And we are prepared to assure this for the control agencies. Only given general and total disarmament under the strictest control can we achieve trust and really create conditions of peaceful coexistence under which no one country or group of countries could arm surreptitiously for the purpose of attacking other countries.

This is our viewpoint. What clearer statement must we make for the representatives of the West to stop repeating that the Soviet Union does not accept control!

I should now like to dwell on another question on which we exchanged views with President Kennedy-the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests.

The Western powers flatly refuse to accept our proposal on the forms of control.

What is the gist of our proposal? Let me state it briefly. We had initially thought it possible to agree to the Western powers' proposal that the executive body of the system for control over the cessation of tests be headed by one person appointed by agreement among the parties. But the events in the Congo put us on the alert, taught us some sense, as they say.

The Government of the Republic of the Congo appealed to the United Nations for help in the struggle against the Belgian colonialists, who were trying to regain their colonial domination over that country. The Security Council and the General Assembly adopted a number of decisions in this connection that were not bad. But what happened thereafter?

Mr. Hammarskjold, masquerading as a neutral person and taking advantage of his position as Secretary-General of the United Nations, interpreted and carried out these decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly in such a way as to please the colonialists.

This is precisely why the Soviet Government has come to the firm conclusion that control over implementation of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests should be exercised with the participation of representatives of the three existing groups of states-the socialist countries, the countries in the Western military blocs, and the countries that are pursuing a neutral policy. Further more, the representatives of these groups of states can take only agreed decisions.

The Soviet Union has not claimed and does not claim an exceptional position for itself. We do not want to dominate in the control commission, but neither shall we permit anyone to dominate us. We claim for ourselves exactly the same rights as the other parties to the treaty will have. We are aiming to prevent abuses by the control commission.

But what do the Western powers want? They want to force some "neutral" person on us as the one-man interpreter and executor of the treaty, want to work into the post some new Hammarskjold, who would give the control orders over our country's whole territory. And, to be frank, they want this person to permit them to carry on unhindered intelligence activities on our territory in the West's interests. To that, of course, we cannot and never shall agree, since the security of our country is at stake.

All the indications are that it has been hard to reach agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests at Geneva because of the position taken by the Western powers. The main thing now is that the problem of general and total disarmament be solved without delay. We said the following to the Presi dent of the United States: let us solve both problems as interconnected-the problem of the cessation of tests and the problem of general and total disarmament. It will then be easier to reach agreement on the establishment of the executive control body.

Under conditions of general and total disarmament the question of state security will appear on a different plane. There will be no armies nor any

threat of attack by one state on another. Under these conditions the Soviet Government will be prepared to accept the Western powers' proposals on control.

Let me now move on to the German question, which held a big place in our talks with President Kennedy.

In the talks with me, President Kennedy made reference-as, incidentally, have other representatives of the Western countries-to the fact that the Western powers have obligations of some kind to the residents of West Berlin, and that these obligations cannot be affected even by the conclusion of a German peace treaty. It is natural, however, to ask the question: what obligations can it be a matter of retaining if they all stem from the fact of Hitlerite Germany's surrender and from provisional allied agreements and, consequently, can be valid only pending conclusion of a peace treaty?

It has always been the case that, after the signing of a peace treaty, the terms of surrender become null and void on the entire territory to which the treaty extends and the entire territory is relieved of the occupation regime. Accordingly, West Berlin, which is situated on the territory of the German Democratic Republic, will, after the signing of the peace treaty, be free of all the conditions laid down in connection with the surrender of Hitlerite Germany and the introduction of an occupation regime there.

It was more than two years ago that we brought out our draft of a peace treaty with Germany." There is nothing in it that would infringe upon the interests of our former allies or of the Germans themselves.

The Soviet Union, which paid a toll many times heavier than that paid by all the other allies in the anti-Hitlerite coalition put together, is proposing that a peace treaty be signed so as to normalize the situation in Europe, to normalize relations with both German states. But the United States, Britain and France, along with the Federal German Republic, do not want to sign a peace treaty but are striving to maintain an ambiguous and dangerous situation. They refuse to do away with the vestiges of the past war and insist on preserving the occupation regime and keeping their forces in West Berlin.

Any person not devoid of common sense realizes that the signing of a peace treaty is the way to improve relations among states. Refusal to conclude a peace treaty and the perpetuation of the occupation regime in West Berlin are aimed at continuing the "cold war". But who is to say where the borderline is that separates "cold war" from war in the full sense of the word? Is it not plain that the "cold war" is a preparation, a build-up of forces for war?

