It is superfluous to speak much about the great positive significance the conclusion of a peace treaty with the G.D.R. will have. This treaty will juridically seal the frontiers of Germany established after World War II. The fact that in one part of Germany-The German Democratic Republic-an end has been put once and for all to the sinister past when German militarism used to unleash aggressive wars will get international recognition.

It follows from the American note that the United States Government is mainly displeased by the fact that the conclusion of a peace treaty with the G.D.R. would do away with the legal basis for further preserving the occupation regime and the presence of the troops of the Western powers in West Berlin. But in real life there is no isolated problem of West Berlin not connected with the German peace treaty. By refusing to take part in a peace settlement, the United States Government would place itself [in] a position where the West Berlin question would be settled without it, with all consequences for the rights of the Western powers based on Germany's surrender.

The proposal to turn West Berlin into a demilitarized free city means nothing other than the Soviet Union's readiness to settle, jointly with all sides concerned, the question of the status of West Berlin after the signing of a German peace treaty.

68

The United States Government repeatedly referred to some commitments it has with regard to West Berlin. True, the question of West Berlin appears in the Paris agreements signed by the Western powers with the F.R.G. Government. But on what ground can one equate the separate Paris agreements and the Allied agreements of the four powers? Many may be the commitments assumed by the United States of America in different areas of the world when pursuing a policy of knocking together military blocs.

"The commitments" with regard to West Berlin to which the United States Government refers were born not in the joint struggle of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the United States and other states against Hitler Germany. They are the consequence of another war imposed on the peoples-the "cold" war.

Thus it appears that the United States would like to base the right to the presence of its troops in West Berlin on the agreements signed together with the Soviet Union, but the "commitments" with regard to that city on the agreements concluded without the Soviet Union and against it. The Soviet Government cannot and will never recognize as legitimate such a contradictory position. Today West Berlin is an occupied city as it was sixteen years ago. This, the right of military occupation, is the only basis of the presence of the Western powers in West Berlin. And when the United States speaks of "protecting the freedom of the city," it is concerned only for preserving in West Berlin of the occupation regime which, as admitted by the United States Government itself, only causes general irritation.

As regards the freedom of West Berlin-that is, the inalienable right of the city's population to settle the questions of internal life at their own discretion and to establish the political and social system in accordance with their own desire this freedom is threatened by no one. On the contrary, the conclusion of a peace treaty, be it with one or both German states, will create a more solid basis for insuring [the] freedom of West Berlin, since its population will live not in the conditions of the occupation regime but in the conditions of international lawful order.

The United States Government refuses to take part in solving the problem of a German peace treaty on an agreed basis, but at the same time objects to conclusion of a peace treaty between a number of states which were members of the anti-Hitler coalition and the German Democratic Republic. What is it that the United States Government aims to achieve in this way? Indeed, it cannot prevent conclusion of a peace treaty with the G.D.R. Such a treaty will be concluded if the United States and other Western powers [do not] stop obstructing the solution of the question of [a] peace treaty on an agreed basis.

Of course, it will be with reluctance that the Soviet Government will conclude a peace treaty without the Western powers' participation. It would sincerely

58 See American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, pp. 483-612.

welcome a revision of the Western powers' position towards constructive actions jointly with the U.S.S.R. on the question of a German peace treaty.

Last year, as is known, it was intended to take up the problem of a German peace treaty at the conference of the heads of the four powers in Paris. The head of the Soviet Government did not go to that conference empty-handed. Everyone will remember, however, that the conference of the heads of the four powers could not take place in view of the provocative actions of the United States' former Administration with regard to the Soviet Union.

But the Soviet Government, taking into consideration specifically the change of Government in the United States of America, never regarded as buried the idea of discussing the problem of a peace settlement with Germany. The Soviet Government declares again that it is ready for talks aimed at the conclusion of a German peace treaty.

Unfortunately, the American note gives ground to serious doubts that the United States Government is striving for such talks. The note, true enough, says that "the United States Government is always prepared to consider in concord with its allies through free talks the question of settling the unsolved problems of Germany." But as it was the case formerly, objections are advanced then and there to the conclusion of a German peace treaty and to the settlement of the situation in West Berlin on this basis.

