nism which the State Department considers as political, but they can inject themselves into segregation which is a political question. Secretary MCNAMARA. I am sure

Senator THURMOND. I am just amazed at your doings.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I am sure that the question of racial discrimination is a political question, but that part of it is not our responsibility to deal with. But it is our responsibility, and I am sure that we maintain military effectiveness and a high state of combat readiness, and we are engaged in determining to what extent that is affected by segregation policies.

Senator THURMOND. After you have made your survey, do you plan to force your commanders to take steps to attempt to desegregate communities around the camps and bases and stations that may not be desegregated?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I can't really answer the question, Senator Thurmond, until we complete the survey and see what the conditions

are.

Senator THURMOND. There is a possibility that you may do that? Secretary MCNAMARA. I think we are responsible for maintaining military effectiveness, and if military effectiveness is being adversely affected by segregation policies, I think we should work with the areas involved to try to eliminate that adverse effect on our combat readiness.

Sentator THURMOND. So you are going to use the armed services, then, as a medium through which to bring about desegregation of the country?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir. We are simply going to assure that we take steps to maintain the level of combat readiness that we are charged with the responsibility for maintaining.

Senator THURMOND. You were in World War I, weren't you?
Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. World War II?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. You know of the units that were trained in the South, don't you?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I know

Senator THURMOND. You saw them in action, didn't you?
Secretary MCNAMARA. I did indeed.

Senator THURMOND. Did you see any lack of combat effectiveness of those units that were trained in the South, because of segregation?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Senator Thurmond, I was in no position to compare the combat effectiveness of the units trained in the South with those trained in the North.

Senator THURMOND. Don't you know that those units trained in the South were just as combat effective as any units trained anywhere? Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't know they weren't, but I don't know that they were, either.

Senator THURMOND. I would suggest that you go carefully on this. Instead of trying to raise the morale that you think you are doing of combat effectiveness, it may turn out that you are going to decrease morale and decrease combat effectiveness not only in the South but throughout the country. I can tell you this now, the sentiment in this country has changed and this administration had better realize that.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you have just stated in answer to Senator Thurmond that your concern was combat effectiveness.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator CASE. Is this narrowly or broadly construed? May I make the point a little more specific?

Would you include in the criteria dealing with combat effectiveness consideration of the fact that a Negro and his family from a community that is not segregated may be forced to live in a segregated community and that there is some responsibility on the military to deal with that situation?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, it is difficult for me to answer these questions specifically because we are just beginning our survey. But I think that I would say that if we find, for example, that we are losing personnel from critical specialties because they are forced to be separated from their family for a period of time by certain conditions, we should seek to try to change those conditions. I think that is my interpretation of our responsibility of maintaining combat readiness.

Senator CASE. I would like to say for the record, just as emphatically as Senator Thurmond has expressed the opposite viewpoint that I think it is very serious from the point of view of military purposes on that score.

In regard to another matter raised by Senator Symington, it is my understanding that you stated that under existing arrangements with the German authorities for purchase of military services, equipment, and so forth, you had achieved a balance so that our position in Germany does not involve currently an outflow of American currency and gold.

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator CASE. This is a very important matter because wherever this can be done it means that there is a negative effect or no effect upon our outflow of gold.

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is quite correct.

Senator CASE. This is true in Germany where in Europe the largest part of our Armed Forces are situated?

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is quite correct, Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Just one other question for General LeMay.

You spoke of the fact that it is a matter of serious concern to you and the Defense Department as well as the Air Force, that officer personnel were not reenlisting at a rate even equal to the average of all personnel in the service.

General LEMAY. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator CASE. You have studies made to determine the reasons for this factor; is that correct?

General LEMAY. Yes, sir; we have.

Senator CASE. I wonder if you could furnish, for me personally and for the Chairman and the members of the committee if they want it, a copy of this analysis that we can study.

I assume there are many factors involved?

General LEMAY. I think I can furnish you some material; yes, sir.

Senator CASE. You say, and I am sure your summary is correct, that it costs us $25,000 a year to get the services of a technical man. It seems to me we could afford to spend a great deal of money to correct this situation to the extent it can be corrected, and that to take half or quarter measures is not a very effective way of meeting

the situation.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

(The information requested follows:)

Officer retention statistics on fiscal year 1958 input measured after 5 years'

(a) Housing-limited and many available are substandard;
(b) Pay lower than civilian contemporaries;

(c) Fringe benefits-lack of dental care-limited BX purchases, etc.

2. Career insecurity:

(a) Flight status;

(b) Retirement-medical benefits.

3. Family considerations:

(a) Housing Government-type limited, rentals off base are high.

(b) Personnel required to go PCS and TDY too often.

4. Limited promotional opportunity: (a) Specifically in field grade authorization.

Reenlistment, first-term airmen, fiscal year 1963, DOD occupational grouping

Reasons for not staying in the Air Force:

1. Promotion system.

2. Civilian life offers greater opportunity.

3. Job dissatisfaction.

4. Pay and allowances.

5. Inadequate housing.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, can you be back this afternoon at 3 o'clock?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; I can.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is necessary for me to go to the floor and I will ask Senator Symington to conclude these hearings. The committee will meet at 3 o'clock for the Vietnam briefing.

