRAWFORD. You have to locate the mine.

Then you have to work with local authorities and everybody else that enters into the picture with respect to taxation, extension of the trucking facilities or extension of the railroad switch, city taxation and everything that you can imagine, and you have to find the capital to pay for that plan; then you have to find the men to put it in operation; you have to buy the new machinery. It takes times to do those things.

Mr. ENGLE. Will the gentleman yield for just an observation?
That isn't the way to do it.

82354-52-15

Mr. CRAWFORD. That may not be the way to do it, but that is the way it is done. I don't care whether private industry or Government. The point is, in private industry men will assume responsibility or else lose their jobs. In Government, nobody has to assuine responsibility. They always pass it on to the next fellow.

Mr. ENGLE. What the gentleman is saying is that the Government is inherently incapable

Mr. CRAWFORD. Of running business.

Mr. ENGLE. And what I say is what they should have done and what it shouldn't have taken 7 months to do it, is just what they are saying to the tungsten people. They are not building plants, looking at mines, or making contracts. They say when you can lay tungsten on the line that meets these specifications we guarantee a floor of $63 and we will do it for 5 years, and these tungsten miners take a look at their claims and say, "Boy, here we go. We can make it on that." and the Government is not obligated for a dime. It doesn't have to look at a mine, or issue a contract. All it has to do is pay for this stuff when the miner brings it in, whether a trainload or a wheelbarrowful. The way to make these programs go is to give them a program which is self-executing and turn them loose.

American industry will do it, and do it so fast that it will make your head swim.

Mr. CRAWFORD. It isn't self-executing when you depend on the Government for financing. If American industry wants to do it on its own, take its profits and losses, keep away from the Government, well and good. These miners are here asking for Government assistance. That is what you are up against. If they are going to ask for Government assistance you are going to have to pay for Government inefficiency until that assistance comes.

Mr. REGAN. I don't know whether the gentleman from Michigan is entirely right, that the miner is asking for assistance. We are asking for minerals. We have to get them. It seems to me, going back to your National Biscuit Co. program, if the National Biscuit Co. has an increased demand for fig newtons in the South and the board of directors decide to put a factory there, they work out their program and then it is carried on. That is what we are trying to work out now, a program to get more fig newtons.

Mr. CRAWFORD. But as Mr. Gibson pointed out here, you have to wait for these wheels to turn around, as set up by your national and international relations and negotiations policies.

Mr. DONOVAN. Will the gentleman yield for a couple of questions? Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes; I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DONOVAN. I notice, Mr. Gibson, in the course of your statement or in answer to one of the questions you mentioned the word "money." Before we go into money and price and before I ask any questions on those, I would like to know whether or not you care to state whether stalling in the face of this emergency characterizes this whole set-up? Mr. GIBSON. Whether what, sir?

Mr. DONOVAN. Stalling.

Mr. GIBSON. I don't think so.

Mr. DONOVAN. I notice that down at the bottom of the first page of your mimeographed statement, you say:

We in the DPA in the case of metals and minerals look to the Administrator of Defense Minerals Administration to recommend those general programs or specific contracts that he believes essential for the expansion of supplies

and so forth.

That, of course, involves price, doesn't it?

Mr. GIBSON. Yes.

Mr. DONOVAN. You don't say anything about the Office of Price Stabilization in that connection in your statement?

Mr. GIBSON. That is right.

Mr. DONOVAN. There is such a thing, of course, though, isn't there? Mr. GIBSON. Yes.

Mr. DONOVAN. And that is in the set-up.

I notice that in this description of the defense, of your whole set-up, on the second page Defense Administration, National Production Authority, General Services Administration, Emergency Procurement Services, Defense Minerals Administration, that you don't say anything about the Office of Price Stabilization. Is that correct? Mr. GIBSON. They are, however—

Mr. DONOVAN. I am driving at a point and I am trying to see if I can find the bottleneck of this whole set-up, notwithstanding speculation as to where the bottleneck has been all the way along the line. I notice at the bottom of the second page you say, you describe this Coordinating Committee that you have.

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DONOVAN. And you refer to the Defense Vital Materials Coordinating Committee and the Defense Production Administration and you talk about the Vital Materials Coordinating Committee and their line-up with the various military boards and then further on you say that the expansion of supply and limitation of essential use is tied in with or rather the activities to expand the supply of metals and minerals are primarily the function of the DMA and all the way through your statement you never mention the Office of Price Stabili

zation.

Mr. GIBSON. I think, sir, that they are a member as I stated of the Vital Materials Coordinating Committee. Mr. Griffith Johnson is a member of that committee and sits in those deliberations which are the initial deliberations on the program.

Mr. DONOVAN. You don't say so in your statement.

Mr. GIBSON. I am sorry, I think I do, on page 2 are the members of the Vital Materials Coordinating Committee, and the Economic Stabilization Agency, G. Griffith Johnson, is listed in the second column, the second down.

Mr. DONOVAN. Where do they come into this picture?

Mr. GIBSON. Where?

Mr. DONOVAN. Yes.

Mr. GIBSON. Well, that is a very early stage.

Mr. DONOVAN. We had Dr. Boyd here yesterday for the Defense Minerals Administration and then we had somebody from the Office of Price Stabilization. It struck me, as it might have struck various members of this committee, that the Office of Price Administration has the last say on all of these things. Is that true or isn't it?

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir. Well, generally speaking, we have to clear the price situation.

Mr. DONOVAN. So that if the Office of Price Administration doesn't go along with you or makes no decision, you are blocked; is that correct?