All this is accompanied by remarks about "dangerous consequences,” “serious threat to international peace" and even about how the NATO countries "may interpret" the steps of other states if they take the road of peace settlement with Germany. What, in this case, is the worth of the assurances of the United States Government about its readiness for talks?

The question arises before the Soviet Government: What aims are pursued by all this[?]

If anyone expects in this way to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union, it is time to understand that the language of threats is least of all applicable in the relations with the U.S.S.R. and that its use can only lead to opposite results. The Soviet Government has declared and declares again: It suggests conclusion of peace and a peace treaty with Germany. If this or that power or a group of powers take actions which will lead to dangerous consequences, it will not be the Soviet Union. Entire responsibility for the possible dangerous consequences for the cause of peace, hinted at by the United States Government, will be borne by all those who will take steps directed against peace. The Soviet Union and other peace-loving states will be in a position to uphold the right cause, their security and peace.

It is far from the Soviet Government's intention to aggravate the situation. On the contrary, it is striving for peace and easing of international tensions through conclusion of a German peace treaty and through peaceful cooperation between states. Insurance of peace and peaceful coexistence of states has been and remains the basis of the entire foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

It is by this that the Soviet Government is guided in its entire policy while setting the task of peace settlement with Germany. It expresses the hope that the United States Government would approach this matter in all seriousness and would, for its part, make a contribution to the cause of its joint settlement in the interests of peace.

50 The official text of this statement in the U.S. note of July 17, reads as follows: "the United States Government is always prepared to consider in agreement with its Allies a freely negotiated settlement of the unresolved problems of Germany"; ante, doc. 239. Subsequent quotations also vary from the official text.

246. UNITED STATES CONSULTATION WITH THE NATO POWERS "ON OUR PRESENT APPROACH TO THE GERMAN AND BERLIN QUESTION": Remarks Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) Following a Conference With the President (Kennedy), August 3, 1961 6o

I have just had a talk with the President before leaving this evening for a few days on the other side of the Atlantic. I will be talking this weekend with the Foreign Ministers of our allies who are directly involved in the problem of Germany and Berlin.61 And then I shall be meeting with the North Atlantic Council to talk with them on the same. subject at their headquarters in Paris.62 After that I shall be meeting with the American Ambassadors in European capitals, in order to get the benefit of their views and to bring them up to date on our present approach to the German and Berlin question.

President Kennedy has already told our own people-and indeed the people of the rest of the world-how we see this Berlin problem.63 It is essentially a very simple problem. There is peace in Berlin, and there is no need to disturb it. There is freedom in West Berlin, and we cannot allow that freedom to be undermined or destroyed.

Now there are some who think that it is negative or old-fashioned to be in favor of the status quo. Now we ourselves and the West would like to see an improvement in the status quo. And since 1946 the West has made many suggestions for changing the situation in Germany so that we can have permanent peace and a permanent settlement in that country. But we cannot admit to a change in the status quo at the cost of peace and freedom in central Europe.

I have no doubt whatever that our NATO alliance-that the great Atlantic Community-will meet this problem with unity and firmness and determination, but also with reasonableness and a readiness to discuss, which characterizes this great, experienced Western community of nations.

There is no reason why this problem cannot be solved by peaceful means if those others beyond the Iron Curtain are willing to approach it in the same spirit. President Kennedy has indicated to the entire world this combination of firmness and readiness to discuss, which must be characteristic of a responsible, great nation.

This is no time for recklessness-recklessness in word or in deeds. But may I point out that one can be reckless in two directions, in giving away essential positions, which only postpone the day of tragedy to some future date, or a recklessness of rash action not thoughtfully pursued; and I am quite sure that the Western alliance will be reckless in neither one of these directions.

Thank you very much.

* White House press release dated Aug. 3, 1961 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 28, 1961, p. 361).

Secretary Rusk consulted with the Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom, at Paris, Aug. 5-8. No communiqués were issued.

62 See post, doc. 248.

See ante, doc. 242.

