law in another part. It does not follow that, if the supreme legislative power in the British Empire sanctioned slavery in one part of its dominions, it could not, or did not, prohibit it in another. But it must be presumed that, if it was sustained in any one part, it could not be judicially considered illegal in the other, on the ground of being contrary to the view of Christian morality sustained by the state. If Christianity is to be held part of the common law of England, a sanction given to the slavery of Africans or negroes, in any part of the world, is a proof that the state did not at that time regard such slavery as contrary to Christianity, or as being for that reason forbidden by the common law.1 The question in this point of view is, not so much whether chattel slavery was maintainable under the local customary law of England; or whether it was maintained by statute law, either in England or in the colonies, or in both: but whether it was recognized at all, and held to be any where consistent with the moral code of a Christian nation. § 176. The recognition of principles having the character of universal jurisprudence or a law of nations, as has been shown in the second chapter, is most distinctly made in the judicial enunciation of private international law: that is, where the customary or unwritten law of the country is applied to determine the rights and obligations of private persons, in those interests and actions which are beyond the control of single states, or where persons are recognized as sustaining rights and obligations in relations which have become existent under the juridical and legislative power of some foreign state.' The English judicial decisions which have this international bearing, in connection with African slavery, will be noticed hereafter. But the recognition by the state of a principle, as part of 'Mr. Hildreth, (Hist. U. S. vol. 2, p. 427,) commenting on juristical opinions in England, 1729-1750, respecting the maintenance of slavery in England, says, "to avoid overturning slavery in the colonies, it was absolutely necessary to uphold it in England." This is not correct: though, if slavery had been repudiated in England on the ground that it was contrary to Christianity, or the law of God, it would have been necessary to infer that it was illegal in the colonies; that is, if the law of England and the law of the colony proceeded from the same political source. 2 Ante, § 10. 'Ante, § 68. the law of nations, may be shown from statutory enactments. And since the meaning of language is a thing of custom, and known by reference to existing facts, the words of a statute may indicate the law of nations, on some point, as received by the state. Especially is this true of legislation in reference to matters of private international law, or matters which imply a recognition of other jurisdictions and sources of law. And this applies both to the action of the legislative and the judicial source of law. The use of terms having a definite meaning in the usage and practice of merchants, which is a particular branch of the private international law,' may be equal to a recognition of that usage and practice as universally allowed, or as a law of nations, especially when the statutes are intended to operate on the intercourse of persons subject to different political sovereigns. When a statute of 1697, 8, 9, and 10, Wm. 3, c. 26, entitled "An Act to settle the trade to Africa," commences" Whereas the trade to Africa is highly beneficial and advantageous to this kingdom, and to the plantations and colonies thereunto belonging," the nature of that "trade" must be explained from the previous history of commerce, and in accordance with the "custom of merchants" at that time. And when in the statute "negroes" are spoken of as the objects of that trade, the extent of the term negroes and the legal nature of their condition, then spoken of as objects of a commercial enterprise, must be explained by the law of nations then acknowledged in mercantile affairs. And it is not to be inferred that, before this act should make slavery lawful under British jurisdiction, provision must have been made by statute, placing the "negroes" in the condition of chattels or of persons under involuntary servitude. A historian must describe such an act as a law declaring the slave trade highly beneficial and advantageous to the kingdom and its colonies." 1 That the law merchant is recognized as part of the common law of England, see Co. Litt., 2 Inst., c. 30. See 3 Banc., p. 414; and compare Lysander Spooner, on the Unconstitutionality of Slavery, p. 25. It may be admitted that, when the "trade to Africa was first mentioned in English public Acts, no reference was had to slaves as articles of that trade. The association of the slave trade with that branch of English commerce was gradually formed between the reign of Elizabeth and 1662, when Charles II. incorporated a third African, or Guinea, company which undertook to supply the British Treaties are as much juridical acts on the part of the state or sovereign as are ordinary statutes; though the objects immediately contemplated may be beyond the realm. They may create rights and obligations which the national courts will enforce. The twelfth article of the Treaty of Utrecht, July 13, 1713, between Great Britain and Spain, granted "to her Brittanic Majesty and to the company of her subjects established for that purpose, as well the subjects of Spain as all others being excluded, the contract for introducing negroes into the several parts of the dominions of his Catholic Majesty in America (commonly called El Pacto del Assiento de Negros), for the space of thirty years.' And the same section grants the occupancy of lands near the Rio de la Plata, "suitable for maintaining the servants of the said company and their negroes (nigritas), and for safely keeping them, the said negroes, for the purpose of being sold." An Act, 1749-1750, 23 Geo. 2, c. 31, entitled, " An Act for extending and improving the trade to Africa," which begins, "Whereas the trade to Africa is very advantageous to Great Britain, and necessary for supplying the plantations and colonies, thereunto belonging, with a sufficient number of negroes at reasonable rates," &c., must be taken to mean that the negro slaves brought or "supplied," were to be sold at reasonable rates. The sale and disposal of negroes as articles of merchandise is also referred to as one of the objects of the trade in sec. 20 of the Act of 1697, wherein "governors, deputy-governors, and judges are forbidden under penalty to act as a factor or factors, agent or agents, for the said company, or any other person or persons, for the sale or disposal of any negroes." And the lawfulness of chattel slavery, of negroes bought as articles of commerce on the coast of Africa, is not the less contemplated, by the Act of 1749-50, because in the twenty-ninth section it is enacted-" that no commander or master of any West Indies with 3,000 negroes annually. See 1 Hüne, p. 297-311. 