(b) it is necessary to prevent the commission of a felony, or

(c) a felony has been committed by an individual whom such private person knows to be the individual who committed the act, or

(d) a breach or threatened breach of the peace has been committed or is about to be committed in the presence of such private person.

There are at least two additional circumstances under which a peace officer can arrest and where a private person cannot, namely where the offense is a misdemeanor or some other public offense not amounting to a felony or a breach of the peace, and where, although the offense has not been threatened or committed in the presence of the arresting person, such person has a reasonable basis for the belief that the individual arrested is guilty of a crime which has, in fact, been committed. To this effect see Section 13468 of the Iowa Code, State v. Thomas, 186 N. W. 695 and Comstock v. Maryland Casualty Company, 179 N. W. 962. Thus it is evident that in this particular case the guards in question, because deputized as peace officers, were given broader arresting powers than they would have had as private individuals, and that these broader powers enable them to more effectively carry out their duties, especially where they may be required to pursue others or make arrests beyond the limits of the plant.

It would also appear that by enabling these guards thus to arrest on the basis of a reasonable belief that a particular person is guilty of an offense, the possibility that suits for false arrest might be commenced and prosecuted against the contractor was very substantially minimized. Inasmuch as the expense of defending such suits and any liability of the contractor resulting therefrom would in all probability constitute reimbursable costs of the contractor under his contract with the Government, the minimization of such suits constitutes a consideration which may be properly taken into account by the Commanding Officer in determining whether or not the expense of obtaining surety bonds for these guards should be incurred as a step in having them deputized under the Iowa statutes.

It, therefore, appears to the War Department that the decision of the Commanding Officer to have these guards deputized and to undergo the expense of obtaining surety bonds for that specific purpose was based on very substantial grounds. It conferred on the guards wider and more effective arresting powers; it enabled all of them to be armed; and it thereby increased their ability to effectively perform their duties. The action of the Commanding Officer was also taken for the further purpose of reducing possible claims against the Government by the prime contractor for reimbursement for expenses of litigation and payment of judgments arising out of claimed false arrests.

On the basis of the record already before your office and the additional reasons herein advanced, it is thought that the Commanding Officer was correct in his determination that the deputizing of the plant guards and the subsequent approval of the payment of the premium on their bonds were "reasonably necessary for the protection of the Government or the contractor" and that the bond premiums were a reasonable cost under the contract. Your favorable reconsideration of this case is requested.

In the decision of September 7, 1942, published in 22 Comp. Gen. 183, there was considered, at the request of the disbursing officer involved, Lieutenant Colonel F. Pearson, Finance Department, United States Army, the question as to whether, on the facts there presented, the disbursing officer was authorized to effect payment on Bureau Voucher No. R-135, stated in favor of the United States Rubber Company, New York, New York, for reimbursement of $770, representing the amount expended by the company for premiums on bonds required incident to the deputizing of guards employed by the company in connection with work under its cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract No. W-ORD-528, dated July 16, 1941, providing for the construction and subsequent operation of an ordnance plant at Des Moines, Iowa. Under Article VII-G, Title VII, of the contract, the contractor agreed, inter alia, that it would:

1. Procure and thereafter maintain such bonds and insurance in such forms

and in such amounts and for such periods of time as the Contracting Officer may approve or require in writing.

2. Procure all necessary permits and licenses; obey and abide by all applicable laws, regulations and ordinances and other rules of the United States of America, of the state, territory, or subdivision thereof wherein the work is done, or of any other duly constituted public authority.

With respect to "Reimbursement For Contractor's Expenditures" Article V-A, Title V, of the contract, provided in pertinent part as follows:

1. The Contractor shall be reimbursed in the manner hereinafter described for such of its actual expenditures in the performance of the work under this contract, as may be approved or ratified by the Contracting Officer, and as are included in the following items:

h. Premiums on such bonds and insurance policies as the Contracting Officer or the Secretary of War may approve or require as reasonably necessary for the protection of the Government or the Contractor.

It was held in the decision of September 7, 1942, supra, that since the evidence submitted in support of Bureau Voucher No. R-135 failed to establish that had the plant guards not been deputized they would have had any less authority than ordinary police officers to protect property, make arrests, et cetera, within the confines of the plant premises, it was not established that deputizing the guards was reasonably necessary for the protection of the interests of either the Government or the contractor, or otherwise was necessary for the proper performance of the contract work. Hence, the disbursing officer was informed that the amount claimed on the voucher, $770, was not satisfactorily shown to constitute a proper reimbursement charge against the Government under the contract, and the voucher together with its supporting papers was returned to the disbursing officer with the advice that payment thereon was not authorized.

