I would appreciate your comments on this alternative approach, including the identification of the amounts of funds by which the fiscal year 1973 request and the estimated total development cost may be reduced as a result of this change. An early reply would be appreciated since, as you know, we are pursuing an accelerated schedule for reviewing the fiscal year 1973 military procurement authorization bill.

I mainly wanted to get that letter on the record. It may be that you would prefer to answer for the record?

General WESTMORELAND. I would prefer to provide the answer for the record. However, on the issue of the number of prototypes, our studies indicate that we will have a broader base of experience and come up with a more reliable helicopter. The helicopter is going to be with us for a number of years to come. It is going to be a workhorse in the Army like the UH-1. We feel with seven prototypes we will be able to conduct a broader based test and come up with more reliable data that will permit us to make a decision involving the production of many thousands of helicopters.

(The information follows:)

The letter read into the record was received by DOD on the 23rd of Feb. 1972. I appreciate the opportunity to respond to your proposal for the UTTAS prototyping; however, the letter is being answered by OSD. My staff and I participated in the development of the OSD response and I fully support the DOD position. (The letter referred to in Gen. Westmoreland's response is shown. below.)

Hon. THOMAS J. MCINTYRE,

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENBE,
Washington, D.C., March 21, 1972.

Chairman, Research and Development Subcommittee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Secretary Laird has requested that I review the Army's UTTAS development program as now approved and to consider whether program modifications as suggested in your letter of February 23, 1972. are appropriate. You indicated that a prototype concept structured more like the A-X. Lightweight Fighter, and Advanced Medium STOL Transport prototype 'programs might be desirable.

Prototypes have become an important element of our Defense research and development philosophy and we are hopeful that their use will contribute measurably to more efficient acquisition of effective weapons systems. In his testimony before you on February 17, 1972, Dr. Foster described the different purposes or orientations of our various prototypes. It is clear that all prototype developments cannot fit a common pattern; their differing purposes determine their structure. The programs you cited involve new operational concepts or technology and are for the purpose of assessing operational practicality. The UTTAS, on the other hand, is oriented towards fulfilling a well established requirement with the cost of acquisition and operations a most important consideration.

Your suggested program for the UTTAS development would reduce the competitive phase substantially. We establish the extent of the competitive phase of any program from judgments considering many factors. We believe that in programs with potentially large procurement and operating costs in relation to the cost of development, the acquisition and operating costs are of primary consideration and justify retention of a competitive situation until these cost fac tors can be validated. This, consideration applies to such programs as the 14-ton Truck, the Mk-48 Torpedo, and in our judgment, the UTTAS. Extended competitive development is also desirable on systems with technical or performance goals difficult to evaluate or validate on other than well developed articles. Stringent maintainability and reliability requirements are examples which apply specifically to UTTAS.

Prior to approval of the current program, UTTAS development alternatives were examined which (1) terminated the competition on evaluation of initial

proposals, (2) continued the competition through a limited prototype phase, and (3) continued competition up to an initial production decision. Each of these is a viable alternative and selection of the latter for UTTAS was based on a judgment considering factors especially appropriate to the UTTAS development. The first alternative results in an apparent, identifiable R&D savings of about $90.0 million. It could provide an operational system as much as two years earlier than currently planned. It would not resolve uncertainties as to subsequent acquisition and operating costs. It would be a favored alternative if urgency of need were a paramount consideration. The second alternative would require FY 1973 and total R&D funding essentially identical with the current plan but at a somewhat different funding schedule; it would provide an operation system as much as two years later than the current schedule. Our uncertainties regarding acquisition and operating costs would remain largely unresolved. It would be a favored alternative if the purpose of the competitive phase were to validate a new or highly advanced technical concept being proposed.

The selected plan projects the competitive phase forward to a production decision. It provides the best possible challenge to the initiative and resolution of industry in an intensely competitive environment. It provides the government the opportunity to evaluate with confidence the suitability of a relatively mature system which a less developed prototype would deny. If both contenders are found to be nearly equally suitable, it provides a procurement alternative which is important considering the high potential procurement of UTTAS for our forces and foreign governments (over 5,000 UH-1's have been produced). The difference of only a few percent in acquisition and operating costs identifiable as a result of this extended competitive phase could result in a very substantial savings which could not be even estimated with confidence at this time but will almost certainly exceed the R&D investment required for this alternative.

