When you fight a war you have airplanes, submarines, all of the various aids, but you still have to have people on the ground—the old foot soldier.

During the depression years we had the Civilian Conservation Corps. We had men scattered all over the woods, a lot of people working on the grounds, and they did a pretty good effective job of initial attack on fires. During the war, of course, our fire-fighting forces, both in industry and in the Forest Service, were naturally lessened because of the war, but then we had lessened use of the forests, so we did not have the same fire problem during the war years. Since the war years and I am telling you now just what my experience has been-in that area there has been a steady decrease of what I call on-the-ground forces. I mean people that are there for initial attack, just the same as the fire department in the city is there to go to a fire as soon as reported. There has been a steady decrease in that type of personnel in the fire service.

We had fire crew stations that were manned in 1946 that are not manned today. Our forces are more centralized. That may be quite possible because of better transportation, but we do not have the initial attack. We rely on other people whose job is not initial attack, is not fire protection, for initial attack on fire.

You heard yesterday, I suppose, although I was not here in the morning, about the survey that was conducted by the California Division of Forestry to determine the adequacy of fire protection to the lands under their protection status. I will not go into that, but I would like to say that from that plan came a setup where the Forest Service on those lands inside the national forests, private lands, that they contract to protect in accordance with the contract issued by the State of California and are paid to protect, were required in 1957 for the first time to locate fire crews in such a manner as was described by the State in the contract.

This is the first time that actual crew locations were stipulated to protect a given segment of forest lands. It is getting back to what we had actually before the war-the idea being to have a crew with equipment and manpower capable of putting out a fire when they got to it quick.

The Chief Forester of the United States, in his annual report of 1951, said, and I quote:

The Forest Service protection forces and facilities in the national forests today can cope with fires that break out during periods of normal or better than normal fire weather. But they are spread too thinly to insure against serious losses when unusually bad fire weather occurs. As a matter of sound business, the Forest Service should be enabled to build a fire-control organization of sufficient strength to assure adequate protection of those values.

In my opinion, it would not be possible for the Chief Forester or anyone in the Forest Service to make the statement that is even in that first sentence today. An excellent normal weather fire record is of little credit to a protection agency after the occurrence of a disastrous fire which is blamed upon critical fire weather.

I am not unaware of the advances which have been made in this cloud modification, airplanes, and various other things. These techniques are good, but we have to recognize they are only tools, just the same as the bulldozer was when it was first used in fire suppression.

We still have to rely on well-trained, efficient, first-class fire fighters. getting to a fire quick and keeping it small.

I say here that I am probably not qualified to make an evaluation of the ratio of overhead to on-the-ground forces in the Forest Service, but I think it would be a splendid idea for the Congress of the United States to make such an evaluation. I think we can more efficiently spend this fire protection and suppression funds we are now allocating for that job.

Thank you very much, Mr. Engle.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Reed.

(Mr. Reed's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF WALLER H. REED, CHIEF FORESTER, COLLINS ALMANOR FOREST, COLLINS PINE Co., CHESTER, PLUMAS COUNTY, CALIF.

Knowing of the area of my experience, Congressman Engle in tendering me an invitation to this hearing undoubtedly realized my comments would lean toward northern California. Actually, however, such is not of consequence, for forest and wild land protection from fire is basically the same problem almost anywhere in the West.

May I stress that I am not appearing as an expert; rather, my comments are based upon experience and observation during some 17 years of contact with the United States Forest Service in connection with my work as forest manager of a privately owned tree farm comprising some 90,000 acres adjacent to and intermingled with lands managed for the people of the United States by the Forest Service.

I am a graduate professional forester and a member of the Society of American Foresters. My experience in purchase and operation of Forest Service timber sales plus my observations of the many activities of forest management, including forest fire prevention and control, prompted me to accept the invitation to appear here and offer my opinions.

Please recognize that these opinions are my own and are submitted constructively, no reflection intended upon any of the officers of the Forest Service, many of whom, naturally, I have come to know and appreciate as friends.

All wild fires start small and must be controlled small if the desired protection status is attained. A large area fire can only be prevented in one of two ways-preventing the fire start in the first place, or extinguishment of the fire while it is small.

Obviously prevention of fire starts is the best protection. Continuous and expanded education in fire prevention is certainly worthwhile endeavor for all. In this connection, the sportsmen and other recreational forest users deserve a lot of credit. In spite of rapidly increasing annual usage of the forest areas by the public, the number of fires on our lands have decreased, which in my opinion certainly proves the value of prevention education.

