TROOP LEVEL EFFECT ON NATO

Senator CANNON. There are [deleted] Army personnel in Europe, of which [deleted] are under the U.S. Army-Europe. Is it your belief that all of these U.S. soldiers are essential to U.S. security interests in NATO today and for the indefinite future?

General WESTMORELAND. I do, sir. I believe it would be a mistake to reduce below that level.

Senator CANNON. Are you talking about unilateral action now or are you talking in terms of MBFR?

General WESTMORELAND. I am thinking in terms of the current situation. Certainly, if something comes out of MBFR negotiations, if and when they take place, it is conceivable that we can reduce that if the Soviets would reduce in accordance with whatever formula is developed for their forces that are in East Germany, or in early reinforcing range of the potential battlefield.

Senator CANNON. Is it not kind of wishful thinking to hope for a thing that would be really meaningful only if we are going to draw troops back to the United States and Russia agrees to take troops out of East Germany? It is 30 miles from East Berlin to the Polish border; so that is really not too meaningful, is it?

General WESTMORELAND. MBFR negotiations would be, because of the considerations you have outlined, extremely complex. If we are not very careful, we could lose our shirt in any such negotiations.

Senator CANNON. Who determines the correct level of U.S. Army Forces there?

General WESTMORELAND. General Goodpaster, who is Supreme Allied Commander, comes in with his requirements, and this is, of course, very carefully worked out with the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army-Europe. These force levels are associated with the entire NATO troop structure as part of the staffing process, and they are finally approved, processed and reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are made to the Secretary of Defense who approves for the administration appropriate troop levels.

FUTURE TROOP REDUCTIONS

Senator CANNON. The Army has some [deleted] additional military personnel, of which [deleted] are Army security people and [deleted] are communications personnel. What reductions could be made in this area in the reasonable future?

General WESTMORELAND. We have very carefully reviewed the level of troops in those two categories and we feel that security and communications are of such importance that we would be assuming unnecessary risk, an unacceptable risk, if we greatly reduced those. On the other hand, General Davison has very carefully and very recently made a detailed study of this. He has made a number of adjustments in his support forces in contrast to combat forces, but he determined that he could not make substantial reductions in command and control and in security. A lot of these security people are concerned with the security of nuclear weapons. Our communications, we feel, are essential and that it is not practical to make [deleted] for any major reduction in that category, either.

Senator CANNON. Is it a fact that as of September 30, 1971 [deleted]. General WESTMORELAND. Those figures are not exactly correct, Senator. According to our calculations, there are [deleted]. This is based on our latest readiness reports from Europe and it is in consideration of the fact that some of our units are organized at [deleted]. Senator CANNON. Are those the ones that are carried as [deleted]. General WESTMORELAND. Those are carried as [deleted]; yes. Senator CANNON. How many of those are there?

General WESTMORELAND. There are [deleted].

Senator CANNON. Then instead of the [deleted] figure that I used, that actually comes up to [deleted].

General WESTMORELAND. We do not think it is meaningful to put in those that are intentionally organized at [deleted].

There are [deleted].

Senator CANNON. And you have had a considerable degree of turbulence in the [deleted] have you not?

General WESTMORELAND. We have, indeed. U.S. Army-Europe in the [deleted].

Senator CANNON. Do you agree with General Goodpaster's assessment that with [deleted].

General WESTMORELAND. With [deleted] but there are many imponderables-what is the enemy's attack plan, how much warning would we in fact get, other matters. In order to precisely answer that question, I think we would have to make a number of assumptions. But on the assumption that [deleted].

However, we feel that we will [deleted] warning, which will permit our troops to be on the alert, in position, and will permit us to effect some reinforcement, particularly by the First Division stationed at Fort Riley, which is part of the Reforger force.

Also, this amount of warning would hopefully permit the Allies to mobilize their reserves.

In brief, if one is to make [deleted] I would agree with General Goodpaster.

But we certainly expect to [deleted].

Senator CANNON. In light of that, then it is not very realistic to say [deleted].

General WESTMORELAND. By virtue of this [deleted].

Senator CANNON. Is it not also a fact that your Army units cover 21⁄2 times the amount of ground or tactical area that normally would be assigned those types of units?

