Mrs. COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Engen. I am sure you are aware of some of the allegations that have been made against the FAA.

For example, yesterday in their testimony, ALPA said that FAA seems to be involved in some kind of coverup with Continental. This certainly concerned me. What is your response to statements that you are somehow in collusion with Continental?

That was in their summary. Earlier, when discussing safety, Captain Duffy indicated that ALPA could not be true to their safety mission, if they were less than candid, in their professional assessment of FAA's investigation of incidents concerning the new Continental.

Here is a direct quote. "In truth, there is more covering up being done, and the uncovering and covering of safety violations."

Mr. ENGEN. Madam Chairwoman, I take grave exception to being accused of covering up because as a Federal agency, we pride ourselves on impartiality and applying the Federal Aviation Regulations in a fair and equitable manner. There will never, ever be a coverup as long as I am at the FAA, and I wish to hurry to assure you of my belief in this. When I spoke in my preamble, my summary of comments, I mentioned that we have been averaging 3.8 inspections of Continental every single day for the last 265 days. This is continuing, and we are continuing to look at the allegations that are brought up. I would like to say that as a practical matter, that many offices are involved in the investigations, and I mentioned that there are some 19 actively involved offices, actively involved in investigating those issues that are brought up. We will address each issue that ALPA brings to us with impartiality, and will do it as completely as we possibly can.

Mrs. COLLINS. Well, let's talk about your surveillance program. You mentioned during your opening remarks that the FAA had conducted over a thousand surveillances of Continental. ALPA claims that even though you might have had a thousand surveillances, that they have been done by people who are your inspectors, who are unqualified or very poorly trained What is your view about that? How well can they do if they are not qualified to do an adequate job?

Mr. ENGEN. Let me address that generally, if I may, and then I am going to ask Mr. Broderick to make a couple of comments.

First of all, we are trying to increase our flexibility within the FAA to do inspections. In trying to do more, we are cross-training our people in general aviation to become air carrier inspectors. We are cross-training our air carrier inspectors to become general aviation inspectors. We are conducting a very intensive training campaign to qualify all of our inspectors. These people are used as required to go out and address the specific issues that are brought up. I have great confidence in these people. We also monitor their performance through management actions.

Now, I would like to ask Mr. Broderick to make a few comments, if I may, please.

Mr. BRODERICK. The situation with regard to air transportation and air commerce in general has changed very markedly over the last couple of decades. There no longer is a sharp and clear dividing line between general aviation and air carrier activity. As a

result, what we are doing, as the Administrator indicated, is crosstraining people. This training is the finest that we can buy. It is provided at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City, and we feel it is the best use of available resources to have people qualified, and that is the important word, qualified to do a broader variety of tasks with the increasing variety of aircraft and operations that are present in the real world today.

Mrs. COLLINS. Well, let me ask you this, Mr. Engen. Last year when you were a member of the National Transportation Safety Board, I understand that the Board criticized FAA's surveillance procedures in several very highly publicized incidents. I think my question should have been, what have you done since you have been Administrator of FAA, to enhance the FAA's surveillance procedures now that you have become the Administrator?

Mr. ENGEN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. When I joined the FAA in April of this year, just 2 months ago, I brought with me a very strong safety bias. I have placed upon the agency a requirement to be responsive, to get the job done quickly, and as efficiently as possible. I have emphasized training in our inspector force. Before I joined the FAA, Secretary Dole, as you know, had said in February of this year, that she was announcing that we were increasing our inspector levels by 166 people, and she was placing special emphasis upon the air carriers. There followed the National Air Transportation Inspection Program which has completed phase 1. We are now completing phase 2, and tomorrow I will have on my desk the interim report from that. I have stressed, besides this responsiveness, thoroughness of inspections, and particularly an impartiality in any disputes between two parties.

Mrs. COLLINS. Yesterday in their testimony, ALPA described what they considered to be some very serious deficiencies that had happened in a landing at La Guardia. We were then told that involved Continental's flight 482; that it had been involved in a hard landing; there was some wrinking; that the airplane had been flown for five or six other flights; that should have been seen and recognized by everybody; and that when the matter was brought to your attention-"When we reported this to the FAA, we were told that we were wrong. The plane was still in New York." Now, the plane wasn't in New York. The plane was elsewhere.

