any comparison with the bazaars of Cabul and Kandahar. The population, who are mostly Afghans, with the exception of about 200 families of Hindu shopkeepers, number close on 10,000.

They have a look of wretchedness and poverty, and are remarkable only for their ignorance and superstition. The chief trade of the city is in corn, fruit, madder, wool, and camels'-hair cloth. The only manufacture is that of sheepskin coats. The neighbouring country is very fertile, the orchards being especially renowned; the fruit of these are largely exported to Hindostan. Tobacco and corn are grown only for home use; also the castoroil plant.

On our taking the place in 1839, we found half a million pounds of wheat and barley and 80,000 pounds of flour in the bazaar.

The weather still continues most favourable for marching, and the men have not suffered; but the climate of Ghuznee is very severe in the winter-it is said to be the coldest place in Afghanistan; as a rule, snow lies on the ground from November to February. In the summer the heat is very disagreeable, and storms being of constant occurrence it is very unhealthy, owing probably to its bad drainage and the dirty condition of the inhabitants.

Until the present war Ghuzni was comparatively unknown, as no Europeans, to our knowledge, had visited the place since Nott destroyed it, so we are ignorant of its defences; but in 1842 all the Engineers were of opinion that, though admirably calculated to defy the implements of war in use at the time of its construction, its defences would not be sufficient to detain an army provided with a siege train for three days.

before its walls. Some scientific authorities give it as their opinion that its situation, as well as its construction, is totally defective; others, in location, position, construction, and condition, consider it useless. Durand, on the contrary, deemed it a spot, situated on the line of communication between Cabul and Kandahar, commanding access to the Gomal Pass, of great strategical value, and the question of strengthening it of great importance. There can be no doubt that he is right.

THE SORTIE FROM KANDAHAR-VILLAGE OF DEH KWAJA.

Kandahar, Aug. 20.

WE have been in such a state of worry and excitement since the disastrous affair of the 27th, and we have had so much work to do in regard to pulling down buildings and cutting down trees, to place obstacles on the roads and in front of our gates, that I have allowed two opportunities for the despatch of letters to escape. In war, as in other matters mundane, misfortunes seldom come alone; and now I have to chronicle a disaster almost equal in intensity to the sad story of which I told you in my last.

At the instance of Brigadier-General Brooke, who strongly advised General Primrose to the attempt, an illjudged, ill-devised, and foolish sortie, was attempted by us four days ago. We have been much annoyed by an irritating rifle fire upon our ramparts from a village called Deh Kwaja, which lies within range of and towards the east face of our citadel. We knew that the main position of the Afghan Prince faced east. Our spies have brought us intelligence that Ayub had with him thirteen regiments of regular infantry, thirty-eight

guns-many of them rifled,—a very numerous array of cavalry, and a large body of fanatical Ghazis. General Brooke himself demanded permission to lead the sortie, stipulating however—or, I should say, suggesting—that our very weak artillery should bombard the village. Poor Vandeleur was with me on the night of the 15th; and although he had specially requested to serve as a volunteer, he pointed out that his knowledge of the locality, gained from frequent quail shooting in the neighbourhood, made him certain that the village we deemed so easy of assault would be found an extremely difficult, hard nut to crack. Several of our men and camp followers have from time to time been murdered by these villagers, who are known to be most bitterly hostile to the wealthier traders of Kandahar and the Kizilbashi merchants, who are friendly to us. With Vandeleur in my tent were two other officers, who had been in the habit of quail and duck shooting on the plains near the village, and they also were strongly of opinion that a simple bombardment, instead of a rush at the village, would be more prudent. However, as we had not the ordering of the affair, nor the control of events, matters were allowed to take their own course.

Before I give you full particulars of the sortie, I may tell you that Brigadier-General Brooke most gallantly led the assault, and was cut to pieces while endeavouring to carry off his wounded comrade and my old friend, Major Cruickshank, our field engineer. Amongst the killed were Colonel Newport, 28th Bombay N.I.; Le Poer Trench, 19th Bombay N.I.; and young Charley Stayner, of the same corps; Poor Teddy Marsh, 7th Fusiliers; young Phil Wood, of the same; and our popular and zealous chaplain, the Rev. J. Gordon-for

many years connected with the Church Missionary Society.

About two hours before daylight our force, in two columns, was drawn out in front of the Cabul gate. The night was somewhat misty, but the moon now and then came through the clouds and lit up the bronzed faces of our Sepoys, many of whom, to say the truth, seemed not particularly elated at the prospect of our venture. The innumerable watercourses that interlace, as it were, the plain that intervenes between our citadel and the village seriously interfered with the order of our march and the movements of our field guns. Prior to the sortie, I have omitted to inform you Ayub had occupied the cantonments, which we had, I think, imprudently abandoned. This occupation, however, afforded considerable amusement, combined with some very excellent artillery practice to our gunners, who, at 900 yards from the Cabul gate, were not long in shelling out the forces posted there by the Afghan general. The latter on the 7th of the month detached a couple of brigades to a strong position on the Herat road, almost between the Mir Bazaar and the Argandab river; while his cavalry and right flank were placed on a steep prominence not far from the ruins of the old Kandahar city. It would be difficult to describe how unusually strong and strategically chosen was this front, enfilading the village, whose approach was watered by many deep canals and irrigation channels, which could be crossed only at few points.

On the morning of the 9th General Primrose ordered some field guns to take up a position on the Picket Hill overlooking our cantonment, and these guns during several days made excellent practice upon the loop

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holed walls of Deh Kwaja. Ayub, it was known, had posted a strong body of irregulars in the smaller villages to the right and left of Deh Kwaja; and we were given to understand that, should an opportunity occur, a night attack would be made upon our Cabul and Durani gates. As I have said, the walls of the village are honeycombed with loopholes, and approachable only through a mass of orchards and considerably broken ground. Our cavalry were carefully selected, and consisted of 300 of picked sabres, in equal proportions of lancers and l'arme blanche. To these were added 900 bayonets, furnished respectively by the 7th Fusiliers, and 19th and 28th Native Infantry.

At the first approach of dawn our guns opened fire upon the village, which we could see was very strongly occupied and reinforced from the neighbouring hamlets. Deploying one half of his infantry into line, with 100 of our cavalry on either flank extended in skirmishing order, General Brooke moved steadily across the plain, taking advantage of whatever cover we could obtain in the gardens and orchards through which we passed. Some 200 yards from the Cabul gate there is a rather deep nullah, behind which there is a mass of rock, the whole forming a most perfect ditch and parapet. Here we came to our first obstacle, namely, some 500 wellposted rifles, who inflicted considerable loss upon our Here Colonel Malcolmson, of the Scinde Horse, had his charger shot under him, being himself badly hit through the sword arm. Major Cruickshank, with fifty men, was then ordered to move round to the left, with the intention of outflanking the enemy; while Colonel Shewell made a very gallant charge on the other flank. The nullah did not suffice to stop our gallant Scinde

men.