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ARMY RESERVE CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
CUMULATIVE STATUS 1 MARCH 1963
APPROPRIATIONS VERSUS OBLIGATIONS

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Chairman RUSSELL. Admiral Pressey?

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. GEORGE W. PRESSEY, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, SHORE ACTIVITIES DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROL DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral PRESSEY. I am perfectly prepared to submit my statement. Chairman RUSSELL. Are you requesting any funds over and above what is allowed in the budget or the House bill?

Admiral PRESSEY. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You will submit your statement for the record? Admiral PRESSEY. Yes, sir.

(Admiral Pressey's statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. GEORGE W. PRESSEY, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, SHORE ACTIVITIES DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROL DIVISION IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to present to you the military construction Naval Reserve authorization program for fiscal 1964 and further, to discuss some of our accomplishments that have resulted from your past support.

The mission of the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve is to augment the Active Naval Forces in the event of general or small wars with:

(a) ASW ships, air squadrons, and combat units, complete with trained personnel and suitable equipment capable and ready for instant mobilization. (b) Trained individuals to fill the existing vacancies in the active fleet. To accomplish this mission the Reserves are organized into selected Reserve Forces comprising some 122,000 Naval and 45,500 Marine Corps Reserve personnel. This is the force that constitutes the major source of trained manpower together with ships and air squadrons that are immediately available to augment the oprating forces in any declared emergency. As this committee knows, this represents a very real force that has demonstrated its ability so magnificently in the past.

As recently as last fall, individuals and units from the east and gulf coast Naval Reserve air stations participated in the Cuban quarantine, logging more than 775 hours of logistic flights and some 350 hours of over-the-water surveillance, flying side by side with the Active Forces. These sorties were carried out on regular drilling weekends and as necessary, annual active duty training.

Significantly, this past year the Marine Corps Reserve has reorganized its Reserve Forces from a heterogenous organization into major elements of the 4th Marine Division wing team. This reorganization is to be responsive and keep pace with the organizational developments and demands of the Active Forces.

To support this force with facilities, the Navy is requesting approval of a lump-sum authorization program in the amount of $5,660,000 for fiscal year 1964. This is in accordance with the change recommended by the Congress and enacted into law last year. We are thoroughly in accord with this new procedure and believe that it provides us with the necessary flexibility to manage our program effectively.

At the completion of World War II the Navy was quick to reestablish its Reserve program. By utilizing the facilities at naval air stations that were excess to the needs of the regular establishment; by the construction of temporary and semipermanent buildings; and by leasing other facilities throughout the country, the Navy has been able to make its Reserve facilities accessible to 75 percent of the male population in the United States.

This sound judgment and foresighted planning enabled us at the time to get the maximum facilities at minimum cost. Now, however, these temporary facilities are deteriorating at a rate faster than they can be replaced, and leases are being terminated with no opportunity of renewal. These facts, coupled with recent technological advances, have established an urgent require

ment for modernizing and updating our facilities if we are to be capable of continuing to meet our Reserve commitments.

We have no plans to increase the number of air stations or surface training facilities this year. In fact, during the last 10 years, we have been able to reduce the number of these facilities from 22 to 12 Reserve air stations and from more than 800 to the present 521 naval surface and Marine Corps ground facilities. This has been done through efficiency, consolidation, and general improvements in our program.

Our facility requirements included in this year's tentative program are limited to minimum operational training structures such as training facilities for the surface and ground forces, and personnel support facilities at the air stations in order to bring these training structures, barracks, messes, and BOQ's up to an acceptable condition. As you know, the Reserve program in itself would be nothing without people, and we have learned through bitter experience that the young men that we want and need will not associate with an organization when the facilities that they have in which to live and train are lacking or badly deteriorated.

In order to make our dollars go as far as possible, we have long pursued the policy of joint utilization. All of our air stations are joint with the Marine Air Reserve and 10 of the 16 projects tentatively scheduled for the surface and ground forces are joint with one or more of the other services. Gentlemen, this concludes my presentation. I am ready to provide you with any further information you may desire.

