mendations from the military departments as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator THURMOND. My time is up. I am going to submit some questions here and I want to get this record clear as to who is responsible, because from what Secretary Kelley says it seems that he deals with personnel policies and possibly not manpower except in the sense of personnel policies. In other words, where is the manpower going, how much manpower in Europe, and who is going to say how much it should be? I want to get clear cut answers.

Can you and Secretary Kelley get together and answer these questions so the record will be perfectly clear on that?

Mr. KELLEY. There is not the slightest question in my mind about what my manpower responsibilities are. The only embellishment I was looking for from Systems Analysis was an accurate statement of what their role in the force structure decisionmaking process was.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR THURMOND

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Questions submitted by Senator Thurmond. Answers supplied by Department of Defense.)

Question. Mr. Secretary, are the people in charge of manpower for the individual services here today or not because we want to ask questions of those individuals who do have the responsibility for this important assignment?

Answer. The Service witnesses present are designated by their respective Service Secretaries to discuss their military manpower requirements and personnel problems before this Committee.

Question. An important illustration, I believe, is the number of U.S. forces stationed in Europe in response to our NATO commitments. We have approximately 305,000 people there. This is certainly a manpower issue. Who at the Department of Defense civilian echelon is responsible for deciding whether this number of military forces should be 305,000, 250,000, or 350,000?

Answer. On an issue of this magnitude and political importance, the President, with the advice of the National Security Council, would make the ultimate decision. Within DOD the responsibility rests with the Secretary of Defense. To support the Secretary's judgment on so complex an issue, the opinions and analysis of several internal DOD agencies (the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretaries for International Security Affairs, Comptroller, Systems Analysis, Installations and Logistics, etc.) as well as interagency coordination with State. Treasury, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and others would be required to determine the military, political, and cost implications of such a move so that sound recommendations can be made.

Question. Who is responsible in the manpower area for testifying and justifying the proper number of people who are located in the various headquarters commands about which I questioned you this morning?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense or his Deputy for the Department of Defense as a whole. The Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff can testify on and justify the manning of the headquarters under Service control. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can testify on and justify the manning of joint and international headquarters.

Question. Who is responsible for testifying and justifying whether the number of Generals and Colonels and/or Admirals and Captains in the various commands throughout the world is sufficient, excessive, or understaffed?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense or his Deputy have the responsibility for the Department of Defense as a whole. The Service Secretaries can testify to and justify the numbers of senior officers in commands under their control, and

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can do the same for joint and international headquarters.

Assignments to three and four star positions are made by the President, or by the Secretary of Defense with the President's approval.

The number of officers in each grade above Captain/Lieutenant (Junior Grade) is controlled by the Officer Grade Limitation Act. The number of flag officers is further controlled by the ceiling set by the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) reviews the Service programs annually to insure that these ceilings are not exceeded. In addition, the Assistant Secretary (M&RA), at the direction of the Congress, is presently conducting a review in depth of the number of officers in the grades of Colonel/Captain and above.

Question. To whom do we talk about these important subjects, and who is responsible?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the whole subject area. For specific subjects, the officials named in the answers to the previous questions can address the subjects in their areas of responsibility in greater detail.

Question. Mr. Secretary, we have 195,000 Army personnel in Europe; 64,000 Air Force; 38,480 Navy; plus 8,800 in NATO activities. Who specifically determines whether each service has the correct level of U.S. forces in Europe?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, upon the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries. Major alterations of force deployments would be decided upon by the President with the advice of the National Security Council.

Question. Is it your responsibility or someone else's to determine what reduction in forces can be made in Europe without significantly impairing the NATO alliance.

Answer. The President of the United States has the ultimate responsibility for approving force reductions of any significant magnitude.

Question. Mr. Secretary, can you justify to the committee the number of military manpower that is involved in the Military Assistance Program in Europe recognizing that 750 people are currently associated with this program?

