administered by the Veterans' Administration, does constitute a legal basis of entitlement to indemnity benefits under section 3, Public Law 23, 82d Congress. (Opinion of the Solicitor, dated March 17, 1953, approved March 20, 1953, XC-16 582 644.)

The foregoing conclusion was influenced largely by the language of section 602 (g) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, as amended (38 U. S. C. 802 (g)), an act which provides benefits upon a contractual basis existing between the United States and individual veterans. The contractual basis upon which the benefits of the National Service Life Insurance Act are based sets it aside as materially distinct from other acts administered by the Veterans' Administration under which mere gratuities are paid. This distinction was pointed out in Administrator's Decision 930, in which it was shown that a stepchild could be recognized as such for death compensation or death pension only if such child had been a member of the household of the person who served.

In considering the question of the analogy between the language of Public Law 23, 82d Congress, and section 602 (g) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, as amended, it was said in Administrator's Decision 930 that:

The language here under consideration ("including a stepchild, adopted child, or an illegitimate child if the latter was designated," etc.) undoubtedly derived from section 602 (g) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, as amended (38 U. S. C. 802 (g)) (“including a stepchild or an illegitimate child if designated as beneficiary by the insured"). Was it inadvertent or designed that the qualification "if designated *** by the insured" was limited to illegitimate children? As to an "adopted child," which term was added to the language, there is obviously no need of designation. (The term "child" was defined by the National Service Life Insurance Act (sec. 601 (e)) as including an adopted child-and evidently the insertion of the term "adopted child" in the clause under consideration was to effect the same purpose.) But why was the qualification, or restriction removed as to "stepchild"? The legislative history of the act does not answer this question.

Under the rules of statutory construction generally recognized for many years this change in language must have significance. (See Administrator's Decision 514 as to adoptive brothers and sisters.)

The conclusion reached in Administrator's Decision 930 was due to the fact that the indemnity provided for by Public Law 23, 82d Congress, was considered in that decision as analogous to insurance rather than as a gratuity, as was done in Administrator's Decision 952.

In the case on which Administrator's Decision 952, dated February 7, 1955, was predicated the question was whether the veteran's stepfather, who was his stepfather in name only, as there was at no time a family relationship between them in the usual sense, was a stepfather within the purview of section 3, Public Law 23, 82d Congress. That question was answered as follows:

The bare legal relationship of stepparent is insufficient to constitute a basis of entitlement under section 3 of the Servicemen's Indemnity Act of 1951. As a prerequisite to eligibility to the indemnity benefit the stepparent must have exercised a familial relationship to the deceased servicemen. General Counsel, dated Dec. 17, 1954, approved Jan. 17, 1955.)

(Opinion of the

In reaching the above conclusion in Administrator's Decision 952 it was stated among other things that:

The then Solicitor and the General Counsel have heretofore expressed the view that the bare legal relationship of stepparent (one who is the spouse of the natural parent), is sufficient to entitle such stepparent to indemnity under Public Law 23, if such stepparent be the last of that sex who stood in the parental relationship (opinion of Mar. 13, 1953, in the case of XC-16 520 248; opinion of the Solicitor, Op. Sol. 145-53; opinion of Dec. 23, 1953, in the case of XC-16 583 113). This view (which incidentally was that of the Comptroller General in relation to similar language in the World War Adjusted Compensation Act) was largely based upon comparison with the terms of the National Service Life Insurance Act (38 U. S. C. 801 et seq.) which limited stepparents to such designated by the insured, and to the fact that there are no such words of limitation in the Servicemen's Indemnity Act of 1951. It is a fact, however, that the Servicemen's Indemnity Act provides a gratuitous—as distinguished from a contractual-benefit; and hence, as stated in opinion of the General Counsel, Op. G. C. 116–54, it may be assumed that the Congress-since it did not define the term-expected or intended the act to be construed as had been other similar gratuity provisions. (Emphasis supplied.)

Upon reconsideration of the matter, it is my present opinion that the rule enunciated in Administrator's Decision 952, i. e., that since the indemnity is a gratuity the rules applicable to gratuities rather than those applicable to contract benefits (insurance) should be applied in interpreting the terms which are not specifically defined in Public Law 23, 82d Congress, such as stepchild and stepparent, and that, therefore, the rule enunciated in Administrator's Decision 930 should no longer be followed.

HELD: (1) The bare legal relationship of stepchild is insufficient to constitute a basis of entitlement under section 3 of the Servicemen's Indemnity Act of 1951.

(2) The rule enunciated in Administrator's Decision 930 should no longer be followed. (Opinion of the General Counsel, dated May 20, 1955, approved June 3, 1955.)