We must continue to study new methods and techniques, including not only the control of fire but the prevention of fire and the various other aspects that go into organizing for fires prior to their occurrence, and in controlling them after they start. for ex We have made certain real systematic approaches to this, as, ample, an operation that was known as Fire Stop which was a systematic, organized effort in southern California in 1955 directed at bringing all cooperative agencies' knowledge to bear on how the problem could best be met. We maintain an equipment development center in southern California directed toward this sort of thing. Furthermore, we are embarking on a more intensive program of the various aspects of fire prevention and control through the process of research in the Forest Experiment Station. Áir attack is a case in point that has been developed rather sharply in recent months, in which there are various types of drops from the air on burning fires, with the use of helicopters for transporting men and supplies and equipment. The fact of the matter is there is a broad horizon for the development of air attack in the application of firecontrol techniques. This we should and must continue to develop. We must continue to study much more intensively the opportunity for hazard reduction. What I mean by hazard reduction is fuel modification or brushstrip burning, or whatever you want to term it. That is the research aspect; the study aspect of that is being placed on a projectwide basis currently. Numerous other things can be carried out. We need to expand what we term preplanning work. That is, preparing the area and understanding it in advance. Development of access, firebreaks, mapping of the area in relation to what types and kinds of equipment can be used, and the placing of helispots for helicopter use, are part of preplanning. It is a constantly shifting thing because as new equipment becomes available, plans, too, must be adjusted to keep current with the new types and kinds of uses. It calls for additional water development and storage, more roads, helispots, fire breaks. Those are the things on the ground that we need to place the area in the best possible condition to meet fire when it comes. Of course, we have the problem of manpower and organization. There is a need for additional manpower. Tenure of present employees should be lengthened from seasonal in many cases to a yearlong basis. Our training program we have always emphasized and will continue to emphasize, including the hazard-safety aspects. Any time a fire occurs it imposes real hazards to the men engaged in fighting it. Last year we had the tragic loss of 11 lives in the fire in Cleveland National Forest in southern California. This is a concrete, driving reminder that fire safety must dominate all else. Incidentally, in relation to the fire in which the lives were lost, a thorough study has been made of the situation, and I have a copy of that here and would like to leave it for the record. The CHAIRMAN. Is that the report on the fire where 11 people lost their lives? Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be made a part of the record. (The report follows:) THE INAJA FOREST FIRE DISASTER, CLEVELAND NATIONAL FOREST, CALIF. "Surely these men gave their lives in defense of this country, for THE INAJA FOREST FIRE DISASTER (PRONOUNCED INN-AH-HAH) NOVEMBER 25, 1956, CLEVELAND NATIONAL FOREST, CALIFORNIA REGION Eleven men lost their lives in a fire blowup in San Diego Canyon in the Inaja fire, Cleveland National Forest, at 8:05 p. m., Sunday, November 25, 1956. Those killed included 3 Forest Service employees, a correctional officer, and 7 inmates of San Diego County's Viejas honor camp. One Forest Service employee and 6 inmates escaped uninjured. The Office of the Chief, Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture, was notified at 3 a. m. (midnight, Pacific Coast time), as soon as the Cleveland National Forest and California region had positively determined the general facts of the disaster. Preliminary investigation Chief Richard E. McArdle immediately dispatched to the scene of the tragedy Merle S. Lowden, chief of the division of fire control, and safety officer Seth Jackson, both of the Washington office, to gather pertinent detailed facts for the Chief's office. They spent November 27 through December 3 with Forest Service Regional Fire Chief M. M. Nelson and other regional, forest, and Inaja fire personnel studying the disaster area, interviewing and getting statements from those directly connected with the fire action or who might have pertinent information. Investigative team Concurrent with sending the chief fire control officer and safety officer to the scene of the fire, the Chief of the Forest Service selected a top-level investigative team to go to the fire area. The team was headed by Assistant Chief of the Forest Service W. S. Swingler of Washington, D. C., and included Donald E. Clark, regional forester at Denver, Colo.; Lawrence K. Mays, assistant regional forester at Atlanta, Ga.; Jack S. Barrows, Intermountain Experiment Station fire research chief, Missoula, Mont.; and Mr. Lowden. Safety Officer Seth Jackson was designated as adviser. In charging the investigative team with its responsibilities, Mr. McArdle said, "The scope of investigation should be directed to circumstances, events, and in stances which led to the tragic loss of 11 fire fighters *** we want facts, what happened, how, and why. And we want these facts studied carefully and evaluated to formulate sound conclusions and recommendations-how could the final outcome, or any of the occurrences or situations leading up to it, have been avoided? Above all, include instances of carelessness or oversight that can be prevented in the future." The investigative team assembled in San Diego, Calif., on December 3. It studied the accident scene on December 4, both from the air and on the ground. Interviews were arranged with the various officials, fire bosses, and fire fighters who were eyewitnesses to the disaster. These interviews, as in all previous investigations of disastrous fires, were originally scheduled in private in order to avoid unnecessary tension on the part of eyewitnesses. However, it became evident that the public interest in this particular fire disaster was so great that the interviews should be made public. Relatives and friends of the victims and the general public were invited to meet with the investigative team, and members of the press were present. Officials of both State and county agencies participated in the investigation. Upon completion of their investigation the team submitted their findings to the Chief of the Forest Service. Origin of fire The Inaja fire allegedly was set by a 16-year-old Indian, Gilbert Paipa, at his home on the Inaja Indian Reservation about 9:10 a. m., Saturday, November 24, 1956. He was apprehended by, and confessed to, Forest Service Investigator Elwood Stone, on Wednesday, November 28. Paipa said, "I just got a mad, crazy idea to do it. I threw