But fires will and do start. Each start during our normal or above normal fire weather is a potential big fire, and therefore, must be controlled early. Such control is possible only when fire control forces are on the fire soon enough and in sufficient strength; in other words, early control demands everready fire department technique.

In my opinion, the United States Forest Service does not provide such fire suppression striking force on the ground, and I emphasize "on the ground," for, as I observe, although the Forest Service has steadily increased in numbers of personnel and appropriations, there has been a corresponding decrease in on-the-ground forces.

During depression years the manpower of the Civilian Conservation Corps provided an almost inexhaustible supply of fire suppression force well distributed throughout the forest. Prior to World War II, on-the-ground striking force was the axiom as evidenced by quite satisfactorily located and supplied fire-control crews. Granted, these forces probably were never numerous nor strong enough to cope with the disastrous fire, but, in my experiences, were responsible for preventing many large fires. Through the war years, on-theground forces were, obviously, lessened, however, results were not grave for forest use by the public was also very much curtailed.

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"On the ground" forces have steadily decreased during the years following the war. Former fire crew locations are not manned, or if so, are reduced substantially in striking force. Emphasis, rather, is use of other forces to supply "on the ground" fire suppression, such as the various Forest Service work crews employed mainly for purposes other than fire control and employees of lumber companies and other private agencies, the principal endeavors of which are, also, other than fire control. These "outside" forces are excellent reinforcements on large fires, however, they should not be classed as initial attack fire control-their endeavors and locations are not conducive to rapid dispatch when a fire occurs.

The recent survey of the California State Division of Forestry emphasized the lack of initial attack fire suppression force on the national forests. This survey was ordered by the State board of forestry to determine the adequacy of protection provided to wildlands by the State for those lands the protection of which is the responsibility of the State. Such a statewide survey, obviously, included the adequacy of protection provided the private lands inside the protection boundaries of the national forests, which protection is the responsibility of the State but is supplied by the Forest Service in accordance with a contract to do so with the State. Until the current year, the consideration paid the Forest Service by the State in connection with the aforesaid contract was "pooled" with national forest protection funds, the suppression effort purchased therefrom being spread over all the lands within the national forests.

From the aforesaid statewide survey the State division of forestry developed a fire plan, a part of which designated the location of "on the ground" crews and the suppression power of those crews necessary to protect the private lands within the protection boundaries of the national forests. Thus, this year for the first time, the contract granted to the Forest Service by the State for the aforesaid private laid protection by the Forest Service requires on-the-ground forces, tied to location and of specified strength of manpower and equipment. These crews are fire department status, designated primarily for fire control for a designated area. Effective protection of national forest lands demands

similar technique.

The Chief Forester of the United States Forest Service said in his annual report for the year 1951, on page 9, and I quote, "The Forest Service protection forces and facilities in the national forests today can cope with fires that break out during periods of normal or better than normal fire weather. But they are spread too thinly to insure against serious losses when unusually bad fire weather occurs. As a matter of sound business, the Forest Service should be enabled to build a fire-control organization of sufficient strength to assure adequate protection of those values."

In my opinion, it would not be possible for the Chief Forester to make the statement contained in the first sentence of that quotation today. Here in California we annually experience "normal" fire weather which from the standpoint of wild fire is always dangerous, and these normal conditions can change to abnormal on short notice. An excellent normal weather fire record is of little credit to a protection agency after the occurrence of a disastrous fire which is blamed upon critical fire weather.

I am not unaware of the advances in the use of cloud modification as a tool in the prevention of fire, and the airplane as an aid in fire control. Such techniques, as was the case when the bulldozer was introduced as an aid in fire control some years ago, are encouraging aids, but at best are only tools, and cannot be relied upon to replace the efficient, well trained and equipped suppression crew in initial attack on each fire start.

Probably I am not fully qualified to evaluate the present overhead-"on the ground" ratio of the Forest Service allocation of appropriated funds. It is my opinion, however, more "on the ground" force is required to supply the degree of forest protection necessary and desirable on the national forests; and that Congress might well make such an evaluation to determine the feasibility of channeling more of the presently appropriated funds into the woods.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ralph L. Fenner. Is he here?

Mr. FENNER. Yes, sir. I do not have a prepared statement with me. I left it in Berkeley yesterday before I left. I would like to present a summary, and I can submit the prepared statement to you for your record.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be perfectly all right, and the prepared statement will be made a part of the record when submitted.

May I suggest, Mr. Fenner, you try to limit yourself to the prescribed 10 minutes, because we are not moving fast enough, and I am going to run out of time before I run out of witnesses.

STATEMENT OF RALPH L. FENNER, FENNER & DAY CO.,
RICHMOND, CALIF.