However, as shown by the facts now set forth in your letter of January 9, 1943, quoted above, it appears to have been found by you, upon further investigation of the matter,

that:

1. In view of the nature of their employment the guards were required to perform certain duties outside of the confines of the plant

area.

2. The said guards could more effectively perform their duties if armed, rather than if unarmed, and since, apparently, under the law of the State of Iowa, permits to carry firearms could not have been issued to private citizens-particularly to those who were not residents of the county in which the plant is situated-for the purpose of making arrests or otherwise enforcing the law, it was necessary to deputize the guards and to furnish the surety bonds required for that

purpose.

3. Since, under the law of the State of Iowa, deputized peace offi cers as distinguished from private guards-have authority to make arrests for misdemeanors, et cetera, and since, although an offense

not been committed or even threatened in their presence they may make an arrest where they have a reasonable basis to believe that the person arrested is guilty of a crime which has in fact been committed, the possibility of suits for false arrests against the contractor were minimized greatly by deputizing the guards.

From these facts it now appears that, as stated in your letter, the deputizing of the particular guards in question actually did enable them to perform their duties more effectively, which, in turn, served a useful purpose in fulfilling the contract requirements. In other words, while the evidence of record at the time of the decision of September 7, 1942, supra, was rendered, justified the conclusion reached therein, upon reconsideration of the matter in the light of the facts set forth in your letter, it now appears that the amount of $770 expended by the contractor for the purpose of bonding the guards, properly may be regarded as having been "reasonably necessary for the protection of the Government or the Contractor" within the meaning of the above-quoted reimbursement provisions of the

contract.

Accordingly, you are advised that, on the basis of the facts now appearing, no objection will be raised by this office to otherwise proper payment on Bureau Voucher No. R-135.

(B-31908)

OVERTIME COMPENSATION UNDER THE ACT OF DECEMBER 22, 1942— ENTRY ON DUTY AFTER THE BEGINNING, OR SEPARATION FROM SERVICE BEFORE THE END, OF THE REGULARLY ESTABLISHED WORKWEEK

In accordance with Executive Order No. 9289 providing for computation on an annual basis of the overtime compensation of per annum employees payable under the act of December 22, 1942, for employment in excess of 40 hours per week, the compensation of an employee who does not work in excess of 40 hours during the regularly established workweek because of entry on duty after the beginning, or separation from service before the end, of the workweek should be computed on the basis of allowing 1/360 of the gross compensation, including both basic and overtime compensation, for each day in a pay status during the pay period.

Comptroller General Warren to O. A. Zimmerli, Department of Agriculture, January 27, 1943:

Reference is made to your letter of January 20, 1943 (file A, DISBURSEMENT, Vouchers, Pay Rolls) as follows:

Enclosed herewith are three pay rolls in amounts of $145.78, $29.92, and $27.90, which were submitted to me for signature as Authorized Certifying Officer. These pay rolls cover overtime for December under Act approved December 22, 1942 (Public Law 821).

I am uncertain as to legality of paying these rolls in the amounts stated for the reason that in some instances the amounts include overtime for administrative work weeks in which the working period of the employee did not exceed 40 hours. The Acts of June 28, and October 21, 1940 (54 Stat. 676 and 1205) and

June 3, 1941 (55 Stat. 241) which are extended as to time limit and scope by the December 22 Act, all provide for overtime payment at the rate of (or not less than) 11⁄2 times the regular rate "for employment in excess of 40 hours in any administrative work week." Section 2 of Executive Order 9289 dated December 26, 1942 also provides for overtime compensation for employment in excess of 40 hours during an officially established regular work week and for work ordered or approved in addition to such regular work week. While Section 3 of the Executive Order permits calculation of overtime compensation on an annual basis and payment in equal amounts on the regular pay days, it is not clear that this section contemplates overtime payment for a week in which an employee does not work in excess of 40 hours because of (a) leave without pay, (b) entry on duty after the beginning of the work week, or (c) separation before the end of the work week.

Before certifying the enclosed pay rolls I should appreciate your decision whether they may be paid in the amounts stated or should be recomputed so as to exclude overtime for any work week in which the individual was in pay status not more than 40 hours. Should it be decided that overtime is not to be paid for weeks in which the time worked does not exceed 40 hours further decision is desired as to whether the 10% increase is to be paid for the periods excluded from overtime computation.

