and that the negotiators will be able to proceed with all appropriate speed toward the conclusion of the first international arms control agreement in the nuclear age.

572. UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM REVISED PROPOSALS FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY: Statement Made by the U.S. Representative (Dean) at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, March 21, 1961 (Excerpt)5

At this first meeting I shall outline our position on the major questions. The necessary elaboration, as well as a review of other prob lems, will follow at subsequent meetings. If we can settle these major issues in constructive ways we shall be far along toward concluding a treaty. I shall now outline these major positions, as follows.

First, one of our first projects was to review the United States seismic research programme as put forward in Geneva last May, to see where we might reasonably accommodate ourselves to the views of the USSR. We now believe that a somewhat longer period is needed for the required research than the two years originally estimated. We are also ready to assume now that for all practical purposes the official starting date of the research programme will coincide with the signature of our treaty, assuming of course that negotiations can be concluded in the relatively near future. However, it is still possible that we may wish to seek the agreement of the USSR to an earlier starting time for the seismic research programme. As regards the content of the programme, our scientists have found no basis for changing this in any significant respect from that which we outlined last May.

Since we have previously said that the research programme and moratorium period should be co-terminous, we now propose that the moratorium should have a duration of three years. As under our previous plan, the last few months of this three-year period would be utilized for consultations among the three of us to determine what should be done with regard to maintaining, changing or eliminating the threshold of seismic magnitude 4.75 after the moratorium and its attendant limitations on the freedom of action of each of us are due to expire. The moratorium would, of course, become effective on the date of treaty signature.

Second, on a related issue, namely, on the safeguards which are to surround the explosion of nuclear devices in the seismic research programme, I can say that the Western Governments are willing to follow in general outline the four safeguard steps proposed by the USSR at the two hundred and fourteenth meeting on 15 June, 1960.7

U.N. doc. GEN/DNT/PV.274 (text as printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 55-65).

6

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 734–751. 7 See ibid., pp. 740-742.

Indeed, our two Governments have long been in general accord on some of the four steps. Please note that I use the words "in general" because the full details of these steps have not been spelled out by the USSR.

Although our move, taken in order to reach agreement, involves an unprecedented step in this age of heretofore complete secrecy on nuclear devices, I am able to inform you that if agreement on other treaty provisions is in sight, the President of the United States is prepared to request appropriate action from the Congress in regard to the Atomic Energy Act so as to allow the United States to show the Soviet Union the internal mechanism of the nuclear devices to be used in the seismic research programme.

This is indeed a forward step in our negotiations. In return we ask only that the Soviet representative confirm his indication made at the two hundred and fifty-fourth meeting on 13 October 1960 that, if the Soviet Government should, pursuant to a seismic research programme, decide to detonate its own nuclear research devices, it would permit us the same inspection procedure which the United States is now proposing.

8

While on this subject, both Western representatives would like to urge their Soviet colleague to have his Government reconsider its decision of June last not to implement the seismic research programme planned by Soviet experts and communicated to their Western colleagues during May 1960.9

We are certain that the USSR could make a valuable contribution to the efforts of the two Western countries. A Soviet seismic research programme would clearly be a sign of Soviet good will and readiness to co-operate in what will have to be a great range of common endeavours involved in implementing this treaty. It could be an extension of the type of co-ordinated action included in the International Geophysical Year and would add much to the sum total of scientific knowledge.

This is quite apart from the participation, which will occur in any case, of Soviet scientists in the carrying out of the United Kingdom and United States seismic research programmes. That participation will serve a useful purpose. If, at the end of the research programme, all three Powers are in general agreement on what has been achieved by that programme, it will help each of us to decide what to do at the end of the moratorium period.

Third, a matter closely connected with the seismic research safeguards issue is the problem of the conditions under which nuclear devices may be exploded for peaceful purposes, which could play a major role in the development of world resources. On the assumption that appropriate action will be taken in regard to the United States Atomic Energy Act, the Western delegations are now willing to accept the same safeguards procedures for these peaceful purpose detonations as for seismic research explosions. They believe, however, that the control commission should be given the right to work out in the

9

8 See U.N. doc. GEN/DNT/PV.254.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 740-742.

future other possible procedures-which may in due course suggest themselves as practical-provided that any such new procedures would have been concurred in by all three original parties before they could

enter into effect.

Fourth, I now turn to the very difficult question of a ban on tests at altitudes above the atmosphere and of the controls to be installed to monitor such a ban. Obviously, this is a most important portion of our treaty. I am sure that the position which I am about to announce will be satisfactory to all of us.

Briefly, the United States and the United Kingdom propose that we agree to a total ban at high altitudes and that we adopt the main recommendations to monitor this total ban of Technical Working Group 1, made on 10 July 1959.10 This will mean the inclusion in the control system of ground-based equipment, of a satellite to detect electrons trapped in the earth's magnetic field, and of far-earth and solar satellites.

It should be noted that this is one field in which almost unbelievably rapid scientific advances are taking place. There may be a desire eventually to modify or alter the system recommended by Technical Working Group 1, either because it will no longer seem necessary in its entirety or because it does not display adequate capabilities. We have already agreed to article 14 of annex I, which provides that the commission, with the concurrence of the three original parties, may change or eliminate control measures in phases II and III of system installation. This may be particularly relevant to high altitude controls. In any case, both for this high altitude area and for all other aspects of the control system, we should like to propose extending this power of the commission to phase I measures as well.