Answer. Prior to 1 January 1972 there were 440 US Military Personnel associated with the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Europe. Forty of these personnel were in Hq, United States European Command (USEUCOM), while the remaining 400 were authorized in MAAGS or similar type organizations within 14 different countries in EUCOM's area. Effective 1 January 1972, USCINCEUR assumed the Military Assistance functions for the Middle East, and Africa South of the Sahara that were formerly performed by Commander in Chief, Strike Command/Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. This functional transfer necessitated an increase of 15 military personnel for Hq, USEUCOM to support MAP activities in seven additional countries. Within these additional seven countries, there are 555 military personnel performing MAP related activities. The military manpower requirement to support the new Security Assistance (SA) Program are based upon the size and complexity of the SA program in each country, the size and structure of the host country armed forces, requirements for end item inspections and the need for personnel for the administration and support of the MAAG. These manpower requirements are reviewed annually as a minimum by the concerned CINC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and finally the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. It should be noted that there has been a decrease of over 50% in the MAAGS authorized manpower in the past 10 years. Question. Are you aware there are 10 Generals and 55 Colonels assigned to this program? Do you believe that it is necessary to maintain this number of high ranking people in a program of this type recognizing that our grant aid is now limited essentially to three countries-Greece, Turkey, and Spain?

Answer. Yes, within the Military Assistance Directorate in Hq. USEUCOM. and the 14 countries in which USCINCEUR administered the Military Assistance Program prior to 1 January 1972, there were 10 General/Flag Officers and 55 Colonels. Although grant aid is now limited. the Nixon Doctrine of country selfsufficiency necessitates an active and aggressive role by the MAAG personnel to

pursue this goal. The rapport and knowledge of senior military personnel with the host government military organizations has proven to be the most effective means for the US military to influence the host government in areas of mutual concern to the US Government. Any lessening of the current rank structure of the MAAGS could degrade a now productive and efficient organization that has gained the respect and confidence of host country counterparts. In those countries which are military oriented, the ranks of the MAAG personnel are looked upon by the host government as directly proportional to the interest expressed by the US Government in that particular country. A reduction in our representative ranks could be interpreted by the host government as a lessening of our interest in their particular national goals.

Question. Whom do we ask about the justification for 44 full-time people engaged in this program at the European headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, alone?

Answer. The approving authority for security assistance manpower spaces within Unified Command Headquarters is the Secretary of Defense; which has been further delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

As stated previously, the number of military personnel required to administer the MAP in Hq, USEUCOM, is a function of the requirement to administer the military aspects of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, and the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, as amended. These manpower requirements are reviewed by the CINC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs. Additionally, once every 3 years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct a manpower survey of the Headquarters of Unified Commands to evaluate and validate manpower requirements. These controls insure that the minimum essential number of military personnel are authorized for the Unified Command to perform the MAP functions.

UNFUNDED RETIREMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To get back on an earlier discussion, Mr. Secretary, the cost of military retirement. In 1967, you testified this morning, it was $1.8 billion, and the present budget carries a figure, a total figure of $4.9 billion. Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. My question now is what is the unfunded military retirement for fiscal 1973?

Mr. KELLEY. General Benade, do you want to provide that information?

General BENADE. The unfunded liability of the military system at the end of 1971 was $117 billion. At the end of fiscal year 1973 the estimated unfunded liability will be $129 billion.

Senator BYRD. The answer, then, would be $129 billion at the end of 1973, fiscal 1973?

General BENADE. Yes, sir.

MILITARY PAY INCREASE

Senator BYRD. You, Mr. Secretary, have charge of personnel, personnel policy and personnel policy structure with emphasis on fairness to people. I think that is the expression you used and it is a good one. And then, in response to Senator Stennis, I assume that you do not contemplate recommending another military pay increase?

Mr. KELLEY. I suppose you could draw that inference from what I said. I would rather not comment beyond what I said on the advisability of a further military pay increase.

Senator BYRD. This committee, Mr. Secretary, is charged with the responsibility of authorizing money. Now we need the advice and the judgment of the man responsible for personnel policies.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. I thought I addressed that point directly by saying that in my judgment, military pay was competitive with civilian pay. That is the standard which we held out as an objective for the military pay system.

