adjusted and are unjust and unreasonable. No reasons were advanced to justify the proposed minimum charge of 30 cents between Boston and Brockton, and of 40 cents between less distant points. The minimum charge maintained by respondent in connection with its class rates between the points here considered is generally 60 cents a shipment. It appears that a minimum charge of 40 cents to apply in con.. nection with the commodity rates hereinafter found just and reasonable would not be unreasonable.

In Boots, Shoes, Paints in New England, 43 M. C. C. 627, (decided July 27, 1944), respondent motor common carriers proposed anyquantity rates on shoes, among other things, from New England producing points to Boston for distances under 90 miles on the basis of the third-class, column D, rates. In that proceeding, division 2 concluded that the described basis would be just and reasonable if confined to less-than-truckload shipments. The proposed commodity rates here range from 2 cents less to 9 cents more than the third-class, column D, rates. We conclude that the proposed commodity rates are unjust and unreasonable, without prejudice to the establishment of less-than-truckload rates on the basis of the third class, column D,

rates.

Protestants urge that since respondent presented no cost data, no determination may be made of just and reasonable rates. Although information relating to carriers' costs of transporting traffic is important and helpful in a determination of just and reasonable rates, it is not necessary in all instances. The record here contains other pertinent data, hereinbefore described, upon which conclusions respecting the lawfulness of the proposed rates can be made.

We find that the proposed rates between Boston, on the one hand, and Amesbury, Beverly, Brockton, Chelsea, Danvers, Haverhill, Lynn, Newburyport, Peabody, Salem, and Worcester, Mass., on the other, are unjust and unreasonable. This finding is without prejudice to the establishment of rates in conformity with the views expressed herein.

We further find that the proposed minimum charge per shipment between Boston and Brockton is unreasonable to the extent it is less than 40 cents a shipment.

We further find that, except to the extent indicated in the foregoing findings, the proposed rates and minimum charges are just and reasonable.

An order will be entered requiring the cancelation of the suspended schedules to the extent found unlawful herein, vacating the order of suspension in all other respects, and discontinuing the proceeding.

43 M. C. C.

APPENDIX

Respondent's present and proposed rates on shoes and the third-class rates

1 The third-class rates apply from and to Boston zone 1, Mass., which includes the Boston postal dis tricts of Back Bay, Charlestown, East Boston, Roxbury, in part, and South Boston, Mass., also parts of Cambridge, Chelsea, Everett, and Somerville, Mass.

2 No commodity rates proposed; third-class rates would apply.

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43 M. C. C.

No. MC-C-377

BENDIX PRODUCTS DIVISION, BENDIX AVIATION CORPORATION v. JOHN GIARAS, DOING BUSINESS AS LAKE SHORE MOTOR TRANSIT LINES

Submitted July 8, 1944. Decided August 29, 1944

Minimum charge per shipment applied by the defendant between St. Joseph, Mich., and South Bend, Ind., found applicable, and not shown to be unjust or unreasonable. Complaint dismissed.

W. F. Gleason for complainant.

L. C. Jones for an intervener supporting complainant.

Harry M. Slater for defendant and an intervener supporting defendant.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

DIVISION 2, COMMISSIONERS AITCHISON, SPLAWN, AND ALLDREDGE

BY DIVISION 2:

Exceptions to the order recommended by a joint board were filed by the complainant, and an intervener supporting the defendant replied.

By complaint filed August 23, 1943, the Bendix Products Division, Bendix Aviation Corporation, alleges that the minimum charge per shipment collected subsequent to March 18, 1942, by the defendant, a motor common carrier of property, on shipments between St. Joseph, Mich., and South Bend, Ind., and between other unspecified points, was and is unjust and unreasonable in violation of section 216 of the Interstate Commerce Act. A determination of just and reasonable minimum charges on past shipments, and the prescription of a reasonable minimum charge for the future, are sought. At the hearing, the Harvey Paper Products Company intervened in support of the complainant, and the Central States Motor Freight Bureau, Inc., hereinafter called the bureau, intervened in support of the defendant. Rates will be stated in amounts per 100 pounds.

There is no evidence in respect of any particular shipments transported for the complainant by the defendant. Although the minimum charges between certain undisclosed points are referred to in the complaint, the only points of origin and destination specifically mentioned in the complaint and at the hearing were St. Joseph and

South Bend, and our consideration herein will be limited to those points.

