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EUROPEAN PERSONNEL ROTATION RATE Senator THURMOND. Of the 190,000 odd U.S. Army personnel in Europe, what percent are rotated back to the United States each year?
General WESTMORELAND. In the last several years, it has averaged about [deleted] percent turnover, Senator. But now that we do not have to levy Europe to provide people to go to Southeast Asia or elsewhere, we anticipate that a soldier or an officer will serve a full tour there unless his service expires.
Senator THURMOND. Is that about 2 years?
General WESTMORELAND. The established tour is 3 years. However, with respect to our draftees, it is about an 18-month tour or a little less, because they normally do not go overseas until they have had 6 month's service in the United States.
(The information follows:) During fiscal 1971, major units in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) experienced a turnover rate of approximately [deleted) percent per quarter or an annual rate of approximately [deleted] percent. This rate steadily declined during the first half of fiscal 1972 to approximately [deleted] percent for the quarter ending December 31, 1971. The average length of tour served by USAREUR departees during that quarter was 17.1 months, an increase of 1.1 months from the previous quarter.
The quarterly turnover rate that USAREUR can sustain without degradation to its training and combat effectiveness has been estimated to be about 16 percent. Higher rates cause units to compress and in some cases repeat training cycles. Thus, our objective is to reduce and maintain turnover to at least this level and by so doing provide increased stability to the command as a whole. We forsee this objective as achievable in the not too distant future when our force structure begins to level off.
DESERTION RATE IN EUROPE
Senator THURMOND. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, what is the desertion rate in Europe compared to that in the United States?
Secretary FROEHLKE. I will furnish that for the record.
General WESTMORELAND. It is much less. I can tell you that, sir. We will provide the exact figures.
(The information follows:) The desertion rate in the U.S. Army Europe during fiscal year 1971 was 7.1. This compares to the Army-wide rate of 73.5 during the same period. The Army desertion rate in the continental United States during fiscal year 1971 was 121.7. Deseștion rates are computed per thousand.
MORALE OF EUROPEAN TROOPS
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, do you generally find the state of the morale of our forces in Europe to be low or high?
Secretary FROEHLKE. I am not one bit hesitant to reply that it is improving. Low or high I find very difficult to answer, but I definitely have found it-I was there for two weeks in October-improving.
The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. Ask him the reason for that.
I think for the very same reason that when morale is down, you have to look to leadership. When morale is going up, you must also look to leadership. Now, there are some other specifics.
Our young men always have and still do want to be challenged, want to be given an assignment. They have been trained for a skill and they want to be put on that job. When Europe was not No. 1 priority, we found that people were being taken off their jobs and we had to switch people around to varying positions, not in their primary military occupation. This was not very satisfying. With the increased priority to Europe, there is less of that-still too much, but less.
Training funds for a number of years had been cut in Europe and it is very difficult, as you well know, to have a garrison soldier with a high morale. He has to occasionally get in the field to do what soldiers are supposed to do. Recently, within the past year, we have given General Davison enough money to provide for good training and that has made the soldier more satisfied.
It was true that the barracks were in just horrible shape in Europe They still are. But the soldier now sees improvement. He can see that there are steps being taken to improve his living conditions, and a small number of them already have been improved. This helps considerably.
Putting all these thing together, plus leadership-improved professionalism among the leaders—I believe that is what is causing the improvement.
General WESTMORELAND. And I would add if I may, Mr. Secretary, two other points.
First, manning levels in units. For a long time, Europe was very low in strength and men do not get the satisfaction out of training with units that can man only [deleted] percent of their tanks or their artillery pieces.
The second point I would add is stabilized tours of commanders, We have now been able to stabilize the tours of brigade commanders for 18 months, battalion commanders for 18 months, company commanders, sergeant majors, and first sergeants for at least a year.
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the Army will have to use an enlistment bonus to meet its minimum strength levels prior to the termination of the draft in June of 1973?
Secretary FROEHLKE. My answer to that is clearly yes, for two reasons. One, we want to use it on an experimental basis to determine whether or not it will work. We are not using the enlistment bonus right now because we want to see the effect of the pay increase. If we were to use both at the same time, we would not be able to weigh them. We will use it at some time in the future and determine whether or not it is necessary. My guess is that we will find that it is worth the dollars invested, that it will pay off.
So for both reasons, one is an experiment
Senator THURMOND. What do you find is the average cost of training a man?
How much would you save if a fellow reenlisted?
Secretary FROEHLKE. I would say we would save $10,000 in training costs. That is the figure I have been using, rule of thumb.
Senator THURMOND. And if you pay a bonus, that would be about how much?
Secretary FROEHLKE. If he enlists for 3 years, $1,000 a year.
Secretary Froehlke. Yes; $1,000 when you sign up, $1,000 the second, and $1,000 the third year.
General WESTMORELAND. I would like to add to this, Senator Thurmond, that we are tying this bonus into proficiency that has to be reestablished every year.
In other words, before we will let this man draw the $1,000, we give him the necessary tests and examination to insure that he is skilled in that combat MOS.
Senator THURMOND. And he is worthy to be retained and to be paid the bonus?
General WESTMORELAND. Correct, sir; plus physically qualified,
IMPACT OF DRAFT TERMINATION
Senator THURMOND, Mr. Secretary, legislation has been offered in the Senate to terminate the draft this June. How would this impact on the manpower requirements of the Army?