Your letter discussed potential savings by reducing both the number of test prototypes and the number of test flying hours. The major R&D costs result largely from engineering design, component testing and qualification, tooling, instrumentation and data reduction. Reduction of prototypes or test hours substantially could jeopardize important developmental goals at relatively small sayings of R&D funds. Meaningful reliability and maintainability testing requires high statistical sampling under realistic conditions. When it is considered that 150-hour life components have been the standard in the past for new helicopters and that we intend to introduce this aircraft into operational service with 1200-hour life components, the magnitude and the importance of the test and evaluation task is clear. Nevertheless, this particular area will be subjected to continued review of both the amount and the nature of planned test flying hours by the Army and other cognizant OSD agencies.

In summary, I am convinced that the Army's proposal and initial decisions approving this program last year are sound. The program is aimed at filling an unquestioned operational need, the technical goals are reasonable, program costs are a priority consideration, virtually no concurrency between R&D and production is planned, and there are progressive validation milestones properly included in the program schedule. Although we can never foresee with absolute assurance the outcome of any new development, there is every reason to be confident that the UTTAS development will be successful. I urge your continued support. Sincerely,

'KENNETH RUSH.

Senator MCINTYRE. We asked the same question of the Secretary of D.D.R. & E., Dr. Foster, and he came down hard on the fact that it is the operational, maintainability and reliability that they hope to get by this rather, simply, from a layman's standpoint, very broad and expensive program on what appears to the average person as being really off-the-shelf technology.

General WESTMORELAND. Since maintainability is a very important element, you have to put a lot of hours on a machine to determine what spare parts are going to deteriorate rapidly and to determine what the long-range maintenance cost will be. This requires many,

many flying hours and with fewer prototypes your basis of experience is going to be much narrower than would be the case of seven as opposed to four.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IN VIETNAM

Senator MCINTYRE. General Westmoreland, has the Army been completely satisfied with the close air support provided the Army in Vietnam?

General WESTMORELAND. We have been. We have been very satisfied with it; but, on the other hand, we have been satisfied with our helicopter gunships, the Cobras. If we had not had the helicopter gunship, the Cobra, we would have not been as successful as we have been on the battlefield. With the Air Force fixed-wing aircraft that have been provided, we are not able to perform certain close-in support missions, and other missions to include the escort of troop carrying helicopters, that have been provided most effectively by the Cobra gunships.

HELICOPTER TESTING AND EVALUATION

Senator MCINTYRE. In this year's request, you are asking for $53.6 million for the Cheyenne and $17.1 of that is for commercial development under the restructured development program. Then there is this item of $36.5 million which you state is requested in order to build 3 prototypes. You have already addressed yourself in answering a previous question to the fact that the $36.5 million will not be expended until the competition or until you or the Defense Department have come down on a helicopter that is cost-effective and can do the job; but that $36.5 million looks to me like it does not take into account that this competition is going to be a competition. It looks like you have already decided that the Cheyenne is going to win this competition. Is that true?

Secretary FROEHLKE. We are not really going through competition. What we are doing now is running these tests to determine what the requirements should be. But it would not be realistic nor fair to put it through competition because the requirements now are addressed to the Cheyenne helicopter and if we put it through a test, it is a foregone conclusion that the Cheyenne would win. So we are not putting it through a competitive runoff. These various tests with the three types of aircraft are to determine what the requirements should be to see if the requirements should change.

So your point is well taken. If we were to put it through a competitive test, the Cheyenne would win because it is the only aircraft that was designed for the requirements.

Senator MCINTYRE. Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding that the Army will conduct a reevaluation of requirements for an advanced attack helicopter which will include the testing and evaluation of the Bell King Cobra and the Sikorsky Blackhawk; then, after this evaluation has been gone through, then there is the operational test program involving the A-X, the Cheyenne and the Harrier, as Secretary Packard advised us.

Should we wait until all these tests have been completed and the results are available before investing a single penny more than that $17.1 million of the Cheyenne?

Secretary FROEHLKE. And we will-of the $17.1 million which we have and which we are now spending for these tests, we will run these tests before we spend any portion of the $36.5 million for the three additional Cheyenne prototypes. So the answer to your question is

yes.

Senator MCINTYRE. I suppose the only way that we could insure that we have a leg up on this would be to deny this appropriation request of $36.5 million and then have you come back this fall and say, "Look, gentlemen, we have gone through this; the Cheyenne is head and tails above it; it has the answer; it is what we want." This Cheyenne, as Senator Goldwater indicated, for 2 or 3 years we have been kicking this around. I went out to view that; it is a beautiful looking aircraft and it can do a lot of things but the vulnerability test [deleted] and the cost bothered this committee very much.