The defendant is a party to certain tariffs containing class rates issued by the bureau as agent. A general rule therein provides for the application of a minimum charge on certain small shipments. For some time prior to March 18, 1942, the defendant participated in the following general rule:

Except as otherwise provided in Notes 1 to 4 below, the minimum charge for a single shipment from one consignor to one consignee on one bill of lading shall be for 100 pounds at the First Class rate, except that in no case will the charge on a single shipment be less than: 55 cents when the First Class rate is 46 cents or lower; and 83 cents when the First Class rate exceeds 46 cents.

Notes 1 to 4 have no application in the instant proceeding. Prior to March 18, 1942, the first-class rate between St. Joseph and South Bend was 44 cents, and under the foregoing rule the minimum charge per shipment between those points was 55 cents.

On March 18, 1942, the defendant and other parties to the bureau tariff established general increases in rates and charges which conformed, on the whole, with those authorized for rail and water carriers in Increased Railway Rates, Fares, and Charges, 1942, 248 I. C. C. 545, hereinafter called Ex Parte No. 148. The amount of the increase in particular rates and charges was, in general, 6 percent. Thereby, the applicable first-class rate between St. Joseph and South Bend became 47 cents, and the minimum charges per shipment shown in the foregoing rule became 58 and 88 cents, respectively. Inasmuch as the first-class rate between St. Joseph and South Bend exceeded 46 cents after the general increases, the defendant applied a minimum charge of 88 cents between these points.

The complaint is directed against the minimum charge of 88 cents, which was the charge being collected by the respondent at the time the complaint was filed and at the time of the hearing in this proceeding. Subsequent to the hearing, on March 6, 1944, the above-mentioned rates and charges were increased by approximately 4 percent, and effective May 1, 1944, a minimum charge per shipment of $1.05 was established between points in central territory, including St. Joseph and South Bend. Our discussion, however, will be confined to the rates and minimum charges in effect prior to March 6, 1944, except as otherwise specifically mentioned.

Although the complaint deals primarily with the alleged unreasonableness of the 88-cent minimum charge, a question was raised at the hearing as to whether that charge was applicable. For a time after the general increases of 1942 were established by the defendant and other motor carriers, the increased rates and charges were contained in a master tariff containing conversion tables, which were

made a part of the rate tariffs by reference. Briefly, the method of applying the increases was to determine the former rate or charge by reference to the rate tariffs, and then refer to the conversion tables in the master tariff for the corresponding increased rate or charge. The complainant's position in regard to applicability hinges upon a contention that in order to avoid double increases, the first-class rate in effect before the general increases, rather than that in effect thereafter, should have been used in determining the minimum charge per shipment. It will be observed that under the complainant's interpretation of the tariffs, the minimum charge between St. Joseph and South Bend was 58 cents, and under the defendant's interpretation it was 88 cents.

The provision in the minimum charge rule reading "when the First Class rate is 46 cents or lower" is clearly a statement of a fact or condition existing at the time a particular shipment is accepted for transportation. Inasmuch as the first-class rate between St. Joseph and South Bend exceeded 46 cents after the general increases became effective, it follows that the applicable minimum charge per shipment between those points became 88 cents at the same time.

To facilitate the establishment of the general increases heretofore discussed, the motor carriers or their tariff-publishing agents applied for and were granted special permission to depart from the terms and requirements of certain of the Commission's tariff rules governing the publication and filing of rates and charges. Among the several orders of special permission entered in connection therewith was one permitting, among other things, the filing of a master tariff providing a method for ascertaining such increased rates or charges. This order of special permission read, in part, as follows:

*

ORDERED: That motor common carriers of property when providIng a method of determining increases in rates and charges for the transportation of property wholly by motor vehicle on the same basis as authorized for all rail transportation in Ex Parte No. 148, are hereby authorized to publish and file with the Commission a master tariff, or master tariffs, providing rules, tables or arbitraries for ascertaining such increased rates and charges. [Emphasis supplied.]

Complainant contends that the emphasized portion of the foregoing order limited the increases for motor carriers to a maximum of 6 percent for the transportation of property, and that the increase from 55 cents to 88 cents, or 60 percent, in the minimum charge per shipment between the described points, was in violation of that order, and therefore unlawful.

The order of special permission dealt only with tariff filing matters in connection with the establishment of the general increases. Such orders were permissive in character. They neither constitute