At this point I may add that it will be possible to install high altitude controls only if our three countries co-operate closely in working out the details of the system, in developing and improving the essential measuring instruments to be placed aboard the satellites, in launching the satellites themselves, and in co-ordinating the data received. Actually, as I have noted before, this can be one of the most promising by-products of the signature of this treaty, namely that we begin to work together on projects of vital importance to mankind's future as we all did so effectively in the programmes of the International Geophysical Year. It is our earnest hope that the Soviet Union will view this challenge as a great common opportunity to establish new habits of joint activity to which we each can contribute much.

Fifth, let me move on to the topic of control posts. A considerable amount of discussion in previous meetings has been devoted to problems relating to the phasing of the installation of the ground-based control system as set forth in annex I.12 In particular, the Soviet Union has objected to the placement of twenty-one control posts in the territory of the Soviet Union. It has proposed that some of these

should be re-allocated to neighbouring areas of Asia, with their construction scheduled for phase II.

On the other hand, the Western delegations have stated previously that in working out the assignment of the control posts on original party territory they were guided by the principle that as great a capability for detecting and locating seismic events on a completely scientific basis should be developed by the end of phase I as would be both feasible and consistent with the grid spacing recommended by the experts in 1958.13

However, if the Soviet Union still wishes to adhere to its former view we would now, after exploring the matter with our scientists and in a spirit of co-operation, be willing to move two of the stations which we had proposed locating just within the borders of Soviet Asia into adjoining territories, thus leaving two in Soviet Europe, one on_a Soviet island and sixteen in Soviet Asia, or a total of nineteen. In turn, the United States would want to reduce the stations on its territory by one, to a total of sixteen, by moving one post across its northern or its southern border. The United Kingdom totals would remain unchanged.

In other respects we affirm our previous proposal made by the United Kingdom and United States at the two hundred and forty-eighth and two hundred and forty-ninth meetings, respectively, on 29 September and 3 October 1960, for a subdivision of the four years of Phase I into parts A and B.14 Furthermore, we urge that on-site inspections should start as soon as the control system begins to produce seismic signals which satisfy the objective criteria. This should be towards the conclusion of phase I-A, but in any event no later than at its end. By this time enough control posts will have been built on the territories of the original parties to make the recording of such signals a practical certainty.

Sixth, in general we reaffirm our approach to the problem of fixing an annual quota for on-site inspections in our three countries. We continue to favour the inspection of an agreed percentage of either located or unidentified events. As an alternative we, for our part, believe it essential to choose an annual number for on-site inspections which bears a reasonable scientific relationship to the anticipated annual number of seismic events which will remain unidentified in each country under the simplified initial criteria. Otherwise no realistic element of deterrence will be built into the system. It is on this basis that we have named-and now reaffirm-an annual quota of twenty on-site inspections for the Soviet Union.

While on this general subject of inspections I should mention that we are now prepared to meet the Soviet proposal made at the one hundred and eighth meeting on 9 July 1959 that there be an equal quota number set for each original party.15 This annual quota of twenty on-site inspections would thus apply not only to the Soviet

13

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1336-1341.

"See Documents on Disarmament,1960, pp. 263-271, and U.N. doc. GEN/DNT/ PV. 249, respectively.

15 U.N. doc. GEN/DNT/60.

Union; but the same quota would apply also in each case to the United States and the United Kingdom. Again this illustrates the spirit in which we approach this meeting.

And, speaking of matters of quota arrangements and inspection procedures, the Western delegations would very much appreciate detailed Soviet comments on the Western draft article on inspection (GEN/DNT/96) tabled on 13 July 1960 and on the relevant portions of annex I submitted on 20 July 1960.16

Seventh, one more thing on the subject of on-site inspection. I should make it clear that after careful review with our experts we do not see any reason for removing our objections to the Soviet position regarding criteria. In particular, we are advised that the criteria on which we have all agreed for locating a seismic event, which are based on having an adequate number of mutually consistent arrival times, are sufficient. To add, as the Soviet Union has proposed, a further, scientifically unnecessary requirement that the event must be located within a given area, could serve unjustifiably to eliminate many, if not indeed all, suspicious events from on-site inspection.

Eighth, in so far as organizational matters are concerned, I wish to outline these basic points today. We are convinced of the soundness of the proposals which we have tabled (i) to regulate the staffing of the inspection teams, (ii) in relation to special aircraft flights, and (iii) in relation to the job of control post chief. All these involve crucial points in control operations where self-inspection must be made impossible.

Ninth, with regard to budgets, we are willing to agree to what the Soviet Union first demanded explicitly in its veto list of 30 January 1959,18 and then sought implicitly in its package plan of 14 December 1959.19 This is the right of each original party to exercise a veto in the commission in approving the total annual budget of the organization, though not on individual budget items. In all other respects normal commission decisions on financial items would be taken by a simple majority, as will be provided in article 5.

In this connexion we are also prepared to agree in principle that the contributions of the United States and the Soviet Union to the organization budget shall be equal, with the United Kingdom paying a smaller share.

Tenth, finally I must mention the composition of the control commission itself. I am about to say here what I had written before hearing the remarks of my colleague from the Soviet Union on the administrator to which we will reply later. What the Soviet Union is demanding, that is a parity of seats between Western and Soviet bloc States, is unprecedented in an international organization. The United States delegation has on many past occasions offered cogent reasons in justification of a commission made up of the three original

16 U.N. doc. GEN/DNT/22/Rev. I (Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 153165). "See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 728–730. 19 Ibid., 1959, pp. 1291–1292.

19 Ibid., pp. 1357-1359.