Bulletin 214, Women's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, entitled "Maternity Benefits Under Union Contract Health Insurance Plans" includes a comprehensive outline of the range of such benefits and the manner in which they are made applicable in labor unions. Such benefit payments on a weekly basis range from a percentage of earnings to a flat rate and from $10 a week to $20 a week, with the greatest number receiving $16.59 average. Among the claimants whose ages range from 17 to 44 years, average 28 years, these groups are divided percentagewise as follows:

During the hearings on S. 784, the question of cost to administer the maternity leave program was raised. The committee took recourse to information supplied by its own actuary and advisers appointed by the chairman of the committee, including Mr. Robert J. Myers, of the Federal Security Agency, and Mr. Maurice S. Brown, of the Civil Service Commission. The advisers so appointed submitted an estimate based upon a likely figure of 13,500 cases per year to cost approximately $5,400,000.

O

80TH CONGRESS 21 2d Session

SENATE

{No. 1526

REPORT

REGULATING THE REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION IN CERTAIN CRIMINAL CASES

JUNE 7 (legislative day, JUNE 1), 1948.-Ordered to be printed

Mr. WILEY, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. 20]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill (S. 20) to regulate the review of judgments of conviction in certain criminal cases, having considered same, do now report the bill favorably to the Senate without amendment, and recommend that the bill do pass.

STATEMENT

The

This bill has two sections. The first section is concerned solely with imprisonment under State court sentence; the second section concerns imprisonment solely under Federal court sentence. legal and practical considerations for a different approach, in Federal court habeas corpus proceedings, to sentences in State courts and to sentences in Federal courts is evident and has been long recognized by the Congress and the courts.

Section 1: The broad effect of this section is to require that collateral attacks upon the validity of confinements on sentences of State courts, because alleged to be in violation of the Constitution, treaties or law of the Nation, shall be determined in State courts with power in the Supreme Court of the United States to review on certiorari. Apparently, the only instances in which such procedure might be inadequate are (1) where a State has no efficient remedy or (2) where the State remedies (though adequate generally) are insufficient to protect the rights of the prisoner in some particular instance because of the existence of "exceptional circumstances." The broad phrase "exceptional circumstances" is intended to cover situations peculiar to the particular case-such as mob interference, strong adverse public sentiment, etc.

In both of these two instances of State procedure inadequacy, original jurisdiction is retained in the United States courts to be

exercised as follows: first, a petition for habeas corpus may be filed before any circuit or district judge (within the circuit or district where the petitioner is confined) whose duty is promptly to determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an adequate State remedy is lacking or whether any "exceptional circumstance" exists; second, if such judge determines adversely to petitioner, an appeal is given to the proper court of appeals; third, if such judge determines in favor of the petitioner, the writ is issued and a statutory court of three judges is constituted to try the case; fourth, a right to apply direct to the Supreme Court for certiorari to review the determination of the statutory court.

It is believed that the section provides complete protection to State prisoners; will prevent conflicts between State and lower Federal courts in all but exceptional situations; and, even in such situations, will provide a special Federal court so constituted as to minimize State irritation.

It

Section 2: This section applies only to Federal sentences. creates a statutory remedy consisting of a motion before the court where the movant has been convicted. The remedy is in the nature of, but much broader than, coram nobis. The motion remedy broadly covers all situations where the sentence is "open to collateral attack." As a remedy, it is intended to be as broad as habeas corpus. However, to take care of situations where, for practical reasons, it is not advisable to remove a petitioner from prison and to be certain that the remedies afforded prisoners will be fully sufficient, the section goes further than prescribing the motion remedy. In these exceptional instances where it may seem that the motion remedy is not practicable, because of the prisoner's "inability to be present at the hearing on the motion, or for other reasons," habeas corpus is made available. It will be noted that there is provided a wide discretion in the use of habeas corpus where, "for other reasons," the motion remedy seems not "practicable." This will take care of any exceptional practical situation which may arise in any particular case.

The two main advantages of such motion remedy over the present habeas corpus are as follows:

First, habeas corpus is a separate civil action and not a further step in the criminal case in which petitioner is sentenced (Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S. 556, 559 (1883)). It is not a determination of guilt or innocence of the charge upon which petitioner was sentenced. Where a prisoner sustains his right to discharge in habeas corpus, it is usually because some right-such as lack of counsel-has been denied which reflects no determination of his guilt or innocence but affects solely the fairness of his earlier criminal trial. Even under the broad power in the statute "to dispose of the party as law and justice require" (28 U. S. C. A., sec. 461), the court of judge is by no means in the same advantageous position in habeas corpus to do justice as would be so if the matter were determined in the criminal proceeding (see Medley, petitioner, 134 U. S. 160, 174 (1890)). For instance, the judge (by habeas corpus) cannot grant a new trial in the criminal case. motion remedy is in the criminal proceeding, this section 2 affords the opportunity and expressly gives the broad powers to set aside the judgment and to "discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate."

Since the

Second, most habeas corpus cases raise fact issues involving the trial occurrences or the alleged actions of judges, United States attorneys, marshals, or other court officials. Obviously, it involves interruption of judicial duties if the trial judge, the United States attorney, the court clerk or the marshal (one or all of them) are required to attend the habeas corpus hearing as witnesses. Such attendance is sometimes necessary to refute particular testimony which the prisoner may give and, obviously, such attendance is the safest course. This is so because experience has demonstrated that often petitioner will testify to anything he may think useful, however false; and, without the witnesses present to refute such, he is encouraged to do so and may make out a case for discharge from merited punishment. Some realization of the possible extent of this burden on court officials may be gained from the bare statement that, while convictions occur in all of the districts throughout the country, Federal prisoners are confined in a very small number of penal institutions; and habeas corpus must now be brought in the district where the petitioner is confined. Even if the testimony of these officials is taken by deposition, the interference and interruption is merely lessened in degree and the above danger is risked.

The main disadvantages of the motion remedy are as follows: The risk during or the expense of transporting the prisoner to the district where he was convicted; and the incentive to file baseless motions in order to have a "joy ride" away from the prison at Government expense.

Balancing these, as well as less important, considerations, the committee is of opinion that the advantages outweigh and that the motion remedy is preferable. As to the risk (escape or delivery) while transporting the prisoner to the district of conviction, the difference is only one of degree of distance and, therefore, of opportunity. As to the expense, it is highly probable that it would be more expensive for the Government witnesses to go from the district where sentence was imposed and return than for the prisoner to be brought to such district and returned. As to the incentive to file petitions, the difference is between a longer and a shorter trip to the court. It is thought that the provision in section 2 providing for habeas corpus (in the district of confinement) where it is not "practicable to determine his rights * * * on such a motion" will furnish a sufficient discretion in the judge or court before whom habeas corpus is filed to evaluate and defeat the above "disadvantages" to a large degree.

Other provisions of the section are merely implementing or supplemental to the above outlined purposes and are self-explanatory.