freedom. It is the objective of our policy for them to continue to have it. Peace does not come automatically from a "peace treaty." There is peace in Germany today even though the situation is "abnormal." A "peace treaty" that adversely affects the lives and rights of millions will not bring peace with it. A "peace treaty" that attempts to affect adversely the solemn commitments of three great powers does not bring peace with it. There is no reason for a crisis over Berlin. If one develops it is because the Soviet Union is attempting to invade the basic rights of others. All the world will plainly see that the misuse of such words as "peace" and "freedom" cannot conceal a threat to raise tension to the point of danger and suppress the freedom of those who now enjoy it. 240. "THE PEOPLE OF WEST BERLIN TODAY HAVE.. In consultation and full agreement with its British and French allies, and with the benefit of the views of the Federal Republic of Germany, and after consultation with the other member governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States on Monday delivered through its Embassy in Moscow its reply 31 to the aide memoire on Germany and Berlin received from the Soviet Government on June 4.32 Our reply speaks for itself and advances what I believe to be an irrefutable legal, moral, and political position. In this statement I should like to convey to the American people and the people of the world the basic issues which underlie the somewhat more formal language of diplomacy. The Soviet aide memoire is a document which speaks of peace but threatens to disturb it. It speaks of ending the abnormal situation in Germany but insists on making permanent its abnormal division. It refers to the Four Power alliance of World War II but seeks the unilateral abrogation of the rights of the other three powers. It calls for new international agreements while preparing to violate existing ones. It offers certain assurances while making it plain that its previous assurances are not to be relied upon. It professes concern for the rights of the citizens of West Berlin while seeking to expose them to the immediate or eventual domination of a regime which permits no self-determination. Three simple facts are clear: 1. Today there is peace in Berlin, in Germany, and in Europe. If that peace is destroyed by the unilateral actions of the Soviet Union, 30 White House press release dated July 19, 1961 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 7, 1961, pp. 223–224). 31 Supra. 32 Ante, doc. 231. its leaders will bear a heavy responsibility before world opinion and history. 2. Today the people of West Berlin are free. In that sense it is already a "free city"-free to determine its own leaders and free to enjoy the fundamental human rights reaffirmed in the United Nations Charter. 3. Today the continued presence in West Berlin of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France is by clear legal right, arising from war, acknowledged in many agreements signed by the Soviet Union, and strongly supported by the overwhelming majority of the people of that city. Their freedom is dependent upon our exercise of these rights-an exercise which is thus a political and moral obligation as well as a legal right. Inasmuch as these rights, including the right of access to Berlin, are not held from the Soviet Government, they cannot be ended by any unilateral action of the Soviet Union. They cannot be affected by a so-called "peace treaty," covering only a part of Germany, with a regime of the Soviet Union's own creation-a regime which is not freely representative of all or any part of Germany and does not enjoy the confidence of the 17 million East Germans. The steady stream of German refugees from East to West is eloquent testimony to that fact. The United States has been prepared since the close of the war, and is prepared today, to achieve, in agreement with its World War II allies, a freely negotiated peace treaty covering all of Germany and based on the freely expressed will of all of the German people. We have never suggested that, in violation of international law and earlier Four Power agreements, we might legally negotiate a settlement with only a part of Germany, or without the participation of the other principal World War II allies. We know of no sound reason why the Soviet Government should now believe that the rights of the Western Powers, derived from Nazi Germany's surrender, could be invalidated by such an action on the part of the Soviet Union. The United States has consistently sought the goal of a just and comprehensive peace treaty for all of Germany since first suggesting in 1946 that a special commission be appointed for this purpose.33 We still recognize the desirability of change-but it should be a change in the direction of greater, not less, freedom of choice for the people of Germany and Berlin. The Western peace plan and the all-Berlin solution proposed by the Western allies at Geneva in 1959 4 were constructive, practical offers to obtain this kind of fair settlement in central Europe. Our objective is not to perpetuate our presence in either Germany or Berlin-our objective is the perpetuation of the peace and freedom of their citizens. But the Soviet Union has blocked all progress toward the conclusion of a just treaty based on the self-determination of the German "This suggestion was made during the Third Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. New York City, Nov. 4-Dec. 12, 1946; see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 96–97. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 658-663 and 685-691. people and has instead repeatedly heightened world tensions over this issue. The Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948,5 the Soviet note of November 27th, 1958,36 and this most recent Soviet aide memoire of June 4, 1961, have greatly disturbed the tranquillity of this area. The real intent of the June 4 aide memoire is that East Berlin, a part of a city under Four Power status, would be formally absorbed into the so-called "German Democratic Republic" while West Berlin, even though called a "free city," would lose the protection presently provided by the Western Powers and become subject to the will of a totalitarian regime. Its leader, Herr Ulbricht, has made clear his intention, once this so-called "peace treaty" is signed, to curb West Berlin's communications with the free world and to suffocate the freedom it now enjoys. The area thus newly subjected to Soviet threats of heightened tension poses no danger whatsoever to the peace of the world or to the security of any nation. The world knows that there is no reason for a crisis over Berlin today and that, if one develops, it will be caused