Navy will be unable fully to safeguard its large investment in these newer aircraft.

The gradual expansion of naval aviation and its modernization requires the funds to operate and maintain the new and more complex aircraft. Every effort is being made to keep these expenses to the minimum.

The Department of the Navy requests the following amendment:

PROPOSED AMENDMENT

Page 19, line 20. Strike out "$3,810,042,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$3,960,042,000," the estimate, an increase of $150,000,000 over the House-approved amount.

EFFECT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT

The proposed amendment would permit accomplishment of the program objective of achieving a reasonably modern naval air arm by December 1954 providing there are no future increases in material costs or labor rates.

HOUSE REPORT

The House recommended reduction of $150,000,000 in the estimate, was based on the following two factors:

(1) Deletion of aircraft associated with the second large carrier, funding of which was deferred.

(2) Possible savings to be derived from a tightening up of contractual procedures and closer figuring of unit costs.

JUSTIFICATION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT

None of the aircraft in the 1953 budget are related to the new carrier requirement because of the difference in lead time required for aircraft production and the construction of the carrier. The Navy's heavy-attack aircraft, including those requested in the 1953 budget, are listed as carrier aircraft, inasmuch as most of them are planned for assignment to the air group on U. S. S. Forrestal which is already under construction. Unless these aircraft are authorized in 1953 for delivery in 1954, the carrier Air Group for the Forrestal could not be organized and trained in phase with the Forrestal's completion date in 1955.

In the area of contractual procedures, virtually all contracts involving procurement of new aircraft or major aircraft components including electronics are of the incentive type which provide for participation by the Government and the contractor in any savings in cost which the manufacturer can effect. Provision is made for redetermination of the unit cost at definite intervals during the life of the contract. In addition, all costs reported by the contractor are subject to review and audit by the Navy's cost inspection service. Finally, while we do not depend upon renegotiation to recover excessive profits, all contracts are subject to the renegotiation procedure.

. Cost estimates used in formulating the 1953 budget request reflected levels of material prices and labor rates current at the time the estimates were prepared and made no provision for any future increases in those factors. Experience during the past 2 years reflects steadily increasing costs for aircraft procurement. A continuation of this trend will preclude completion of the procurement program presented in the 1953 budget request. Under the procurement program presented in the original 1953 request, there will exist at December 31, 1954, a deficiency of more than 700 modern combat aircraft. A reduction of $150,000,000 in the estimates as passed by the House will further increase this deficiency. The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee has criticized the Navy, as well as the Air Force, for the slow delivery rates of aircraft. If this $150,000,000 is not

restored, it will reduce the numbers of aircraft available to the Navy by about 100 additional aircraft. Further, the combination of this $150,000,000 reduction and the expenditure ceiling imposed by the House not only will reduce the tot: numbers of aircraft that eventually will be available to Naval Aviation, but will force a further stretch-out in the program and slippage of aircraft deliveries scheduled for 1953 and 1954.

Senator O'MAHONEY. The Marine Corps is not concerned in this? | Admiral CLEXTON. No, sir.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Page 19, line 5, strike out $963 million and insert in lieu thereof $1,038 million, an increase of $75 million over the House approved amendment. The House committee made it $963 million and that was agreed to on the House floor. It is an increase over the appropriation for 1952.

Admiral COMBS. I have a statement here which covers this amendment and the one we are requesting involving restitution of $150 million under the appropriation "Construction of aircraft and related procurement, Navy."

Senator O'MAHONEY. You talk, sir, as though you thought they stole this money from you.

Admiral COMBS. I would not say that, sir. We do welcome, however, this opportunity to discuss with you the salient aspects of our aviation programs during the past year and our aviation objectives for fiscal year 1953. My statement today covers both the operational programming for Naval Aviation and the related budgetary requirements amounting to $4,538 million in new obligational authority.

Our request for fiscal year 1953 is predicated on the plans formulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and on the implementing directives issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. These directives contemplate larger average operating forces in 1953 but $300 million less in appropriations than the amounts provided during the current year for smaller average forces. The House of Representatives has further reduced these estimates by $225 million and in so doing has lowered the appropriations to a level that is inadequate to support programed naval and marine aviation during the coming year.