I say this so that all may understand how grave a danger is entailed in further delay in concluding a German peace treaty.

The Governments of the Western powers maintain that they have given promises to protect the freedom and welfare of the population in West Berlin, although the quadripartite agreements bearing on Berlin say nothing of these obligations on the part of the United States, Britain and France. The idea of assuring freedom for the residents of West Berlin can in itself elicit objections from no one. It is the Soviet Union that is proposing that the political and social regime in West Berlin be the one its residents want.

So there is no encroachment on the freedom of West Berlin, nor are there barriers to access to the city. We have stated repeatedly and we now state once again: a peace treaty will create all the conditions necessary for assuring the freedom of the free city of West Berlin and the maintenance of unhampered ties between West Berlin and the outside world.

Needless to say, when the questions concerning access to West Berlin are settled, generally accepted international rules should be adhered to-that is, the "Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 591-601.

territory of the country through which the access routes pass should be used only with the consent of its government.

Such a situation is recognized by everyone as normal. Then why should it be considered abnormal if the consent of the German Democratic Republic must be asked for transit to West Berlin? After all, the overland routes to West Berlin pass through its territory, the water routes also pass through its territory, and the air routes as well traverse its territory. Consequently, after a peace treaty has been concluded, countries desirous of maintaining ties with West Berlin will have to make arrangements with the Government of the German Democratic Republic on the procedure for access to West Berlin and on ties with the city.

We ask everyone to understand us correctly: the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany cannot be put off any longer; a peace settlement in Europe must be achieved this year. We summon all countries that fought against Germany to take part in the peace conference when agreement is reached on its convocation. The question now is not whether or not to sign a peace treaty but whether that peace treaty will be concluded with the two existing German states-the German Democratic Republic and the Federal German Republic-or with one German state, and whether all the states that fought against Germany will take part in the peace settlement or only some of them.

The governments of several countries have announced in advance that they will not take part in the peace conference. The Soviet Union will, of course, regret it if some states evade the signing of a German peace treaty. We have always sought and seek now to have all the countries in the anti-Hitlerite coalition participate in the peaceful settlement of the German question.

But even if some countries refuse to take part in the negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty, this will not stop us, and, together with other countries that wish to do so, we shall sign a peace treaty with the two German states. If the Federal German Republic is unwilling to sign a peace treaty, we shall sign it with the German Democratic Republic alone, which has already declared its desire to conclude a peace treaty and has given its consent to the creation of a free city of West Berlin on its territory.

During the meeting in Vienna there was also an exchange of views on the situation in Laos and on peaceful settlement of the Laotian question.

The communiqué on this subject states that the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union "reaffirmed their support of a neutral and independent Laos under a government chosen by the Laotians themselves, and of international agreements for ensuring that neutrality and independence, and in this connection they have recognized the importance of an effective cease-fire in Laos."

During the discussion of the Laotian question with President Kennedy it became apparent that we had a similar approach. I declared that, for this question to be settled, it was necessary to assure the creation of an independent and neutral Laos. At the same time, there had to be a clear-cut separation of external problems from internal ones.

The internal policy of Laos cannot and should not be determined either by the Soviet Union or by the United States or by other countries. If any countries specify the kind of life Laos is to lead and the kind of government it is to have, it will be not an independent, neutral Laos but a Laos ruled from without. And this is inadmissible.

The three political forces active in Laos should themselves set up a government that would stand for independence and neutrality. The Soviet Union would welcome such a policy and do everything in its power to further it.

I told President Kennedy all this. I formed the impression that the President's attitude to what I said was one of understanding. He declared that our two countries should bring influence to bear on the respective political groupings in Laos to the end that an understanding might be reached among them on the establishment of a single government and of a program for it, on the basis of

recognition of independence and neutrality. We consider such an approach sensible.

It came out in our talks with the President that the question of the peaceful coexistence of states is one that we see differently. The idea expressed by the President boiled down to the raising of a dam against the movement of peoples toward the establishment in their countries of systems that are objectionable to the ruling circles of the Western states.

If such a stand is taken, then an agreement should be concluded and commitments assumed to keep a check on other states and prevent any changes in the systems existing in them, even if the peoples rise up against those systems. It turns out that should the people of some country have a mind to change the socio-economic order, this is not to be permitted.

This is clearly an utterly erroneous conception, and we cannot, of course, concur with it. No one is in a position to stop peoples from aspiring to freedom. No regime that is built on the oppression and exploitation of the people is stable, can exist forever. And however cunningly a system of exploitation and oppression may be constructed, the people still win their freedom and throw off the oppressors.

