We fully understand the reasons why Tunisia and others among our friends have thought that it was necessary to call this special session.84 We recognize that the work of the General Assembly, if it wisely fulfills its honorable role, can constitute a compelling summons to the conscience of the world. Nevertheless we should be careful to avoid any steps that might tend only to harden positions, no matter how well-intentioned.

What role can the United Nations play in re-establishing peace and international understanding in Tunisia?

There are certain things we think the Assembly can and should do. First, it is right and proper for us to emphasize to both parties the obligations they bear under the charter. These include the duty, as set forth in article 1 of the charter, "to develop friendly relations among nations based on. . . the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples" and, in the words of article 2, to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." The charter is also clear as to the means to be employed in the settlement of a dispute of this nature. Article 33, which deserves our constant analysis and our constant repetition, states that the "parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation ." What could be more precise, what could be more definite, in the present circumstances?

From the first clash at Bizerte on July 17, my Government has consistently urged, both privately and publicly, that talks be undertaken without delay. I am sorry to say that results have not yet materialized. But we can and we will keep on trying. We continue to have faith that the common sense and the statesmanship of the great leaders of the two countries involved will eventually lead to harmonious agreement to bring about the ultimate conclusion that both parties already agree upon.

The second major contribution this Assembly can make is to underline to both sides the serious view that the world takes of this dispute. It is a dispute that can and must be ended, and ended promptly, for these are explosive times, times in which no spark must be permitted to fan itself into a blaze that could mean the conflagration which would consume us all. France and Tunisia may well be said to have the peace of all of us in their hands.

This is particularly true in north Africa. Blessed by nature and the energy and abilities of its people, it has nevertheless lived in almost constant crisis and conflict during the past decade. It is essential that peace return to the Maghreb as soon as possible. A solution to the Bizerte problem could contribute to the development of new and stronger ties between both shores of the Mediterranean, based on the principles of self-determination and of mutual respect. The United States, for its part, pledges itself to continue its efforts to establish peace in north Africa, of which the present crisis is an im

"See the unnumbered title, supra.

portant component. The task seems to be more formidable than the simple circumstances would suggest, and we intend to do nothing, we intend to say nothing, that would imperil any usefulness that we may have in this role.

In summary, Mr. President, we believe that the only solution is through negotiations between France and Tunisia. We have encouraged the parties to undertake such talks, and we continue to hope that they will do so.

We do not believe that it would be useful for the Assembly to adopt a resolution which, regardless of its merits, might serve only to prolong the present stalemate. And we shall be guided by that concern in determining our position and our vote.

85

337. CONSIDERATION OF THE GRAVE SITUATION IN TUNISIA OBTAINING SINCE 19 JULY 1961: Resolution 1622 (S-III), Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, August 25, 1961 86

The General Assembly,

Having examined the grave situation prevailing in Tunisia since 19 July 1961 which was the subject matter of Security Council consideration in its meetings of 21, 22, 28 and 29 July 1961,87

Noting with concern and regret that France has not fully complied with the provisions of the interim resolution adopted by the Security Council on 22 July 1961,88

Noting that the Security Council has failed to take further appropriate action,

Convinced that the presence of French armed forces in Tunisian territory against the express will of the Tunisian Government and people constitutes a violation of Tunisia's sovereignty, is a permanent source of international friction and endangers international peace and security,

1. Reaffirms the Security Council's interim resolution and urges the Government of France to implement fully the provisions of operative paragraph 1 thereof;

2. Recognizes the sovereign right of Tunisia to call for the withdrawal of all French armed forces present on its territory without its consent;

85 See infra.

U.N. General Assembly Official Records, Third Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/4860), p. 2. This resolution, sponsored by the representatives of 32 of the member states, was adopted by a vote of 66 to 0, with 30 abstentions (including the U.S.). The Representative of France did not participate in the U.N. General Assembly's third special session.

87 U.N. docs. S/PV.961-966.

88 Ante, doc. 331.

3. Calls upon the Governments of France and Tunisia to enter into immediate negotiations to devise peaceful and agreed measures in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations for the withdrawal of all French armed forces from Tunisian territory.

338. UNITED STATES VIEWS ON THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION RESPECTING THE SITUATION IN TUNISIA: Statement Made by the U.S. Representative (Stevenson) Before the U.N. General Assembly, August 25, 1961 (Excerpt) 89

I have explained previously that the United States has been engaged almost incessantly for several weeks in an effort to bring these parties together.90 There are several aspects of this resolution,91 I have also explained, with which we agree, including our profound regret that the resolution of the Security Council 92 has not been fully implemented and that the parties have not met to discuss and to agree upon the final disposition of the facilities now under the control of France at Bizerta.

We have felt obliged to abstain because we are fearful that this resolution will not accelerate, but will retard, these talks and the peaceful results which have been the almost unanimous hope of the many speakers we have heard during the past week.

With the conclusion of this special session, a new stage of this unhappy affair must now begin. The resolution itself is at best a prelude to negotiations between the parties-early negotiations, we hope-which are necessary before there can be a definitive solution in Bizerta which takes full account of Tunisian sovereignty and the right of Tunisia to be master in its own house.

