When the scraper crew boss got to the top of a small 15-foot bluff on the trail, approximately 75 feet in a direct line from the canyon rim, he noticed that the main fire was unexpectedly flaring up on a side ridge more than 1,000 feet below the men. Suddenly it made a short run toward the main ridge where the men were building trail. He called a warning to the men working on the fire trail below and told them to come out. One of the bosses below answered his warning. The men stopped work and all started back up the trail at normal pace. This was at about 7: 45 p. m. The men farthest down the hill had approximately 1,100 feet to travel up the trail. Survivors reported that there was no panic. Some of the men wondered why they were being called out. Most of them kept their tools. One even picked up a shovel and canteen abandoned by another. The fire below suddenly gathered momentum and the crew boss on the top of the small bluff saw that it was now a real threat to the men below. This happened about 2 minutes after the first warning, and he again yelled to the men, telling them to hurry up. Most of the men now dropped their tools and began to go faster.

Two of the men stationed on the upper part of the line escaped before the fire reached the rim. Two others, who also had been working on the upper part of the line, stopped at a small open spot just below the rock bluff on the cleared line. Others pressed on up to them from below. Within a minute or two, 5 men who had been working lower on the line reached the 2 men waiting in the open spot. They were slightly ahead of the remaining nine men. By this time, the fire had outrun them to the right and had crossed the cleared trail above. These 5 men turned off to the left, climbed and struggled up the 15foot rock bluff, and raced the remaining 75 feet to safety at 8:05 p. m. They reported later that, on this last stretch, the fire was only 10 feet behind them. The 11 victims were cut off while still below the small bluff, presumably by an instantaneous "flashover" of a large area of fire. This sudden expansion of the fire front was testified to by the survivors and other nearby observers. In addition, two fire bosses on the opposite side of the main San Diego Canyon observed the action of the fire when it made its fatal run. They reported that it ran up the ravine beside the ridge where the men were working and across the fire trail near the top. At about the time the fire got to the rim, there was a sudden "flashover" to the left, which the observers said simultaneously ignited a large area, perhaps 40 acres. This explosive "flashover" enveloped the 11 victims just below the small bluff. It apparently was caused by ignition of gases forced up the ravine by the extremely rapid run of the fire.

All victims were found in an area with a radius of 45 feet, and the lowermost one was only 300 feet from the tractor-built line at the top of the canyon rim. The fire barely crossed this line in only a few places, where it was quickly put out. Of the men that escaped, two had been working at the very lowest part of the trail. Two who had been working closest to the rim did not escape.

Several of the fire fighters, including the forest officers who lost their lives, stayed with the crew until the last, helping and urging others out, even though they might otherwise have had an opportunity to escape. One of those who escaped credited a fellow crewman with saving his life when he became exhausted while climbing over the rock bluff.

Control of the fire

Before being controlled at 6 p. m., Wednesday, November 28, the fire burned 43,611 acres within the Cleveland National Forest and adjoining land protected by the State. The area burned had a 90-mile perimeter. At least five homes were destroyed. More than 2,000 men fought the fire, 1,300 under Forest Service supervision. These included 500 Indians (local and southwestern region), about 500 Navy personnel, 200 inmates from San Diego County and State honor camps, and other organized crews. These men, plus 3 helicopters, 4 air tanker planes, 2 scouting planes, 27 bulldozers, and a fleet of 90 stake, tank, and pickup trucks, formed one of the greatest arrays of men and equipment ever assembled to fight a forest fire in San Diego County.

Conclusions

A. Fire behavior.-The disastrous flareup of the Inaja fire was caused by a critical combination of highly flammable fuels, steep topography, and adverse weather. The lull in the fire before and at the time of arrival of the night crews created a false sense of security, even though existing conditions of fuel, topography, and weather were critical.

B. Crew location in canyon.-The men were taken down the line into the canyon, owing to a lack of information to show possible danger from the fire in the canyon below. The contributing factors were:

(a) Absence of specific information on the fire status in San Diego Canyon available for the briefing at the base camp, due to poor conditions for aerial reconnaissance.

(b) Emphasis placed on the danger of the burning-out fire rather than on the main fire in the canyon below, when the day division boss briefed the night overhead personnel.

(c) Quiet appearance of the fire as viewed from the rim.

(d) The night overhead personnel had not seen the terrain in daylight. (e) Lack of detailed scouting of the canyon on sector G during the day.

