of all, it came from pilots on other airlines, pilots who were becoming increasingly concerned about near misses; about Continental aircraft crossing their runways or glidepaths; about spilled fuel causing fire hazards; and damaged aircraft being used in revenue passenger service. And so ALPA began to keep close track of the new Continental. In other words, we didn't set about to exploit every picayune fault to gain a public relations advantage in the strike.

Our concentrated safety watch on the new Continental began as a defensive action, to protect the pilots and passengers on the airlines that share the skies with Continental. After all, that's why ALPA was formed 53 years ago and adopted as its motto "Schedule with Safety." Let me summarize our findings.

Incidents we've been able to verify include deviating from assigned altitudes, resulting in near misses; overflying both final approach courses on parallel runways; taking off without clearances; flying damaged or improperly maintained equipment; crossing active runways without clearance; taking off below minimums; and flying excessive distances off course; just to name a few.

We believe that the FAA's principal operations inspector for Continental Airlines has discounted incidences out of hand without proper investigation. We learned that the FAA's investigation of a blatant duty-time violation consisted of checking the trip schedule, not the actual flight times, hardly a textbook example of investigative technique.

We found a pattern of human performance failures by new Continental pilots, from willful wrongdoing to ignorance of proper procedures to inadvertent errors, most of which experience tells us are caused by stress. Some of these human performance failures leads ALPA to the inescapable conclusion Continental is pushing its pilots beyond the limit of human endurance. We were shocked by Continental's inadequate training program for pilots, especially since the airline was previously famed for the depth and professionalism of its pilot training. In fact, Madam Chairwoman, Continental passengers are paying to participate in an innovative training program for pilots-on the job training in real airplanes with real passengers. Passengers are paying to train a whole generation of new hires and instant upgrades.

Then there is the matter of flight and duty time. Work rules were changed to meet FAA minimum flight hours. Unfortunately, duty time is unregulated, and in spite of company assurances that it would never abuse its pilots, it happened. And as pilots can tell you, when fatigue sets in, the margin of safety narrows. We learned that the new Continental is not attracting qualified, experienced employees. Instead, it upgrades first officers to captain after only 6 months' experience. The industry norm is 14 years.

Let me tell you what the National Transportation Safety Board had to say about that type of situation. And you should ask them about it when they appear before you tomorrow. Their report on the 1982 Air Florida flight 90 accident states:

Both the industry and the traveling public have come to expect the highest degree of performance and professionalism from flight crews, of scheduled air carrier operations, and particularly from airline captains. The Board believes that the captain of flight 90 missed the seasoning experience normally gained as a first officer, as a

result of the rapid expansion of Air Florida, wherein pilots were upgraded faster than the industry norm to meet the increasing demands of growing schedules.

The new Continental's termination rate of new pilots is as much as 40 times the industry norm, demonstrating a lack of care in the hiring process. Continental's unilaterally imposed working conditions have reduced its pilots to subprofessional status. People do what they are told when they are told, no questions asked. Personally, I think the traveling public wants a pilot to tell the company when it is unsafe to fly, because of weather or equipment, and then won't fly. A new Continental pilot who does that is subject to instant dismissal. They are so afraid of losing their jobs that they won't even properly report a potentially life endangering accident, and I'm referring to the pilots of Continental 462, who were involved in an abnormal landing accident on December 28, 1983, at LaGuardia Airport.

Based on crew statements from their hearing regarding this accident, the crew knew that they had incurred "an other than normal landing." Obviously, fearing reprisal from the company, they chose not to report the accident, and the aircraft subsequently flew in six revenue passenger flights; until December 31, 1983, when American Airlines personnel observed wrinkles in the fuselage and reported the damage. The damage to the aircraft specified in the National Transportation Safety Board's report included structural damage to 19 of the airplane's 59 stringers, which are like the support I-beams in the ceiling up here.

We have a diagram that we'd like to pass out, that will show the damage; so sensitive to the structure of the aircraft is the critical area, that a special warning on page 1 of section 53-12-0 reads:

Warning: Drilling of holes in the upper low body stringers number 9 left through number 9 right from body station 440 to body station 1183 is not permitted because this area is a critical stress area.

