specifically, that instead of granting cease-and-desist authority it would be more desirable to empower EEOC to bring civil actions in the federal district courts. Still, in our view, quite apart from its connection with the granting of cease and desist authority, adoption of the proposal to amend section 707 would be harmful from the standpoint of achieving equal employment opportunity.

This amendment does not involve the mere transfer from one agency to another of the authority to bring pattern or practice suits. With the limited exception of suits pending at the time of enactment of the amendment, it would result in elimination of the judicial remedies now provided by section 707. Thus, the only means of federal enforcement under Title VII would be administrative proceedings as authorized by section 706.

The purpose of Title VII is to provide for elimination of discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, in employment practices. It is apparent now, as it was in 1964 when Title VII was adopted, that such discrimination exists in many parts of the United States.

In view of the nature and extent of the problem of denial of equal employment opportunity and the fact that the section 707 authority of the Department of Justice has been a valuable remedy, we submit that elimination of that authority would be highly inadvisable.

Creation of the administrative machinery contemplated by H.R. 1746 would be a substantial undertaking. Whatever the long-range effects of such procedures, time would be required before they are operating at full effectiveness. will not presume to predict the length of such organizational and "break-in" period, but it seems certain that it will occur. To avoid an unfortunate lapse in Title VII enforcement, the authority to bring pattern or practice lawsuits should be continued.

In our view, the pattern or practice relief authorized by section 707 provides a method for attacking broad scale, structural and procedural problems which cannot be matched by administrative remedies. Whatever the merits of the administrative procedure-investigation, hearings before a hearing examiner, review before a Commissioner, or ultimate court enforcement-may be with respect to individual charges of discrimination, they appear to be wholly inappropriate for the deeply ingrained and pervasive policies and practices which are the subject of many of our pattern and practice lawsuits.

Let us look at the pattern or practice remedy. It permits an adjudication of all of the employment practices of a corporation, union, or group of unions promptly, with relief addressed to the practices or policies which are either discriminatory in themselves or which perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. Section 707(b) requires the courts to expedite these cases in every way, and the courts have recognized the urgency which this Act of Congress requires.1

The kinds of lawsuits we have filed in the last two years reflect problems which can be met successfully in a pattern or practice case, but which would be very difficult if they were dealt with in an administrative process. For purposes of illustration, let me make reference to two of the suits which have been filed within the last two years: Cannon Mills, filed April 8, 1969; and the Seattle Building Trades suit, filed October 31, 1969.

The Cannon Mills suit alleged a pattern and practice in hiring, transferring and promotions with respect to employment practices, and discriminatory rental and assignment of company-owned housing. The suit pertains to all of Cannon's plants which employ approximately 24,000 persons.

The consent decree which was entered on February 24, 1971 changed the standards for transfer and promotion for the affected class of black employees, a class including approximately 90 per cent of the black employees, and provides that they may transfer without loss of seniority to the better-paying, traditionally white jobs. It also provides the objective criteria for hiring and promotion which are set forth in a detailed job description catalogue.

The system of rental of housing was totally reformed.

In short, the decree calls for reformation of the entire system of hiring, transfer and promotion; and at the same time deals with the problem of housing segregation.

The cease and desist authority is geared toward individual complaints and complainants. We find it difficult to understand how pervasive practices of

1 United States v. Gustin-Bacon Division, Certain-Teed Prod. Corp., et al., 425 F. 2d 539 (C.A. 10, 1970) certiorari denied, U.S. (3 [CCH] E.P.D. (8005); and United States v. Local 1, Ironworkers, F. 2d - (C.A. 7, 1970) (3 [CCH] E.P.D. ¶8098).

hiring, transfer and promotion which have discriminatory impact can be successfully met in the complaint-oriented administrative procedures, even apart from the question as to whether housing problems such as those at Cannon Mills could be addressed in an administrative proceeding under Title VII.

The second suit which illustrates my point is the Seattle Building Trades case, styled United States v. Ironworkers, Local 86, et al., 315 F. Sup. 1202 (W.D. Wash., 1970). That suit was filed on October 31, 1969. After discovery, trial on the merits was held in February and March of 1970, and on June 16, 1970, effective relief was granted by the district court. The relief took effect on June 30, so that although the defendants' appeal is still pending in the court of appeals, the victims of discrimination are now employed and are obtaining the benefits of the lawsuit. That suit involved the referral and membership practices of the five largest building trades in the Seattle area, and the apprenticeship selection standards and practices of three affiliated joint apprenticeship training committees.

The Court's decree not only grants specific relief for 135 individual victims of discrimination but also provided for the reformation of procedures with respect to referral, membership and selection of apprentices. Again, we question whether this kind of area-wide suit against eight separate defendants could be handled in an administrative proceeding. Based on the history of the National Labor Relations Board, we feel quite certain that effective relief could not have been obtained administratively in the short period of time in which the court was able to address itself to this problem, hold a full scale hearing and grant effective and enforceable relief.

