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What reductions do you believe can be made in Army headquarters there? Answer. Possible reductions in headquarters, U.S. Army Europe are now under study in relation to a major review of USAREU R's mission and functions. Upon completion of the study, CISCUSAREUR will submit appropriate recommendations through channels to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. While these future reductions are tentative, it should be noted that the Fiscal Year 1972 end strength projected for headquarters USAREUR is 1,218, which represents a reduction of 31.2 per cent already accomplished or programmed from the Fiscal Year 1969 end strength of 1,770.
Question. Don't you feel there are too many high-ranking officers to fight a war of such potential limited duration? For crample, there are 123 general officers in the NATO headquarters, including 30 U.S. general officers and some 131 U.S. coloncls. In addition, the U.S. Army has 47 generals and 380 colonels authorized in Europe. Don't you feel some reasonable reductions are possible in the number of high-ranking officers??
Answer. The number of high-ranking officers in Europe is a matter of continuing special attention in the Army. The objective is to determine and maintain the optimum numbers consistent with organization and missions.
The officer grade structure is the product of our organization. The major headquarters in Europe would be the foundation for any build-up required by hostilities there. The nucleus necessarily includes a relatively high officer grade structure.
A major consideration in authorizing certain high officer grades is the need for parity with the ranks of our NATO allies in international commands. This is vital if we are to exert the proper U.S. influence in NATO.
We have a number of ongoing actions which are designed to identify and resolve manpower problems. Periodic manpower surveys place special emphasis on reexamination and validation of high rank officer positions. A current study of the organizational structure in Europe is aimed at correcting any overlapping or duplication of headquarters activities. The Army is now participating in an overall review by OSD) of the numbers of high rank officers. These actions may result in some reduction in the number of high-ranking officers, although this cannot be predicted with certainty at this time.
Question. Many people think the present plan for moving troops to NATO is com pletely unrealistic.
The NATO buildup plan calls for the Army to go from [deleted]. Tell us exactly how the Army intends to transport (deleted) men and equipment in this period of time, especially in view of possible enemy opposition.
Answer. (Deleted). The Army plans to meet this requirement by a combination of forward deployment, prepositioning of equipment, and the strategic movement of active and reserve foces from the CONUS base. Four and one-third divisions are now in Germany plus prepositioned equipment for an additional 222 divisions.
In the event of a contingency, we will deploy the remaining forces and equipment on a time phased schedule. We plan to use all available C-5, C-141, and commercial aircraft to deploy initial increments of troops and selected equipment. In addition, maximum utilization of US sealift and available NATO shipping will be required to move the bulk of our equipment, war materiel and sustaining supplies.
Our ability to meet the deployment schedule using all existing air and sealift resources will depend upon strategic warning, the ability of the US and NATO Air Forces and Navies to hold our air and sealift losses to a reasonable level, and availability of reception facilities and their associated throughput capabilities.
Question. Mr. Secretary, last year Congress provided $1.2 billion for the Safeguard system. This year you report that the acquisition cost has gone up another $900 million for the 4-site Minuteman defense. We really aren't gaining much ground, and I understand that including the $1.5 billion in the fiscal year 1973 request, acquisition costs of about $3.2 billion are still required for the 4-site program. That is on top of the $4.7 billion already funded. How firm are the latest cost estimates?
Answer. Our estimates of the cost of deploying Safeguard are considered to be reasonable; they include the best currently available approximations of the effect upon the system of future conditions that cannot be predicted exactly. The current estimate for the total DOD acquisition cost for the Safeguard foursite program is $8.0 billion. This reflects a $0.9 billion increase over last year's
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estimate of $7.1 billion. The increase in the estimate is attributed to a further stretchout of the deployment schedule from last year ($0.2 billion), to added inflation allowances ($0.2 billion), and to program changes and revised cost estimate ($0.5 billion).
The estimate is in terms of DOD acquisition costs. It excludes operating costs (OMA and MPA) and does not include nuclear warhead costs which would be borne by the Atomic Energy Commission. Also not included are certain indirect costs that are budgeted elsewhere, such as national range support, and family housing.
Question. You are requesting a total of $100.5 million for Site Defense of Minuteman formerly known as Hardsite Defense ($80.1 million in RDI & E and $20.4 million in construction.) How much is the Site Defense of Minuteman formerly knoun as Hurdsite program going to cost-R & D and construction? When you have completed the Site Defense of Minuteman formerly known as Hardsite prototype Demonstration Program, will Site Defense of Minuteman formerly known as Hardsite be ready to be deployed? How much additional development funding is required before Sile Defense of Minuteman formerly known as Hardsite could be deployed?