How could something like this come about?

Mr. ENGEN. Madam Chairwoman, as I understand the sequence of events, if I could take just a moment and go back, on December 28, 1983, Continental flight B-727 experienced a hard landing at La Guardia. The flight had originated in Portland, OR, with an intermediate stop at Denver before going on to La Guardia. The crew, as I understand, went back and inspected the aircraft. It was raining and it was dark, and there was a series of inspections of the airplane, and they looked for particular things that would be found in a hard landing. I am just relating the facts that have been given to me, and I don't want to place any evaluation on this because the NTSB is, in fact, investigating this, and that is under their purview.

So it was reported that they went back to check for the oxygen masks, which may have fallen from the overhead, which is an indication, an early indication of a hard landing, and it was reported to

me that no oxygen masks had fallen, but that the corners of two panels had come down, and the flight engineer replaced them. It has been reported to me that they did, in fact, inspect the airplane, and subsequently it was reported, as you have said, by an American Airlines traffic tower, ground traffic tower there, that there was a wrinkle along the fuselage. This was after six additional flights had been flown on the airplane.

When that occurred, the crew, it was reported to me, taxied back in and went to the tower themselves to investigate it.

Subsequent to that, now, I understand that the designated engineering representative of Continental who has the authority-he is designated by the FAA-has the authority to evaluate the situation, and make a decision. In concert with discussions with Boeing, I have found that the designated engineering representative placed a Boeing-approved patch over that particular area, and authorized a one-time flight without passengers to their maintenance activity, which is in accordance with the regulations.

I have two pictures here, if I could bring them forward and just pass them to you. I think you saw them yesterday, but I would like to show them to you, and I would call your attention to the area of the American flag, and you will see how difficult it is to see. I am not making any excuses, but I want you to just see these pictures. Our Los Angeles office was alerted, the FAA was alerted, that this action had been taken, and our Los Angeles office-it was officially noted on the 3d of January that the aircraft was en route to Los Angeles, and they did, in fact, meet the airplane and did, in fact, inspect it at that time. That was the first time the FAA personnel inspected the airplane.

Mrs. COLLINS. Mr. McGrath.

Mr. McGRATH. I find, Admiral, some disturbing inconsistencies with things that we are told in accordance with FAA regulations. Certain inspections that should have been done but were not done in accordance with FAA regulations. A Boeing patch was put over the fuselage of the airplane to fly it to Los Angeles in accordance with FAA regulations. Yesterday, testimony regarding a flight attendant's test at training course with Continental where they gave not only the test but the answers to the questions, in accordance with FAA regulations.

Now, it seems to me that there may be something askew here if the regulations allow things, which to a layman seem to be a little bit out of whack.

Could you comment on that?

Mr. ENGEN. Yes, sir, Mr. McGrath. I view with concern any time that it appears that we are not doing that which we are supposed to do. On the Boeing patch, we have a number of air carriers out there, a large number of air carriers, and in order that we don't become a burden to the American people in the cost of having the numbers of people that would be required, we have over time used the designated engineering representative as a means of managing oversight of the many airlines out there. We train each of these people. They meet our standards, and there is a specific amount of trust and confidence which is placed in the airline itself to insure that these people fairly and openly do their job. I have heard comments from the companies that often that they wonder why they

pay the salary of these people because they, in turn, are putting them on report, so they have a different view. That is just to show that I think that the designated engineering representatives as a class do a very good job.

In the matter of training, I think that I would like to ask Mr. Broderick, if I can, to mention some facts about the training. I would say in passing that we also provide the answers to pilot exams and other examinations in a way that people can understand the proper answers. I don't say that pilots have the answers in front of them when they take their tests, or anything like that, but we try to be as open with these examinations as possible so that people can understand what it is that is expected of them. Mr. Broderick.

Mr. BRODERICK. With regard to the specific question about flight attendant training that you raised, sir, that wasn't mentioned in the Administrator's opening statement, his informal remarks, because it took place before the strike.

Mr. MCCANDLESS. Would you pull the microphone just a little closer to you, please?

Mr. BRODERICK. I am sorry; is that better?

The actual training of the flight attendants to which you referred took place before the strike; our takeoff point was the strike itself. That training took place in Denver. It did not take place in the Western Pacific region, but in the Northwest mountain region. It involved approximately 650 flight attendants. Only about 450 flight attendants were eventually graduated from that school, and six individual, independent inspections were made by different inspectors doing surveillance on those flight attendant training classes. Those are the facts as we have them with regard to that particular set of flight attendant training classes.

Mr. ENGEN. I would add, Mr. McGrath, that I take seriously your concerns, and they are my concerns as well, and I will continue in the future to examine these areas to insure that we do meet that which we are required.

Mrs. COLLINS. Before we get too far away from the issue of this landing at La Guardia, I want to ask one more question. It is my understanding from ALPA that when FAA inspectors came out to look at the plane, that Continental employees would not let them look at it. Is this the case?

Mr. ENGEN. I am going to pass that directly to Mr. McClure, if I may, please.

Mrs. COLLINS. Mr. McClure.

Mr. MCCLURE. Madam Chairwoman, that is absolutely incorrect. We have had complete access to the Continental maintenance hangar in Los Angeles all during the course of the strike period as well as before the strike. We were given access immediately to the airplane when it was ferried to Los Angeles, and met it on the ramp.

Mrs. COLLINS. So at no time were you ever denied access to the airplane at all?

Mr. MCCLURE. No, ma'am. We have never been denied access to any of the Continental facilities-

Mrs. COLLINS. Not for one single minute?

Mr. MCCLURE. Before the strike or after the strike.

Mrs. COLLINS. Thank you very much. Mr. McGrath, on your own time.

Mr. McGRATH. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I have a couple of questions that are generic in nature, and then I would like to get into the incident that brought us all here. One of the fundamental points made by witnesses yesterday seems to concern the difficulties facing the FAA, and that being one of developing our air space system in many respects, and at the same time regulating its safety. Has the FAA faced greater pressure in this area, trying to balance these two poles since deregulation; and do you foresee future problems in balancing these questions?

Mr. ENGEN. Mr. McGrath, I think that there is always a tug and a pull between planning and operations, and I would be less than candid if I didn't say that it is always a manager's problem in making the future come true while dealing with the issues today. That is a charge that I take very seriously, and we are working very hard through Congress' good offices to develop the National Air Space Systems Plan, so that as we go into the 21st century, we will have a new and upgraded system.

With regard to regulating and monitoring the day-to-day operations as we go along, that is a very real problem, and we are dealing with it. Speaking nationwide, traffic levels today are in excess of those that they were in July 1981 which was prestrike. We are running somewhere around 108 percent of the traffic levels at that time. We are doing it safely. I want to hasten to say to this committee that I am dedicated to safety in the system. I personally monitor it on an hourly and day-by-day effort. We have flow control which is an anathema, if you will, to some of those that use the system because it does slow down traffic so that we pace airplanes into airports at a rate which they can accept. We do have four airports which are chockablock, if I can use that term, and where we are working very hard to create more capability of receiving aircraft. They are O'Hare, La Guardia, John F. Kennedy, and Washington National. We are working daily trying to do this, and we are using flow control.

There is a problem, but let me say that in no way are those efforts affecting the safety of the system. We continue to maintain safety.

Mr. McGRATH. Yesterday we heard testimony regarding the role of traffic controllers. The chief pilot at Continental referred to problems as far as taxiing and whatever, coming in too short or too long, or whatever, that the traffic controller would get together with the pilots afterwards and have a cup of coffee over it, and now they are being reported. What do the Federal Aviation Regulations require? We heard about traffic controllers being cops, or facilitators. What do they require in terms of reporting, in terms of near misses and other potentially dangerous situations?

Mr. ENGEN. I am going to ask Mr. Broderick to quote directly from our facility operation administration manual which addresses this.

I feel, just as a user of the system, as a pilot having used it myself for 42 years, and as I know everybody who is using it today-everybody in the system has a responsibility to report, to