As in the past weeks, the United States pledges to the Assembly its unrelenting efforts to do everything it can within its power to bring about the result which is not only desirable, but also indispensable, to any effective and final solution of this situation. Our earnest hope is that this resolution, which so many Members approved, will not retard these talks, and as I say, we pledge our continued and tireless effort to avoid this consequence and to bring France and Tunisia together to settle this unfortunate conflict between old friends. Our role has not been an easy one, nor has it escaped criticism here during the past week. But I would remind Members that, as we say in our language, discretion is sometimes the better part of valour.

339. FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MODUS VIVENDI WITH TUNISIA IN BIZERTE: Statement Made at a News Conference by the President of the French Republic (General de Gaulle), September 5, 1961 (Excerpts) 93

There has been aggression by Tunisia against our territory in the Sahara and our installations at Bizerta. . . . In these circumstances we could do nothing, and have done nothing, but maintain the integrity of our territory in the Sahara and reestablish conditions for the use of the Bizerta base, and we shall certainly do it again in similar circumstances. But for a long time, and again recently, we have been inviting the Tunisian Government first to agree on a modus vivendi for Bizerta, and then to open negotiations on conditions for the use of the base in the dangerous period through which the world is now passing."

B. Developments Affecting the Situation in the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville)

[NOTE: Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this section to the Congo are to the Republic of the Congo, Léopoldville.]

CONGOLESE MILITARY THRUST AT THE REBEL STRONGHOLD OF BUKAVU THROUGH THE TRUST TERRITORY OF RUANDA-URUNDI: Report of the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in the Congo (Dayal), January 1, 1961 1

340. THE OBLIGATION OF BELGIAN AUTHORITIES TO PREVENT CONGOLESE USE OF THE TRUST TERRITORY OF RUANDA-URUNDI FOR MILITARY PURPOSES: Note Verbale From the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold) to the Belgian Representative at the U.N. (Loridan), January 1, 1961 2

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has the honour to refer to the note verbale dated 31 December 1960 of the Permanent Mission of Belgium to

93

The statement printed here is taken from p. 18345 of Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1961-1962.

A French-Tunisian agreement was signed at Bizerte, Sept. 29, 1961, by the French Consul-General in Bizerte (Jeannot) and an official of the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior (Caïd El Sebsi whereby French forces withdrew, Oct. 1-3, 1961, to positions held before fighting broke out in Bizerte, July 19, 1961.

1 Section IV of U.N. doc. S/4606.

2 Section V of U.N. doc. S/4606.

3

the United Nations concerning the landing of troops of the Armée nationale congolaise at the airport of Usumbura in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. The Secretary-General has noted the statement of the Belgian Government that it had been informed of the request made by Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Bomboko for authorization to land and effect transit of Congolese troops at the same time that the Belgian Government learned of the actual landing at Usumbura. He further notes that the Belgian Government then instructed its Resident-General in Ruanda-Urundi to dispatch without delay the contingents to the Congolese frontier.

The report received by the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo stated that the troops of the Armée nationale congolaise, which were permitted to land at Usumbura, were provided with trucks driven by Europeans in civilian dress which brought them some ninety miles from Usumbura to Shangugu, thus facilitating their transit to Bukavu in the Kivu province of the Republic of the Congo.

The conclusion that the Secretary-General is compelled to draw from this report is that the authorities of the administering power in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi failed to take action to ensure that the Congolese troops did not carry out a military operation through the Trust Territory. It is evident that persons in the Trust Territory must have lent support to the operation both at the landing and by facilitating the transit of the Congolese troops to their intended destination. The Secretary-General finds it difficult to believe that such support can have been furnished by persons in Ruanda-Urundi without the knowledge of the responsible authorities of Belgium in the Trust Territory.

In view of these facts, the events referred to above indicate the direct or indirect provision of assistance for military purposes to the Armée nationale congolaise by authorities under the Belgian Government, in contravention of operative paragraph 6 of the resolution 1474 (ES-IV), adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on 20 September 1960. The gravity of the event is accentuated by the fact that assistance was rendered through the facilities and in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, which is administered by Belgium under an agreement with the United Nations that includes a solemn obligation to further international peace and security.'

The Secretary-General accordingly calls upon the Belgian Government to take immediate and effective measures to ensure that there will be no possibility of Belgian authorities in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi or elsewhere lending support directly or indirectly to military action by Congolese troops. It is imperative that instructions be given to the officials of the Belgian Government in Ruanda-Urundi that any attempt by Congolese troops to utilize that territory for transit purposes in support of military action must, in accordance with the duty of impartiality, require the disarming of such Congolese troops and if necessary guarding them in order to ensure that they do not engage in military action. This obligation, which is similar to that imposed upon neutrals under international law, follows from the duty of non-intervention contained in the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS TO ASSURE THE NEUTRALITY OF THE FRONTIER BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND THE TRUST TERRITORY OF RUANDAURUNDI: Report of the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in the Congo (Dayal), January 5, 1961 o

'Section III, ibid.

8

'In a telegram of Dec. 30, 1960, to the Ambassador of Belgium at Brazzaville; text ibid.

Б Cited as an unnumbered title, supra.

Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 593–594.

U.N. doc. A/159/Rev. 2.

8 Section VII of U.N. doc. S/4606/Add.1.