Answer. The Site Defense of Minuteman formerly known as Hardsite Defense Prototype Demonstration program was authorized in January 1971 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to demonstrate prototype versions of the equipment and software which could be carried to further development and deployment as a system, if required. Subject to refinement after the prime contractor is selected, the total funding requirement for the prototype
demonstration program is estimated to be approximately $700-800 million in RDT&E funds. The $20.41 MCA requested for FY 73 is expected to complete the MCA requirement for the prototype demonstration program.
In addition to the prototype demonstration program, other development effort will be required, prior to deployment, in areas such as tactical communications, siting, and nuclear hardening; development tests of the proposed warhead; additional Spring test flights (with inert warhead components) which simulate actual engagements; and production planning studies. Such efforts are not neces. sary to meet the objectives of the prototype demonstration program, but will be required before the system could be deployed . The additional RDT&E funding requirement to complete full-scale development is estimated to be approximately [deleted) again subject to refinement after the prime contractor is selected.
Question. Last year the Congress terminated the MBT-70 program. What is the Army now doing to provide a new tank? Do you plan to use the prototype approach?
When will a new lank be available for the operating forces!
Answer. Our Main Battle Tank Task Force at Fort Knox will have defined the hardware performance requirements for a new tank by August. This document, which we call a Materiel Need requirements document, will then constitute the goal for subsequent hardware developments. We plan to use the prototyping approach in accord with Congressional guidance contained in the FY 72 DOD Appropriations Bill Conference Report unless, of course, such an approach would increase program costs or unduly stretch-out the development. In that case, we would report back to the Congress with our alternative recommendation. Right now it looks like eight years will be required to develop, test, start to produce, and field a new tank. However, we will do everything prudently possible to shorten this time.
Question. Would you describe the M60A1 product improvement program?
Answer. The M60A1 tank product improvement program exploits advances in technology, makes our current tanks more combat effective, and extends the useful life of our current tanks. Product improvements include improved air cleaners, add-on stabilization, crew-served weapons sight mount, solid state ballistics computer, LASER rangefinder, tube-over-bar suspension system, an improved reliability engine, and improvements to the electrical system and the track.
Question. Does the funding requested in fiscal year 1973 complete the work required on the M60A2 tankı Have you any plans for production of the M60A2 missile tank?
Answer. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the FY 73 request completes the M60A2, formerly the M60A1E2, program of 540 tanks. The Army has no plans to procure any additional M60A2 tanks.
Question. Admiral Moorer spoke of a new Russian tank, the T-70. Would you describe this new tank and is it a missile tank like the M60A2? How does it compare in capability to the M60A1 gun tank? How will it compare with the improved M60A17
Answer. Information is classified and was furnished the committee separately.
Question. One of the continuing problems with all tanks has been maintainability and reliability. What are you doing in this area on the current tanks, and what kind of priority do you place on maintainability/reliability in the new tank development program?
Answer. The M60A1 Tank Product Improvement Program includes provisions for the application to our current M60-series tanks of an improved reliability engine, a longer-life steel track, an improved electrical system, and top-loading air cleaners. These four improvements are designed specifically to increase the reliability and maintainability of our current tanks. In our new tank development program, we will place a high priority on insuring the reliability and maintainability of the new tank.
Question. The Air Force is buying 120 UH-1 helicopters for $35.9 million which will be given to the Army. In the past two years, ercess engines were overhauled and used on new production OH-58 helicopters. Are there excess UH-1 or T-53 engines available that could be used for the fiscal year 1973 Air Force buy?
Answer. T-53 engines are avilable from Army stocks to equip 120 UH-1 helicopters for the FY 1973 Air Force buy. It is planned that the 120 engines will be overhauled and modified prior to installation to make them compatible with the latest Army UH-1 configuration.
Question. The Army has not procured UH-1 helicopters for several years. With the Army being pulled out of Vietnam and the strength being reduced, why do you need these additional UH-1 helicopters that the Air Force is requesting?