2 Anderson's Hist. Com., p. 627. Dumont's Corps Diplomatique, Tom. viii., p. 395, and Wheaton's L. of Nations, p. 586; refers Dumont, Tom. viii., 2 me. partie, p. 344. "When [about 1750] the exclusive privileges of the Royal African Company expired, the English government undertook to maintain, at their own expense, the forts and factories on the African coast, and the trade was thrown open." 2 Hild. 427. the law of nations, may be shown from statutory enactments. And since the meaning of language is a thing of custom, and known by reference to existing facts, the words of a statute may indicate the law of nations, on some point, as received by the state. Especially is this true of legislation in reference to matters of private international law, or matters which imply a recognition of other jurisdictions and sources of law. And this applies both to the action of the legislative and the judicial source of law. The use of terms having a definite meaning in the usage and practice of merchants, which is a particular branch of the private international law,' may be equal to a recognition of that usage and practice as universally allowed, or as a law of nations, especially when the statutes are intended to operate on the intercourse of persons subject to different political sovereigns. When a statute of 1697, 8, 9, and 10, Wm. 3, c. 26, entitled "An Act to settle the trade to Africa," commences" Whereas the trade to Africa is highly beneficial and advantageous to this kingdom, and to the plantations and colonies thereunto belonging," the nature of that "trade" must be explained from the previous history of commerce, and in accordance with the "custom of merchants" at that time. And when in the statute "negroes" are spoken of as the objects of that trade, the extent of the term negroes and the legal nature of their condition, then spoken of as objects of a commercial enterprise, must be explained by the law of nations then acknowledged in mercantile affairs. And it is not to be inferred that, before this act should make slavery lawful under British jurisdiction, provision must have been made by statute, placing the "negroes" in the condition of chattels or of persons under involuntary servitude. A historian must describe such an act as a law declaring the slave trade highly beneficial and advantageous to the kingdom and its colonies." 1 That the law merchant is recognized as part of the common law of England, see Co. Litt., 2 Inst., c. 30. 2 See 3 Banc., p. 414; and compare Lysander Spooner, on the Unconstitutionality of Slavery, p. 25. It may be admitted that, when the "trade to Africa" was first mentioned in English public Acts, no reference was had to slaves as articles of that trade. The association of the slave trade with that branch of English commerce was gradually formed between the reign of Elizabeth and 1662, when Charles II. incorporated a third African, or Guinea, company which undertook to supply the British Treaties are as much juridical acts on the part of the state or sovereign as are ordinary statutes; though the objects immediately contemplated may be beyond the realm. They may create rights and obligations which the national courts will enforce. The twelfth article of the Treaty of Utrecht, July 13, 1713, between Great Britain and Spain, granted "to her Brittanic Majesty and to the company of her subjects established for that purpose, as well the subjects of Spain as all others being excluded, the contract for introducing negroes into the several parts of the dominions of his Catholic Majesty in America (commonly called El Pacto del Assiento de Negros), for the space of thirty years." And the same section grants the occupancy of lands near the Rio de la Plata, "suitable for maintaining the servants of the said company and their negroes (nigritas), and for safely keeping them, the said negroes, for the purpose of being sold." 1 An Act, 1749-1750, 23 Geo. 2, c. 31, entitled, "An Act for extending and improving the trade to Africa," which begins, "Whereas the trade to Africa is very advantageous to Great Britain, and necessary for supplying the plantations and colo-> nies, thereunto belonging, with a sufficient number of negroes at reasonable rates," &c., must be taken to mean that the negro slaves brought or "supplied," were to be sold at reasonable rates. The sale and disposal of negroes as articles of merchandise is also referred to as one of the objects of the trade in sec. 20 of the Act of 1697, wherein " governors, deputy-governors, and judges are forbidden under penalty to act as a factor or factors, agent or agents, for the said company, or any other person or persons, for the sale or disposal of any negroes." And the lawfulness of chattel slavery, of negroes bought as articles of commerce on the coast of Africa, is not the less contemplated, by the Act of 1749-50, because in the twenty-ninth section it is enacted-" that no commander or master of any West Indies with 3,000 negroes annually. See 1 Hüne, p. 297-311. 2 Anderson's Hist. Com., p. 627. 'Dumont's Corps Diplomatique, Tom. viii., p. 395, and Wheaton's L. of Nations, p. 586; refers Dumont, Tom. viii., 2 me. partie, p. 344. "When [about 1750] the exclusive privileges of the Royal African Company expired, the English government undertook to maintain, at their own expense, the forts and factories on the African coast, and the trade was thrown open." 2 Hild. 427. |