We are completely aware, General and Mr. Secretary, that the Army is looking forward to this helicopter as very important to its future, being integrated as part of the cavalry, as they say, and so on.

But we want the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army to take a strong, hard, fair look at this whole problem, because you may be able to get another helicopter that will do the job for you.

General WESTMORELAND. Senator McIntyre, to reinforce what the Secretary stated, based on our present requirements for an advanced armed helicopter, the Cheyenne is the only helicopter that can reasonably fulfill those requirements.

With respect to the Blackhawk and the King Cobra, they are armed helicopters and they have considerable capability; but it would be unfair to have them compete with the Cheyenne. So we will evaluate very carefully the Blackhawk and the King Cobra to determine what their performance actually is and then we will reexamine our requirements.

Conceivably, if we feel we can justify lesser requirements that could be met by one of these, then we have a new ballgame. If after. we determine what their full capability is and we reevaluate the requirement, we find that they fall short, then we are in a position. to go ahead with the production of three prototypes of the Cheyenne preliminary to going into the full projected production of [deleted] a month.

Of the three prototypes, one will be a hard-tooled prototype that will be made from the production die.

Senator MCINTYRE. The objective of every member of this committee, I am sure, is to authorize sufficient of your requests so we maintain the security of this country and we are constantly alert to the developments of any possible enemies. One of the arguments this year, with $942 million requested for ULMS, they say, well, we have taken a look at the intelligence and it looks to us like the Soviets are building their submarine fleet up to proportions that are beginning to worry us. However, here in the helicopter, it is my understanding, the Russians have nothing like we have; they do not have the experience. I was so glad to hear General Ryan say yesterday that his force was tip top.

So in the helicopter why can't I say as a member of the committee, now, look, gentlemen, you do not have to scare us; the Russians do not have this thing.

Let's make sure that before we bite off the Cheyenne, that worries us from the standpoint of the type of air superiority fight we can expect to face in the ETO—that it will do the job, because the one thing, as you know, General, what is bugging us is the cost of this helicopter. General WESTMORELAND. Senator McIntyre, I would point out to you that the [deleted].

Senator MCINTYRE. Sure; they see ours.

General WESTMORELAND. [Deleted.] But we do know that by virtue of our success with armed helicopters on the battlefield in Vietnam, by virtue of their knowledge that we are developing the Cheyenne and they know quite a bit about the Cheyenne because most of it is in the public domain [deleted].

Senator MCINTYRE. It is very logical. They have seen what the helicopter has meant to the infantry and they are the greatest copiers. I put them next to the Japanese in copying what others do. You say it is in the public domain. I do not know much about aircraft but that aerospace publication comes in every week and I am amazed at the information that comes in. I wonder what Russian intelligence does. General WESTMORELAND. They do not have to work very hard. Senator MCINTYRE. No; I do not believe they have to work very hard.

Well, anyway, we are concerned that we get the kind of helicopter at the cost effective price that will do the job and we do not want any lip service to this retesting, reevaluating, and all that should, for your own sake and the sake of the Army, be put into it.

Thank you very much, General. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR M'INTYRE

I have a few questions I will submit for the record.

(Questions submitted by Senator McIntyre. Answers supplied by Department of the Army.)

Question. In retrospect, it is interesting to speculate whether if in support of the Vietnamese conflict we had called up the Reserves and National Guard instead of relying upon the draft, we would have come out much better in terms of the serious problems we encountered within the Army relating to race, drug abuse and so forth. In your opinion, is there a lesson to be learned from this experience?

Answer. The problems of race and drugs are endemic to our society. These problems would have been encountered if the Reserves and National Guard had been called up instead of relying on the draft. While it is not possible to state precisely how much these serious problems would have been influenced, there is no reason to believe that use of the reserve components would have significantly reduced the social problems that have been encountered.

Question. There is a tendency in our comparison of ground forces deployed in Europe to discount the significance of the need for the Soviets to maintain a very substantial number of divisions on the border between China and the Soviet Union. If you were in the position of the Soviets and were interested in a mutual balanced force reduction in the European theater, would you see the situation differently than you do as Chief of Staff of the United States Army?

Answer. Viewed from a Soviet perspective NATO forces deployed in Central Europe probably constitute a minimum credible deterrent to a surprise attack by