changed from that point to Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, certified copy also enclosed.

Mr. Hershberger was a member of the Mobile Survey group and this change of headquarters was effected for administrative reasons to coordinate the control at a central point of the preparation of conservation surveys. Because of the employee's being subject to moves from place to place, it was deemed unwise to have Mr. Hershberger move to the headquarters then designated. Dual headquarters were then established at Catonsville, Maryland for the purpose of precluding the payment of per diem to the employee while serving at that location.

The uncertainty of requirements with respect to mapping and the fact that the employee was subject to moves anywhere in the United States depending upon the needs of the Service, the length of time that he would be stationed in Catonsville, Maryland was not readily determinable. However, circumstances caused the continuous assignment of Mr. Hershberger at Catonsville for the period from July 1, 1940 to on or about September 1, 1942, at which time it was deemed in the best interest of the Service to transfer him from Catonsville, Maryland to Woodbury, New Jersey.

The authorization for the movement of household effects was issued, certified copy of which is attached to the voucher in question, covering the movement from Mr. Hershberger's official headquarters Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, to Woodbury, New Jersey. Mr. Hershberger, not having ever been required to move his household effects to Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, naturally moved his household effects from Catonsville, Maryland directly to Woodbury Heights, New Jersey, a suburb of Woodbury, New Jersey under this authorization.

This employee is married and has dependents and under the authority contained in Executive Order #9122 [8588] he is entitled to the benefits of 5000 pounds of household effects at government expense whenever the movement of his household effects is required for the convenience of the government. The Jist attached to the unnumbered contract listing household effects indicates that there are no articles restricted by Executive Order #8588.

Section II [3] of Executive Order 9122 [amended section 11 of Executive Order No. 8588 so that it] reads as follows:

"SECTION II. [11] Shipment from Points Other Than Official Station.--The expenses of transportation authorized hereunder shall be allowable whether the shipment originates from the employee's last official station or from some previous place of residence, or partially from both: Provided, That the cost to the Government shall not exceed the cost of shipment in one lot by the most economical route from the last official station to the new. Shipments involving a cost greater than that authorized by this section may be made on a Government bill of lading, but the employee shall be required to reimburse the Government for the excess cost immediately upon completion of the shipment. No expenses shall be allowable for the transportation of property acquired enroute from the last official station to the new. For the purposes of these regulations, the term 'official station' shall be construed to include any point from which the employee commutes daily to his official post of duty."

In defining the official headquarters of Mr. Hershberger, it appears for practical purposes that Catonsville, Maryland was his official headquarters, although daily commutation between Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, and Catonsville, Maryland would be impracticable; however, under the authorization setting up his dual headquarters, Mr. Hershberger was allowed travel expenses between the two points whenever officially required. The distance between Catonsville, Maryland and Upper Darby, Pennsylvania is approximately 111 miles. The mileage between Catonsville, Maryland, and Woodbury, New Jersey is approximately 106 miles, and to Woodbury, New Jersey via Upper Darby, Pennsylvania 130 miles.

The circumstances surrounding this case were not created by any consideration for the convenience of the employee, but on the contrary, it has been somewhat of a hardship due to the uncertainties carried with his type of employment. In view of the fact that the circumstances were created by official necessity, approval is respectfully requested for payment in full of the enclosed voucher at government expense.

The involved shipment having been made, if not from the employee's headquarters, at least from a "previous place of residence" (refor to the Executive order quoted, in part, in your letter [E. O.

April 6, 1942]), the formal Government contract with the carrier and the use of a Government bill of lading were not illegal; the carrier is entitled to be paid its proper charges. (However, for the preferable procedure in such a case, see 20 Comp. Gen. 568; 21 Comp. Gen. 283.) While the lump-sum bid of $78 (offered at the time when the only weight available was an estimate of 5,400 pounds) was accepted, the bid stated, further, that the carrier holds a motor carrier's certificate issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission and that it operates under the Household Goods Carriers' Bureau tariff. The tariff rate being available, the carrier may not lawfully collect under its contract with the Government at a rate higher than the freight chargeable under the tariff. 22 Comp. Gen. 22; id. 503. The tariff cited provides an applicable rate of $1.56 per cwt., resulting in a charge of $75.74, which amount, only, should be paid to the carrier-unless some packing or other accessorial services be shown to warrant payment of the higher figure claimed. There is involved, also, the question whether any portion of the amount paid is chargeable to the employee.

