pared to East German feelings about their regime, we are ready to have that question submitted to a free vote in Berlin and, if possible, among all the German people. And let us hear at that time from the 21⁄2 million refugees who have fled the Communist regime in East Germany-voting for Western-type freedom with their feet.

The world is not deceived by the Communist attempt to label Berlin as a hotbed of war. There is peace in Berlin today. The source of world trouble and tension is Moscow, not Berlin. And if war begins, it will have begun in Moscow and not Berlin.

For the choice of peace or war is largely theirs, not ours. It is the Soviets who have stirred up this crisis. It is they who are trying to force a change. It is they who have opposed free elections. It is they who have rejected an all-German peace treaty and the rulings of international law. And as Americans know from our history on our own old frontier, gun battles are caused by outlaws and not by officers of the peace.

In short, while we are ready to defend our interests, we shall also be ready to search for peace-in quiet exploratory talks, in formal or informal meetings. We do not want military considerations to dominate the thinking of either East or West. And Mr. Khrushchev may find that his invitation to other nations to join in a meaningless treaty may lead to their inviting him to join in the community of peaceful men, in abandoning the use of force, and in respecting the sanctity of agreements.

While all of these efforts go on, we must not be diverted from our total responsibilities, from other dangers, from other tasks. If new threats in Berlin or elsewhere should cause us to weaken our program of assistance to the developing nations who are also under heavy pressure from the same source, or to halt our efforts for realistic disarmament, or to disrupt or slow down our economy, or to neglect the education of our children, then those threats will surely be the most successful and least costly maneuver in Communist history. For we can afford all these efforts, and more-but we cannot afford not to meet this challenge.

And the challenge is not to us alone. It is a challenge to every nation which asserts its sovereignty under a system of liberty. It is a challenge to all who want a world of free choice. It is a special challenge to the Atlantic Community, the heartland of human freedom.

We in the West must move together in building military strength. We must consult one another more closely than ever before. We must together design our proposals for peace and labor together as they are pressed at the conference table. And together we must share the burdens and the risks of this effort.

49

The Atlantic Community, as we know it, has been built in response to challenge: the challenge of European chaos in 1947, of the Berlin blockade in 1948,50 the challenge of Communist aggression in Korea in

49 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 1243-1321.

50

See ibid., pp. 908–939.

31

1950. Now, standing strong and prosperous after an unprecedented decade of progress, the Atlantic Community will not forget either its history or the principles which gave it meaning.

The solemn vow each of us gave to West Berlin in time of peace will not be broken in time of danger. If we do not meet our commitments to Berlin, where will we later stand? If we are not true to our word there, all that we have achieved in collective security, which relies on these words, will mean nothing. And if there is one path above all others to war, it is the path of weakness and disunity.

Today the endangered frontier of freedom runs through divided Berlin. We want it to remain a frontier of peace. This is the hope of every citizen of the Atlantic Community, every citizen of Eastern Europe, and, I am confident, every citizen of the Soviet Union. For I cannot believe that the Russian people, who bravely suffered enormous losses in the Second World War, would now wish to see the peace upset once more in Germany. The Soviet Government alone can convert Berlin's frontier of peace into a pretext for war.

The steps I have indicated tonight are aimed at avoiding that war. To sum it all up: We seek peace, but we shall not surrender. That is the central meaning of this crisis-and the meaning of your Government's policy.

With your help, and the help of other free men, this crisis can be surmounted. Freedom can prevail, and peace can endure.

I would like to close with a personal word. When I ran for the Presidency of the United States, I knew that this country faced serious challenges, but I could not realize-nor could any man realize who does not bear the burdens of this office-how heavy and constant would be those burdens.

Three times in my lifetime our country and Europe have been involved in major wars. In each case serious misjudgments were made on both sides of the intentions of others, which brought about great devastation. Now, in the thermonuclear age, any misjudgment on either side about the intentions of the other could rain more devastation in several hours that has been wrought in all the wars of human history.

Therefore I, as President and Commander in Chief, and all of us as Americans are moving through serious days. I shall bear this responsibility under our Constitution for the next 31⁄2 years, but I am sure that we all, regardless of our occupations, will do our very best for our country and for our cause. For all of us want to see our children grow up in a country at peace and in a world where freedom endures.

I know that sometimes we get impatient; we wish for some immediate action that would end our perils. But I must tell you that there is no quick and easy solution. The Communists control over a billion people, and they recognize that if we should falter their success would be imminent.

See American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, pp. 2527 ff.

We must look to long days ahead which, if we are courageous and persevering, can bring us what we all desire. In these days and weeks I ask for your help and your advice. I ask for your suggestions, when you think we could do better.

All of us, I know, love our country, and we shall all do our best to serve it.

In meeting my responsibilities in these coming months as President. I need your good will and your support-and above all, your prayers.

243. SOVIET-UNITED STATES PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF A CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT FOR THE YEARS 1962-1963: Statement Issued by the Department of State, August 1, 1961 52

Talks on United States-USSR Cultural Exchanges were concluded here yesterday.53 During these talks, preliminary proposals for a possible new exchange agreement, covering the years 1962-1963, were exchanged.

Both sides indicated that cultural exchanges should be increased. There was a frank discussion of the problems involved in carrying out specific exchanges. It was agreed that proposals for a new exchange agreement would be discussed during the next several months, with negotiations tentatively scheduled to begin in November.

The Soviet participants in these discussions were Mr. S. K. Romanovsky, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and Mr. V. M. Kamenev, Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Committee as well as representatives from the Soviet Embassy. Mr. Frank G. Siscoe, Director, Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, handled the detailed discussions for the American side.

