Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrd, this is an intriguing subject. In 1957, I chaired a subcommittee that held hearings on a military pay bill and we did go into the subject of retired pay. Mr. Braswell, my staff assistant, made a lot of calculations and an actuary figured out when it would hit the billion dollars. When we asked the Pentagon about that they did not believe it. It was hard to get at but it hit just a little ahead of when he said it would. I think it was 1959 that it hit a billion dollars. Senator BYRD. That is the funded part, not the unfunded? The CHAIRMAN. No; that is the per-year cost. It has gone up so rapidly since then that it has really become a problem. I want to go back just a minute. The cost of this training, it seems to me, is a big item with you and we want you to supply for the record, Mr. Secretary, what were the calculations for the manpower needed for Vietnam when you made this training calculation? Mr. KELLEY. For fiscal 1973? The CHAIRMAN. Yes, for fiscal 1973. You will be down to 69,000 now before the fiscal year starts. Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. If you will just use the basis that you planned it on for Vietnam with the strength in Vietnam during 1973, that will be an index and will be helpful. (See p. 128.) The CHAIRMAN. I have already referred to the fact that the NATO matter has come up in debate several times. There are two questions involved there and I have very vigorously defended the idea of not cutting those troops any appreciable amount. We have to have more facts about the situation over there in order to meet these debates. It is important for the committee to have simple, accurate information on our contributions to NATO. We would like to have prepared separate material showing each of our NATO allies' contributions in manpower and forces, together with draft data. Each of our own services' contributions to NATO in terms of forces in Europe and those committed to Europe immediately after mobilization began should be included in this data. Mr. KELLEY. We will provide that for the record. (The information follows:) A summary of our Allies contribution is included below. Each NATO ally has been drafting the following number of people. 120,000 additional conscripts drafted in overseas areas for service outside of Portugal. Our own Service contribution is as follows: [deleted]. The CHAIRMAN. The testimony and the material provided the committee indicates that the contingency plans for reinforcing NATO do not assume that all of the Reserve forces would be used. The committee needs a breakout of the Reserves and National Guard forces by numbers and by units which are not to be used in Europe under current contingency plans. I think that will help meet the situation on the debate that is likely to come up. Will you see that we are supplied this information? The CHAIRMAN. And request that it be answered. (The information follows:) Current Department of Defense planning calls for the Reserve Components to furnish combat and combat support units to sustain the fighting capability of active forces in the initial few months of a NATO war. Contingency plans are specific JCS documents. If information is to be transmitted on these, only the JCS can do so. However, department planning documents do cover many of these areas, particularly Tac Air. The documents are used when available in answering this question. [Deleted.] The CHAIRMAN. And, therefore, I put that in the form of a question. We have formed a Subcommittee on the Volunteer Armed Forces and Selective Service and Senator Bentsen of Texas has agreed to be chairman of it. It is keeping an eye on manpower and under the new system surveillance over it under the new draft act, how it operates, and also the type of men you recruit. I know you are vitally interested in that and I believe they will want you to cooperate with them and make periodic reports. I call that to your attention now. Mr. KELLEY. I will be happy to work with that committee. The CHAIRMAN. In that way we can keep informed and supply certain information on the floor of the Senate to the membership of the Senate at large. Senator Thurmond, do you have any more questions? Senator THURMOND. No, sir; that is all I have, Senator, thank you. PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR SMITH The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith has been detained this afternoon on other matters and she asked unanimous consent for her questions to be submitted for the record for Assistant Secretary Kelley's answer for the record. Without objection, so ordered. (Questions submitted by Senator Smith. Answers supplied by Department of Defense). Question. It is projected, on conservative estimates, that there will be 1.2 million military retirees by fiscal year 1980 and that the cost of military retirement pay in that year will be almost $7 billion. In this regard, what is the administration position on integrating the proposed changes in the military retirement system with any changes in recomputation and/or survivor benefits? Answer. The proposed military retiree survivorship proposal, the one-time recomputation proposal approved by the President, and the military retirement revision recommended by an Interagency Committee and now undergoing review in the Department of Defense, could each be handled independently since they are consistent. The Department of Defense is particularly concerned that early action be taken on the survivor benefit proposal which, having already passed the House of Representatives, is now pending before the Senate. We strongly believe