If the facts be that there was a transfer of station on July 1, 1940, from Baltimore to Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, and a further transfer to Woodbury, New Jersey, effective September 1, 1942, with no shipment of effects until after the second transfer, the shipment of the effects direct from the first post to the third would not be reimbursable in full, since the shipment did not begin within the limit of six months (or any extension thereof up to two years) from the date of the first transfer the ultimate time limitation prescribed by Executive Order No. 8588, as amended. 20 Comp. Gen. 568; B-28260, October 24, 1942.

The papers submitted with your letter include a copy of a letter dated July 1, 1940, signed by the Regional Conservator, advising Mr. Hershberger that his headquarters were changed, effective that day, from Baltimore to Upper Darby, with authority granted for payment of the cost of shipping his effects, and, also, a copy of a similar letter dated August 10, 1942, approved by the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, which advised Mr. Hershberger as follows:

In connection with the change of your headquarters from Upper Darby, Pennsylvania to Woodbury, New Jersey effective on or about September 1, 1942, transfer of your household effects is authorized under existing regulations, the amount and type of goods to be transported to conform with Executive Order No. 8588, dated November 7, 1940.

This transfer is for the benefit of the Government and not for the personal convenience of the employee.

If, as would be the presumption, those letters written at the time of the "transfers" reflect the true state of affairs, it is not understood upon what evidence it is now asserted that it was deemed unwise for the employee to move to Upper Darby, and that dual headquarters

were then established at Catonsville (a suburb of Baltimore) for the purpose of precluding the payment of per diem while there.

Unless some actual duty was called for at Catonsville, the employee's home at that place could not become his official headquarters or one of dual headquarters-the general rule being, as held in a comparable matter considered in 22 Comp. Gen. 231, that it is "improper in any case to designate the home of a consultant at which no work is performed as his official station *." Whether Mr. Hershberger's headquarters once established at Baltimore actually were transferred to Upper Darby in 1940 depends not alone upon his purported transfer order, but also upon the actual facts, such as the nature of his work, the designation of his position, and at what specific locations he was expected to, and did, render service. 10 Comp. Gen. 469; 15 id. 624; 16 id. 47; 18 id. 423; 19 id. 347; 22 id. 231. In other words, the location of an employee's official headquarters is determined from the principal place of his work rather than from a mere designation in an order.

What were the actual facts of Mr. Hershberger's place of assigned duties does not appear from your letter and, accordingly, the only determination justifiable on the present record is that, as his orders stated, he was transferred to Upper Darby in July, 1940. From this it would follow that, since his further transfer was more than two years later, he is chargeable with the expense incurred for the shipment of his effects over and above the constructive cost from Upper Darby to the new post at Woodbury, New Jersey (20 Comp. Gen. 479), which, according to Independent Movers' and Warehousemen's tariff 1-B, MF, ICC #7, appears to be $33.12. Unless some evidence can be adduced to establish that the employee's headquarters did in fact remain at Baltimore, or that his headquarters, or one of dual headquarters, actually and properly were fixed at Baltimore or Catonsville until the final move to New Jersey (compare the case of Dr. W. O. Gordon, of the Bureau of Agricultural Chemistry and Engineering, B-29647, October 27, 1942), there should be reported the collection from the employee of the difference between $33.12 and the amount properly to be paid on the voucher in accordance with the foregoing. The voucher is returned herewith.

When your letter was received in this office, it was not entirely clear whether it was your purpose to forward the claim to the General Accounting Office for direct settlement under the provisions of section 236, Revised Statutes, as amended, or to request of the Comptroller General, under authority of the act of December 29, 1941, 55 Stat 875, 876, 31 U. S. C. 82c, an advance decision as to the legality of proposed payment. In that connection, there is for noting that letter was addressed to the General Accounting Office-not

Comptroller General of the United States. When a certifying officer desires an advance decision, the voucher need not be certified and, to facilitate handling here, the submission should be addressed to the "Comptroller General of the United States, Washington, D. C."

