Soviet Strategic Arms Policy Before SALT

In this book, Christoph Bluth provides an original analysis of one of the most perplexing periods of Soviet foreign and military policy--the build up of strategic forces from the death of Stalin to the SALT I agreement. Bluth outlines Soviet strategic arms policy in this period, identifies the principal interest groups involved and studies a number of critical decisions taken in relation to strategic bombers, strategic nuclear forces based at sea, ballistic missile defence and the military uses of space. Strategic arms policy in the Khrushchev period exhibited a number of apparent paradoxes which the author explains. As well as examining external threat assessment and wider foreign policy, he pays particular attention to the role of domestic factors such as Khrushchev's endeavours to shift resources away from the military industries to agriculture and the production of consumer goods. Bluth is therefore able to demonstrate how domestic priorities and internal power struggles account for some of the seeming inconsistencies of military and foreign policy. Given current reassessments of the nature of the Soviet military threat and the revival of interest in the Khrushchev period, this book is most topical. Using source material hitherto unavailable, Bluth combines, for the first time, an analysis of foreign, military and domestic policy. Soviet strategic arms policy before SALT will, therefore, be of interest to a wide range of students and specialists of Soviet affairs, strategic studies and international relations.