porting for active military service they, as constituent members of the Army Nurse Corps, are subject to all regulations governing Army nurses, and are entitled to the same pay and allowances and subject to the same disciplinary control as other nurses in the corps. It would seem, therefore, that while in active status under competent orders, Reserve nurses in the Army Nurse Corps are to all intents and purposes "nurses of the Regular Army" within the meaning of the act of March 8, 1928, supra, and hence entitled to the benefits of the act of December 17, 1919. Cf. Thorsen v. United States, 79 C. Cls. 282. This conclusion is fortified by other considerations which properly may be noted in this connection as tending to illustrate the policy of Congress on the general subject. The act of December 17, 1919, confined the benefits of the 6 months' death gratuity to "officers and enlisted men on the active list of the Regular Army or on the retired list when on active duty," and section 2 of that act expressly excluded from its benefits "officers and enlisted men of any forces or troops of the Army of the United States other than those of the Regular Army.” The act of March 8, 1928, extended the benefits of the act of December 17, 1919, "to nurses of the Regular Army to the same extent and under the same conditions as to officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army." An act of April 3, 1939, 53 Stat. 557, extended to officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men of the Army of the United States other than officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army, if called or ordered into the active military service of the Federal Government for extended military service in excess of 30 days, certain enumerated benefits theretofore available only to personnel of the Regular Army. In view of the express phraseology of that act, this office was constrained to hold that the benefits conferred thereby were personal to the soldier and did not include the 6 months' death gratuity to dependents. By an act of December 10, 1941, 55 Stat. 796, and for the declared purpose of meeting such decisions of this office, the act of April 3, 1939, was amended to provide, in totidem verbis, that the benefits conferred by that act should include "for their dependents the benefits of the act of December 17, 1919 (41 Stat. 367), as amended." In a decision of this office of July 15, 1942, (B-25768), 22 Comp. Gen. 37, it was pointed out that although the act in question, even as amended, for reasons stated in said decision left room for doubt as to its applicability under the facts upon which said decision was rendered, in view of the history of the legislation, and in the light of existing conditions, this office felt justified in the conclusion that the Congress intended to assure to the personnel of the emergency forces when on active duty, and to their dependents, every benefit available to the personnel of the Regular Army during time of war or peace; that to deny to any member of the emergency forces or to those they leave behind any benefits available to others would lead to injustices, inequality, and absurd consequences; and that a purpose of such grievous discrimination was not to be imputed to the Congress. To apply another rule here would be to deny to a Reserve nurse in the Army Nurse Corps, while serving on active duty pursuant to competent authority and to her statutory or designated dependent relatives in case of her death, valuable benefits apparently now available to all other personnel of the military establishment otherwise falling within the category of the several death gratuity statutes. It reasonably follows that when the death of a Reserve nurse, while she is on active duty, results from wounds or disease not the result of her own misconduct, as here, payment of the 6 months' death gratuity to a dependent designated relative properly within the statute, is authorized if otherwise correct, provided, by analogy with later gratuity statutes, she has been "called or ordered into the active military service of the Federal Government for extended military service in excess of thirty days." You are accordingly advised that payment of the voucher, returned herewith, is authorized, if otherwise correct. (B-27549) COMPENSATION-OVERTIME-TRAVEL TIME Official travel time during which an employee is in a pay status is properly for regarding as "employment" within the meaning of the act of June 3, 1941, providing overtime compensation for certain per annum employees in the field service for "employment" in excess of 40 hours in any administrative workweek and, therefore, payment of overtime compensation to such employees for overtime due to official travel is authorized. Decision in 14 Comp. Gen. 907, considering the act of March 28, 1934, providing overtime compensation for "labor" in excess of 40 hours a week, distinguished. (Modified by 22 Comp. Gen. 636.) Comptroller General Warren to Col. H. D. Ayres, U. S. Army, July 31, 1942: By first indorsement dated July 18, 1942, the Chief of Finance, War Department, forwarded here for consideration your letter of June 19, 1942, (file No. 248.2), as follows: 1. The inclosed supplemental pay roll of the Engineer Department at Large, Milwaukee Ordnance Plant, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, covering claim for additional pay to certain employees during the period April 16 to May 30, 1942, in the amount of $47.06, submitted to the undersigned, a Disbursing Officer, U. S. Army, for payment, is forwarded for advance decision as to legality of the claim. 