Changes in the social and political life of society are an inevitable process, one that does not depend on an understanding among statesmen. If anyone did display such folly as trying somehow to reach an understanding on this question, he would thereby show his bankruptcy and his failure to comprehend the developments and changes that are occurring in the world.

In our view, the main thing that should be recognized by the Western powers, and particularly by the United States, is that socialism has now become firmly established in the world, and no one is in a position to alter that fact. Ruling circles of the Western powers are known to have hatched and to be hatching plans for eliminating the socialist system. But such attempts have failed and will continue to fail.

The fact of the existence of two social systems in the world must be taken as the starting point, and relations between socialist and capitalist states must be framed in such a way as to ensure peaceful cooperation between them.

This is the only sensible course in relations between states if peace is to be safeguarded.

This is what I wanted to tell you, comrades, about our talks with the President of the United States. I must note that, all in all, I came away pleased with these talks. If I were to be asked, "Was it worth while making arrangements for the meeting, was it worth while holding it?" I would answer without a moment's hesitation-the holding of such a meeting was worth while, and, more than that, it had to be held.

In our talks with the President of the United States, neither side avoided raising and discussing the sharpest issues. It can be said that a frank conversation took place. We carefully acquainted ourselves with the position of the United States Government and spelled out the position of the Soviet Government on a number of major international questions. This alone is of no small importance. No one, of course, expected us to reach full accord-the courses that our two states are following are really much too divergent for that to have been looked for.

I formed the impression that President Kennedy appreciates the great responsibility that rests with the governments of two such mighty states. I should like to hope that awareness of that responsibility will continue to exist, so that urgent international problems can be solved, the stones removed that are blocking the road to lasting peace, to the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

Relations between our two countries at present leave much to be desired, and this situation has come about through no fault of the Soviet Union's. But we would like to believe that the time will come when Soviet-American relations improve. and this will have a salutary effect on the entire international situation.

C. The Aftermath of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Meeting at Vienna-United States-Soviet Confrontation on the Issues of Germany and Berlin

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231. "THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STANDS FOR THE IMMEDIATE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY... TRANSFORMING . . . [WEST BERLIN] INTO A DEMILITARIZED FREE CITY": Aide-Mémoire Handed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) to the President of the United States (Kennedy) at Vienna, June 4, 1961 (Excerpts) 1

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Proceeding from a realistic evaluation of the situation, the Soviet Government stands for the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. The question of a peace treaty is one that concerns the national security of the U.S.S.R. and of many other States. The time has already passed for allowing the situation in Germany to remain unchanged. All the conditions for the conclusion of a peace treaty matured a long time ago and this treaty must be concluded. The point is who will conclude it and when, and whether this will entail unnecessary costs.

The U.S.S.R. deems it necessary in the interests of consolidating peace formally to recognize the situation which has developed in Europe after the war, to legalize and to consolidate the inviolability of the existing German borders, to normalize the situation in West Berlin on the basis of reasonable consideration for the interests of all the parties concerned.

In the interests of achieving agreement on a peace treaty the Soviet Union does not insist on the immediate withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Germany from NATO. Both German States could for a certain period, even after the conclusion of a peace treaty, remain in the military alliances to which they now belong.

The Soviet proposal does not tie the conclusion of a peace treaty to the recognition of the German Democratic Republic or the Federal Republic of Germany by all the parties to this treaty. It is up to each Government to decide whether or not to recognize this or that State.

If the United States is not prepared to sign a joint peace treaty with the two German States, a peaceful settlement could be achieved on the basis of two treaties. In that case the States that participated in the anti-Hitlerite coalition would sign a peace treaty with two German States or with one German State, at their own discretion. These treaties need not be completely identical in wording but they must contain the same kind of provisions on the most important points of a peaceful settlement.

The conclusion of a German peace treaty would also solve the problem of normalizing the situation in West Berlin. . . .

At present, the Soviet Government does not see a better way to solve the West Berlin problem than by transforming it into a demilitarized free city. The implementation of the proposal to turn West Berlin into a free city, with the interests of all parties duly taken into consideration, would normalize the situation in West Berlin. The occupation regime now being maintained has already outlived itself and has lost all connection with the purposes for which it was established, as well as with the Allied agreements concerning Germany that established the basis for its existence. The occupation rights will naturally be terminated upon the conclusion of a German peace treaty, whether it is signed with both German States or only with the German Democratic Republic, within whose territory West Berlin is located.

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1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 7, 1961, pp. 231–233.