During the coming year we will bring in sufficient men to offset losses during the previous fiscal year, which are heavy. Also, we will have to [deleted].

Senator CANNON, Yes, but you end up with a lower figure at the end of the year?

General WESTMORELAND. We end up with 841,000 men, a loss of 20,000. This 20,000 involves certain small structural cuts and it also involves a cut in the training base. We will have fewer in transit status; we will have fewer prisoners. Other than the division structure, we will have a lower workload and, therefore, can cut some people. But we will have a requirement to increase the people that we have in our divisions.

LEVEL OF GENERAL OFFICERS

Senator CANNON. General, of the 531 generals on active duty, 127 were assigned outside the Army. Is that not an excess number of general officers to serve outside Army?

General WESTMORELAND. It is quite a number, Senator Cannon. We have no effective control over that. We are required to provide general officers to other defense agencies and to some agencies outside of the Department of Defense. These are not chargeable to us-those outside the Department of Defense; they are reimbursable. But those within the Department of Defense are not reimbursable.

Senator CANNON. Since 1960, the number of general officers assigned outside the Army has increased 50 percent; is that not rather high?

General WESTMORELAND. I think, Senator Cannon, this is the result of the progressive development of the Department of Defense as a structure which involves the organization of a number of agencies which report to the Secretary of Defense but which provide support to the services.

As an example, such as the Defense Supply Agency, the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Atomic Support Agency and, of course, there are three additional agencies being organized nowthe Defense Security Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, and the Defense Investigative Agency.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CANNON

(Questions submitted by Senator Cannon. Answers supplied by the Department of the Army.)

Question. General Westmoreland, would you give us a summary of the Army's planned FY 73 program for an advanced attack helicopter. Could you expand on your prepared statement?

Answer. The Army's FY 73 advanced attack helicopter program has been developed to accomplish two primary purposes. The first purpose is to complete the development of the Cheyenne to fully capitalize on the rigid rotor and integrated weapons system technology incorporated in this aircraft. For this purpose, our FY 73 program contains $17.1 million to complete development of the Advanced Mechanical Rotor Control System and to support the development effort through completion of Army acceptance tests. The second purpose is to provide the Army with the flexibility to either continue or redirect the advance attack helicopter program according to our decision based on the results of the Advanced Attack Helicopter Requirements Evaluation which will be concluded in July of

this year. If the presently stated performance requirement is validated, the Cheyenne program would utilize $36.5 million to fabricate three preproduction prototypes to obtain early test data on the complete production configuration and to keep the technical base intact until a production program is initiated in FY 74. Results of the prototype effort would feed into the production program prior to any major commitment of funds. If we select an alternative other than Cheyenne, we must have FY 73 funds available to initiate a new attack helicopter

program.

Question. Do I understand that the Army is performing a formal flight evaluation of the Blackhawk and the King Cobra and is giving them full consideration as well as the Cheyenne?

Answer. Yes. During the next six months, the Army will complete an Advanced Attack Helicopter Requirements Evaluation. The Army's position has been, and continues to be, that alternate approaches to meeting the Advanced Attack Helicopter requirement would be considered objectively on a cost and effectiveness basis and that a production decision will be based on selection of the weapons system which is the most cost effective buy. The Army has, for the past two years, been involved in an analytical study examining in detail the basic requirements for an advanced attack helicopter. The flight evaluation of these aircraft as part of the Advanced Attack Helicopter Requirements Evaluation will provide the basis for a sound decision on the program.

Question. When will the Army decide which of the three attack helicopters it wants to put into production?

Answer. The Army will be in a position to decide the direction of the advanced attack helicopter program late this summer. This decision will be based on the results of the Advanced Attack Helicopter Requirements Evaluation. A decision for production of one of the three attack helicopters will be contingent on the design requirements developed during the Evaluation. At present we believe this decision can be made in time for the FY 74 budget submission.

Question. If one of the other candidates, other than the Cheyenne, wins the competition, do you have adequate funding in the 1973 budget to start the R&D?

Answer. Yes. The $36.5 million requested for three additional Cheyenne prototypes could be applied to development of one of the other alternatives.

Question. What would the Army do to fund one of the alternatives to Cheyenne in FY 1973, should one of them be chosen?

Answer. The decision to obligate the $36.5 million for Cheyenne prototypes will not be made until the completion of the Advanced Attack Helicopter Evaluation. Should an aircraft other than Cheyenne be selected the Army would request reprograming of the $36.5 million as a part of the necessary R&D funds to begin development of an alternative Advanced Attack Helicopter.

Question. What is being done in FY 1973 to prototype a new tank? How much money is requested for this program? What characteristics do you want in your new tank?

Answer. We are requesting $19.7 million RDT&E for the tank development program in FY 73. However, we have directed that the Main Battle Tank Task Force address the fiscal year 1973 fund requirements and their recommendations will be submitted prior to 1 April 1972. Our request will be modified based on their recommendations. We know that the new tank must possess significant advances in performance as well as a high degree of reliability and durability. However, it would be unwise to hazard opinions on specific performance characteristics. We are depending on our tank experts at Fort Knox to determine this for us.