(f) Absence of contact with the bosses of the division across the canyon who had a different vantage point for viewing the situation.

C. Trail location.-The location of the fire trail on the specific ridge where it was built, instead of the next spur ridge up the canyon, was questionable. The previous behavior of the fire, and the position above and alongside a precipitous chimney, made the chosen location hazardous.

D. Burning out.-Sound fire-fighting principles call for burning out the intervening fuels between the control line and the fire edge. The effect of the burning-out fire on the behavior of the main fire and on the planned escape routes is a vital factor influencing decisions on when, where, and how to burn out, and where to place men.

Fire behavior is not well enough understood to firmly establish the possible effect of the burning-out fire in sucking the main fire rapidly up the chimney at the site of the disaster. Other factors would have permitted the explosive run without the presence of the burning-out fire. Furthermore, the burningout fire did not cut off the escape route.

E. Lookout. The crew cutting line into the canyon received warning to come out when a crew boss on the upper part of the line saw the fire heating up at a point below the men. It is uncertain in the Inaja fire disaster that a specifically designated lookout would have given the warning any sooner. However, it is vital that a lookout be designated when crews are in a potentially dangerous location.

F. Water.-Exhausting the water supply from the tanker at the time of the flareup did not cause or contribute to the tragedy. The flames that raced up the canyon slope were of such height, and were extended so far in advance of the burning fuel, that water available from one or several ground tankers would not have had material effect.

G. Personnel. The leaders on the Inaja fire were capable and experienced. They were trained in accordance with recognized Forest Service standards. There is, however, need for more intensive, advanced, fire-behavior training for key fire supervisory personnel.

Line crews on the sector where the tragedy occurred were experienced, trained fire fighters. Moreover, on this sector there were experienced overhead personnel from the local forest and from other forests.

Recommendations of the investigating team

A. It was strongly brought out by the investigation that better knowledge of fire behavior must be developed as an essential means of preventing future fire tragedies. Research studies even more comprehensive and penetrating than past and current fire-behavior research must be carried out to determine means of fighting mass fires and the behavior of fires in forested areas, especially in rough topography. In addition to progress in fire-control methods already made, new and more powerful methods of attacking mass fires are needed and must be developed. Such methods, like use of aerial attack with water and chemicals, may provide the means of controlling dangerous fires with less risk to human lives.

B. More experts on fire behavior must be developed for assignment to critical fires. These highly skilled experts would evaluate situations and assist fire bosses in making decisions for safe, effective fire fighting.

C. The investigators pointed out that, in general, although not related in particular to the Inaja fire, present Government salary and wage rates make it difficult to obtain and hold competent fire-control personnel. Controlling mass forest fires is a difficult and highly technical job. The specifications for these positions should be further reviewed with appropriate Department and Civil Service Commission officials.

98149-58-2

Working notes and data

The investigating team's voluminous notes, maps, photographs, analyses of weather records, fuel-moisture measurements, fire-behavior observations, information on training and experience of leaders, etc., are to be filed with the office copy of this report. Further study will be made of this material, and a Service memorandum will be prepared covering points which may be helpful to Forest Service officials having fire-control responsibilities.

Glossary

Base camp.-Same as main camp, in this case.
Control line.-See Handline.

See Main camp.

Division.-A unit of a complex fire perimeter between designated topographical or cultural features (such as ridges, streams, and roads) organized into two or more sectors for control.

Fire trail.-Same as fireline. See Handline.

Fire weather.-Weather factors that affect the probability that forest fires will start and their rate of spread after starting. It is the composite of elements such as drought conditions, wind, and air temperature and relative humidity. Flanks of a fire. The parts of a fire's perimeter that are roughly parallel to the main direction of its spread or progress.

Handline.-A fireline or control line made with hand tools rather than machines such as bulldozers. A strip a few inches to several feet wide is scraped or dug to mineral soil so that fuel is absent and the fire's progress may be halted when it reaches the fireline. Sometimes a fireline is located some distance from the main fire, and then the intervening vegetation and fuels are purposely burned to make a much wider strip devoid of fuel. This is called backfiring or burning out.

Lookout.-A person designated to detect and report forest fires, from a vantage point such as a tower or a natural elevation.

Main camp.-Headquarters of the fire boss, who is responsible for all suppression and service activities at a fire. Same as fire headquarters.

Sector. A designated segment of fire perimeter or control line comprising the suppression work unit for 2 or more crews under 1 sector boss.

