ering, a lot of prejudice and division, divisiveness that exist in America today by this bill if it is enacted into law. That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WAGGONNER. May I comment, Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, you can respond to the gentleman's question. Mr. WAGGONNER. The gentleman concludes by saying we are going to eliminate a lot of prejudice and divisiveness and bickering which is going on in this country today by passing this so-called civil rights proposal. I don't think any of our members need to be very long in remembering that this same claim was laid to each of the previous civil rights proposals that we have had in recent years, beginning with my first session in the Congress, the 87th Congress, and I don't think any of you will challenge the statement when I make the statement that none of these have accomplished what its proponents said. Now the gentleman started by saying that neither he nor I were real estate experts. I readily agree that I am not. And I accept the gentleman's statement that he is not. But the very fact that he admits that he is a lawyer, that as a Member of Congress, and I admit that I, not as a lawyer, but as a Member of Congress considering this legislation, cannot class myself as a real estate expert makes necessary the usage of third parties in conducting real estate transactions. And the use of third parties is outlawed by this proposal if a man is not to be subject to the penalty of the law after a due process of time, when the law is fully in effect. Now there isn't anything in the present law today that prevents any man who owns a home or any real estate man who is engaged in the real estate business from selling to whomever they want to, if they want to. These things can be done now if people want to. I think the very fact that people don't want to is demonstrated by virtue of the fact that they haven't been doing these things that we are going to compel them to do by passage of this legislation. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Anderson? Mr. JOHN B. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, just one question. I understood the gentleman to say that he interprets section 805 to say that a financial institution cannot deny a loan. Mr. WAGGONNER. Yes, sir. Mr. JOHN B. ANDERSON. I read those words "to deny a loan" in connection with the next clause "or to discriminate against him because of race, color, religion, or national origin." I don't see how you can come to the conclusion that this is a prohibition against turning down a loan. Don't you have to read in the other clause in that section? Mr. WAGGONNER. Yes, sir. But it says "or to discriminate against him in the fixing of the amount of interest rate, duration or other terms or conditions of such loan or other financial assistance." Mr. JOHN B. ANDERSON. Because of race, color, religion, or national origin. Mr. WAGGONNER. But not the basic right. The basic right to deny the loan is not included in those prohibitions. Now the English construction, Mr. Anderson, simply is not there. Mr. JOHN B. ANDERSON. Well, I wouldn't set myself up as a stylist and perhaps the gentleman's knowledge of syntax is better than mine; it probably is. But I still think you have to consider the paragraph as a whole. You just can't take out one clause and ignore the other language in that section. I just can't conceive of this Congress or any other Congress writing a law saying that a financial institution must make a particular loan. And I would think we could make that very clear not only in these hearings, but on the floor. Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Anderson, that proves the point; that is the reason this legislation needs to go to committee where some of these things can be worked out. I thank you for that contribution. Mr. MATSUNAGA. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. JOHN B. ANDERSON. Yes, I yield. Mr. MATSUNAGA. I am inclined to agree with the gentleman from Illinois. There is a comma after the word "assistance" there. If that comma were missing then I would agree with the gentleman from Louisiana. But there is that comma before the word "because." It reads, "because of race, color, religion, or national origin of such person." So that definitely this clause would modify the denial of loans also. And I think the fears of the gentleman from Louisiana are truly unfounded. And I might say that as one who has had some experience in legal interpretation of statutes. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bolling? Mr. BOLLING. No questions, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Anderson? Mr. WILLIAM R. ANDERSON. No questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. MATSUNAGA. No further questions. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Waggonner. I think you have made a very able statement about this matter. It is going to be up to the committee tomorrow. Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, before I go, could I concur with the gentleman from Missouri? We don't always agree on some of our politics, but I would agree with the gentleman from Missouri that the die was cast and this issue I think had been settled to a degree as to what this committee would do--and what the House would do-prior to the events of last Thursday night. I agree with his appraisal of the situation prior to last Thursday night. The CHAIRMAN. Just one further thing. I would like to get the opinion of the able gentleman from Louisiana on this. As to the antiriot bill which the country was so much interested in, I noticed on the TV and other media of communication that this rioting, this burning, this looting, this thing that required some 12,000 troops to come in here, is now being called by those in authority in the District a civil disturbance. I take it that under that language, if that were adopted, this whole antiriot bill wouldn't amount to much. Thank you very much. Mr. WAGGONNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess at this time until tomorrow morning at 10:30, when the die will be cast if it hasn't already been cast. And the witnesses who were scheduled and who asked to be heard who could not come today will have an opportunity to express their views, following the procedure of this committee to permit everybody to express themselves. (Thereupon, at 12 noon, the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m. the following day.) (The following was subsequently supplied:) STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE ARMISTEAD SELDEN Mr. Chairman and members of the Rules Committee, I welcome this opportunity to share with you my views concerning the legislation presently under consideration, House Resolution 1100, which provides that H.R. 2516 be taken from the Speaker's table and the Senate amendment be agreed to. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the adoption of this resolution, and I urge that it be amended so as to send H.R. 2516 back to the Judiciary Committee so that the proper legislative procedure can be followed by the holding of hearings on those matters that have not been considered by the 90th Congress. I might add that it appears that the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee also should be consulted concerning several titles of the revised version of H.R. 2516. This pending legislation tramples on the basic English Law and U.S. Constitutional principles of the rights of property. Yet, we have seen in recent days an attempt to coerce the Congress to enact this legislation-not on the merits or constitutionality of the measure but rather under the threat of mob violence in the streets of this nation. We in the Congress must not bow to this coercion. We will not be coerced. Mr. Chairman, during 1966 the House of Representatives approved legislation containing similar provisions as those in H.R. 2516. The basis of the provisions of the so-called open housing sections at that time was the commerce clause. Undoubtedly, that vehicle now has been dropped, and the proponents of the Senate amendments now appear to base this legislation on the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. In view of a long series of Supreme Court cases, it is evident to me that this cannot be the basis for the constitutionality of Title VIII of H.R. 2516. I believe that United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, makes this point crystal clear, for in that case the Court said: "It is commonplace that rights under the equal protection clause arise only where there has been involvement of the State or of one acting under the color of its authority. The equal protection clause 'does not . . . add anything to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another.' (United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554–555)." Also the Court pointed out in the 1948 decision in Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1: "The principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the 14th amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the State. That amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Mr. Chairman, Title VIII of H.R. 2516, as passed by the Senate, is a travesty upon the conscience of our people. Through the years American citizens have been encouraged to privately own real property. Indeed, the ownership of a home in fee simple is the dream of millions of Americans. I do not believe that the federal government-or any government-should have the power to interfere with the rights of citizens to exercise their rights over their property, as H.R. 2516 seeks to grant. We have been bombarded with propaganda about the conflict between "property rights" and "human rights," but, in truth, there is no such conflict. The ownership of property in our society carries with it rights and responsibilities which are indisputably "human rights." Chief among these is the individual owner's right to manage and sell and rent and use his property. As long as the owner pays the taxes on his property and uses it for no illegal or immoral purpose, he can do with it what he wishes. He can occupy it, vacate it, sell it, or rent it as he sees fit and to whom he wishes. If H.R. 2516 is enacted in its present form, this will no longer be true. Title VIII of this measure constitutes a dictatorial imposition on the homeowner by the federal government. It constitutes the use of federal force to divest an owner of fundamental rights and prerogatives which have always gone with ownership under our system. It gives preference to one party to a proposed transaction by denying to the other his freedom of choice. Mr. Chairman, human rights cannot exist without property rights and a healthy respect for both. Any attempt to destroy or weaken the right of private ownership of property is an attempt to destroy a system of private capital and to substitute a totalitarian form of government in its place. Any government which has the power to give all of its citizens everything can be the same government which can subsequently take away all rights of all citizens of majority and minority groups alike, reducing them to the status of slaves and subjugating them absolutely to the tyranny of an all-powerful bureaucracy. For those who clamor so loudly for federal action to correct what they regard as a wrong should reflect that this same federal action may some day be used against them. Mr. Chairman, I believe that most Americans subscribe to the philosophy of the English statesman William Pitt, who said in the 18th century: "The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all force of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter, the rain may enter-but the King of England cannot enter; all of his force dares not cross the threshold. ***" Our federal judiciary has followed William Pitt's philosophy. As Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion in Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 stated: "An individual's right to restrict the use of his property, however unregenerate a particular exercise of that right may be thought, lies beyond the reach of the 14th amendment. The dilution or virtual elimination of that right cannot well be justified either on the premise that it will hasten formal repeal of outworn laws or on the ground that it will facilitate prudent State action is a case of that kind." Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Rules Committee, I respectfully urge that you give most careful consideration to House Resolution 1100 and, in your wisdom, require that the latest civil rights legislation-H.R. 2516-be returned to the appropriate committees of the House of Representatives so that the will of the people, through their elected representatives, may be heard on this dangerous and far-reaching proposal. Thank you very much. TO PRESCRIBE PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN ACTS OF VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 1968 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, The committee met at 10:50 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room H-313, the Capitol, Hon. William M. Colmer (chairman of the committee) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will resume its consideration of House Resolution 1100 and House Resolution 1118, the so-called civil rights bill. Mr. Wiggins, I believe you would like to make a presentation. STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. WIGGINS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I first thank you all for the privilege of offering my testimony on this bill, H.R. 2516. My testimony shall be confined to titles I and VIII of the bill. It is not my purpose to comment upon the need, if any, for this legislation, nor the moral issues which may be involved and which others have raised. My remarks will be addressed only to the constitutionality of the two titles. The tragic events of the past few days have no legal relevancy on this constitutional issue. Mr. Chairman, the most important single fact is that we are discussing Federal legislation. Our Federal Government possesses no general police power jurisdiction to do whatever may seem reasonable and necessary to protect the public interest. General governmental powers of this sort are reserved to the States. State governments may, and have, enacted open housing laws without serious constitutional challenge. I am personally unaware of any constitutional bar to the enactment of a carefully drawn open housing law at the State level. But to concede the power to act on the part of States is no admission that such power exists at the Federal level. This is what the federal system is all about. Further amplification on the point should be unnecessary. I am sure that every member of this committee agrees with the elementary proposition that the Federal Government possesses only limited, enumerated powers as a starting point for a discussion of the constitutional issues. |