Answer. The Army has been and is currently providing UH-1Hs from Army assets for the Vietnamese Air Force which is an Air Force Military Assistance Service Funded program. This has resulted in an Army deficit to the Authorized Acquisition Objective (AAO) through the FY 1974 funded delivery period. The Army baseline AAO for Utility Tactical Helicopters is [deleted). Projected assets at the end of the FY 1973 funded delivery period are (deleted). This figure includes 120 in the Air Force FY 1973 budget and 150 UH-1B substitute aircraft considered not fully capable in the lift ship role. The paybacks of UH-1Hs to the Army is essential in order to maintain Army readiness.
Question. The Air Force Congressional Data Sheet shows a planned fiscal year 1974 procurement of another (deleted] UH-1 helicopters. Will these also be given to the Army?
Answer. Yes sir. If paybacks are not received in FY 1973 and FY 1974, the Army will be approximately [deleted] below its readiness requirements.
Question. Last year, Congress denied funds for a conventional warhead for the Lance surface-to-surface missile. Are any funds requested in fiscal year 1973 for a conventional wrhead for the Lance missile?
Answer. No. The Army has forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense a prior approval reprogramming action requesting authority to complete development of the conventional warhead for Lance using FY 72 RDT&E funds.
Question. You are requesting 20 U-21 small seven passenger fixed wing aircraft for $12.7 million. Your Congressional data sheet shows that you already have (deleted] of this type of administrative aircraft. The data sheet states that this is part of a phased procurement "to fill the most critical shortages.” Would you explain what these aircraft are used for and identify specifically what critical" shortages these 20 aircraft will fill?
If you are not buying a strictly commercial aircraft, what changes are you making, what are the costs of the changes, and what is the reason for the changes?
Answer. The (deleted) aircraft currently on hand consists of (deleted] preferred assets and [deleted] second line substitute aircraft which are inefficient or inappropriate for the mission. The primary utilization of this category of aircraft is in providing quick response, command transportation for senior Army Headquarters, and 'Military Assistance Advisory Groups. The aircraft also provide
the capability for medical evacuation and limited, high priority cargo transport. These aircraft will be assigned to Commands located in geographic areas where high en route altitudes are needed to overcome difficult terrain and weather and to certain selected major commands with significant transportation requirements which can best be satisfied by this type aircraft. The proposed allocation of the twenty aircraft in the FY 1973 budget are to fill the following critical requirements.
3 US Army, Alaska
2 US Army Element MAAG (Ethiopia)
Question. The only other aircraft that you are requesting for procurement is 6 VH-1N Presidential helicopters for $8.1 million.
The request also includes $3.5 million for initial spares for the 6 helicopters. Would you explain why you need such a high proportion of initial spares?
Answer. Initial spares costs for the VH-1N are relatively high because of the unique operational requirements for the 6 aircraft being procured. The aircraft will have to be ready for deployment worldwide on short notice, therefore spare parts and special tools must be immediately available to accompany the aircraft, potentially to two deployment sites at the same time. Three aircraft will be stationed at Quantico and three at Fort Belvoir. Wherever practicable (in view of dual deployment requirements) tools and equipment are centralized. Because of security considerations, time change components will be replaced at half of their normal operating life, thus doubling the amount of those spares required to be on hand. Also, costs are increased by the twin-pack engine configuration of the VH-1N. (The unit price of the power plant assembly for example is $167,000.)
Question. Your fiscal year 1973 request for aircraft modifications is $60.9 million. This compares to a 1972 level of $36 million.
Would you explain the large increase in aircraft modifications?
Answer. The increase in aircraft modifications this year results from three primary sources. First, the need for improving the safety of our aircraft by taking advantage of new technology and incorporating crash resistant fuel cell systems in our first line helicopters to reduce the hazard of post crash fires. Second, we are initiating a program to convert OV-B/Cs to an OV-1D configuration which will update and incorporate total surveillance requirements within a single model aircraft in lieu of new procurement. Third, we are procuring and installing AIMS equipment in our aircraft to meet Federal Aviation Administration safety requirements for a positive altitude reporting capability and thus contribute toward overall aviation safety and air traffic control.
Question. The Dragon man-portable anti-tank missile has increased significantly in cost.
What was the average missile program unit cost used for the initial planning estimate? What is the current estimate of the average program unit cost of the missile?
What are the reasons for the substantial cost increase?
