time but also the enormous cost per unit. I do not know now what your plans are; but we will have to have a report on that from time to time.

I heard part of your testimony this morning, but in the meantime is there not some way that you can improve the tanks you have? General WESTMORELAND. We are doing that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just briefly, what is being done?

General WESTMORELAND. We are upgrading to a limited degree the M60A1. Of course, we are going into production on an M60A2 whose main armament is a missile. There are funds in this budget in connec tion with additional production and improvement of the M60A1. The CHAIRMAN. What is in this budget on the new tank? General WESTMORELAND. We have approximately $20 million to terminate; we have $20 million to develop a new prototype.

The CHAIRMAN. Twenty for each purpose?

General WESTMORELAND. Yes, sir; $20 million to terminate and $20 million to develop a new tank. As I pointed out, we have a board of officers under General Desobry and it will come forth with its reports this summer. We hope to save time and money by utilizing tested, proven components, not only from the United States but also from our allies.

The CHAIRMAN. No reflection on the military but there are a lot of phases of that that they would not be experts in, as I see it. Perhaps to complement the military bring in someone else, some other talent, to try to get started on the practical side of this thing.

General WESTMORELAND. What this amounts to, Mr. Chairman, is that we are going to have to look at what we expect this tank to do; in other words, the military need. If we came up with the same performance characteristics of the XM803, we would come up with another XM803, which would cost just as much.

So what we are looking at now is whether we need a tank that can fire a conventional round and cannot fire a missile? Do we need all the speed we had in the XM803? Do we need all the armament? These are the matters to be considered by this board.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to refer back to General DePuy's statement, reading from his statement, page 189 of what is now volume 3 of the typewritten copy of the hearings. After we came back in session, the second day, he was here. I called on him and he said he wanted to go back over these figures, about that 50,000. That is when he gave these figures. He wound up by saying:

Then we had some management problems. We did not react right away. We hoped it would turn around. It was not. Secondly, our estimates were off a few months, so we were on the red line.

That is what I had in mind. I think now the record is fully covered from your viewpoint and from his.

I have a few more questions, but it is beyond 12:30 and we will come back at 2:30.

I think we had a mighty nice session. I enjoyed it.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., of the same day.)

MILITARY PROCUREMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973

THURSDAY FEBRUARY 24, 1972

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:35 p.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman).

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Thurmond, and Goldwater. Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; R. James Woolsey, general counsel; L. R. Garcia, John A. Goldsmith and Edward B. Kenney, professional staff members; James Kendall, chief counsel, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee; Ben Gilleas, director of investigations, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, and Fran Funk, staff aide.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen. I had agreed to recognize Senator Thurmond. He is on his way, we are told, from his office. I have a question here that I will ask in the meantime.

I want to say this to you, gentlemen, on the matter of troops in Europe. I know you do not make final decisions on that, but as one who supports NATO, I very strongly advise all of you to get up some data and statistics and make some reductions over there which I believe can be made without cutting the bone and muscle of the real forces there.

I do not want to be responsible for what may happen on the floor of the Senate if you do not do something along that line. I have been through that battle several times, including last December, when the Appropriations Committee put the limitation on the funds. It was defeated on the floor, but only after the President made a very strong statement about it in the form of a letter.

As one who us friendly to the idea of NATO, I am telling you now that something has to be done, and you tell Mr. Laird that and the State Department and the White House. That is my best judgment about it. I am not excited nor angry about it. It is just a fact of life which we have to contend with.

Now, while the Senator is getting ready-I do not want to rush you, but I told you I would recognize you.

Senator THURMOND. You go ahead, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. While you are getting set there, let me go over this thing, then I am going to have to go over to the floor, gentlemen. We have very urgent matters up there and I have not been over there today.

(1281)

HELICOPTER TESTING

Gentlemen, I want to make sure that we understand the situation on this $36.5 million that is requested for 1973 for three Cheyenne prototypes. It is my understanding that $20 million is required to update two existing Cheyenne helicopters and that these helicopters will not be available for any kind of testing until after fiscal year 1973 is over.

Is that correct that they will not be available for any kind of testing until after fiscal year 1973 is over?

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT F. FROEHLKE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. W. C. WESTMORELAND, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY; LT. GEN. WALTER P. LEBER, SAFEGUARD SYSTEM MANAGER; MAJ. GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS, CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON; COL. RICHARD L. LIVERMORE, MILITARY ASSISTANT, OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY; COL. ROBERT W. SENNEWALD, OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY; AND LT. COL. RICHARD L. FEENEY, M60A1 PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM SYSTEMS STAFF OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

General WESTMORELAND. I will have to provide that for the record, Senator. I do not know exactly what date those two helicopters will be available for testing.

The CHAIRMAN. If they will not be, the question arises then of how much of this money is for that purpose, and whether or not you need all of it.

All right, you supply that. That is a positive question. (The information follows:)

Of the three pre-production prototypes to be fabricated with $36.5 million of the FY 73 request, two aircraft will be available to start testing in October 1973, and the third in November of that same year. This schedule assumes funding availability to let the contract so that work begins in October 1972. All of the funds which we are requesting for these prototypes are required in the FY 73 appropriation as the related contracts will be accomplished during that period.