2. In view of the fact the period for which the overtime pay is claimed covers a day spent in travel between official stations, this office entertains doubt as to whether or not these employees are entitled to overtime compensation under the Act of June 3, 1941 (Public 100, 77th Congress). The supplemental pay roll voucher in question contains a certificate as follows: I certify that it has been administratively determined that the work of per annum employees paid overtime hereon was essential to and directly connected with the expeditious prosecution of the overtime work on which the employees enumerated in the act of Oct. 21, 1940, were engaged, and that the overtime compensation claimed hereon is in every case in addition to and in excess of the regular forty hour workweek which has been administratively established for these employees, and I further certify that the employees listed on this pay roll performed the following overtime work at this station in connection with the construction of the Milwaukee Ordnance Plant in order to meet completion date as determined by the Chief of Engineers. June 13, 1942. Your doubt as to the legality of the proposed payment appears to arise from a statement made in first indorsement dated May 27, 1942, from the Area Engineer, Milwaukee Ordnance Plant, to you, as follows: 1. Supplemental #1 to Overtime #5, $31.37, is returned to your office for further consideration. It has been changed to read, May 30, 1942, instead of June 1, 1942, as per your suggestion in another letter. 2. These employees have not been paid their salaries for the days on which pay is claimed on this roll. The 25th of April, the 2d of May, and the 9th of May are all Saturdays, are extra duty days in addition to the 40 hours previously worked by each of these employees. The regular pay for these employees was for the 40 hours of Monday through Friday in each instance, of 8 hours each, and under the decision of the Comptroller General (14 Comp. Gen. 907) they are entitled to receive regular time for the Saturdays they were in transit while being transferred from their last permanent station to their new permanent station. The Comptroller General's decision above referred to reads: "No labor is performed during periods of travel between duty stations and headquarters, and accordingly, during official travel time the employee is limited to pay at the basic rate per hour for not to exceed 8 hours per day." 3. It is our understanding that the above decision precludes time and one half for the extra duty days involved, and limits it to regular time. The Office of the Chief of Engineers, in our Circular Letter #1403, Civilian Personnel #85. March 19, 1942, goes into the question of overtime compensation to Field Employees of the Engineering Department quite extensively, and based on our understanding of that circular letter, the pay roll was prepared for these four employees travelling on Saturday while in official transfer from their old station to their new station in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Section 1 of the act of June 3, 1941, 55 Stat. 241 (Public No. 100), provides as follows: That compensation for employment in excess of forty hours in any administrative workweek computed at a rate of one and one-half times the regular rate is hereby authorized to be paid, under such regulations as the President may prescribe, to those per annum employees in the field service of the War Department, the Panama Canal, the Navy Department, and the Coast Guard, whose overtime services are essential to and directly connected with the expeditious prosecution of the overtime work upon which the employees enumerated in section 5 (a) of the Act of June 28, 1940, and section 1 of the Act of October 21, 1940, are engaged: Provided, That in determining the overtime compensation of the foregoing per annum employees the pay for one day shall be considered to be one three-hundred-and-sixtieth of the respective per annum salaries." [Italics supplied.] The decision of June 18, 1935, 14 Comp. Gen. 907, quoted by the Area Engineer, Milwaukee Ordnance Plant, held that official travel time is not "labor" for per diem employees within the meaning of the 40-hour week statute of March 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 522, and, accordingly that overtime compensation could not be paid for travel time to employees coming within the purview of that statute. The term "labor" does not appear in the act of June 3, 1941, but overtime com pensation is payable under that statute "for employment in excess of 40 hours." Official travel time during which an employee is in a pay status appears properly for regarding as "employment" within the meaning of the act of June 3, 1941. See 21 Comp. Gen. 724. Payment on the voucher is authorized, if otherwise correct, which voucher, together with supporting papers, is returned herewith. (B-27648) POSTAL SERVICE-COMPENSATION OF POSTMASTERS AND Under the provisions of 39 U. S. C. 133 authorizing the Postmaster General to allow reasonable compensation for clerical service and a proportionate salary increase to the postmaster whenever unusual business accrues at any post office, the salary of a postmaster at fourth class and Presidential offices may be increased where the additional business is caused by the proximity of military or naval forces even though, due to extension of the free mailing privilege to such forces, there is a decrease in receipts and cancellations, but the classification of post offices must continue to be based upon receipts and cancellations as required by existing law. Comptroller General Warren to the Postmaster General, July 31, 1942: I have