Question. Of the 149 requirements for Army generals "outside" the Army, you assigned 127 generals or an 85% fill. Are you as successful in filling operational requirements for general officers in the Army?

Answer. The inside Army general officer requirements for Fiscal Year 1972 totaled 514. Of these requirements, we were able to support 385 positions with general officers. This is a 74.9% fill.

Question. General, are you aware of the 5,947 colonels as of June 30, 1971, that 848 of them were assigned "outside" the Army-nearly 15% of your colonel force. Do you feel this detracts from Army efficiency and should not this policy be reversed?

Answer. Yes, I am aware that a considerable number of officers are assigned to joint and combined activities within the Department of Defense and to some activities outside the Defense Department. The latter group of officers are, of course, either carried as reimbursables in the budget or budgeted for separately in the case of officers involved in activities covered by the Public Works Appropriations Bill of 1964.

Since the Army is operating below its structure requirement for field grade officers, the assignment of officers to activities outside the Army does impact on Army readiness. Significantly, joint headquarters, including DOD and JCS, have a "mandatory fill" priority, and consequently, these requirements are met before most of the in-house Army requirements. This means that the Army must use lower grade officers to fill positions calling for higher grades. However, the importance of joint activities cannot be ignored and the Army must bear its fair share of staffing these activities.

Question. Do you believe it is essential for the Army to maintain more colonels as of June 30, 1973 than you had in 1964 prior to the Vietnam war by several hundred when the size of the overall Army will be less in 1973 compared to 1964?

Answer. Sir, it is true that the overall total is higher, but one has to examine why and where the increase has occurred. The total officer force in FY 73 is projected to be 117,136, including those authorized by the Public Works Appropriations Bill of 1964. This compares with 110,870 authorized in 1964. A large portion of this increase results from increased requirements for warrant officer aviators. The remainder of the increase has occurred in the medical area (doctors, dentists, Medical Service Corps officers, nurses, medical specialists, and veterinnarians), Women's Army Corps, and the Chaplain's Corps. The number of combat and combat support type Colonels will be about the same as 1964. Doctors and dentists were removed from the constraints imposed by the Officer Grade Limitation Act in 1968, and since that time these officers have been promoted more rapidly and at a higher rate than the remainder of the officer corps. This move was made by the Department of Defense in an attempt to rectify the very poor retention rates of these officers. Summarily, the increase has occured primarily in the professional area where retention of personnel is most difficult, and in all other branches of the Army the number of field grade officers is insufficient to meet structure requirements.

Question. Another way to put this, General, is that the Army enlisted strength was reduced 137,000, from 971,000 to 734,000, a 14% reduction, between June 30, 1971, and June 30, 1972, yet the number of colonels on active duty was only reduced 253a 4% reduction. Should not these reductions be more proportionate?

Answer. No sir. Although the total enlisted strength will have been reduced by 237,000 during FY 72, this reduction has been accomplished primarily by reduced accessions and release of first term personnel. The career content of the enlisted force has been held rather stable through managerial action. About 26,000 career enlisted men have been separated during this period, but they have been replaced by first term personnel who have, or will have, reenlisted by end FY 72. In planning for phase-down at the time the Vietnam buildup began, the Army purposely initiated a program to hold the career content at projected baseline levels so as to maintain quality and minimize the problems that would otherwise occur during the phase-down period. Although a similar program could not be conducted for the grade of Colonel, since these officers are careerists, a combination of losses and promotion slowdown will have reduced the Colonel strength by end FY 72 to within 700 of what it was at the time the buildup began. This 700 differential has occurred almost entirely in the medical area (doctors, dentists, nurses, veterinarians, medical specialists, and Medical Service Corps). The number of combat and combat support type Colonels is on the decline.

By way of comparison, the career portion of the officer corps is about 65 percent in a peacetime environment as opposed to 39 percent for enlisted personnel. Yet, during the two-year period from end FY 70 to end FY 72 the commissioned officer strength will have been reduced by 26.4 percent as opposed to 36.3 percent of the enlisted force. Due to the higher career content, the impact has been proportionately heavier among the Army's commissioned ranks. These comparative

phase-down percentages become more significant when the specific Army structure changes are considered. Most of the units being deactivated by the Army are those`` with a low officer and high enlisted content. A brigade, for example, has only one Colonel and approximately 3,000 enlisted men. The structure cuts do not, therefore, permit a proportionate reduction of officers and enlisted men.

Question. What reductions can you make in Army headquarters and commands in the near future?

Answer. In addition to the programmed reductions in Army headquarters for FY 72 and FY 73, we are continually looking to reduce or eliminate those headquarters functions which are determined to be of marginal value and also identifying functions which, while essential, may be duplicative and thus susceptible to consolidation. These studies are underway at all echelons of command. In addition, on-site objective manpower surveys are scheduled for five major Army commands within the next nine months. The survey teams will review current missions and determine the minimum numbers of personnel and the best organization required to perform them. The studies and surveys may enable us to make some additional reductions but this will not be determined of course, until they are completed.