PROTOTYPING FUNDS

The CHAIRMAN: The remainder of the $16 million, based on your statements this morning, is to build a complete production prototype helicopter and it will be at least 18 months to 2 years before that helicopter can be flown.

General Gribble stated the other day that the fabrication of these airplanes will provide the best means of early test data for operational stability of the Cheyenne prior to a substantial production commitment. He also stated that $36.5 million are required to obtain three additional fully equipped prototype representatives of production aircraft.

As I understand it, this work is not necessary to conduct any of the tests in the next year between the Cheyenne and the other competitor helicopters, nor is it necessary for any tests between the Cheyenne and A-X or any other close air support aircraft. Is that understanding correct?

General WESTMORELAND. That is essentially correct, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Then, why that much money now?

General WESTMORELAND. Two of the prototypes we now have, have to be refitted and updated, particularly the new rotor to which the Secretary referred. The third prototype, which accounts for the $16.5 million, involves a hard-tooled preproduction helicopter with production-type dies. As you know, this is such a far-reaching development, Mr. Chairman. It is a very complex machine, incorporating so much advanced technology that it is necessary that we test and debug it, so to speak, before we go to production.

The CHAIRMAN. We do not want to get into production this year, gentlemen.

General WESTMORELAND. We are not getting into production except for the prototypes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the thing to do is put it in the bill, but put it in as prototypes only. Then we can make a flat statement that there are no production funds in this bill for the Cheyenne. It may not be the ideal solution for you, but it is the practical thing, as I see it. So if you have to have three, I am willing to vote for three, but nail it down that it is prototype only and no production. You can put them in with the production group later.

General WESTMORELAND. Of course, if we commit this $36.5 million for the three prototypes, essentially we are committing ourselves to the Cheyenne helicopter. But during the interim, we could debug the production process, because every new aircraft has a certain. number of deficiencies, although they may be relatively modern, that have to be worked out. This can be done basically only after you perform rather extensive tests, which means a lot of flying hours.

We are not only interested in the performance of this particular aircraft, but we are also interested in the maintainability, because we hope that it will be a very inexpensive aircraft to maintain and one that can be repaired in the field.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, thank you very much. Senator Thurmond, I am glad that you could be here.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a few questions for Secretary Froehlke and General Westmoreland.

Mr. Secretary, I might take you first.

PERSONNEL IN EUROPE

Mr. Secretary, what has been done about the shortage of Army personnel in Europe in certain skilled categories such as [deleted]. Secretary FROEHLKE. AS General Westmoreland described earlier this morning, we have given Europe generally the highest personnel priority right after Southeast Asia.

Unfortunately, because of the early release programs, there nevertheless, have been manpower shortages and certainly in certain_key MOS's, but with this higher priority-the highest priority, in effect, with the drawdown in Southeast Asia-we are confident that we are now in the process of [deleted] we will have to train replacements because the early release did drain the bottom of the bucket. But as these men are trained, Europe will get the No. 1 priority.

DRUG PROBLEMS

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, has any improvement been made in handling the hashish drug problem among the U.S. troops in Europe?

Secretary FROEHLKE. I hesitate to make an unequivocal statement in the area of hashish and marihuana for a couple of reasons. I know that it is very-hashish, I believe, is just a stronger variety of marihuana-is very prevalent in this country, is very prevalent in high schools, very prevalent in colleges. Therefore, I assume that it is quite prevalent among the military. But we do not have any means of identifying the hashish user as we do in the case of heroin user.

Therefore, if you ask me how prevalent is it, I cannot answer that question. I suspect it is quite prevalent because I know it is everywhere else in society and there really is no reason to believe it is different with

us.

So, I do not know where we are. I do know that we are opposed and we are doing our best, particularly in the hard drugs. I think we are doing an excellent job of both education and identification. I am very satisfied with what we are doing with the hard drugs. We also are attempting, not on as great a scale, because frankly, we do not have as good reasons, but we also are attempting to point out the dangers of marihuana. Of course, marihuana and hashish are illegal. And when we do find it, we eradicate it.

Senator THURMOND. Do you think you are making some improvement?

Secretary FROEHLKE. I think we are, but I would not want to flatly state that because of the reasons stated.

General WESTMORELAND. I would add one thing to that if I may, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary FROEHLKE. Yes.

General WESTMORELAND. Hashish, Senator, has been brought into Germany by some of the Turkish itinerant workers. The German Government is now concerned about this. They are cooperating very well with us now to try to stop the flow of this dangerous drug.

Senator THURMOND. Why is not some arrangement worked out with Turkey on this?

General WESTMORELAND. Our narcoties people have given this a great deal of study and it is my understanding that the Turkish Government has banned opium production after the 1971-72 growing

season.

Have you heard that?

Secretary FROEHLKE. I have not.

General WESTMORELAND. I cannot vouch for it, but I have heard such a report.

Senator THURMOND. I think an agreement should be worked out between our country and Turkey.

General WESTMORELAND. I am not sure of that, but whereas we were not getting too much cooperation from the German Government a year ago on hashish, we are now.