by the Soviet Government's attempt to invade the rights of others and manufacture tensions. It is, moreover,misusing the words "freedom" and "peace." For, as our reply states, "freedom" and "peace" are not merely words-nor can they be achieved by words or promises alone. They are representative of a state of affairs. A city does not become free merely by calling it a "free city." For a city or a people to be free requires that they be given the opportunity, without economic, political, or police pressure, to make their own choice and to live their own lives. The people of West Berlin today have that freedom. It is the objective of our policy that they shall continue to have it. Peace does not come automatically from a "peace treaty." There is peace in Germany today even though the situation is "abnormal.” A "peace treaty" that adversely affects the lives and rights of millions will not bring peace with it. A "peace treaty" that attempts to affect adversely the solemn commitments of three great powers will not bring peace with it. We again urge the Soviet Government to reconsider its course, to return to the path of constructive cooperation it so frequently states it desires, and to work with its World War II allies in concluding a just and enduring settlement of issues remaining from that conflict. See A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949, pp. 908-939. 36 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 591-596. 241. THE PROGRESSIVE PUBLIC DETERIORATION OF SOVIET-UNITED STATES RELATIONS OVER THE ISSUE OF BERLIN: Replies Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to Questions Asked on the ABC Program "Editor's Choice," July 23, 1961 (Excerpts) 37 When the new administration came in in January, we made a systematic effort to establish our lines of communication between Washington and Moscow, lines of communications which were in a state of some disrepair, you will recall. We felt it was important that two nations who had serious disagreements have an ability to talk things out with each other. And in the process we tried to eliminate some of the minor and unnecessary irritations and frictions that were there, such as the fliers who were returned 38 and points of that sort. But we were never under any illusions that the great vital overriding problems were solved in the course of these exchanges. Now, in the course of the last several weeks the Soviet Union has returned to the question of Berlin. It has made some far-reaching proposals, proposals to destroy our rights in Berlin. It has done so publicly. Now, these have to be met publicly, have to be explained publicly, debated publicly, because they go to the heart of our position in the free world. I don't believe that we can see any changes in their position since the date of the Soviet aide memoire at the time of the Vienna visit.39 I have no doubt that this is a genuine attempt on their part to settle the Berlin question on their terms. But it is not a flashpoint for a future war, certainly from the point of view of the West. West Berlin offers no threat to anyone. There is peace there. There can be peace there. Now, this is no security hazard for the East Germans or for the Soviet Union. If Berlin is a focal point of trouble, it is because of the pressures coming from the East. There are many possible explanations of the Soviet initiative on this question. I think we know that they are anxious about the situation in East Germany itself. I think they would undoubtedly like to consolidate their present de facto position in East Germany and in central Europe, and I think that they feel that West Berlin, cut off as it is, is always a tempting possibility for applying pressure. At the present time our rights in West Berlin come from the surrender of Nazi Germany and not from an agreement with the Soviet *The replies printed here are taken from pp. 282 and 283-284 of the Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 14, 1961 (reprint of Department of State press release No. 525, July 24, 1961). 38 See ante, doc. 216. 39 Ante, doc. 231. Union, although the Soviet Union has recognized these rights in a number of agreements along the way. But there is a very long record of broken agreements and treaties with the Soviet Union made during and since the war. I think we can be forgiven if we are skeptical about the offer of fresh assurances when these are made at just the time that they are withdrawing assurances already given. Now, the question of agreements with the Soviet Union is a very complex one, but there are times when it looks as though, as I said in another place the other day, an agreement seems to them to be a rest camp where you pause to refit, waiting for an opportunity for a further advance.40 An attempt to destroy Western rights in West Berlin by a piece of paper signed between the Soviet Union and East Germany simply cannot have that effect. This is a legal absurdity. It is not an act of political wisdom, and if implications are drawn from this notion that our rights have been destroyed, this could create a very dangerous situation. 242. "WE CANNOT AND WILL NOT PERMIT THE COMMUNISTS TO DRIVE US OUT OF BERLIN, EITHER GRADU. ALLY OR BY FORCE": Address by the President (Kennedy) to the Nation, July 25, 1961 (Excerpts) "1 44 41 43 Seven weeks ago tonight I returned from Europe to report on my meeting with Premier Khrushchev and the others.42 His grim warnings about the future of the world, his aide memoire on Berlin, his subsequent speeches and threats which he and his agents have launched, and the increase in the Soviet military budget that he has announced 45 have all prompted a series of decisions by the administration and a series of consultations with the members of the NATO organization. In Berlin, as you recall, he intends to bring to an end, through a stroke of the pen, first, our legal rights to be in West Berlin and, secondly, our ability to make good on our commitment to the 2 million free people of that city. That we cannot permit. We are clear about what must be done and we intend to do it. I want to talk frankly with you tonight about the first steps that we shall take. These actions will require sacrifice on the part of many of our citizens. More will be required in the future. They will require, 40 Remarks made in the course of the Secretary's address before the National Press Club, July 10, 1961; text in the Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1961, pp. 175-178. 41 White House press release dated July 25, 1961 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 14, 1961, pp. 267-273). The President's address was carried by the principal radio and television networks. 42 See ante, doc. 229. 43 Ante, doc. 231. 44 See ante, doc. 232. |