Tanker.-A truck equipped to carry water or other liquids used in suppressing a fire.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. We should continue the cooperation and strengthen it as it exists.

Mr. Chairman, we have appreciated the opportunity to discuss with you and members of your committee the circumstances that are associated with what we consider and, as you indicated, what you consider the most difficult fire problem that prevails in the country. We welcome your review of it. We welcome the opportunity to discuss it with you, and your suggestions, as determined by your deliberations, will be most welcome in our work.

(Mr. Connaughton's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT BY CHARLES A. CONNAUGHTON, REGIONAL FORESTER, CALIFORNIA REGION, FOREST SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, RE FOREST SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FOREST-FIRE CONTROL IN CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman and committee members, I am glad to make a statement on Forest Service fire-control responsibilities.

My statement will be in three parts: (1) A brief description of general Forest Service responsibilities and activities in wild-land fire prevention and suppression and their particular application to California including the problems of recent years associated with intensified use of the national forests; (2) the southern California forest-fire situation, and how the Forest Service fits into that picture; and (3) some comments on brush burning and fire.

FOREST SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES IN WILD-LAND FIRE CONTROL

The Forest Service was created over a half century ago in 1905. It was given responsibility for administration of the forest reserves which had just been transferred from the Department of the Interior and renamed national forests. On June 30, 1957, there were 149 of these national forests in 39 States, Alaska,

and Puerto Rico, including 181 million Federal acres. In addition, the Forest Service has direct responsibility for wild-land fire control on 77 land-utilization projects, including an additional 7 million acres. In the California region there are 17 national forests with a net area of 19.3 million acres.

For many years the main job of the Forest Service was custodial. Principal duties were to prevent trespass and suppress fires. Fire fighting was the primary duty of practically all employees of the Service. I think it is generally recognized that the Forest Service pioneered in forest-fire control in this country.

The Forest Service has a complete fire organization staffed with qualified career people. Starting with the Division of Fire Control in the Chief's office, there are parallel organizations in each of our 10 regional offices and each of the 149 national forests. There is also a fire-research organization at our regional forest-experiment stations. Six fire-control centers are operated for smokejumpers in the West. In addition, there are of course the district rangers, who are the trained leaders of our on-the-ground work. In times of peak fire activity we add many thousand temporary employees to the rolls.

The Forest Service, through its research organization, has responsibility for all Federal forest-fire research. In addition, the Forest Service maintains major equipment development centers at Arcadia, Calif., and Missoula, Mont. Many of the important techniques and equipment now commonly used in fire suppression were pioneered by the Forest Service for its own use and for other agencies. Some of these include tractor plows for fire-line construction, powered brush cutters, powered fire-line trenchers, techniques for fighting fire from the air, portable two-way voice radios, special fire pumpers, lightweight hose, and evaluation of fire danger through measurement of a combination of climatic and other factors. The Forest Service smokejumper corps was a forerunner of the Army paratroopers.

One of the more profitable research projects was the study known as Operation Firestop, conducted in southern California. Industry, city, county, State, Defense Department, and other Federal agencies combined forces in 1954 to concentrate research and development effort on new methods of forest-fire control. The total value of their contributed effort was one-half million dollars. Firestop developed the technique of bombing fires with chemicals dropped, uncontained, from airplanes. It tested several ways to use helicopters as firefighting tools. It conducted special studies of fire weather and fire behavior. All of these approaches advanced our knowledge.

During 1956, several of the developments started during Operation Firestop became practical fire-fighting measures. Air tankers joined ground fire-fighting forces on 25 fires by dropping 1,350 loads of water and chemical. Ground tankers made chemical attack on 23 fires. Hose-lay trays, now in regular production, were used to lay hose by helicopter on two fires. In the current year these modern fire-attack methods have been used on more fires and to a greater extent. Cooperative study projects between research groups and fire fighters continue at a scale unknown in the past.

On the public-relations front, too, there has been much progress. For 15 consecutive years the Forest Service, the Advertising Council, and State Foresters have jointly conducted a nationwide public-service campaign for forestfire prevention. This campaign was originally conceived in southern California. Since 1942, the number of forest fires in the Nation has decreased about 30 percent. Man-caused fires in California national forests have declined from an average of 1,033 per year in the early 1930's to an average of 656 per year in the past 5 years.