KOREAN OPERATIONS

Before proceeding with our new plans and requirements, however, I should like to summarize our operations in Korea. In these operations, naval aircraft-which include those integral to, our Marine Corps divisions as well as carrier and shore-based Navy planes-have amassed impressive totals of combat activity. Through May of this year, covering 23 months of war, we have flown over 150,000 combat sorties, totaling slightly more than one-third of all United States combat sorties, at a loss of about 360 aircraft to enemy action.

We have not had in Korea the intense air-to-air combat we had in World War II. Communist aircraft have not attacked our carrier task forces, which have been operating both in the Yellow and in the Japan Seas. While their MIG fighters have high performance for air-to-air combat, they lack range and endurance. The enemy undoubtedly has reasons for not employing his longer-range aircraf which could reach us but which are lacking in performance. He must recognize that, although we have not been engaged in actual fighting in the defense of our carrier task forces, we are maintaining these forces in a high state of readiness and, if need be, can defend them successfully.

In recent months, the offensive missions performed by naval aircraft have been predominantly interdiction and close support of ground troops. Interdiction has understandably received the greater emphasis but the close support of our ground troops definitely has not been neglected. During the last 6 months of 1951, for example, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft flew 55 percent of all close-support missions flown in Korea. Throughout this period our land-based and tenderbased patrol aircraft have continued air patrols and surveillance over the Japan, Yellow, and east China Seas and in the Formosa Straits. In addition, although submarines have not attacked our forces as yet, the threat remains and to counter this threat, we maintain in the Far East a carrier hunter-killer group to complement our patrol squadrons.

BASIC-I LANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Our budget plans and the supporting appropriation estimates both are predicated on termination of Korean hostilities by July 1, 1952, and accordingly make no provision for the support of combat operations in Korea or elsewhere after June 30, 1952. Continuance of hostilities during 1953 undoubtedly will lead to the incurring of increased costs over and above those contemplated in the budget requests you are now considering. The full extent of the impact of this planning assumption cannot, however, be estimated realistically until the scope of future combat activities is established.

Experience in Korea has afforded us valuable information for future planning, but although we obviously must be prepared for the possibility of other wars similar to Korea, we certainly cannot overlook the possibility of a general war. Naval aviation is being shaped to cope with either situation, even though during 1953 there will be no significant increase in the major air forces of the Navy and Marine Corps over those in being at the end of fiscal year 1952. Because of the build-up during the past year, however, our average aircraft strength for the coming year will be larger and the total number of aircraft flying hours will be approximately 20 percent greater than during the past year.

Operationally, the availability of small atomic weapons for use on tactical aircraft has altered our conception of air-to-ground warfare appreciably. All naval attack aircraft and all long-range fighter aircraft now under procurement, and all of those for which we are asking funds, will have the capability of carrying these small atomic weapons. In addition, we are modifying a significant number of aircraft procured in prior years to give them this capability. We still feel, however, that there is a place for the larger atomic bomb, and we now have on hand carrier planes capable of delivering them.

It is vital that we maintain and improve the air defense of our carrier task forces as well as their offensive capabilities. We are procuring interceptor aircraft of exceedingly high performance in air-toair combat which will enable us to provide a strong defense for our forces. These aircraft will be relatively limited in endurance and will have to be launched in time to meet incoming raids. For this reason, we must have airborne a maximum number of these planes in a minimum of time. This need is directly related to and is an important factor in the requirement for the second large carrier which was discussed by Admiral Fechteler.

Our most urgent need for the new carrier, however, stems from the increasing inadequacy of the carriers we now have relative to the

performance characteristics of modern aircraft. Billions of dollars already have been authorized and appropriated to the Air Force and to the Navy for aviation facilities ashore having longer and stronger runways and greater aircraft capacity generally. The same performance characteristics of modern aircraft that made necessary these large public works programs ashore make necessary a parallel but much less costly carrier program to provide adequate bases afloat in our carrier task forces. The great versatility and ready mobility of the Navy's carrier task forces constitute a military advantage so important to the defense capability of our Nation that the Nation cannot afford not to take full advantage of this major military asset.

AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT

As was explained last year, we are not restricting our aircraft procurement to models in production at the outset of the Communist invasion of Korea. During the past two years we have been balancing the current need for increased production against the longterm need for higher performance. We could have built more planes in the past 2 years, but it would have been at the expense of new aircraft models. We feel that our planned 1953 program likewise represents a good balance between current needs and future require ments. However, as Admiral Fechteler has stated, action taken by the House of Representatives will, if affirmed, sharply reduce our aircraft deliveries and in so doing will make a serious inroad on our combat readiness.

Our planned 1953 program calls for $2,898 million for the procurement of new aircraft. Even with this sum we would have s deficiency of more than 700 first-line combat aircraft by Decenber 31, 1954. The $150 million deleted by the House will increase this already serious deficiency by some 100 additional aircraft. In rec ommending this reduction, however, the House committee apparently assumed that our 1953 program included aircraft associated with the second large carrier which the House also eliminated. Actually none of the aircraft in our 1953 budget estimate are related to the new carrier requirement because of the approximately 2-year difference in lead-time between aircraft and carrier.

Our aircraft procurement program would be even more seriously disrupted by another action taken in the House. I make reference here to the House amendment which would impose a rigid limitation on expenditures in fiscal year 1953. Under this amendment, more than 500 aircraft now scheduled for delivery in 1953 could not be delivered in that year. Production delivery rates would have to be reduced one-fourth from those currently planned during 193 and could not then be accelerated to planned levels until mid-19 As a result of this enforced stretch-out, naval aviation would not be modernized until December 1956.

We accordingly are requesting complete reversal of the $150 million reduction in aircraft procurement imposed by House action.

COMPLEXITY OF MODERN AIRCRAFT

During the committee's session last Monday evening, there was considerable discussion of the feasibility of reducing the complexity of new aircraft. This problem has been receiving careful attention within the Navy but it must be emphasized that much of the present day complexity of aircraft is a direct reflection of an inescapable

military requirement for combat superiority. We do not believe that, as a practical matter, we can lower our performance requirements and we are concentrating instead on meeting these performance requirements with less complex equipment and at a lower over-all cost. Although we have not as yet attained this objective, we have progressed to the point where we can expect in a very few years to achieve it.

Our principal effort is directed toward simplifying use at the operational and maintenance level and simplifying manufacture. We are making progress in both of these areas but it is in the manufacturing stage that there lies the greatest promise of future savings. We have had under way for some time a definite program to reduce costs during the manufacturing stage and we already have developed a very practical method of lowering costs. Because of its great impact on future appropriation requirements, I should like to have our aviation industrial specialist, Captain Reynolds, show briefly what we are doing in this respect.

GUIDED MISSILES

Definite progress is being achieved toward the introduction of the guided missile as a service weapon. Our plans for 1953 call for a continuation of missile training and evaluation programs and for outfitting for the initial service use of a ship-to-air missile, an air-to-air missile and the first ship-to-surface attack missile. The first of these three missiles is covered in the appropriation estimates which will be presented by the Bureau of Ordnance. The other two are included in our aviation appropriations. Our plans also provide for the procurement of a limited number of other missiles of advanced performance for technical development and early evaluation.

Significant improvements in our methods of warfare will become possible with the introduction of these newly developed guided-missile weapons, but the introduction of these weapons will necessitate extensive changes in the equipment of our fleet combat-squadrons and of their supporting units throughout the Naval Aeronautical Organization. Initial provision for guided missile outfitting equipment has been included in the estimates you are now considering. This equipment will be used to outfit a number of fleet units so as to augment their present striking power with the capabilities of the new guidedmissile weapons now available.

NAVAL AVIATION TRAINING PROGRAM

All Naval Aviation personnel are included in the Navy personnel plan to be presented by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Personnel. There is one phase of the general personnel picture, however, which is of particular importance to the program now being considered and which has not as yet been discussed during these hearings. My remarks here pertain to the Naval Aviation training program which provides the technical and professional training required of all aviation personnel, whether pilots, air crewmen or groundsupport personnel.

The general expansion in our combat aviation forces and the increasing complexity of aviation equipment have combined to place steadily increasing demands on our Naval Air Training Command. We have added new technical training facilities and are almost doubling the monthly output of basic graduates in 1953. At the same