Mr. ENGLE. But it does a great deal of fabricating; doesn't it? Mr. ENGLE. I am not speaking of any particular man. I am trying to find out if you have any man in your shop who knows anything about the mining business, who has had any practical experience in it at all. The answer is "Yes" or "No"? Mr. EWING. I would say yes. Mr. ENGLE. Well, who is it now? Let's get his name. Mr. EWING. I would say that Mr. Lenz has had considerable experience in the mining business. Mr. ENGLE. He is the man who isn't here? Mr. EWING. That is correct. I can't speak for Mr. Jacoby. Possibly Mr. Jacoby can speak better for himself. Mr. ENGLE. Your organization recommended and argued for a $45 price on tungsten; didn't it? Mr. EWING. $55, sir. Mr. ENGLE. You say that you never asked for a price of $45 at all? Mr. ENGLE. That was my information. Why did you do that? Mr. ENGLE. Why did you do that? Mr. EWING. I think possibly on the tungsten phase of it I could turn that over to Mr. Lipkowitz for an answer a little better than I can give it myself. Mr. ENGLE. Yes; I would be very interested. EXPERIENCE RECORD OF LIPKOWITZ, OPS ECONOMIST Mr. Lipkowitz, your face is familiar to me for some reason. Mr. ENGLE. Are you the same Mr. Lipkowitz who served in WPB? Mr. ENGLE. And had something to do with the infamous L-208 that ruined the gold mines in this country? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. The adjective is yours, sir. Mr. ENGLE. Is it a fair statement, Mr. Lipkowitz, that you are the same Mr. Lipkowitz who had something to do with L-208? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Yes, sir. Mr. ENGLE. I am unhappy to see you again. Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I am happy to see you, sir. Mr. ENGLE. I have looked over your list of qualifications Mr. DONOVAN. May I ask, is Mr. Lipkowitz going to be a witness here? Mr. ENGLE. He is a witness now, and he is on the list and he is here at the table with Mr. Ewing. I observe that all of the experience that you have had which is listed here is in Government; is that right? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. That is right, except for the last job which was with an international agency. It is an intergovernmental agency, not the United States Government, but a part of the UN. Mr. ENGLE. Are you still on the payroll of this last agency, the International Bank? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I am on a leave of absence for 3 months to the OPS in what I considered a patriotic duty, sir. Mr. ENGLE. I am just asking if you are getting paid. Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Not by the International Bank. In fact, I am paying money into their pension plan. Mr. ENGLE. Your qualifications on page 10 of this statement go back to 1941 when you were an economist with the United States Tariff Commission. What did you do prior to 1941? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I was an economist with the National Labor Relations Board from 1937 to 1941. Mr. ENGLE. And what did you do prior to 1937? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I was a statistical clerk with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, and with the United States Employees' Compensation Commission before that. Prior to that, I was working at the time I went through college, in the evening. Mr. ENGLE. In other words, you have been a Government employee from the time you graduated from college? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Two years after, sir. Mr. ENGLE. What did you do in that 2 years? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I took further work as a graduate student and was working before that. I have been working since 1928. Mr. ENGLE. But you have had no experience whatever in private business? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Oh, yes; I have. Mr. ENGLE. Was that during the time that you were a college student? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Yes, sir. Mr. ENGLE. I hope that it stayed with you, but what was it? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I worked as a cashier in a restaurant for a period of about 4 years, and I met the payroll for the organization. Mr. ENGLE. You met it; yourself, personally? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I made it out every week. Mr. ENGLE. Oh, I see. Mr. LIPKOWITZ. And distributed the checks. Mr. ENGLE. And then as soon as you got out of college and got through your training you went to work for the Government and you have worked continuously for the Government since, as you have indicated, is that right? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Except for a 9-month period when I was on leave of absence at Harvard University and doing some further graduate work in economics. Mr. ENGLE. Are you an economist? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I think I am. Mr. ENGLE. What do you know about the mining business that made you a qualified applicant for the job you now hold where Mr. Ewing was glad to have your services? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I have put it all down on a page here. If you want to ask me in detail, I will be glad to answer it. I served for 212 years on the Quota Committee which administered the price plan for the copper, lead, and zinc during the last war in which I solved the cost figures for 95 percent of the copper, lead, zinc mines in the United States and I think I know as much about them as anybody else in this room. Mr. ENGLE. What did you do in the State Department? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I worked on metals and minerals with the head of the section involved in handling the foreign mineral problems of the United States, including negotiating contracts along with the Board of Economic Welfare and RFC. In the case of tin, I sat on international committees involved in tin, copper, coal. I have visited the mines in the United States and abroad. I have been underground in them. I don't profess to be able to run them. I am not a mining engineer. I am not making that claim, but I don't think you have to be a mining engineer to know anything about the economics of mining. Mr. ENGLE. It would help a lot if you would run a mine for a while, wouldn't it? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. It would help, but it would also help if some engineers learned some economics, sometimes. Mr. ENGLE. Were you the chief of the metals and minerals section in the State Department, is that right? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. That is right, in the International Resources Division of the Department of State. Mr. ENGLE. In other words, you were the top man for metals and minerals. Mr. LIPKOWITZ. That is right. Mr. ENGLE. And what are they doing now, in your absence? Mr. ENGLE. Were you one of those in the State Department who advocated the building of foreign mines to the exclusion of the domestic industry? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. You are putting words in my mouth, sir. Mr. ENGLE. You can answer the question; you can say "Yes" or "No." Mr. LIPKOWITZ. No. Mr. ENGLE. All right. You are not, but you did work in that program, is that right? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Let's put it this way. The Division which has to do with negotiations of tariff agreements between the United States and other countries was not the division in which I was working. I was at times consulted by people working on that matter. Is that specific, or would you care to ask further questions on that? TUNGSTEN CEILING PRICE OF $65 PER UNIT HELD UNNECESSARY BY OPS ECONOMIST Mr. ENGLE. I think that will do, but let's get back to tungsten. Why did you advocate a $45 figure? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I can explain that quite readily, sir. I spent a good bit of time working up what available information there was as to the production of tungsten in the United States, the prices for it, took those prices, deflated them by the changes in the wholesale price index, which is precisely the technique done and used by the Bureau of Mines in various of its studies, came to a conclusion that on the basis of information published by the United States Bureau of Mines and Geological Survey in the hearings before the subcommittee on the Committee of Public Lands of the United States Senate in May, 1947-I believe you are familiar with the document-that over 60 percent of the nonreserves of the United States, as then estimated, could be mined very profitably at a price of $55 and I, therefore, advocated that the ceiling price be set no higher than $55. I also advocated that if it was found that more production needed to be had and could be had, that a subsidy be advocated on top of $55. I have always made the contention that the two things would necessarily have to be hinged if the demands for tungsten were as large as were indicated to us by the Defense Minerals Administration. Mr. ENGLE. Did you consult anybody in the industry before you arrived at a conclusion as to what the price ought to be? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I haven't completed stating all the facts I have. If you wish to have them, I can give you more of them. Mr. ENGLE. Can you answer this question: Did you consult anybody in the industry? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. No, I did not. Mr. ENGLE. You mean you sat down with a bunch of books and a slide rule and figured out what it was going to be? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I figured out what I thought it ought to be. I figured out what I thought it was. Mr. ENGLE. Without talking to a single producer in the industry? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. And I talked to some of them since and I don't think that the answer is greatly changed, sir. Mr. DONOVAN. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. ENGLE. Yes. Mr. DONOVAN. On these loan applications that you were on, acting as advisor to the officer of the International Bank, did you go to Poland and Yugoslavia? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Yes, sir. Mr. DONOVAN. Did you make any recommendations as to the mines in Poland and Yugoslavia? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Yes, sir. Mr. DONOVAN. What were they? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I would be glad to say that. Mr. DONOVAN. When did you go on those expeditions? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Poland in 1947, Yugoslavia in 1949. Mr. DONOVAN. Did you make some recommendations as to loans for Polish mines in 1947? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Yes, under certain conditions which I am afraid to reveal here because they are confidential matters. Mr. DONOVAN. Secret? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Not secret Mr. DONOVAN. Behind the iron curtain? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I didn't make the recommendations to Poland. I made the recommendations to officers of the bank, who are right here in Washington. Mr. DONOVAN. Did you make recommendation that the International Bank pump money into Polish mines? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Yes. Mr. DONOVAN. Did you make recommendations that United States, through the International Bank, pump money into the Yugoslav mines? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. The United States? I never recommended that the United States pump money into anything. Mr. DONOVAN. Did you make a recommendation that the International Bank pump money into the Polish mines? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Yes, and may I qualify Mr. DONOVAN. And into Yugoslavia mines? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Yes. May I qualify the remark, sir? Mr. DONOVAN. I have my answer, and that is all I want to know. Mr. BOSONE. I would like to ask Mr. Lipkowitz about Poland. Mr. LIPKOWITZ. In 1947, when we visited Poland, Europe was suf fering from a coal shortage. If you gentlemen remember, the ECA and Marshall plan were under discussion at the time. If you will look at the document, you will find that in the year 1947 Western Europe imported 37 million tons of coal from the United States in addition to coal from Poland. The coal from the United States was costing $20 a ton. Coal could be bought from the Poles at $8 a ton, plus something on the order of $5 freight to Western Europe which would have meant $13 a ton. Had steps been taken to increase the coal production, the saving under the Marshall plan would have been $7 a ton. In the year 1948, 20 million tons of coal were brought from the United States for Poland. Had any part of that been available for every million tons, there would have been a $7 million reduction in the amount of Marshall aid. That is what I mean-by qualification. I am perfectly proud of that recommendation. I was not in a position to forsee that the international situation would deteriorate so greatly. I also would like to point out one thing, that when I visited Yugoslavia, in 1949, it was after Marshal Tito had broken with Stalin and as I understand it, the United States Government has since that time lent $55 million to Yugoslavia, whereas, the bank has not as yet made any loans because it is not completely satisfied as to certain factors. Now, if I am considered unpatriotic for making certain recommendations, I want to point out that other people in the United States have advocated and made loans which we in the bank have not yet thought advisable to make. Mr. ENGLE. Mr. Lipkowitz, I ask you to justify your argument in favor of the $45 tungsten. You didn't say anything about it. Mr. LIPKOWITZ. I said $55. Mr. ENGLE. Then I take it Mr. Ewing is not correct and my information is in error that you advocated $45 for tungsten? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. Now wait. Now wait. I think I know where your $45 figure came from. It came from a discussion we had with three gentlemen from DMA. In the course of that discussion, we said that we thought that since three of the very large producers could undoubtedly produce at a profit, a substantial profit at $45 a unit, it might be just as well to set the ceiling at $45 and start the subsidy from that level. We have since and earlier, always thought in terms ultimately of $55, and if you want to ask me why we talked about $45 and go to $55, then I should suggest that other agencies have talked in terms of other figures and then come down to $65. Mr. ENGLE. And the $65 figure which is coming out is coming out with great reluctance as far as you are concerned? Mr. LIPKOWITZ. As far as I am personally concerned, I think it is a fraud on the American people. I think that you can get all the production that you will get at $65 at $55. I think that that extra $10 will not actually result in any additional production on top of that worth speaking of. If you want more production on top of that, you should have $55 and a subsidy program, tailored to the |