Senator BYRD. That is right. So, I would judge from that that you and the Defense Department do not plan to recommend any military pay increase?

Mr. KELLEY. I am sorry, I cannot say that.

Senator BYRD. To put it another way. I would judge from what you do not say that you are planning to recommend another military pay increase.

Mr. KELLEY. Certainly, you could not say that. But I am not authorized to say to you that the Department of Defense either is or is

not.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I do not recall exactly whether this question was put to you when you came before the committee for confirmation, it has been put by the chairman to most nominees, and that is, that the nominee, whether he be a military man or a civilian, would give the committee his judgment.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Give the committee his judgment.

Mr. KELLEY. I have always attempted to do so, but I cannot tell this committee, because I am not authorized to, what the Department of Defense may do with respect to further actions in the pay area. I offered the judgment, which is my best judgment, that military pay is already competitive with civilian pay.

Senator BYRD. So, you could not as Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Personnel Policy, you could not recommend that there be a change?

Mr. KELLEY. No; I could not recommend that there be a change. Senator BYRD. So your recommendation would be that there not be a change?

Mr. KELLEY. I think that is what you have to conclude from what I have said, and I am not trying to be devious. I am simply telling you what my best judgment is in the situation, and it is my judgment that there would be no basis for my recommending a further change in the form of an additional military pay increase.

Senator BYRD. If there was to be an additional change, the recommendation, necessarily, in the chain of command, would come from you as Director of manpower and as one who is charged with personnel policy. Would that not be the case?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

STATION CHANGES

May we stay a moment on this? On page 40 of your statement you say the military member has made a permanent change of station move on the average of one a year and the annual cost of travel alone in such moves exceeds $1 billion.

Are you making changes in that present system? Is it reasonable to have an average of one permanent station move a year?

Mr. KELLEY. NO; it's not reasonable in the sense of being efficient, but the frequency of those moves has been driven by conditions over which the services have very limited control. One of the conditions that drove those frequent moves was, for example, the large number of individuals on 1-year tours in Southeast Asia. Another was the 2-year draft obligation. Another was the requirement that the services, particularly the Army, had to accept releasing people early in order to stay within the limitation of man-years authorized for the individual services.

Senator BYRD. You are getting away from the 1 year, you still have the 1-year limitation but that will apply to fewer and fewer men as far as Vietnam is concerned. You are not drafting to any great extent now, so the 2-year draft requirement will be to some considerable extent eliminated.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; and that will be reflected in a lengthening of the assignment tours of individuals. The average assignment tour will be longer in fiscal 1973 than it was in 1972.

Senator BYRD. I noticed you put the cost at $1 billion. Do you think that will be reduced?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; it has to be reduced and it will be reduced as the period of assignment is lengthened. My characterizing of the effects of turbulence is recent past tense and not a forecast of things as they will be in fiscal 1973.

Senator BYRD. So you expect an improvement for 1973 in that respect?

Mr. KELLEY. We expect a modest improvement in 1973. The reason that I included this as a chief manpower issue is because I think it bears a causal relationship to so many of the problems that we have with people in the Armed Forces today. I think the problems associated with frequent moves should be a compelling force that drives us to build stability into the system and to consider every one of our major programs and every one of our personnel policies in terms of whether they contribute to stability rather than to turbulence.

DISCIPLINE

Senator BYRD. As one who is responsible for personnel policy, how do you size up the discipline in the Armed Forces now with particular reference to the Army?

Mr. KELLEY. I think it is tremendously improved, Senator Byrd, over what it was, say, 2 years ago. I think this is a reflection of two major factors, and I am sure there are others. One of the factors is that the Vietnam war, particularly because of the extent of our manpower involvement, certainly confused many of our young people and more or less polluted the atmosphere.

The second factor was that the turnover of command personnelpetty officers, squad leaders, first sergeants, company commanders, platoon leaders was so high that the individual just never had an opportunity to establish an effective working relationship with a group of people, and without the force of good leadership, the breakdowns of discipline were frequent.