Since Title VII took effect in July 1965, the Civil Rights Division of the Department has filed some 59 suits on the basis of section 707. We have obtained favorable injunctions or consent decrees in 32 of them. An additional seven have been tried and are awaiting decision, and four more are pending in the courts of appeal. Our suits are selected with care, our objectives being to pursue cases involving important points of law or cases which, due to the nature of the defendants, will have substantial impact. Principles established in our suits, at the trial or the appellate level, have been useful to private litigants and to other federal agencies.

The courts understand that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represents "a clear mandate from Congress that no longer will the United States tolerate this form of discrimination" and that it is therefore "the duty of the courts to make sure that the Act works." Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals, 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir., 1964).

In the courts of appeals, our record has been one of repeated success, with 6 courts of appeals rendering decisions in favor of interpretation of the Act in a manner which maximizes the rights of victims of discrimination.2

In fact, we have prevailed in each of the pattern or practice lawsuits which has come to final decision.

We submit that our record fully warrants continuation of our Title VII enforcement program.

It is not a solution to say that the Employment Section of the Civil Rights Division would continue but as part of EEOC. While the personnel of the Employment Section deal almost entirely with Title VII matters, the section is not a separable entity. Rather, it is an integral part of a Division and a Department. The section works with the other sections, the appeals unit, and the Deputy Assistant Attorneys General-persons who devete a portion of their time to Title VII matters.

The Civil Rights Division has access to the investigative resources of the Federal Bureau of Investigation-resources which have proved invaluable in ascertaining the facts and marshalling them for evidence in pattern or practice cases. Moreover, the United States Attorneys, who are the field representatives and chief federal law enforcement officers in every judicial district in the nation, have a knowledge of local situations which is irreplaceable; and they are in a position to render counsel and assistance which cannot be obtained from any other source.

2 Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F. 2d 980 (5th Cir., 1969), certiorari denied. 397 U.S. 919: United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36, 416 F. 2d 123 (8th Cir., 1969): United States v. Electrical Workers Local 38, 428 F. 2d 144, certiorari denied - U.S. (3 [CCHI E.P.D. 8049): United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F. 2d 800 (C.A. 4, 1970): United States v. Gustin-Bacon Div.. Certain-Teed Prod. Corp., et al, 426 F. 2d 539 (C.A. 10, 1970), certiorari denied. U.S. (3 [CCH] E.P.D. 1008): United States v. Local 1, Ironworkers, — F. 2d (3 [CCH] E.P.D. ¶8098 (C.A. 7, 1971); Volger v. Local 53, Asbestos Workers, 407 F. 2d 1047 (C.A. 5, 1969).

Section 707 as presently written, requires the personal signature of the Attorney General (or in his absence, the Acting Attorney General). This requirement not only means that there will be most careful consideration and preparation before each suit is filed, but also carries to the opposing parties and the courts the sure knowledge that the entire weight of the Department of Justice is behind any pattern or practice lawsuit.

For the reasons I have outlined, we urge the Subcommittee to provide for continuing the pattern or practice authority and for retaining that authority in the Department of Justice. Perhaps, in time, alteration of the pattern or practice authority will be appropriate, but to do so at this point in history would we think be a step backward, a step which need not and should not be taken.

2. With regard to the proposal to transfer the Office of Federal Contract Compliance from the Department of Labor to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, we defer to the agencies directly involved for a discussion of the relevant considerations. However, the Department of Justice agrees with the view of the Labor Department and EEOC that such a transfer would be undesirable.

3. I wish to turn now to the matter of extending Title VII to the employment practices of state and local governments. In view of the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to such governments, the question here is not one of prescribing new duties, but rather of determining what federal remedies would be appropriate.

The significance of covering public employment depends largely on the means provided for enforcement of Title VII. I have expressed our preference for a combination of (1) section 707 authority in the Department of Justice and (2) authority of EEOC to bring lawsuits. We believe that making such federal judicial remedies applicable to state and local government employment would be beneficial.

Studies of the United States Commission on Civil Rights suggest the widespread existence of discriminatory employment practices by state and local governments. If that is the case, the reliance on private litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment or on existing state remedies has not proved adequate, and the scope of present federal remedies is limited.

Discrimination in public employment at the state, county and municipal levels is especially detrimental when it occurs in such highly visible organizations as police and fire departments.

In terms of job opportunities, state and local governments are important because of the vast and continually increasing number of persons that must be employed and also because of the great variety of the positions that must be filled.

We favor extending Title VII to public employment if the means of enforcement are those which we have urged. However, should Title VII be amended to grant EEOC cease and desist authority, we do not believe that state and local governments should be made subject to that authority. In our view, it would be inconsistent with our system of division of governmental powers to subject state and local authorities to the cease and desist power of a federal commission.

Thus, in the event the Subcommittee retains the basic approach to administrative enforcement provided in H.R. 1746, we would suggest that, as to state and local governments, Title VII should be enforced by means of lawsuits by the Attorney General, rather than by administrative proceedings of EEOC. Our experience in implementing Title VII, as well as other civil rights laws, should enable us to deal effectively with the problems of discrimination in public employment.

Mr. Chairman, I have completed my prepared statement and I would be happy to receive any questions which you or members of the Subcommittee may have. Mr. NORMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to have copies distributed so that the members of the subcommittee would have it before them.