While in Washington, Mr. Romanovsky, and Mr. Kamenev also met with Mr. Philip H. Coombs, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and Mr. Donald M. Wilson, the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency.

52

63

Department of State press release No. 544.

The talks began July 27; see the Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 21. 1961, pp. 333-334.

244. JOINT RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO ORDER UNITS AND MEMBERS IN THE READY RESERVE TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR NOT MORE THAN TWELVE MONTHS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES: Public Law 87-117, Approved August 1, 1961 54

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, until July 1, 1962, the President may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty for not more than twelve consecutive months. However, not more than two hundred and fifty thousand members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty (other than for training), without their consent, under this section at any one time.

SEC. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, until July 1, 1962, the President may authorize the Secretary of Defense to extend enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, periods of active duty for training, periods of obligated service, or other military status, in any component of an armed force or in the National Guard that expire before July 1, 1962, for not more than twelve months.

245. "TO MAKE THE CONCLUSION OF A GERMAN PEACE TREATY DEPENDENT ON ... GERMANY'S REUNIFICATION MEANS TO REFUSE TO SETTLE EITHER OF THE QUESTIONS": Note of the Soviet Government, Handed to the American Ambassador at Moscow (Thompson), August 3, 1961 (Excerpts)

55

56

In connection with the note of the United States Government of July 17, 1961, which was a reply to the Soviet Government's memorandum handed to President Kennedy in Vienna on June 4, 1961, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics finds it necessary to state the following:

In its note the United States Government emphasizes that the question of a peace settlement with Germany cannot be settled until the reunification of Germany has been realized. But this is, to say the least, an unrealistic approach

54

S.J. Res. 120, 87th Cong.; 75 Stat. 242. See Authority for Ordering Ready Reserves to Active Duty, Extension of Enlistments, and Additional Appropriations for Procurement: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, on S. 2311 and S.J. Res. 120, July 27, 1961; S. Rept. 642, 87th Cong., July 27, 1961; and H. Rept. 816, 87th Cong., July 28, 1961.

English-language text as released by the Soviet news agency Tass, printed in the New York Times, Aug. 5, 1961, and reprinted in Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 704-714. Similar notes were handed to the Ambassadors of France, the German Federal Republic, and the United Kingdom.

Ante, doc. 239.

Ante, doc. 231.

to the question. The problem of Germany's unification is a purely internal problem of the German people and it can be solved only on the basis of agreement between the two German states-the G.D.R. and the F.R.G.—whereas the question of a peace treaty is international in its very nature and affects the interests of many states.

Speaking of Germany's unification, the United States Government deemed it appropriate to touch on the question of the right to self-determination. Thus it appears that the right of self-determination is defended by those who in real life serve as bulwark of colonial order and every time block the way to this or that people when it begins the struggle for the right to independent national development.

Manipulations with the slogan of self-determination of the German nation in the conditions when two independent German states exist are a rather cheap trick. It is not on the national question that the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. now differ. They are separated by deep-going differences in the internal way of life, in other words, by deep-going social differences. To try and counterpose the slogan of self-determination to the struggle inside a nation for social progress means to juggle with concepts. If we are to speak of the social system, and this is precisely the matter to be discussed in connection with the formation of two independent states instead of former Germany, both these states have long since made their choice.

It is a matter for the Germans themselves to search for a way to unite their two states which are developing in different directions. In a situation when the F.R.G. Government flatly refuses even to start talks with the G.D.R. Government on the question of unification, there, of course, can be and will be no prospects of reaching agreement of the two German states on this question. in view of such a policy of the F.R.G. Government. This is an irrefutable fact and it cannot be ignored.

The four powers can change nothing in the obtaining situation. Even if they agreed between themselves on the order of Germany's reunification desirable to them, they would have to impose their decision on the two German states by force. What would this have in common with the principle of self-determination, about the application of which for the solution of the problem of Germany's reunification the United States Government speaks?

If the four powers can at all help practically in solving the problem of Germany's reunification, it is only by concluding a peace treaty. By assuming identical international commitments under the peace treaty, both German states would thus get a common ground for rapprochement in the interests of solving general national tasks of the German people. But to make the conclusion of a German peace treaty dependent on the solution of the problem of Germany's reunification means to refuse to settle either of the questions.

The Soviet Government maintains that under the conditions now obtaining the conclusion of a peace treaty with the participation of all states who were in the state of war with Germany on one hand and both German states on the other hand would be the best solution. As pointed out by the Soviet Government, it regards possible also such a solution of the question of a German peace treaty, when two peace treaties would be concluded, one with the German Democratic Republic and the other with the Federal Republic of Germany, with basic provisions of both treaties being identical.

At the same time the situation in Europe is becoming so tense that it is impossible and dangerous to align oneself with the position of those who, for these or other narrow considerations, continue objecting to the conclusion of a peace treaty. To follow in the wake of the opponents of a peace settlement with Germany would mean to share with them grave responsibility for all the consequences of further delays in concluding a peace treaty.

The Soviet Union would betray the basic principles of its policy of peace. were it to follow this road and permit the events, clearly leading to the growth of war danger, to develop in this way.

If the Western powers and the F.R.G. Government, as they constantly declare, refuse to sign a peace treaty with Germany, such a treaty will have to be signed without them. In this case a peace treaty will be concluded between the states which participated in the war against Hitler Germany, and which will be desirous to do so, and the German Democratic Republic, which has already agreed to this.