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strong; and it is unfortunate for the cause of infidelity, that the friends and propagators of ith should find it necessary to the success of then cause, first, to shake mens' faith in what they universally and daily act upon, and, from the im pression of whose fidelity, they are so frequently induced to hazard their most important concerns./ But let us consider the objection more in detail. d And first, a miracle is a violation of the esta blished law of nature.' In the establishment of a fixed order of nature, the divine Being had régard to the good of the intellectual creation "the formation and discipline of mind.' And this end could scarcely be accomplished, if the regular operation of the laws by which this order was upheld, were frequently disturbed; inasmuch as the observer of nature would be held in a state great uncertainty with respect to the result of any given combination of her elements, and would make no progress in the knowledge of her works.

of

But although the Deity rules the world by fixed laws, as more conducive to the improvement, the general good, and the happiness, of his rational creatures, than variable and uncertain ones; there can be no valid reason assigned against occasional departures from the established order of things, when such departures should be calculated to effect a greater good than an adherence thereunto.

In fact, to make the general regularity of nature's operations, an objection against any

The great purpose for which an order of nature is fixed is plainly the formation of mind.—See Dr. Channing's admirable Sermon on the Evidences.

interposition, how beneficial soever its re its results might prove; is to seem to doubt the wisdom and loving-kindness of the Author of nature is to consider him as the stern and inexorable Ruler of mankind, rather than as their merciful Father; it' is virtually to represent Him, in whom we live and move and have our being,' as adhering to a particular order of things for its own sake, and without a due regard to that infinitely more important object, the securing of the welfare and happiness of the creatures for whom such laws were originally instituted.

To one, indeed, who has a firm conviction of the absolute goodness of God, and a well-founded belief in his watchful providence, the objection that a miracle is a violation of the established order of nature, will be no valid argument against the truth of miracles. On the contrary, the previous necessity of any alleged interposition being shown, it will be to him a strong presumption in favour of such interposition. He will, with all humility consider, that wheresoever more good, upon the whole, would accrue from miraculous agency, than from the strict observance of an' established law, such a case would present him with a sufficient reason for believing that an infinitely powerful, wise, and good Being would interpose in behalf of his rational creatures: otherwise he must, as it seems to me, give up the idea of the existence of such a Being, and console himself as he best may, with the gloomy atheistical notions of the atomist and fatalist."

Again, a miracle is contrary to all experience.'

This

to

may mean contrary to the experience of the individual making the objection, or contrary the experience of all mankind.

If it mean the former, the objector endeavours to excuse his unbelief upon most unreasonable grounds. He dogmatically sets his limited experience-his little circle of observation, against the experience of all former generations and times, and virtually demands that a miracle should be wrought in compliment to his obstinancy. Why does he admit the validity of testimony contrary to experience,' on a countless variety of subjects, and make his and against its authority when it deposes to what it is most desirable for man to know, and wherein, if he know any thing, he must trust to its report? Why does he not carry along with him the spirit of his objection into every-day life and ordinary subjects?-because the principle is fallacious, and is condemned, as such, by the universal practice of mankind; and yet, if it be good in religion, it is good on every other subject.

But what would be the state of that man's mind, who, on general subjects, should refuse credence to all such reports of testimony, as were contrary, either to his experience, or to his preconceived notions of probability? How limited would be the attainments of such a man in all those branches of knowledge which should require the exercise of a generous and enlightened confidence in testimony. It were better to possess a credulous mind than one so sceptical; because imprudent credulity will be corrected by experience; but

scepticism, as far as it respects every science against which it opposes itself, remains in the rear of advancing society whilst others are confiding and learning-acting and advancing-the sceptic is lagging behind, discussing probabilities and vacillating with dubiety.

But the unbeliever's objection, that ‘a miracle is contrary to experience,' may mean, contrary to the experience of all mankind: and if it do, it is an unjust impeachment of the credibility of the Christian witnesses, and an unwarrantable opposition of a mere assertion, to the testimony of men, whose whole conduct evinced integrity of heart, disinterestedness of purpose, and an unconquerable regard for truth. In either case he deals unfairly with the Christian historian and with Christianity, inasmuch as he refuses to the former, that degree of credence which he freely accords to the profane historian of whatsoever country or times; and he rejects the latter, notwithstanding that it is accompanied with a greater variety and mass of evidence than what he deems sufficient to establish the truth of many of the objects of his undoubting confidence. The objection, therefore, against the Christian miracles, on the ground of their being contrary to experience, is an unreasonable objection.

Again, the proposition that 'Belief is founded upon and regulated by experience,' is true only in part; and cannot be justly alleged as an argument against the truth of Christianity.

Belief is as much grounded upon, and regulated by, testimony, as experience. And this confidence

in testimony is not misplaced; for it is more agreeable to experience, that testimony should be true, than that it should be false. In this respect, indeed, it may be said that belief is founded upon experience; but herein is the argument more. favourable to revelation than to the cause of infidelity. .it .g5e egne ftuglsdon 90) na

Men daily and hourly act upon information, the truth of which they have no means of ascertaining, until the result of such action prove whether or not they have been deceived. The statesman, the lawyer, the manufacturer, the merchant, and the men of whatsoever rank station, regulate their proceedings fully as much by testimony as by experience; it is folly, therefore, to decry, merely for the purposes of infidelity, either the one or the other.

What, moreover, is mens' belief of the facts of history-many of which, though sufficiently wonderful, are fully credited-but a belief resting upon testimony, and 'regulated by experience' of its general correctness? What, for the most part, is mens' faith in the actual existence of the diversified climates, productions, laws, manners, and customs in distant regions of the earth, but a belief founded on a testimony which asserts the. reality of a state of things essentially differing from the actual experience of the parties to whom such representations are made? In fact, our belief and our knowledge-if, indeed, the term knowledge can be correctly applied to the varied, mass of facts that are treasured up in the mind, but of which we have made no personal obser

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