that early action is essential to establish a meaningful system for military personnel to share their retired pay with their survivors at a cost which is within reach of all segments of the military retired population. The recomputation proposal, although devised to dovetail with the Interagency Committee's recommendations for revision of the nondisability retirement system is not inconsistent with any foreseeable change which may be made in the military retirement system. Accordingly, the recomputation proposal could be considered either in conjunction with a proposed revision of the retirement system or separately. Question. It is quite possible, if we define manpower costs broadly, to talk in terms of two out of every three dollars of the defense budget being manpower related. In an All-Volunteer Force environment would the cost per man be greater or less than now? If the cost per man would be greater in an All-Volnteer Force, what is the anticipated percentage of the defense budget in fiscal years 1974 and 1975 that will be manpower-related? What are the predicted manning levels and defense budgets for those years? Answer. We expect that our average costs per man in an All-Volunteer Force environment will be greater than the FY 1973 costs we have been discussing. This is primarily because we have included military retired pay in the average costs per man and these costs can be expected to increase significantly in the next two years. We cannot predict at this time if any additional costs in the future should be attributed to the All-Volunteer Force concept until we are able to evaluate the results of the programs requested for FY 1973, including the generous pay increases which were authorized this year. We do not have defense budgets prepared for FY 1974 and FY 1975 and therefore cannot furnish the predicted manning levels and defense budgets for those years as you requested. However, our rough projections for those years indicate that personnel costs as a percentage of the total Department of Defense budget can be expected to remain at about the same levels as in FY 1973. Question. Is it tue that with United States' present augmentation plans and capabilities that a conventional war in Europe would be over before the U.S. could bring its reserve forces to bear? In your answer please comment on our present sealift and airlift capabilities and how long NATO conventional forces in Europe could reasonably hold, giving an all-out conventional Soviet attack? Answer. The probability of a massive attack coming as a complete surprise is considered unlikely. Existing intelligence organizations should be able to detect activity of this scale and provide some warning time. For an attack with some warning, we feel that the existing force levels committed to NATO insure a reasonable chance for a successful defense of NATO. During the first 30 days following mobilization for a NATO contingency, U.S. lift assets have the capability of delivering over [deleted] personnel and approximately [deleted] tons of supplies and equipment to Europe. [Deleted.] Question. I understand that the Army will discharge 462,000 men in fiscal year year 1973, with a net loss of 262,000 men. How does the Army plan to maintain any continuity of force structure with this tremendous turnover? Answer. Approximately 480,000 men will leave the Army in FY 72 of which 262,000 will not be replaced. To cope with this problem and to minimize personnel shortages within Army troop units, we have [deleted]. These actions will help to lessen the impact of personnel turbulence caused by the early release programs. We recognize the undesirable nature of this turbulence, but regrettably there was no other feasible way to meet the man-year ceiling. Question. The feasibility of the All-Volunteer Force is questioned by a number of our major military commanders. There is a real concern about the ability to attract quality personnel needed to run the sophisticated weaponry of our armed forces without the impetus of the draft. Presumably, the All-Volunteer Force will require more support troops as conditions of service are changed, working hours shortened, more services provided, et cetera. Please comment on the question of attracting quality personnel to our armed forces in an allvolunteer environment. Also comment on the need for more support personnel in All-Volunteer Force. Answer. One of our concerns is meeting the qualitative as well as the quantitative requirements of the services. Our studies show that draft motivation has been higher among the upper mental groups. After the end of the draft we may, therefore, have difficulty in obtaining the high quality personnel needed for electronics, avionics, nuclear power and similar skills. The services have discussed with us the possible need for an enlistment bonus for high aptitude personnel, many of whom serve an initial enlistment of six years. We also have undertaken a review of qualitative requirements so that we will know exactly what we need. To date the number of high school graduate enlistments and the number of enlistments in the higher mental groups has held up very well. We are measuring these trends carefully and at the appropriate time will take such action as may be needed. I do not think the All-Volunteer Force will require more military support personnel. It is true that working hours are being shortened in comparison with the hours worked during the period of extended Vietnam operation and more services are being provided. Most of the personnel needed will be civilian, rather than military. We have improved services by shifting personnel from other functions, not