Question. Do you not think there are an excessive number of headquarters and headquarters personnel in the Army?

Answer. I do not think so sir. An Army command and its' headquarters is established because of a need to accomplish a specific mission that cannot be accomplished by an existing command. For example, this mission could be to provide a land defense capability for a geographic area, which is the main reason for U.S. Army, Europe, or it could be to provide world wide logistic support, which is the primary mission of the U.S. Army Materiel Command.

The need for Army commands is constantly under review. Within the last couple of years we have abolished the Fourth U.S. Army and transferred its', functions to the Fifth U.S. Army. Below the major command level, the Second Region of the U.S. Army Air Defense Command was eliminated.

The number of headquarters personnel is determined through objective onsite manpower surveys, based on workload data from a "zero-base", to determine the minimum numbers and the best organization required to perform the assigned, missions. Survey teams are directed to assure adherence to strict staffing standards. Therefore, each manpower space in a headquarters, military and civilian must be justified.

In addition to the manpower surveys which are normally performed on a two year cycle, there are several on-going studies which are likely to reduce headquarters staffs. These include the Optimum AMC Plan, called (TOAMAC) and the U.S. Army Europe study of its mission and structure. Studies such as these, together with the manpower survey program have enabled the Army to exceed Congressional directed reductions in headquarters staffing over the last three

years.

By the end of FY 1973, cumulative manpower reductions in the Major Army Command Headquarters displayed in the Budget will have totaled 8,677 since the end of FY 1969:

The Army recognizes the necessity to reduce overhead costs in a period of declining resources. The strengths for the departmental area and the major. Army field commands are now below the pre-Vietnam (FY 1965) build-up levels and further reductions in these commands are programmed for FY 1973. As noted above, Headquarters strengths are continuously monitored and reduced as conditions warrant; however, it is believed that further arbitrary reductions would be detrimental to mission accomplishment.

74-696 O 72 pt. 2 - 62

Question. What would happen to the ability of the Army to carry out its mission if the Readiness Command in Florida were eliminated?

Answer. Readiness Command is the single point of contact for combat-ready forces required by other unified commands when such reinforcement is directed. The elimination of this headquarters would require the services, their combatant commands, and various DOD transportation agencies to respond to the several overseas unified commands for both support planning and providing CONUSbased reinforcements. Because of the large number and wide diversity of the missions of the agencies involved, augmentation planning would be unwieldy, complex, and ineffective. Readiness Command performs functions both in peacetime and wartime essential to the Army's ability to carry out its mission. Readiness Command is responsible for the development of the detailed joint deployment plans which are the corollary to the employment plans of all other Unified Commanders across the broad spectrum from general war to limited contingencies, These plans establish the task organization and force composition of all CONUSbased forces for deployment to other theaters, and integrate the movement requirements of the forces of all Services with the available strategic mobility capacities.

Readiness Command also evaluates and exercises the capability of assigned and mobility forces to execute various deployment plans, thus insuring the maintenance of the highest standards of readiness to execute these plans, and the continuing development and refinement of procedures among the Services. Additionally, in peacetime, Readiness Command evaluates and exercises the doctrine applicable to the forces assigned and makes appropriate and timely recommendations for changes and improvements in this doctrine so as to insure optimum effectiveness in the joint employment of forces, particularly those of the Army and the Air Force.

In wartime, Readiness Command would play the key role in insuring the mobilization, readiness, and deployment of Reserve forces to meet the timesensitive force requirements of the oversea Unified Commanders. Here again, the Readiness Command role would include the resolution of competing demands on mobility resources to insure the optimum use of these resources to achieve maximum deployment levels at the earliest practicable dates.

In view of the truly joint nature of the foregoing requirements and capabilities, the Army, acting unilaterally or in coordination with the other Services, could not achieve the same levels of readiness and effectiveness.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator.

RETIREMENT RECOMPUTATION

Gentlemen, about the military retirement, I have expressed myself publicly about this matter because I think unless something is done by way of change-I do not like to use the word "reform"-the thing is going to break down and destroy itself. It is already unmanageable and to me unthinkable that by the year 2000 it will be costing $16 billion a year. I have made it very clear that I do not want to take one thin dime from what has been earned by any individual. I think it has been earned and it belongs to them. So I would not change the formula in midstream under any circumstances.

I do not know just what can be done, but something must be done. Here is another illustration: I have a memo here because I have been asking the Department of Defense to give us some figures on the problem. Here is a memorandum that states on recomputation:

"If we were to go to full recomputation of military retired pay today," that is, go back to the full system of recomputation, "the first year cost would be $925 million" and if we go back to full recomputation, Senator Cannon, of retired pay and have a recomputation every time there is a pay raise, the additional cost for it in 30 years, for that alone, would be $84.4 billion.