Mr. FENNER. I believe that great French statesman, Clemenceau, said, "Wars are much too important to be left to generals." Perhaps this is something that we should also consider in our fire-control operations, since there is a tendency at times to attempt to provide protection for protection's sake rather than to evaluate the problem, which is to reduce damage and also to reduce potential damage, which is most important, the continual threat of disastrous fires.

The problem, as I see it in California after 15 or 20 years of work— incidentally, I am a private consulting forester, a forest comburologist, specializing in forest-fire work, wildland fire problems. I have worked for the Forest Service, for the State division of forestry, and in research as well as a regular line fireman.

I think one of the basic problems that we face here today is something that I have not heard resolved, and that is: What is this brush we are talking about?

When we have an area like southern California where the sun is shining on it and where there is a certain amount of water, to grow up, if you will, the nuclear energy from the sun is converted by the chlorophyll process and the energy is stored. This accumulates at the rate of tons per acre.

During the initial stage of growth, during the first 10 or 12 years, this accumulating cellulose has a considerable amount of water in it, and therefore it is not easy to burn. As the brush becomes older, the quantity of water in the brush reduces until a mature or overmature stage, and under very dry conditions, under the drought conditions. we have here in the fall, there is very little moisture in the fuel, the fuel that is accumulated from a few tons per acre to anywhere from 25 to 75 tons per acre. Expressing that in terms of nuclear energy, I think it has been expressed that 40 acres of this kind of brush is equivalent to a 1-kiloton atomic bomb.

Therefore, conflagration conditions grow; they grow without brush. It is not a static condition.

The areas of the east highlands, Inaja, Malibu are practically fireproof today. Twenty years from now, 30 years from now, they will be up to optimum or maximum conflagration potential again. They will be depleted by fire, and then they will build up again in the traditional way. This has been going on for a long time. We have our brush fields in southern California, as far as I am able to determine, on approximately a 20-year rotation burning, burning rotation at the present time.

I prefer to think of this as the standard rather than the standard being that the brush is not going to burn. I think the historical evidence is such that we know that the brush is going to burn, it is burning on a 20-year rotation. Anything we can do to extend that rota

tion or reduce the damage from the fires that do occur I think is worthy of consideration.

What is a conflagration?

I believe that a conflagration is a natural consequence of management of brushlands where provision is not made for periodic reduction or harvesting of the fuel.

Conflagrations can be regarded as floods of fire. These floods occur when fuel accumulates to a critical level and then the barriers to burning break down. Conflagrations can be contained by reducing fuel accumulations below the critical level or by increasing the strength of the barriers to contain the energy which is released.

In forest management, fuel is removed or reduced by the logger who takes the fuel out of the forest, cuts it up into lumber, and makes houses out of it. On rangelands fuel is reduced by livestock, converted into beef, brought down to the city where people eat them.

Under current watershed management practices fuel is accumulated indefinitely. We build up the fuel, we do not remove it.

Brush fuel increases in quantity and decreases in moisture content with age. The result is a constant increase in flammability with time. Therefore, the climax or equilibrium state of the brush fields in southern California under a policy of fire exclusion is an unstable equilibrium, becoming increasingly unstable with time. That is, we are trying to balance a marble on an upended bowl, which is the classical definition of an unstable equilibrium, and the bowl is getting higher and gets higher and steeper all the time.

Stabilizing fuel can be accomplished by various tactics. Light burning is one that I do not concur with in southern California. I don't believe there is any place for light burning in southern California for watershed or range management. The technical reason for this can be found in the height of the thermos lines above the fine fuels which burn under the so-called light-burning conditions.

When we have the high level of a forest the temperature for scorching leaves will not reach the lower leaves.

When you are dealing with the elfin forest of southern California any light burning will scorch the leaves and kill them, and you get a hopeless situation in terms of building up a greater conflagration potential than you reduce with light burning.

However, light burning-as it is commonly called, broadcast burning. We will think of it in terms of broadcast burning. There are techniques that have been developed in recent times wherein local areas that are going to give trouble are removed.

The technique has been referred to one of the techniques of using fire to do this job. My reason for using fire is why not use the local source of energy. If you have got tremendous energies available in terms of tons of fuel per acre, why not make this work for you at low cost, at low extra cost, rather than bringing in crews of men at high cost, and bulldozers at high cost, and do the job, if it can be done, with the energy that is available on the ground sensationally and effectively.

Area ignition is a technique that was developed to burn these small areas to use fire, not to burn-to use fire to use these energies effectively for removing local trouble spots in the energy blanket that