247. UNITED STATES DECISION NOT TO TAKE ECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES "AT THIS TIME” IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET THREATS WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN: Statement Issued by the Department of State, August 4, 1961 64

The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce have discussed whether or not the increased tension over Berlin should affect current United States policies with respect to economic relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of the Soviet bloc.

It is only natural that Soviet threats with respect to Berlin should have stimulated considerable speculation concerning countermeasures, including action in the economic field. Now it is possible that if the Soviet Government continues its threatening attitude toward the vital interests of the United States and its allies, we will be obliged to reconsider all aspects of our relations, including economic, with the U.S.S.R. and the countries of the Soviet bloc. However, we do not believe that our interests or the cause of world peace would be served at this time by the initiation of actions designed to interrupt or significantly modify current economic relations with these countries.

248. REAFFIRMATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION DECLARATION ON BERLIN OF DECEMBER 16, 1958: Communiqué Issued by the Permanent Council of NATO, Paris, August 8, 1961 65

The Ministers noted with regret the lack of progress on the reunification of Germany. They reaffirmed their conviction that a peaceful and just solution for the problem of Germany including Berlin is to be found only on the basis of self-determination. With particular regard to Berlin, they reiterated their determination, as expressed in the declaration of 16th December, 1958,66 to maintain the freedom of West Berlin and its people. As to the often repeated threat by the Soviet Union to sign a separate peace treaty, they reaffirmed the statement in the 1958 declaration that "the denunciation by the Soviet Union of the inter-allied agreement[s] on Berlin can in no way deprive the other parties of their rights or relieve the Soviet Union of its obligations"."

64

Department of State press release No. 553 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 21, 1961, p. 334).

65

66

Ibid., Aug. 28, 1961, p. 361.

Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 602–603.

249. "THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO ENCOURAGE OR DISCOURAGE THE MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES [FROM EAST GERMANY]": Reply Made by the President (Kennedy) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, August 10, 1961 (Excerpt)67

Of course, we're concerned about the situation in Eastern Germany and really in Eastern Europe. There has been a tremendous passage from East to West which, of course, I know is a matter of concern to the Communists because this tremendous speed-up of people leaving the Communist system to come to the West and freedom, of course, is a rather illuminating evidence of the comparative values of free life in an open society and those in a closed society under a Communist system. In answer to your question, however, the United States Government does not attempt to encourage or discourage the movement of refugees, and I know of no plans to do so.

250. WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF "AN ORDER ON THE BORDERS OF WEST BERLIN WHICH WILL SECURELY BLOCK... SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AGAINST THE SOCIALIST CAMP COUNTRIES": Declaration Issued at Warsaw by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, August 13, 1961 (Excerpt) 68

The present traffic situation on the borders of West Berlin is being used by ruling quarters of the German Federal Republic and intelligence agencies of NATO countries to undermine the economy of the G.D.R. The government bodies and military concerns of the German Federal Republic, through deceit, bribery, and blackmail, induce certain unstable elements in the G.D.R. to leave for West Germany. These deceived people are compelled to serve with the Bundeswehr, and recruited for the intelligence agencies of different countries to be sent back to the G.D.R. as spies and saboteurs. A special fund has even been set up for such subversive activities against the G.D.R. and other socialist countries. Recently West German Chancellor Adenauer urged the NATO governments to increase this fund.

It is highly indicative that the subversive activities directed from West Berlin have greatly increased of late, right after the Soviet Union, the G.D.R., and other socialist countries advanced proposals for an immediate, peaceful settlement with Germany. This subversive activity not only inflicted damage on the G.D.R. but also affects the interests of other countries of the socialist camp. In the face of the aggressive aspirations of the reactionary forces of the German Federal Republic and its NATO allies, the Warsaw Pact members states cannot but take necessary measures to guarantee their security and, primarily, the security of the G.D.R. in the interests of the German peoples themselves.

The governments of the Warsaw Pact member states address the Peoples Chamber and Government of the G.D.R., and all working people of the G.D.R., with the proposal to establish an order on the borders of West Berlin which will

The reply printed here is taken from p. 557 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961.

Unofficial translation in the Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 4, 1961, pp.

400-401.