Secretary FROEHLKE. I would oppose that legislation, and I would oppose it because I do not know-as I indicated earlier, there are so many unknowns that we do not know-how many people are going to enlist or reenlist. We do not know, therefore, the size of the Army and and we do not know at this stage how important it is for enlistment to have a draft available.
I would oppose doing away with the draft from the standpoint that I think that although we may never have to, but, we must have the draft mechanism available in cases of emergency, because in times of hostilities, I do not believe we can rely on volunteers.
Senator THURMOND. In fact, you do not draft men unless you have to anyway, do you?
If you get enough volunteers you do not draft?
Secretary FROEHLKE. That is correct. We are not drafting during the first 3 months of this calendar year.
Senator THURMOND. If you have the draft on the books, then if you did not get enough volunteers, you have the wherewithal to accomplish it. Without that, where would you be.
Secretary FROEHLKE. You have stated the case.
INCREASE OF RESERVE CAPABILITY Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, as you know, the Army Reserve is below strength. What incentives do you believe would be necessary to boost the Reserve potential and new enlistments if this downtrend continues?
Secretary FROEHLKE. I am very concerned about it.
Secretary FROEHLKE. That is tied in with the draft, because there is one school of thought that says that many of those in the Reserves were motivated more because of the existence of the draft than those that enlisted in the Regular Army. So we do have a serious problem.
Again, I am not prepared now to give you my recommendations on what we need for the Reserve. We probably will have to come up with some monetary rewards for service in the Reserves. I have a feeling, however, that we will not be able to solve this problem through strictly monetary means. I think that we are going to have to use other means; for want of a better term, other more inspirational means, harking back to the days where people joined the Reserves and the National Guard because it was the thing for a U.S. citizen to do to be willing to serve if needed.
Those days are not with us anymore and we have to take certain steps to again point out to a significant number of Americans that we are relying more and more on the Reserves. In fiscal year 1974, 45 percent of our total force will be Reserve and National Guard.
If public is not willing to accept that, then the whole concept necessarily fails.
Senator THURMOND. I was wondering if you had not thought about a cheap life insurance program as an incentive?
Secretary FROEHLKE. You are hitting very close to my heart, being a former life insurance man. It appeals to the businessman in me.
However, I must frankly also tell you that when I was in the life insurance business, we found it very difficult to sell life insurance to young people because young people were not interested.
Normally, you had to be 25, 30, 35 before you realized the importance of life insurance.
And if we do spend money for life insurance, we should do it to attract young people. And they should be interested, but I am afraid they are not.
Senator GOLDWATER. There used to be riders in it, too, death by military.
Secretary FROEHLKE. Not recently, Senator. There used to be.
INCREASED COST OF SERVICES
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, in your statement, I noted a significant jump in cost of services to the soldier under the all-volunteer program. This category showed an increase of 26 percent. Why this big jump in cost?
Secretary FROEHLKE. As a matter of fact, in our budget of $22.7 billion, we roughly have about $3.3 billion we call soldier oriented. And as a matter of fact, I am very positive about that, because when we were in all-out war in Southeast Asia, we were not spending very much money on the niceties. I think they are more than niceties, but we call them niceties. We had to devote all of our priorities to Southeast Asia. Now that is no longer the case and again, we can give No. 1 priority to attracting and retaining good men in the Army. And there is only one way we are going to attract and retain good men in the
Army; that is to be able to pay them sufficiently to have a professional Army in which they can serve, and to give them the satisfaction of having an important job and doing the job well.
All of these things cost money. So I am not one bit defensive about that $3.3 billion. I feel very strongly it is long overdue.
Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I may come back with some more questions, but I think I might proceed with General Westmoreland now for a few.
General, I notice in your statement that [deleted]. What is this evidence? The CHAIRMAN. Senator, excuse me. I believe your
time has expired. Senator Goldwater?
DETECTION OF HARD DRUG USERS
Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I only have one question and I will be glad to yield the rest of my time to Senator Thurmond.
General Westmoreland, you and I have had several occasions on which we have talked about the drug problem.
General WESTMORELAND. Yes, sir.
Senator GOLDWATER. Since that time, I was out in the Pacific and I stopped at Kelley, where they give the urinalysis test and I was very pleasantly surprised to find out that less than 1 percent of those people tested had used hard drugs. I remember the last time we talked, you indicated that your experience in the Army was much, much less than the rather absurd figures that we were hearing on the air and seeing in the press.
Could you give a comment on that?
General WESTMORELAND. Yes, Senator Goldwater. There were some very exaggerated estimates made by the press a number of months ago. Vietnam, of course, has been our major problem because of the low cost of the drugs and the availability. According to our latest urinalysis tests, the rate is running around 4 percent, plus or minus a few points.
Senator GOLDWATER. That is on the hard stuff?
Senator GOLDWATER. I also learned, and I did not know this, that amphetamines are more of a problem to them than the hard drugs. Are you finding this true? Is that peculiar to the Air Force and not peculiar to the Army?
General WESTMORELAND. We have a problem with amphetamines. I am in no position to make a relative assessment as to our problem versus the Air Force. I would suspect they are probably comparable, but it is a problem. But we do not feel that it is the same problem as the hard drugs, where, of course, a man can be more easily addicted and more seriously so.
Secretary FROEHLKE. I might just add, Senator, that I think on all the drugs, it is not a problem of service. It is a problem of age and geography. Everybody of the same age in the same area is doing the Same thing
Senator GOLDWATER. This is precisely what they were telling me at Manila, that it was not a problem of service. They found, strangely,