Despite the wide scope and long history of Forest Service responsibilities in fire control, we have been hard-pressed since the end of World War II to keep on top of the situation. This is due to two factors: (1) Increased use of the national forests, and (2) rising costs.

Most of the national forests are in the West. The urban, industrial, and agricultural expansion of the West since 1945 is well known. In the 10-year period 1946-56, the population of the 11 Western States jumped 32 percent. The national forests, particularly those around metropolitan areas such as in southern California, Portland, Seattle, and Salt Lake, have been greatly affected by this impact.

Recreation visits to national forests of the Nation have jumped from 18.2 million in 1946 to 45.7 million in 1955. In California the increase in this period has been from 3.9 to 7.7 million. This means more chances for a wildfire from a campfire getting away, a tossed cigarette, or from other acts of carelessness. The volume of timber cut has increased from 2.9 to 6.4 billion 1

feet in this same 10-year period. In this State the timber cut has steadily increased to a present cut of more than 800 million board-feet per year. This increases the likelihood of fires in logging slash. The recent great upsurge in mining, and the increase in number of claims countrywide to 200,000 in 1955, means more people in the woods. Special-use permits for summer homes, stores, rights-of-way, et cetera, have increased from 46,000 in 1946 to 55,000 in 1955, More than 18,000 of these are in our California national forests. The Forest Service welcomes this increased use, but it does create additional problems of fire prevention and suppression.

Increased costs are evident in many ways such as higher hourly wage rates, overtime pay, and an upswing in the costs of equipment and supplies. A lookout or fire-crew man costs 3 times more today than 15 years ago. Overtime is an important factor because our fire services must operate on a 7-day week, and often on a 24-hour day. Fire-equipment costs doubled between 1940 and 1950 and have continued to increase.

Congress has recognized this situation through increases in appropriations. The total funds appropriated for national-forest fire control increased from $14.7 million in 1950 to $20.7 million in fiscal year 1957. Despite our best efforts to offset rising costs by improved mechanization and technology the total cost for fire control per acre has increased substantially.

THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRE SITUATION

The forest-fire problem in southern California is without parallel in the United States. It is due basically to two factors: (1) Concentration in a small semiarid area of a high population and intensive industrial and agricultural development; (2) bordering this area are steep mountains with highly erodible soils, and highly flammable brush cover. These mountains are extremely important sources of water to the valley and urban populations. The proximity of the mountains to the people is such that floods and mud and rock flows from denuded slopes do serious damage. Repeatedly, floods and mud and rock flows have followed large fires in this area.

Southern California includes about one-tenth of the State but has more than one-half of the State's population. It is one of the fastest growing regions in the United States. There were 3.7 million people there in 1940, 6.8 in 1954, and the estimates are for 9 million in 1965. Expansion is so fast that highly valuable citrus groves are giving way to homes. The suburbs are expanding into the canyons and onto the brushy slopes of the mountains. This expansion means more water is consumed and it also subjects the valuable homes and improvements to the danger of fire and floods.

The role played by this southern California area in the national economy is remarkable. Southern California alone accounts for 4 percent of the Nation's population, 6 percent of its motor vehicles, 5 percent of its retail sales, 5 percent of the value added by manufacturers, 5 percent of its mineral production, 2.5 percent of its cash farm income, over 10 percent of its truck crops, more than 30 percent of the citrus fruits, and over 50 percent of the aircraft manufacturers. It is the center of the motion-picture industry, has important ocean ports, and vital military, air, and naval bases.

In southern California about 7.3 million acres, or 25 percent of the total land area, is considered to be water-yielding area. Despite vast expenditures for water developments and the bringing of water from the Colorado and Owens Rivers, about three-fourths of the total annual water used in the south coastal basin still comes from these local watersheds. Ninety percent of the local water is produced from 3.5 million acres classed as major water-yielding area. Most of this is on national-forest land. Thus it could be said that the national forests of southern California produce roughly half of the total water used in the south coastal basin, which includes the Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Bernardino metropolitan areas. The water problem is further aggravated by the fact that present annual use of local water from underground basins exceeds the safe yield.

Studies of 12 southern California watersheds located mainly on national forests and averaging 73 square miles show that if they were completely burned, flood peak for major storms would be tripled in the first year after burning, while peak flows for smaller storms would be increased as much as 10 to 20 times. But of even more significance is the probable increase in the erosion rate. The normal erosion rate is 115,000 cubic yards annually. The first year following burning, the rate could increase about 30 times if a normal series of storms occurred.