a match in the grass to see if it would burn." Initial control action 1 Two lookouts reported the fire at 9:15 a. m. A three-man tanker crew arrived at 9:25. They could not control it. Acting Ranger John Davis recognized the fire's danger and dispatched additional men and equipment. By 5 p. m., the fire had crossed the San Diego River bed to the west, run over Mount Gower and down the west side of El Capitan Reservoir and onto El Cajon Mountain. It had then burned an estimated 25,000 acres. In a meeting attended by Forest Supervisor Walter Puhn and officials of the California Division of Forestry, it was agreed that the State would handle all the fire west of the San Diego River except a portion on the north side of the fire between the river and Sawday truck trail. This latter division was across the river from division IV, where the tragedy later occurred. On the second day of the fire, the Forest Service had four fire-fighting divisions led by experienced and qualified personnel from all parts of the California region. Pine Hills Guard Station was fire headquarters. The flanks of the fire had been contained except for three hot sectors-a handline from Eagle Peak down to the San Diego River on the south; across San Diego Canyon from rim to rim on the north; and across Cedar Creek at the rear of the fire. The latter was considered of greatest concern due to the threat to more than 100 homes nearby. During the day, Sunday, the fire in San Diego River Canyon was advancing slowly up the canyon against the wind with occasional flareups. Tongues of flame intermittently moved ahead and up small side ridges. Fire on and just below the east rim of the canyon was quartering into the wind with occasional flareups as it reached heavy fuels. High winds made it impossible to use helicopters until 4 p. m. The night line boss scouted division IV on the north side and east of the San Diego River at 4:30 p. m. (An aerial photomap of this area is shown on p. 3.) Because of the wind, he had to fly high. This situation, coupled with the smoke from the fire, made it impossible for him to get complete information as to control lines lost and progress of construction of other lines. The fire edge was relatively hot, burning into the wind on the west side and more slowly on the east side. Burning conditions Fire weather throughout southern California in 1956 was unusually severe. It was climaxed by a prolonged period of Santa Ana wind conditions' extend 1 This and other technical terms in this report are explained in a glossary on the last page. 2 Strong, dry winds from th desert area east of the coast mountains flowing down through the mountain passes and canyons to the sea. ing from November 19 through the Inaja fire disaster on November 25. The area was having unprecedented drought. Rainfall had been well below normal for 4 years. During the afternoon and evening of November 25, relative humidity in the vicinity of the fire was near 18 percent and temperature was about 68° F. Gusty east and northeast winds averaging 15 or 20 miles per hour, but with some gusts up to 40 miles, were observed at many places around the fire. Brush consisting of chamise and sagebrush of medium density covered much of the disaster area. Moisture content of the brush approximated the lowest ever measured for these species, and is believed to be near the minimum possible. The San Diego River bed was dry. The canyon walls are steep and rugged, with slopes as steep as 70 percent in many places. Rock outcroppings are common on both sides of the canyon. The distance from the rim to the riverbed was about 3,500 feet in the disaster area. Day shift action, November 25 The job to be done on the east side of the San Diego River Canyon (division IV, sector G) was to clear by tractor a fire trail through the brush along the rim of the canyon and to construct by hand a similar trail from the top of the canyon rim to the dry riverbed on the canyon floor. These trails were to serve as control lines for burning back to the main fire. The tractor-built trail running along the rim was completed by 11 a. m. Some burning out to make the trail wider was started. The trail was patrolled by a 4-man crew, using a 280-gallon water tanker. Two attempts were made to start hand construction of the trail from the top of the rim to the canyon floor. In both cases the men were called back when it became evident that the trail could not be completed before being flanked by the main fire. Later in the day a third line was started. By 2 p. m. the crew had cut about 600 feet of fire trail downward from the canyon rim. It was estimated that 3 more hours of work were needed to reach the bottom. At about 3 p. m. the division boss withdrew the men for the third time because fire conditions seemed to make work there unsafe. The crew had completed nearly 1,100 feet of trail. The crew continued to patrol the tractor-built trail along the top rim of the canyon. Between 4: 30 p. m. and 7 p. m. the fire quieted down. No flareups were observed during this period. Night shift action, November 25 At the main camp the night shift division boss was instructed to build line and burn out. Since there was little specific information on sector G available at the main camp because of the partial ineffectiveness of aerial reconnaissance, he was told to check with the day division boss for conditions on the ground. The night shift arrived at the fire after dark, about 7 p. m. The day division boss briefed the night division boss on fire conditions and work done during the day. He emphasized that during the day the wind had been tricky and that difficulty had been experienced along the rim when burning-out operations were attempted. The night division boss discussed the conditions with his two sector bosses, and they agreed upon a plan of action. One sector boss and 1 crew boss with 20 inmates were to burn out along the tractor-built line on the canyon rim and down the hand line. Operations of this kind are normally carried out at night when winds subside and burning conditions are less hazardous. The second sector boss with 3 crew bosses, the correctional officer, and 13 inmates was to complete the cutting and scraping of the hand trail to the river. The two sector bosses synchronized their watches at 7:18 p. m. and agreed to have a radio check at 7:55 p. m. The plan went into operation with men going down the hand line and the tanker crew on the rim laying a hose to help hold the burning-out fire. One length of hose broke and some water was lost in replacing it. The water in the tanker was used up by 8 p. m. The brush cutters in the 13-man trail-building crew started work as soon as they reached the point where the day crew had stopped work. The scrapers waited a few minutes until the cutters got a short piece of trail cleared. The boss of these scrapers lined out his men and gave them instructions on the work they were to do. He then went back up the fire trail toward the canyon rim to check on the burning-out work as the sector boss had previously instructed him to do. |