Chairman RUSSELL. General Wilson?

General WILSON. In the Air Guard we are only asking for the money in the President's budget that is the Air Force.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have an additional statement?

General WILSON. I have a statement on the air side I would be glad to submit for the record, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are not asking for any more money?
General WILSON. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is rather unusual for you, General. [Laughter.]

General WILSON. We have a real good program this year, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes; I notice you are in position to take care of that on the budgetary level. You have to come to the Congress to get it submitted.

(The statement of General Wilson follows:)

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WINSTON P. WILSON, CHIEF OF THE

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, once again it is my privilege to appear before this committee for the purpose of presenting the Air National Guard military construction program for fiscal year 1964.

Before proceeding with the details of our fiscal year 1964 program, a few words relative to our current year program are in order. With the reinstatement of the lump-sum authorization, as directed by the Congress last year, our program accomplishments to date are indicative of a maximum performance a performance so reminiscent of the years prior to 1959 when the lumpsum authorization prevailed for the Reserve Forces. In my opinion, this is the only system which is responsive to the needs of the Reserve Forces under current day concepts of organization, operation, and employment. As this committee is so acutely aware, the ANG has gained the recognition of a truly ready-now force and, as such, has been integrated as part of the force in being with mission and employment concepts established accordingly. While we welcome this respected and vital position on the overall defense team, it has not and will not in the future be without the expense of providing facilities essential to the training and operation of a force which is subject to continuous modernization and updating with the assignment of more complex and sophisticated

weapons systems. Historically, many of these changes have been virtually on a no-notice basis. Events of the past year and those now appearing on the horizon for the next year do not portray a significant departure from this experience. If anything, the type, magnitude, and impact of these changes are taking on even greater significance with commensurate facility and financial requirements. It is for these reasons that I am so confident that the present system will allow us maximum latitude in achieving our program objectives. The current year's performance serves to illustrate this point. All projects of the fiscal year 1963 military construction program, except four had been awarded as of June 30, 1963. Since then, three additional contracts have been awarded. with one project outstanding as of this date. This project requires resiting which must be accompanied by reclearance for additional support items and funds. Contracts for two urgently needed facilities, communications building, Portland, Maine, and aircraft parking apron extension, Hector Field, Fargo, N. Dak.. not originally presented as part of the fiscal year 1963 program have now been awarded. This increased capability has been made possible by favorable low bids and continuous close surveillance to insure that only essential and austere type facilities are provided. Both projects are the result of changes in program or circumstances which justify the priority action accorded them.

By and large, our fiscal year 1964 program will provide for phased construction of facilities to meet current projected conversion and equipment schedules. As in the past, pavements to support Century series aircraft and heavy transports will account for the lion's share of the total program. Existing pavements at a number of locations were not designed to support the heavy equipment now being assigned to the ANG inventory. To protect this investment, it is our objective to strengthen these pavements before serious failure and deterioration occurs. Expansion of aircraft parking aprons and widening of taxiways are, of course, essential to accommodate the larger and heavier aircraft such as the C and KC-97, C-121, etc.

In addition to pavements, the balance of the program is associated primarily with three other categories of construction; namely, nuclear storage facilities, operations and training facilities, and maintenance facilities. I shall briefly discuss each one separately. The assignment of nuclear weapons to the ANG has created a new requirement for their storage and associated special handling. These facilities must meet the same critical design and safety criteria as is applied to active Air Force locations. The facility consists of an assembly and checkout building, a security guardhouse with an extensive communications system, and a series of storage igloos. All are located within a chain link compound. With the provisioning of these facilities, the ANG units involved will significantly increase their potential utilization in the overall defense system. Close surveillance of this program by the major gaining command is being exercised on a continuous basis.