your undated letter, received here July 27, 1942, as follows: Reference is made to the provisions of 39 U. S. C. 133, which reads as follows: "Extra labor at offices. Whenever unusual business accrues at any post office, the Postmaster General shall make a special order allowing reasonable compensation for clerical service, and a proportionate increase of salary to the postmaster during the time of such extraordinary business." Compensation to postmasters of the fourth class is based on cancelation. The Act of March 27, 1942, which extended the privilege of free postage to persons in the Armed forces has reduced the compensation of postmasters of fourth class post offices at Army camps or adjacent thereto to such an extent that these employees do not receive compensation commensurate with the service rendered. The case of the postmaster at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, is cited for your information. This is a fourth class office located on a military reservation which is dependent to a great extent on the mails of the enlisted men and officers assigned to the post. The inspector who investigated the matter determined that the compensation of the postmaster for the fiscal year 1942 will amount to $1,100. The cancelations for the March quarter 1942 amounted to $391.63 exclusive of box rents. During the month of May the cancelations dropped to $59.19 and the value of postage on free matter would have amounted to $106.75 additional. The inspector states that the postmaster is actually entitled to advancement to the salary of a $1,500 office. Information is desired as to whether the Postmaster General has authority under the provisions of the above cited law to authorize compensation to postmasters of the fourth class offices which are affected by the unusual conditions resulting from the enactment of Public #507 approved March 27, 1942, at a rate to be determined by investigation, and in such cases waive the necessity for using the cancelations as the basis for fixing the postmaster's compensation. Informaton is also desired whether the Postmaster General would have authority under the provisions of 39 U. S. C. 133, to authorize additional compensation to postmasters at Presidential offices whose salaries will be reduced as a result of the use of the free mailing privilege by members of the Armed forces. It is also requested that the Department be advised whether post office may be continued without change at offices affected I activities which would be reduced if such classification is bast of a Mitary In view of the emergency conditions existing, it is requested that an early decision be furnished this Department. Section 901, Title IX of the Act of March 27, 1942, 56 Stat. 181, Public Law 507, provides as follows: Any first-class letter mail matter admissible to the mails as ordinary mail matter which is sent by a member of the military or naval forces of the United States (including the United States Coast Guard), while on active duty or in the active military or naval service of the United States, to any person in the United States, including the Territories and possessions thereof, shall be transmitted in the mails free of postage, subject to such rules and regulations as the Postmaster General shall prescribe. Section 133, Title 39, U. S. Code, quoted in the first paragraph of your letter, incorporates the language of section 3863, Revised Statutes, which latter statute is derived from section 90 of the act of June 8, 1872, 17 Stat. 296, providing as follows: That whenever, by reason of the presence of a military or naval force near any post office, or from any other cause, unusual business accrues thereat, the Postmaster General shall make special order allowing reasonable compensation for clerical service, and a proportionate increase of salary to the postmaster during the time of such extraordinary business. Thus, considering the provisions of section 133, Title 39 U. S. Code, in the light of the provisions of the derivative statute there is manifested an intention that its provisions shall apply to a post office at which there is an extraordinary increase of business because of the close proximity of military or naval forces to the particular office involved. The extra allowance for clerical services and for "a proportionate increase of salary to the postmaster" which the Postmaster General is authorized to allow by special order under the statute is not made dependent upon the receipts or cancellations in the particular post office. On the contrary, it is the evident purpose and intent of the statute to authorize an additional allowance for clerical services and an increase in the salary of the postmaster because of the extraordinary business not involving receipts or cancellations which are authorized to be included in computing the regular salary of the postmaster-such as increased business resulting by operation of section 901 of the act of March 27, 1942, supra, granting free mailing privilege to persons in active military or naval forces of the United States. Accordingly, the question contained in the fourth paragraph of your letter is answered in the affirmative. See United States v. Wright, 11 Wall. 648. The question stated in the fifth paragraph of your letter also is answered in the affirmative. Referring to the question in the sixth paragraph of your letter, there is nothing in 39 U. S. Code 133, or in section 901, of the act of March 27, 1942, supra, which supersedes or renders inoperative the provisions of law requiring the classification of post offices to be based upon the receipts and cancellations of the office. 39 U. S. |