Hundreds of lives were jeopardized as the aircraft could have broken apart in flight, if it had encountered severe turbulence. A 2foot by 20-foot long metal plate was installed on the outside of the fuselage, and under the cover of darkness, the aircraft was ferried to Los Angeles.

When we reported this to the FAA, we were told that we were wrong. The plane was still in New York, or so the FAA thought. It was flown to Los Angeles prior to an inspection by the FAA's New York office. When the plane arrived in Los Angeles, it was locked in a hangar and hidden from all interested parties; the same way this unscrupulous Continental management is trying to hide all of their safety violations.

All in all, we found 152 safety-compromising incidents on Continental since November 1983, in just 7 months. The complete list has been provided to the members of this subcommittee. And we reported them to the FAA. Rather than just submitting a collection of meaningless reports, I demanded that our staff verify as many as possible. ATC tapes and other information must be scrutinized; other witnesses found and statements checked. As a result, ALPA's own staff of experts, without the benefit of the Government's subpoena power and other investigative resources, have verified 66 of

these-66, and the number grows as we gain access to information, the FAA could have had at the snap of its fingers.

We took all this data to the FAA. Why? Because we knew that the traveling public and the airline employees who serve them have had a high degree of confidence in the integrity of safety investigations performed by the Federal Aviation Administration. We knew these investigations to be thorough, unbiased, and diligent. Both the investigations and the investigators were of the highest professional and ethical standards. That's all past tense.

It is my sad duty to report that we have grave reservations about the integrity of current FAA safety investigations, based on ALPA's experience with the FAA's handling of our own reported incidents involving the new Continental Airlines. ALPA is uncomfortable in this role of fingerpointing. We've had a long and cooperative relationship with the FAA, particularly in safety matters. We want it to continue. It must continue, because ALPA members fly the preponderance of air transport time in this country.

I expressed that opinion to the administrator before coming here. We know how important the FAA's role is. It can make a significant contribution to the public confidence in America's air transportation system. That's why ALPA is shocked and saddened to see the FAA fail to conduct a professional, thorough investigation on which the industry has relied for so many years.

I invite the subcommittee's close attention to the exchange of correspondence between ALPA's safety experts and the FAA, which is contained in our submitted testimony. It is a classic example of an agency that either can't or won't do its job. Note the delays in responding. See how ALPA is chided for not providing more information faster, when the information we must ferret out for the FAA comes from its own tapes and records. Examine the bureaucratic classic of closing incidents that ALPA never raised. Marvel at the fact that the only two incidents that the FAA uncovered on its own were two that had been widely reported in the media, and then ask yourself, as we asked ourselves, is the watchdog of the airline industry on a short leash, or is it now all bark and no bite?

As I stated earlier, air safety was the principle reason for the formation of ALPA. Through the years, safety has been our mission. We would not be true to that mission if we were less than candid in our professional assessment of the FAA's investigation of incidents concerning the new Continental.

In truth, there is more covering up being done than the uncovering and correcting of safety violations. Whether this is happening out of design or sheer incompetence, we don't know, but it is happening.

The West Pacific regional office pleaded manpower shortage. That hardly squares with the official pronouncement of the number of man-hours spent on the investigation. It is one thing to spend the time; quite another to do it productively. We also find it very curious that Clark Onstad, former chief counsel of the FAA and present vice president of government affairs for Continental, has been able to receive copies of internal FAA correspondence about ALPA and proceed to distribute them to the Congress and leak them to the media. These documents were leaked to the press,

despite the fact that subsequent information provided the FAA by ALPA forced the investigations to be reopened.

We're concerned when the response to ALPA's Freedom of Information Act request for air traffic control tapes and other data is so slow, that evidence is destroyed before our safety experts are able to analyze it. We're frustrated when the FAA closes cases and says evidence doesn't exist, when we have the evidence from official FAA records and tapes. And we haven't received a request from the FAA to provide it. Can't the FAA find the evidence, even when it exists in their own files?

This raises the question, how complete are the investigations? And who's conducting the investigations? Madam Chairwoman, we asked that precise question of the FAA through the Freedom of Information request-who's conducting the investigation? Are they experienced, seasoned commercial aviation investigators, or are they general aviation investigators reassigned to the new Continental, or what? We can't get an answer, maybe this subcommittee

can.

We're incensed when the FAA admits that the new Continental check airman program appears not to be in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations, yet stonewalls requests for further information. We're especially angered since we brought the matter to FAA's attention, and pursued it vigorously despite official denials and evasions. Now the FAA says it can't feed us anymore because they're investigating it. If the check airman program is not being run according to the book, new Continental is in violation of the Federal Aviation Regulations and should be grounded, until further corrective action is taken.

We're disillusioned when Continental officials boldly tell the media that ALPA is only making an issue of safety because it's a labor dispute. They know that's not true. I'll compare ALPA's record of involvement and concern with air safety with anyone, anytime. The number of incidents at the new Continental is staggering. We couldn't invent all of these incidents if we tried.

Just a few words on Continental's claim of interference with Continental radio frequencies. ALPA has not, does not, and will not encourage, authorize, or condone this. We've repeatedly instructed our members not to engage in any unauthorized use of radio frequencies, even extra chatter. The FAA has been unable to give us any specifics on claims of radio frequency blockages, which show improper ALPA conduct. The FAA knows that this is an ongoing problem. The FAA has admitted that scattered instances of derogatory comments are not a real safety problem, but one that diminishes smooth operation. While not endangering the public safety, even this is unprofessional, and we've told our members repeatedly not to do it.

Our recent letter to the FAA is available to you. It seems to us that false accusation against ALPA is being used to discount the preponderance of evidence that the new Continental Airlines is not safe; in other words, out of spite and because ALPA is exposing the FAA's shoddy investigation practices, the FAA is permitting the unsafe operation of an air carrier to continue.

It is endangering the public and those of us who share the skies and runways and taxiways with the new Continental's ill-trained

pilots, and poorly maintained equipment. We've stated quite clearly that any of these safety violations could occur at any airline. Those of us in this profession know that these types of situations are part of the job description. I've made mistakes just as every other pilot in this business has. We're human, and the safety requirements are exacting. But the fact is that the number and frequency of safety compromising incidents on the new Continental are unprecedented in this industry, for the size of the carrier and the number of daily flights.

The old Continental used to have six or eight incidents a year. The new Continental has that many a week. The incidents were not the result of the confusion and disruption initially caused by the bankruptcy and the strike; they are continuing and they are increasing months later.

The current rate of potentially life-threatening incidents is almost one a day, one a day. The new Continental in my professional judgment, is an accident waiting to happen. This management is playing Russian roulette with the traveling public, all in the name of profit. And from what we've seen thus far, the FAA is not doing a thing to prevent that accident. The bally hooed white glove inspection was either a sham or a public relations hoax. During the 3-week period FAA investigators were supposedly going over Continental with white gloves, ALPA reported 24 safety compromising situations to the FAA.

Among these incidents, which were reported, was Continental flight 344 that took off from runway 8 right in Denver, after receiving a report of three-quarters of an inch of wet snow on the runway. Other pilots announced they would not take off with that amount of wet snow on the runway, and taxied to runway 35, which had been plowed. Federal rules prohibit takeoff with more than a half inch of wet snow on the runway, because aircraft takeoff performance is degraded to unsafe levels. The fact that the FAA has dismissed some of our reports as insignificant or technical violations is evidence that the agency has not learned the lesson of Air Illinois.

As NTSB chairman Burnett reported last month in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, "At the Board's public hearing on the accident, which I chaired, we uncovered a laundry list of maintenance and operational procedures which were not carried out 'by the book'." Of significance here is that only after the National Transportation Safety Board public hearing revealed a serious deficiency in the airline's operations, that an embarrassed FAA finally suspended the airline's certificate.

Indeed, the Air Illinois crash and shutdown were the sum of a series of minor technical violations that had gone uncorrected by the FAA.

Finally, one day they added up to a fatal accident. Only rarely do single events result in accidents. Usually they are a chain of events. Break that chain, and the accident can be prevented. The FAA's job is to prevent accidents, breaking the chain. And if the agency can't promote the airline industry while preventing accidents, then its job as cheerleader for the industry must be termi