I want to speak principally today about that portion of section 5 of H.R. 1746 which would seek to transfer the pattern and practice authority from the Department of Justice to EEOC.

It is not simply a transfer, it is essentially taking the Department of Justice out of the equal employment enforcement business.

I do not plan to speak on the merits of the whole question of the desirability of EEOC's having cease-and-desist authority. Mr. Kleindienst appeared before this subcommittee in December of 1969 and expressed our view, the view of the administration. We adhere to that view now; namely, that we think that it would be far more desirable to give EEOC authority to litigate their cases in the district courts rather than proceed administratively by cease and desist.

But I want to focus instead on the question of the pattern and practice authority. We, the Department of Justice and the administration, are opposed to any such transfer.

We have a number of reasons for that, and I want to point out and reaffirm again before we get into those reasons that we are deeply dedicated to the achievement of equal employment opportunity for everyone, and that the reason that we oppose the transfer of pattern and practice authority is that we think the achievement of equal employment opportunity can best be served by retaining in the Department of Justice the pattern and practice authority.

Our first consideration is that we feel strongly that the Justice Department approach, the law enforcement approach in the courts that we have followed in pattern and practice cases is tested, tried, and successful.

We think it has been exceptionally successful. We have never lost a case that has been finally decided, and we are now structured in the civil rights division to handle an ever-increasing flow of pattern and practice cases.

In October of 1969, the civil rights division reorganized and created an employment section, among other sections, so that the attorneys and the supervisory attorneys assigned to that section, which now number about 29, would work exclusively on pattern and practice cases, seeking to achieve equal employment opportunity for everyone.

Our purpose then, and now, is to concentrate our efforts by highly specialized, highly trained lawyers giving their full time to that practice, and I think our record since the formation of the employment section is a very, very good one.

I might say, for example, that in 1970 alone, the employment section tried some 16 cases and in the 3 previous years only 13 all together had been tried.

The employment section came into existence with a considerable backlog of cases that were languishing in the courts. The purpose then and now is to remove that backlog and to get on with all the new cases that need to be brought.

Secondly, on a more general level, we think that the pattern and practice problem, if I may call it that, is one most suited for solution by litigation rather than by administrative proceeding, and it has to do with the inherent nature of the complex problems and broad scale approach that needs to be taken in pattern and practice cases.

I think it is important to understand that we do not proceed from a complaint-oriented base. When we find, when we hear, of evidence or complaint, or any other kind of information of discrimination, we are authorized to proceed without the necessity of a complaint from a citizen or from a group, and without the necessity of a charge.

We are authorized to proceed on that information, to investigate it, and if it has merit, sue and seek to reform the practices of the particular defendant.

But those cases are complex and broad in two ways that are very meaningful from the standpoint of achievement of equal employment opportunity.

Most often, they involve, when you are not focusing on one or two individual complaints, but you are focusing instead on the practices and the structure and the organization of a business or a labor organization and your information necessarily takes you to almost all practices, the whole internal organization of the company or union.

We present to the court evidence as to how the defendant is structured, for example, evidence that black employees are not able to move into lines of progression where they deserve to be.

We ask the court to fashion broad scale relief, which essentially means reforming the internal structure of the institution itself.

Those are complex cases. The courts have learned to deal with them and deal with them well, and now much more expeditiously than ever before, and we have obtained extremely good relief.

I want to give one illustration, at least, and perhaps two. Last fall, there were some difficulties in Seattle arising out of a dispute, I think, between some members of the black community, and the practices of certain labor organizations.

On October 31, 1969, we filed suit in the district court, a suit that involved five of the major building trades unions and three of the major related joint apprenticeship committees.

There were eight defendants, basically, in one suit, defendants which are organizations rather than specific individuals.

We asked for expedited treatment, which is our uniform practice now. The judge set the case for trial on the merits in February. It was tried in February and March, and by the end of June we had complete relief from the court, enforceable, effective relief.

In a period of 8 months from filing suit to complete relief, relief which involved restructuring the referral system, the membership requirements, and the standards for apprenticeship, in about 8 months. Now we can do that, and we have been very successful in doing that in our pattern and practice cases. We do not believe it is the kind of thing that can be handled that effectively and expeditiously by administrative proceeding.

The same is true by way of illustration of a case we had involving one of the textile mills. One suit covered 16 of the company's plants, some 24,000 employees in those plants. Interestingly, it involved not only employment practices but also housing practices, because the company owned housing around its plants and was found to have been involved in some discrimination in the assignment and rental of the housing. Since our Department has pattern and practice authority under title VII, and since we have authority uunder the fair housing law, we could combine in one suit both the employment problems and the housing problems. We did, and we recently obtained a very fine consent judgment from that particular company, which is very far reaching in the sense that the company is bending over backwards, so to speak, to make its hiring, promotion, and transfer policies nondiscriminatory, as well as its housing policies.

Third, I want to speak to the question of resources. I know that H.R. 1746 as now drafted suggests that the personnel and other resources of the Department of Justice which are devoted to title VII efforts would be transferred to the EEOC.