Answer. The average missile program unit cost used in the development estimate as reflected in the current Selected Acquisition Report is (deleted] (total program cost including Research Development Test and Evaluation costs plus cost of missiles, ground equipment and spares divided by total number of missiles planned for development and procurement). The comparable cost in the current estimate is (deleted). Considering procurement only, the unit cost for missiles in the development estimate is (deleted) ($277.7 million for (deleted) missiles) and the current estimate is [deleted] ($238.9 million for (deleted) missiles).
The current estimated total program is $485.1 million which is $80.9 million greater than the development estimate of $404.2 million. Categories of cost growth include: program stretchout $57.1 million; engineering and technical problems $20.7 million; increased training support requirements $11.3 million; increases due to change in learning curve computations, labor rates, overhead rates and a $16.6 million estimating error for a total of $88.3; million and inflation
and escalation $35.4 million. These increases were offset by a $131.9 million reduction in quantity.
There are two principal reasons for the substantial missile unit cost increase. First is the increased total program costs as indicated; secondly, the large reduction in missile procurement quantity from [deleted] to (deleted] based on revised consumption rates, forces to be equipped and Basis of Issue precluded realization of lower missile costs from the earlier planned high volume procurement, while coincidentally lowering the ratio of missiles to total program cost.
Question. The average program unit cost of the TOW and the Dragon anti-tank missiles are both [deleted] however, the TOW (deleted] times the range of the Dragon, and is more accurate than the Dragon. Have you considered buying more TOW missiles and cancelling the Dragon program.
Answer. TOW and Dragon are complementary weapon systems. There ar3 essential employment roles and missions that neither weapon system will completely satisfy by itself. For example, TOW provides a 3000 meter range capability which enables the infantry to effectively engage enemy tanks before TOW is taken under fire.
Despite the outstanding effectiveness of TOW, its weight militates against wide distribution below the company level in infantry units where the man who is habitually on the ground needs an antitank weapon that he can carry wherever he goes. The Dragon is man portable and can be moved quickly in and through terrain not accessible to vehicles that would be required to carry the TOW. It is a weapon designed for the front line infantry and affords a capability never before possessed-the ability to confront tanks at a reasonable range with a high assur ance of killing the tank and surviving. Because Dragon does not generate a vehicle requirement and can be employed by one man, a larger number may be allocated to company sized units than would be possible with TOW. Thus, what is involved here is a question of the cost effectiveness of Dragon in view of a cost growth associated with the Dragon program, rather than a consideration of canceling Dragon and buying more TOW. We believe the Dragon is suitable for meeting the requirements for a medium antitank weapon and that it is cost effective. However, to assure that this is so, a cost effectiveness study of the Dragon program and alternatives to that program has recently been performed by CDC, assisted by AMC. The study, which has not been approved and is currently being reviewed within DA concludes that antitank weapon mixes that (deleted).
Studies such as the recently produced cost effectiveness study, together with results of tests such as the Engineering Test and the Expanded Service Test that are currently being conducted, are part of a continuing effort to insure that the Dragon weapon system is the appropriate system for satisfying the medium antitank weapon requirement and that we have the correct mix of complementary antitank systems with which to meet the tank threat.
Question. The Vulcan gun system is a 20mm gun that is either mounted on a track vehicle or towed. Its primary use is against aircraft isn't it?
The Army terminated production of the tracked version after the fiscal year 1969 buy with only about (deleted) percent of the requirement filled. Why was the production terminated? Why are both the tracked and towed Vulcan versions still listed as experimental without being fully approved by the Army for so long? Will you have to re-open production lines for the fiscal year 1973 procurement? What is the demonstrated effectiveness of the Vulcan system compared to the planned effectiveness when development was started?
Answer. Yes sir. The Vulcan is primarily an Air Defense Weapon. Production ended when deliveries were completed from the fiscal year 1969 procurement. The Army planned a procurement in fiscal year 1970 but fiscal constraints caused cancellation of the program. The Army plans type classification in late March of this year. The delay in adopting the system as Standard A can be attributed principally to two deficiencies (deleted). The Army considers that these deficiencies are not of sufficient magnitude to preclude effective use of the current system; hence we are programing the additional procurement to fully support our forces. These deficiencies are currently under study with the view toward later product improvement of the entire fleet in a cost effective modification program. The production line for the 20mm gun is currently running to satisfy other US military services and foreign government requirements. The production facility for the M113 basic · carrier chassis will also be open for sales to foreign customers at the time of this procurement. However, production lines for assembly of the entire system will