Mr. ONSTAD. The next point we'd like to address just briefly is the testimony of the good Dr. McGraw. I should tell you at the outset that to my knowledge, he never asked the company whether or not we would cooperate in that study. He very fuzzily draws the line between people who are on strike that he's talked to, and alleged people, working people he's talked to, and there seems to be no clear demarcation.

I would note that his degree is, he is not a medical doctor. He has a masters and doctorate in clinical psychology from North Texas State University. I also note that he's done considerable work in weight-loss programs and nutritional management, but I don't know that he has any experience in aviation safety psychology of any note. I would also submit to you that if you look at the Boston University study on air traffic controllers, which is recognized throughout the world as the leading study on stress analysis-it took 5 years and a very qualified team of people—that Mr. McGraw's study will not withstand the analysis by a peer group of similarly competent people. I will also note that the good Dr. McGraw failed to note a recent NASA study, "Cleared for Visual Approach: Human Factor Problems in Air Carrier Operations, NASA Document CR166573," in which they studied 354 incidents of air carriers, ALPA pilots, cleared for approach, prior to the PATCO strike, the 33 months were May 1978 to January 1981. The NASA study finds that there were 244 conflicts reported; 25 unstabilized approaches; 35 altitude deviations; 31 landings without tower clearances; 25 landings on approaches or runways, wrong runways; 9 landings or approaches at the wrong airport; 60 sent toward terrain or obstacles.

Also note that Mr. Duffy, when he says he wasn't in the compiling business, well NASA is, and that's the result of their analysis. Namely, that there are any number of these occurrences that go on, day in and day out, even when they are cleared for a visual approach, which is supposed to be the optimum condition. There were repeated references to the fact that there is a safety institution at an airline, because you're represented by ALPA, and the allegation is that Continental doesn't have one. I would be glad to have Mr. Hillman address that particular point.

Mr. HILLMAN. Thank you. I would want to say real quickly, and bring you up to date a little bit on my background in that I have been with Continental 17 years, and an ALPA member during that time, and have served on various ALPA committees. Also during that time, I've been in management 10 years.

I can recall throughout this time, there were always designated ALPA safety representatives. However, I can also recall in late 1982 and early 1983, we had a series of incidents, three or four situations where an aircraft took off without the required fuel, to reach destination, had to make unscheduled field stops. A couple of taxi accidents-these are the things that I'm sure Mr. Laughlin was referring to in terms of incidents that we would investigate. At that time, I was a chief pilot in Los Angeles. I do not recall ever hearing from the designated safety representative from ALPA. ALPĂ would attend the hearing to defend the pilot, but never did the safety man come. Now we did have a body, which I felt was very, very beneficial in the area of safety, called the Flight

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Standards Advisory Committee, made up of line pilots; who would meet with us on a regular basis, and we would discuss safety procedures and so on. We have that same body in force today. We started it up again shortly after the filing of the bankruptcy. We have eight pilots on the committee; it's called now the Operational Safety and Standards Group. All but two of the eight were pilots with us prior to the filing. We have representatives from captains of DC-10's, 727's, DC-9's, we have some flight engineer representatives. This body does exactly the same function that the Flight Standards Advisory Committee does, in that they provide us inputs from the line operation on the recommendations on how they feel we should attack safety problems; change procedures when necessary; fuel conservation, and so on.

So, I feel we definitely do have a good working safety committee on the property of Continental Airlines today.

Mr. ONSTAD. I would like to also return one more time to the study by Dr. McGraw. We'd like to submit to the committee a letter from the Kelsey-Seeboldt Clinic. These people actually see our working pilots day in and day out. I would like to simply read to you two paragraphs, if I may, of this letter from a man who's examined numerous working Continental pilots. This is by Dr. A.D. Catterson, M.D.:

I have not found evidence of any physiological strain or fatigue among these pilots resulting from their working experience. I have, in fact, been somewhat surprised by the fact that several pilots responded to my questions about any difficulties they were experiencing from the new flight schedules or demands placed upon them by their present situation, with statements to the effect that they felt much more confident in their ability to handle the aircraft, since they had been flying more hours per month than they were prior to the airline reorganization. More than a few of these pilots have stated that they were flying so infrequently under the old schedule, that they really thought their proficiency suffered for lack of continuous, active, hands-on experience in controlling the aircraft.

His final paragraph—

These flying pilots in general convey an attitude of confidence, optimism and dedication to re-building a stronger, satisfying career. They appear to feel quite comfortable about the decision that they have made. In considering my experience in examining these people over the past year, it is my honest, professional opinion that they are in excellent health as a group, physically and emotionally. My experience as a medical counselor and flight examiner has not given me any indication that the pilots flying for Continental Airlines are any less healthy or less well adjusted than other pilots that I see day in and day out in my airport practice.

Finally, Madam Chairperson, I'd like to note that when you asked Mr. Duffy about the hard landing, he said that the hard landing was the most serious incident Mr. Duffy has seen in this industry.

I offer this picture, not to say Mr. Duffy is unsafe, but simply to show you a comparison. This is Mr. Duffy's aircraft, after he landed 3,500 feet long in Chattanooga, TN, in 1973, and ended up 420 feet at the other end of the runway. Mr. Duffy surrendered his certificate for 25 days as a result of that accident.

There is not a single incident in the evidence that you have before you of a single Continental pilot having even one incident that comes close to that accident.

Thank you.

Mrs. COLLINS. Well, there is a vote on, so before we get on to questions, why don't we just adjourn for 10 minutes and come back and begin our questions.

[Recess taken.]

Mrs. COLLINS. This hearing of the Government Activities and Transportation Subcommittee will reconvene at this time.

Mr. ONSTAD. Madam Chairwoman, could I have 1 more minute at this time, I realize that I forgot to ask that our entire written statement-I only summarized our written statement-that our entire statement be accepted for the record.

Mrs. COLLINS. Without objection, it will be inserted into the record at this point in its entirety.

[Mr. Onstad's prepared statement, with exhibits, follows:]

TESTIMONY OF CONTINENTAL AIR LINES, INC.

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT

ACTIVITIES AND TRANSPORTATION

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Madame Chairperson and Members of the Subcommittee, Continental Airlines deeply appreciates the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee. The subject of the hearing, "Aviation Safety Management" is a matter Continental takes very seriously.

Continental has devoted hundreds of millions

of dollars and 50 years of effort to ensure the highest level of aviation safety. We are certain that any objective reading of the record Continental is laying before the Subcommittee will lead to two firm conclusions. First, Continental's safety record is equal to or better than that of any other major U.S. air carrier. Second, the Air Line Pilots Association's (ALPA) claims, like those of PATCO three years ago, are an undistinguished attempt to garb an economic argument in a safety cloak.

Concomitantly, Continental's testimony poses three important public policy questions for the Subcommittee's consideration: (a) Are the harassment efforts of ALPA and the drain which they are placing on the FAA's resources