by increasing the total personnel-military or civilian. RELIANCE ON RESERVES The CHAIRMAN. On the Reserve matter I raised a point this morning that we have to believe stronger that the Reserves actually are being prepared for use and will be used. One argument regarding manpower is that the active duty manpower budget does not reflect any greater reliance on Reserves than heretofore. For fiscal 1973 the in strength of the Army goes down only 20,000 men, from 861,000 down to 841,000. No reduction in Navy and Marine Corps, and in the Air Force only 13,000 men from 730,000 to 717,000. What is your response about this reliance on the Reserves? I want to make a case as strong as we can that we are relying on these Reserves. We do have a policy that is firm with reference to their use. However, if they are insisting that we still need all of these men in the service, that is a growing percentage cost and does not argue very strongly for a place for the Reserves. Do you want to comment on that now? Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. KELLEY. I would like to make three points. The first point is that the Guard and Reserve budget as a portion of the total defense budget has increased in the past 3 years. It has approximately doubled from slightly more than $2 billion to slightly in excess of $4 billion in fiscal 1973. So, relatively speaking, the Reserve portion of the budget has increased much, much more than the budget overall. The second point I would make is that the Reserve components influence in the total force concept cannot be measured by the total numbers of people but rather has to be measured by the readiness of Reserve units. The readiness status of Reserve units has been very greatly improved in the last 3 years. The third point I wish to make is that the deployment plans of the services include, as will be shown by the military service witnesses, a very substantial reliance on Reserve components, which is exactly the point you said this morning must be done." It is one thing for us to talk about a total force concept, but it is quite another thing to implement it. I think there are demonstrable signs that the Armed Forces are in fact relying more heavily upon the Guard and Reserves than they were 3 years ago. The CHAIRMAN. I hope that is right, I am encouraged by what you say, Mr. Secretary. I think that is a good answer. Senator Thurmond. Senator THURMOND. Nothing else. The CHAIRMAN. If you do not have anything more, let us check on the situation when they think they are going to vote. By the way, without objection, I want to put in the record here the points I raised on the subject of retired pay. I will not take anymore time now. Put that in the record. (The information follows:) Retired pay costs have increased from $1.2 billion in fiscal year 1964 to $4.9 billion for fiscal year 1973, which does include about $270 million for legislation yet to be submitted. Retirement costs are estimated to reach $16 billion per year by the year 2000. There is presently a net addition to the retired role of about 50,000 men per year with an average age of middle or low forties and most of whom are in their prime of life in terms of experience. This situation results basically from several factors: 1. We have had a large active force on duty since World War II but superimposed on this is rapid promotion and early retirement, far beyond anything contemplated when the laws authorizing the present system were established after World War II. Admittedly, the Congress has not attempted to reform this system to any degree. 2. There has been a lack of management in the Department of Defense on trying to control this matter. We have now reached the point where lack of management threatens to make this entire retirement matter unmanageable just from the cost standpoint. There will always be strong opposition to any reform of the system. Some means must be found, however, to utilize our military men for a longer period of active service and bring the tight cost within some semblance of control. The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much and we have kept you away from your office all day. If you wish to retire now you may. We will move to the next witness. Mr. KELLEY. I would rather remain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. All right, if you will let the chief witness sit over here. General DePuy, we do not know how long we will proceed with you but at least, we will get started. For the record, this is Lt. Gen. William E. DePuy, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Department of Army, and we are glad to have you here, sir. General DEPUY. Mr. Chairman, Senator Thurmond, we are very hopeful that we can explain the Army manpower program and force structure fairly thoroughly to the committee. We have briefed the staff of the committee in greater depth, of course, than I will have time to do here. I have tried to pick out those aspects of it which are highlights in deference to your knowledge, but we are prepared to go behind these charts in greater depth if you wish. I want to talk a little bit about how we get our force requirements. I want to talk about the things we think are on your mind, which is the support-to-combat ratio, the so-called teeth to tail. I want to talk about the problems of 1972, which feed into 1973, and I would also like to break Europe out into its various parts so that discussions about Europe can take place in the context of what we have got over there. The CHAIRMAN. The perspective of the Army over the last 7 years is portrayed on this chart. You may recall this chart from 2 years ago. |