(B-30931)

PAY-AVIATION DUTY-ARMY AVIATION MEDICAL EXAMINERS

An Army aviation medical examiner required to participate regularly and fre quently in aerial flights is not a flying officer of the Army within the definition of a flying officer contained in section 1 of the act of October 4, 1940, as enlarged by the phrase "commissioned officers or warrant officers while undergoing flying training” appearing in the Military Appropriation Act, 1943, and, therefore, is not entitled to the 50 percent additional flying pay for flying officers authorized by section 18 of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942. Assistant Comptroller General Elliott to Lt. Col. A. A. Dunn, U. S. Army, February 1, 1943:

There was considered your letter of November 2, 1942, as follows: Pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 25, Finance Circulars B-1, March 14, 1942, there is submitted herewith for a decision in advance of payment, the Pay and Allowance Account and allied papers of Captain Walton T. Champion, 0-381073 (ORC), submitted to the undersigned disbursing officer for payment, whereon is claimed increased allowances for the period July 1, 1942, to October 31, 1942, inclusive.

The undersigned is in doubt as to whether or not Section 4, Executive Order 9195, July 7, 1942, as published in Bulletin No. 35, War Department, July 16, 1942, contemplates additional payment to aviation medical examiners of 50% of their base pay when by proper authority required to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights. On the other hand, the Military Appropriation Act of 1943, as published in Bulletin No. 30, War Department, July 10, 1942, Section, "Finance Department, Finance Service, Army" excludes aviation medical examiners from the classification of a flying officer. Further provision being made therein prohibiting payment in excess of $720 per annum to nonflying officers.

Payment on the voucher submitted herewith has not and will not be made by the undersigned, pending return of same, properly approved for payment. Section 18 of the act of June 16, 1942, 56 Stat. 368, Public Law No. 607, 77th Congress, provides that:

Officers, warrant officers, nurses, and enlisted men of any of the services mentioned in the title of this Act and members of the Reserve forces of such services, and the National Guard shall receive an increase of 50 per centum of their pay when by orders of competent authority they are required to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, and when in consequence of such orders they do participate in regular and frequent flights as defined by such Executive orders as have heretofore been, or may hereafter be, promulgated by the President:

Section 4 of Executive Order No. 9195, dated July 7, 1942, in directing the execution of the above section 18 of the act of June 16, 1942, provides in pertinent part that:

Each officer of the Medical Corps of the Army or of the Navy who is duly assigned to duty with any aeronautic headquarters or unit of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard, or assigned to duty at a station where there is an aeronautic unit, and who has qualified as a flight surgeon or as an aviation medical examiner may be required to participate regularly and frequently in

aerial flights by the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces or by such officer or officers as he may designate for the Army

The proposed payment is based upon the proposition that inasmuch. as Captain Champion has been ordered to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights during the period of July 1, 1942, to June 30, 1943, he is entitled, in his capacity as aviation medical examiner, to the 50 per centum increase as flying pay provided in section 18 of the act of June 16, 1942, by reason of the provision in Executive Order No. 9195 that officers qualified as flight surgeons or as aviation medical examiners may be required to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights.

However, payments authorized under the cited law are necessarily subject to the limitations contained in the act of July 2, 1942, 56 Stat. 612, Public Law No. 649, 77th Congress, making appropriation for the military establishment for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1943, which, under the heading "Finance Service, Army," provides as follows:

* That the appropriations contained in this act shall not be available for increased pay for making aerial flights by nonflying officers at a rate in excess of $720 per annum, which shall be the legal maximum rate as to such officers

Section 1 of the act of October 4, 1940, 54 Stat. 963, defines a flying officer as follows:

That a flying officer is defined as one who has received an aeronautical rating as a pilot of service types of aircraft or one who has received an aeronautical rating as an aircraft observer or as any other member of a combat crew under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe.

The act of July 2, 1942, supra, provides further:

That, during the continuance of the present war and for six months after the termination thereof, a flying officer as defined under existing law shall include flight surgeons, and commissioned officers or warrant officers while undergoing flying training

While flight surgeons are specifically included within the above definition of flying officers, no provision is made for the inclusion of medical officers qualified as aviation medical examiners. Whether officers qualified as aviation medical examiners and ordered to participate in aerial flights are to be considered flying officers within the statutory meaning, must rest upon a determination as to whether they may be considered commissioned officers undergoing flying training. Inasmuch as the quoted provision of the act of July 2, 1942, does not qualify the phrase "undergoing flying training" it is proper to refer briefly to the legislative history of the enactment in order to ascertain the particular result which was sought to be achieved by the language used. 19 Comp. Gen. 227; 20 id. 81; and cases there cited. In the hearings on the proposed bill, H. R. 7280, before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, on page 71, appears the following discussion of the proposed provision: