Ms. CLAYTON. From reports that we've had of flight attendants that were in the training.

Mrs. COLLINS. You also say on the final page of your written testimony that what is happening at Continental is not isolated. If Continental is successful at setting unsafe work rules because there is no regulation to stop them, other managements will follow, and other flight attendant groups will be faced with the same unsafe work, and so forth.

How do you know, or do you know for a fact that Continental is not an isolated case?

Ms. CLAYTON. Well, we are in constant communication with other flight attendant unions to begin with. We all have safety committees that communicate with one another, and in a deregulated environment, when you have companies coming to you asking for concessions-one of the first concessions we were approached with was to cut down the training. We went from having two training classes of 8 hours each 6 months, where the company wanted to have only one training class, and then a homework study book, which is basically an open test. So we feel that this is not isolated at Continental, that you'll find the other flight attendant unions being faced with the same situation. They're going to want concessions.

Mrs. COLLINS. So Continental is not an isolated case, and this happens throughout the entire airline industry, or you think it's going to happen throughout the entire industry.

Ms. CLAYTON. That's correct.

Mrs. COLLINS. Mr. McGrath.

Mr. McGRATH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. We have been through this before in the old Burton subcommittee which dealt with regarding work rules for flight attendants, and I thought perhaps we had some accommodation with the FAA on these rules.

And I think, Madam Chairwoman, that you have adequately covered the questions that I would have had, based on the experience of the last 4 years in this subcommittee.

Just a simple-regarding the test. The FAA doesn't monitor the giving of these tests?

Ms. CLAYTON. I have never, in my actual 16 years of being a flight attendant, had an FAA inspector ever come into a training class. And I don't know of anyone that ever has. I think the only monitoring they do of the training is they go to the company and look at the company records. Now the company records don't necessarily show what transpired in the training class. They may meet some of the regulations as far as going through the aircraft, and what we call the checklist, checking off items that you have located-emergency equipment and that sort of thing-but as far as actually going into any of the training classes or even talking to any of the flight attendants and asking their opinions of the training, it's never happened to my knowledge.

Mr. McGRATH. Thank you very much.

Mrs. COLLINS. Mr. McCandless.

Mr. MCCANDLESS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Ms. Clayton, you talked about what you had in the way of hardwon rights as far as your labor contract was concerned, prior to bankruptcy. And then on page 5 and 6, you talked about the

number of hours that currently new Continental is asking their flight attendants to fly, referring to in excess of 100 actual flight hours per month, and some as high as 140. What did you have in the way of hours prior to this, under your agreement?

Ms. CLAYTON. We had a maximum of 80 hours, with an option to fly 90. And we considered 90 hours to be very difficult on a flight attendant physically. So the idea of flying 100 to 140 hours is inconceivable. I don't know how they can do it.

Mr. MCCANDLESS. Where do you first begin to fail in your basic function as a flight attendant when you begin to acquire these additional hours? What function begins to suffer first?

Ms. CLAYTON. Speaking for my own personal experience, when you're tired and exhausted, the first function that goes is that you get tired of hassling with passengers over carry-on luggage. Instead of forcing them to put their carry-on luggage underneath the seat, or stow it properly; instead of arguing, you'll just maybe let it slide. There are always problems with seating arrangements. They may inadvertently seat a passenger with children in emergency exit. And if you have a full flight, and you have a woman with two small children in the emergency exit, you have to play musical chairs, and get that woman to change seats, and find someone else that's willing to change seats, and it's a big fiasco. And if you're exhausted, you might overlook that and just let it ride.

Mr. MCCANDLESS. So we have here more of a customer relations, personal relationship with the passenger rather than a safety problem.

Ms. CLAYTON. No, I feel it's a safety problem. If you've got carryon luggage out in the aisle, or not stowed properly, and in an accident, that can be a very serious problem, having carry-on luggage flying through the cabin. Also in an emergency exit, with children sitting there, and if you are in an emergency, you can basically forget using that emergency exit, because there will be no one there to open it. The flight attendants don't sit across from the window exits on the aircraft, they are all the way in the very back of the cabin, and in the very front of the cabin. You'd have to rely on passengers to open those over-wing exits. If there's children sitting there, you can write off that emergency exit. So it's a real safety problem.

Mr. MCCANDLESS. When you experience, say, a 3- or 4-hour flight, with the service that the passengers receive that period, and you experience 1-hour to 12-hour flight with the service also, is the 4hour flight as tiring or is the 12-hour flight as tiring as the 4-hour flight-what do you feel like at the end of that flight?

Ms. CLAYTON. Well you don't

Mr. MCCANDLESS. Comparing the two, I guess, is what I'm trying

to say.

Ms. CLAYTON. Well, it's not the one particular flight that's tiring. It really doesn't make any difference if you only fly one trip in one day, whether it's a 12-hour flight or a 4-hour flight, as far as the safety level with exhaustion. What gets you to that point is the combination of how many flights you have in 1 day, and the total amount of hours that you spend on duty. You could have one flight that may be 61⁄2 or 7 hours long, but you only go through the

boarding procedure, you only go through and check the carry-on luggage one time, so everything is minimized.

But if you have, say, four or five flights in 17 hours, you're doing an emergency check four or five times that day, you're boarding passengers four or five times that day, you are doing service and so forth. It's the accumulation of flights, and the amount of time that you're on duty, more so than the length of the flight.

Mr. MCCANDLESS. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mrs. COLLINS. Mr. Schaefer.

Mr. SCHAEFER. I have just one question. Is it correct that the Continental flight which received the bomb threat had all new flight attendants? Is that correct?

Ms. CLAYTON. Yes.

Mr. SCHAEFER. Is this common? I didn't think that the airlines would put everybody new on one flight. Isn't there always a senior member who has some experience?

Ms. CLAYTON. Well, not usually, because the way flight attendants bid their schedules in accordance with seniority. So the more desirable trips are all going to be usually flown by flight attendants in the same seniority bracket. The less desirable trips are going to be the flight attendants that are the most junior; or if it's a trip that was not covered by scheduled flight attendants, then it would be flown by reserve flight attendants. And all the reserve flight attendants would be new hires.

Mr. SCHAEFER. So therefore the trip from Los Angeles to Denver was not a desirable flight?

Ms. CLAYTON. Right. Not necessarily-it could be that it was a trip that the crew became illegal for. There's lots of reasons why there might be four new people. It's not uncommon at all.

Mr. SCHAEFER. It isn't. I figured that they would probably at least have 1 seasoned member on each flight. I just feel it should be that way. That's all I have, thank you.

Mrs. COLLINS. We thank you for your testimony, Ms. Clayton.
Our next panel will be Continental Airlines representatives.

We'll have Mr. Richard M. Adams, who's a senior vice president of operations, Mr. Clark Onstad, who's the vice president of governmental affairs, and Capt. Richard Hillman, the senior director of flying.

You may proceed with your testimony at this time, gentlemen. STATEMENT OF CLARK ONSTAD, VICE PRESIDENT, GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD M. ADAMS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF OPERATIONS; CAPT. RICHARD HILLMAN, SENIOR DIRECTOR OF FLYING; AND RAE TATE, MANAGER, INFLIGHT TRAINING AND PROCEDURES

Mr. ONSTAD. Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

Madam Chairperson and members of the subcommittee. Continental Airlines deeply appreciates the opportunity to appear here today. The subject of the hearing, aviation safety and management, is a matter Continental takes very seriously. Continental has devoted hundreds of millions of dollars, and 50 years of effort to ensure the highest level of aviation safety in its operations.

I'm Clark Onstad, vice president of governmental affairs for Continental, and I'm the former chief counsel for the FAA. On my left is Mr. Richard Adams, senior vice president of operations and technical services. Mr. Adams has 44 years of experience in the safety business, the last 22 with Continental Airlines. On my right is Mr. Richard Hillman. Dick has been with Continental for 17 years, and he has over 5,000 hours of experience in commercial airline operations.

Any objective reading of the extensive record Continental is laying before the subcommittee will lead to two firm conclusions. First, Continental's safety record is equal or better than that of any other major air carrier in America. Second, the Air Line Pilots Association claims, like those of PATCO 3 years ago, are an undistinguished attempt to garb an economic argument in a safety cloak.

Continental has one of the finest airline technical organizations in the world. Continental operates a fleet of 101 aircraft, serving 37 domestic cities, and 25 cities internationally. Continental's route structure stretches from 37 domestic cities to Tokyo, to Micronesia, to Australia, to Fiji, and eight cities in Mexico. Three hundred and sixty one times a day, a Continental Airlines jet takes off and lands safely somewhere in the world.

Continental has been inspected by the FAA over 1,000 times since September 24, 1983, the day we filed for reorganization. The FAA has looked at every aspect of Continental's organization, and found that Continental is qualified to hold an air carrier operating certificate. Continental is safe.

Continental's pilot work force has over 18,000 years of total flying experience. Let me repeat that statement, it is a phenomenal statement. Continental's pilot work force has over 18,000 years of total flying experience. The average pilot flying experience at Continental today is 17 years. Every captain flying for Continental worked for the company prior to the company filing for reorganization. The most junior captain has been with this company for 5 years. Five hundred and thirty of Continental's pilots are ALPA members who flew for Continental before ALPA struck on October 1, 1983.

Because ALPA chose to strike a bankrupt company, Continental has been forced to hire some pilots. These highly qualified people were chosen from an unprecedented 14,000 qualified job applicants. Continental has meticulously screened these people, hiring only 1 in every 30 applicants, or less than 4 percent. The pilots who join Continental have an average, an average, of 4,500 flight hours. Many acquired years of flying experience with major air carriers, where they paid ALPA dues, such as Braniff, Eastern, TWA, and United.

Continental Airlines filed for reorganization on September 24, 1983. The Federal Bankruptcy Court found that Continental had then only a few days of cash left. Eight thousand, soon to be 9,000 employees rebuilt this company. Eighty-five percent of them were on Continental's employment rolls the day we filed for reorganization.

In the process, these people have provided high quality service to 6 million people, and saved the public over $600 million in airfares

over what they would have been paying under the old Continental's airfares.

ALPA chose a different course. ALPA called a strike. But there was no strike vote. ALPA launched a $40 million campaign to eliminate Continental, including over a $1 million negative advertising campaign. ALPA also embarked on a harassment campaign. Two ALPA members now stand convicted and sentenced to a Federal penitentiary for 5 to 8 years for attempted pipe bombing, high explosive pipe bombing of a working pilot's home.

The FAA and the Federal Communications Commission are investigating over 100 incidents of frequency jamming by ALPA members. We'll be glad to provide you examples that Mr. Duffy was not able to find this morning, including evidence from their own files. Despite ALPA's protestations to the contrary here this morning, there are massive amounts of evidence that ALPA members are involved in an organized campaign of interfering with Continental's air-to-ground communications. In fact, we've submitted to the committee and I have here today what ALPA distributes, and we picked this up off of a striker-these are Continental frequencies which they pass out these cards-was picked up from a striker who was arrested in California recently. He had four of these cards in his pocket, and he was attempting to pound nails in the tires of a working Continental pilot's van.

Continental has been forced to file a $630 million lawsuit against ALPA and individual members for a long list of acts against Continental employees, including death threats, the firebombing of a working pilot's home, the firing of gunshots at a working pilot's home, while his wife and children were in the room, and the hurling of a putrified elks head through the front window of a Continental pilot's home in Colorado.

Union leaders have taken the fifth amendment when asked whether or not they or ALPA funded the activities, such as the pipe bombing, which led to the Federal convictions. This ALPA effort is a sad record for a once-proud organization.

Prior to deregulation, ALPA made positive contributions to airline safety. Today, rather than face the economic realities of deregulation, ALPA's actions are degrading the level of aviation safety.

ALPA's charges have more to do with the fact that the average pilot at the major air carriers today in America makes $113,000, whereas Continental can only afford to pay an average of about $38,000 a year. You've heard ALPA's charges this morning. If ALPA were truly raising these items as matters of aviation safety, wouldn't they have brought them to Continental first? This is the traditional way of handling these problems.

Continental wrote to Mr. Henry Duffy on May 8, 1984, asking ALPA to share this data with Continental. The letter is unanswered.

To test ALPA's safety assertions, the subcommittee should ask why is it that ALPA has not reported a single incident on any other ALPA crewed airline? Ask the FAA tomorrow. You will find that ALPA has not reported a single incident on any other ALPAcrewed airline.