Chairman RUSSELL. One matter I would like to bring up before leaving. I have received from Senator Mansfield a list of questions in regard to the housing requirements at the Malmstrom Air Force Base which he would like to have answered for the record. Also Senator Yarborough, Senator Dirksen, and Senator Carlson have made inquiry concerning the requirements at Perrin Air Force Base, Savanna Ordnance Depot, and Schilling Air Force Base, respectively. I submit these inquiries to you and ask that your answers be supplied for the record.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

QUESTIONS CONCERNING MALMSTROM AIR FORCE BASE FAMILY HOUSING

CONDITIONS

Question 1. What is the basis of need for this project?

Answer. This housing requirement results from the scarcity of available offbase adequate housing and the lack of sufficient Government owned or controlled units. At present, we can only provide adequate housing for 73.9% of our eligible personnel. This does not include 621 families of lower grade airmen which we cannot consider when we program additional housing.

Question 2. What is the mission at this base?

Answer. Malmstrom AFB supports Strategic Missile Wing (Minuteman), Fighter Interceptor and Western Air Rescue Center missions. In addition, Headquarters, Great Falls Air Defense Sector is located here.

Question 3. If one of the activities is being closed out, why do you need more housing?

Answer. Even though the KC-976 tanker unit will phase out of Malmstrom AFB, we will still only be able to adequately house 73.9 percent of our eligible families. This mission reduction was taken into consideration at the time our program was prepared on our projected strength requirement.

Question 4. You mentioned a 260-unit Capehart project which recently has been completed. Where do occupants of this housing come from? Will they not leave adequate housing vacant in the community?

Answer. The 260 Capehart units have been completed and are now occupied. Many of the occupants come from both adequate and inadequate community support units. Even after these units were occupied, we found 1,470 families living in inadequate community support housing.

Question 5. How many military stationed at Malmstrom Air Base at the present time, eligible for housing on base, live off base?

(a) Number of officers?

(b) Number of noncommissioned officers?

(c) Number of enlisted personnel?

Answer. There are 554 officers and 1,437 eligible enlisted personnel (noncommissioned officers) living off base. These figures exclude 515 lower grade enlisted men who are not entitled to quarters.

Question 6. What percentage of military live on base?

(a) Married officers.

(b) Bachelor officers.
(c) Married NCO's.
(d) Bachelor NCO's.
(e) Married enlisted.

(f) Bachelor enlisted.

Answer. Because our personnel at Malmstrom AFB will be decreased and our projected housing requirement is computed to reflect the decrease, your question can best be answered with respect to those who will be living on base at the end of fiscal year 1966 and after these 200 units are constructed and occupied. Married officers in housing, 406 or 76 percent.

Bachelor officers, 120 or 100 percent.

Married NCO's, 1,000 or 76 percent.
Bachelor NCO's, 330 or 100 percent.

Married lower grade enlisted, none.

Bachelor lower grade enlisted, 1,714 or 100 percent.

Question 7. Earlier you cited a projected gross requirement for 1,952 units. Does this number cover all families of men assigned to Malmstrom?

Answer. The 1,952 units appears to pertain to our total housing requirement for eligible officer and airmen families, which is 1,852 units. This figure does not include the families of 621 lower grade airmen who are not eligible for Government housing.

Question 8. How do you determine whether families are adequately housed off base?

Answer. Each year we survey all married personnel, eligible and ineligible, to determine exactly which families are adequately and inadequately housed. Question 9. What were the results of your survey at Malmstrom? Answer. Our survey disclosed 204 families adequately housed off base with 69 of these adequately housed in areas other than Malmstrom AFB. In addition, the survey disclosed 1,426 families inadequately housed in the Malmstrom AFB area.

Question 10. What is the cost of rentals off base? That is, are those living off base paying more than the housing allowance? If so, how much?

Answer. Off base rentals are normally high cost units, especially when the cost of utilities is included in the overall cost to the serviceman. Our survey disclosed that 902 families, including 303 lower grade airmen, pay more than their housing allowance. Of these: 151 families pay up to $10 more; 326 families pay between $10 and $25 more; 307 families pay between $25 and $50 more; 118 families pay $50 or more than allowance.

Question 11. Those living off base, are they individuals who need three or four or more bedrooms?

Answer. No, but suitable units of this size are very scarce and because of this we propose to construct all 200 units as 3-bedroom relocatable housing units. Question 12. According to military regulation, is it correct that a serviceman must live within a certain distance from base?

Answer. No. However, because of the mission of this installation our personnel are included in the emergency war plan and should live within 20 minutes average driving time.

Question 13. Am I correct in understanding that houses listed unsuitable would be located more than 1 hour's drive in distance from the base?

Answer. No. Units listed as adequate would be those which are: (a) substandard construction; (b) excess cost; (c) excess distance.

Question 14. If the 200 relocatable units are approved, am I correct in assuming that they will be 3- or 4-bedroom units?

Answer. These will all be three-bedroom units.

Question 15. Do you plan eventually to build housing on base for all of the families which were found to be unsuitably housed?

Answer. No. Department of Defense administrative practice only permits programing up to a point where 90 percent of our projected (long-range) housing requirement can be met through all available assets. This is 90 percent of our eligible requirement and does not include the families of lower grade airmen who, by law, cannot be included in our requirement.

Question 16. These figures apply to last year's survey. How would the proposed 200 units affect the future or long-range situation?