In decision of January 21, 1943, B-31789, 22 Comp. Gen. 683, to the Secretary of Labor, a copy of which is enclosed, it was concluded that a per annum employee who is absent from duty without pay during an administrative workweek is entitled to 1/360 of the gross compensation, including both basic and overtime compensation, for each day in a pay status during the pay roll period, and that there should be withheld only 1/360 of the gross compensation, including both basic and overtime compensation, for each day on which the employee is in a nonpay status (leave without pay). The same rule for prorating the gross compensation on an annual basis is applicable in computing compensation for a fractional pay period of an employee who enters or leaves the service during an administrative workweek.

It is understood the pay rolls forwarded with your letter have been computed in accordance with the above-stated rule. If so, and if they be otherwise correct, they may be certified for payment. The vouchers are returned herewith.

(B-31518)

REPRINTS OF PRIVATELY PUBLISHED WRITINGS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICERS-APPROPRIATION AVAILABILITY

The procurement for official use by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts of copies of a special printing, with certain additions, of a pamphlet prepared in its original form by a Referee in Bankruptcy, and published by a private publisher, on the procedure, etc., for handling estates of bankrupts constitutes a matter of printing and binding if the pamphlet was prepared by the Referee in his official capacity and the Government has a proprietary interest therein, and, under such circumstances, the cost must be charged to a printing and binding appropriation regardless of whether the printing be done by the Government Printing Office pursuant to the act of March 11, 1919, or whether procured elsewhere under proper authorization. Copies of a special printing, with certain additions, of a pamphlet prepared in its original form by a Referee in Bankruptcy on the procedure, etc., for handling estates of bankrupts may be procured from the private publisher

for official use by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the cost thereof may be charged to an appropriation available for the purchase of law books, rather than to a printing and binding appropriation, if the pamphlet was prepared and published by the Referee on his private responsibility, with permission of the agency under which serving at the time of its publication, and the Government has no proprietary interest therein.

Comptroller General Warren to the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, January 29, 1943:

I have your letter of January 1, 1943, as follows:

This office contemplates the issuance of instructions to conciliation commissioners and supervising conciliation commissioners regarding the handling of funds of the bankruptcy estates administered by them, their indemnity or expense funds, the submission of semiannual reports and other matters relating to their work, and we think it advisable to include as a recommendation to these officers a pamphlet prepared by Honorable Fred H. Kruse, Referee in Bankruptcy, of Toledo, Ohio, outlining the jurisdiction and procedure in cases pending before conciliation commissioners together with complete forms. The pamphlet has recently been published by the Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company as a supplement to Volume 9 of Remington on Bankruptcy.

This treatise at present is available only to subscribers having complete sets of Remington on Bankruptcy and when purchased with the set of supplements. The publisher has no facilities for marketing this in the form of a specially printed pamphlet to get it into the hands of the conciliation commissioners, few of whom have sufficient work to justify their purchasing the entire set. The publisher has agreed to reprint the pamphlets at a reasonable cost and insert certain additional material which we believe should be added if it can be sold in bulk for distribution by this office.

The procedure provided by the Bankruptcy Act for administering such cases is difficult and complex. The conciliation commissioners who are required to be appointed from the county from which a case may arise are, for the most part, not too well informed as to procedure in Federal courts and particularly in bankruptcy matters. As a result there is urgent need that some supervision and instruction be given by the Administrative Office in assisting the courts and the conciliation commissioners in the administration of cases filed under Section 75 of the National Bankruptcy Act. In this connection I enclose herewith a copy of Hearings on H. R. 7356 before the Special Subcommittee on Bankruptcy and Reorganization of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives which contains information and a number of letters from United States judges outlining the difficulties of administering the Act under the present system with respect to conciliation commissioners. H. R. 7356 would have permitted conciliation commissioners to serve more than one county and also would have permitted Referees in Bankruptcy to serve as conciliation commissioners with jurisdiction in more than one county. This legislation passed the House of Representatives but died in the Senate with the adjournment of the 77th Congress. Consequently, the judges are compelled to continue with a large number of conciliation commissioners each having a limited volume of business and a consequent low income.

We are not certain as to the availability of appropriated funds for the purchase of these pamphlets. If they were procurable by the individual commissioners, their cost would be payable from the emoluments of their office or in the case of the commissioners operating under local rules permitting the establishment of indemnity funds the cost would be payable from those funds. Also, since the Supreme Court of the United States and the district courts appointing the officers are, under the statute, the sole agencies authorized to promulgate rules and orders governing the practice and proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, this office can only recommend the procedures set forth in the pamphlet as being consistent with and supplementary to the General Orders and Forms in Bankruptcy established by the Supreme Court.

On the other hand, the issuance of the pamphlet appears to be a proper function of the Administrative Office in aiding the courts in the administration of the