As a result of experience gained during the Berlin contingency, it became transparently clear that our tactical fighter unit organizational structure was not compatible with current day deployment and employment concepts. Comparability with like active units did not, in fact, exist. Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, therefore, recommended realinement which would provide this comparability and essential responsiveness. Reorganization of our ANG units from an augmented squadron to a group structure was the answer and has been so directed. The aggregate military strength increased from approximately 513 to 700 per location. Our limited and very austere facilities at some locations simply cannot adequately support the vital operational and training requirements generated by this new organizational structure. After a thorough examination of the situation, we have determined that a multipurpose operations and training facility must be provided. This facility will include essential medical support and food service capability as well as normal operational and training space. It will also adequately support the unit if, under emergency or activy duty conditions, it is employed to operate from their home station. We have, through research and study, designed a preengineered type facility which can be readily site adapted and constructed at a cost of approximately $240,000, compared with $430,000 expended for similar permanent type a few years past. Our construction effort over the next few years will show added emphasis toward meeting this critical requirement.

The other major requirement is that of adequate maintenance space to accommodate our aircraft inventory, particularly the heavy transports. This requirement is being met through the use of maintenance-nose-dock-type facilities.

Such facilities have been used extensively and most effectively by the Active Establishment. In keeping with my policy of stretching the defense dollar to the maximum, we have been successful in acquiring a limited number of docks excess to the Air Force and relocating same at our ANG locations. This practice has saved considerable money. As an example, new docks to accommodate the C-97 or C-121 cost approximately $350,000 each. We are currently locating two docks from Charleston, S.C., to Charlotte, N.C., at a total estimated cost of $100,000.

The ANG military construction authorization requested for fiscal year 1964 stands at $15.6 million. This level will support the most essential requirements dictated by approved Headquarters U.S. Air Force and OSD programs. Let me again assure this committee that any construction undertaken by the ANG is done so only after I have been personally satisfied that it represents a sound, urgent, and long-term requirement.

This concludes my presentation in support of the ANG military construction authorization program. My staff and I are ready to entertain any questions you may have concerning our construction program.

Chairman RUSSELL. General Curtin?

Colonel McDONALD. General Curtin was unable to be here. I am Col. James B. McDonald, representing him.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have a statement?

Colonel McDONALD. I have his statement, sir. We are asking for no further increase in the President's budget.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well, you may submit the statement for the record.

(General Curtin's statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT H. CURTIN, DIRECTOR OF CIVIL ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

MISSION

Until 1961 the Air Reserve Forces were employed under a concept which envisioned these forces as augmentation of the Active Air Force in the event of war. However, the 1961 Berlin and 1962 Cuban events modified their concept to a significant degree. In both of these contingency events selected units of the Air Reserve Forces were called upon to augment the Active Air Force. We now have an additional element of air power which can be relied upon for use over the entire spectrum of war.

Let us look at some specifics as they apply to the Air Force. First, the Reserve units and individuals responded quickly and effectively to these rapid mobilizations. For the Cuban callup, there was no period of premobilization alert. The decision to recall selected Reserve units was made during the late evening of Saturday, October 27, 1962. The effective time set for mobilization was 9 a.m. local time the next day, Sunday the 28th. Ninety-three percent of the assigned officers and airmen made this deadline.

Eight troop carrier wings with 24 flying squadrons, plus 6 aerial port squadrons, were called to active duty. The 8 wings were equipped with 439 C-119 and C-123 aircraft. This mobilization involved a total of 14,100 people, all of whom were members of the Air Force Reserve. This force sufficiently augmented the Active Air Force units to meet the airlift needs of the several plans under consideration. In other words, these units were trained to combat effectiveness; and equipped so that they could have performed a combat mission immediately. Although this force was not employed in combat in this instance, it contributed significantly by marshaling supplies, equipment, and personnel to the southeastern area of the United States at the peak of the crisis. Also, immediately before and after the recall, Air Force Reserve units provided additional help. Eighty aircraft flying more than 1,000 hours delivered 361 tons of equipment to the Florida area without accident or incident. More than 1,000 tons of supplies and equipment were airlifted for Air Force and Army units returning to their home stations. In addition, the five C-124 Globemaster-equipped Air Force Reserve squadrons, although not recalled, contributed concurrently to other worldwide airlift requirements. They flew 870 hours providing over 80,000 passenger-miles

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