General WESTMORELAND. The front of U.S. Army-Europe is 265 kilometers. That means that our divisions are covering between 60 kilometers and 100 kilometers. To give you an example of what this means, in the Pusan perimeter, where we were in a defensive posture posture in 1950, our divisions were covering about 50 kilometers.

Of course, desirably, we would like to have our divisions covering not more than 30 kilometers. On the other hand, with the mobility and the firepower that our troops have, and if we do get warning and our troops are at a full state of readiness, we feel we can slow down an attack by the Warsaw Pact to the point where they will suffer heavy casualties and where we can hopefully avoid the use of tactical nuclear

weapons. But this posture is predicated upon [deleted]. We feel that we will have [deleted].

Senator CANNON. As a military expert, do you not think that if the Soviets were going to attack, they would attack through the Northern Plains, where the U.S. Army is not located and where we actually run a strong risk of being outflanked there?

General WESTMORELAND. Certainly, the Northern German Plain has been the traditional attack route; and you are quite correct that we have no U.S. forces there. The troops are from the Benelux countries, Germany, and England. If the Warsaw Pact chooses to attack [deleted].

Senator CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I know I have used more than my time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right.

Senator McIntyre had to leave. Suppose you take another 5 minutes. I have some questions, but I will yield 5 minutes to you. Senator CANNON. Thank you.

EUROPEAN TROOP TURNOVER RATE

General, is it not a fact that Army personnel in Europe have an annual turnover rate of between [deleted] percent?

General WESTMORELAND. In the last several years, Senator Cannon, it has been about [deleted] percent; but as the Secretary pointed out, we are doing all we can to stabilize our people in Europe, second only to the small, relatively small number of forces we have in Southeast Asia, which is of highest priority. The people that we are sending to Europe now are, generally speaking, not subject to later being sent to Southeast Asia, although there may be a few cases where a man with a particular skill may be levied there. Therefore, our Army people will have a tour of at least a year but our objective is 2 years, except for some of our low-ranking enlisted men, whose tour might be as little as 18 months unless they are eligible for early discharge. Because of the 150-day early discharge policy, we are having men who have been there for less than a year returning home for discharge.

But in summary, because of the priority of Europe, we are doing our utmost to stabilize our people, with emphasis on our leaders. But we expect all of our ranks to serve a reasonable, tour in Europe. Turnover,subsided last year and it will be reduced despite the early release program this year.

Senator CANNON. Do you have any kind of percentage estimate? General WESTMORELAND. As to what will be compared to the 80 percent.?

Senator CANNON. Yes.

General WESTMORELAND. I do not have one based on any studies that have been made; but my estimate would be that it will be down to between [deleted] percent during the current fiscal year.

Senator CANNON. Of course, one of the problems you had over there was getting training with the units because of the limited training space. Is that not a fact?

General WESTMORELAND. We do have a problem with respect to training areas, but we do consider them adequate; but marginal.

MISSION CAPABILITY IF EUROPEAN COMMAND ELIMINATED

Senator CANNON. What would happen to the Army's capability to carry out its mission if the U.S. European Command were eliminated?

General WESTMORELAND. In other words, all services, U.S. European Command, which is commanded by General Burchinal? Senator CANNON. Right.

General WESTMORELAND. This would be a problem for General Goodpaster, and General Goodpaster would have to take over a function that is now performed by General Burchinal. That would mean that he would be not only a international commander; he would have to be an active U.S. commander in order to deal with those problems associated with all troops-Army, Navy, and Air Force so he would have to have in my opinion, a double staff there at SHAEF, which I do not think would be politically desirable. Of course, this would add additional burdens on him as an individual in having the many problems associated with our unilateral U.S. effort and in addition, the international problem, the primary function of the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe.

HIGH RANKING OFFICERS IN EUROPE

Senator CANNON. Of the [deleted] generals and [deleted] colonels authorized to the U.S. Army in Europe, there are [deleted] generals and [deleted] colonels assigned. Do you believe it is essential to have so many high ranking officers in Europe?

General WESTMORELAND. We feel that every general officer has responsibilities commensurate with those expected of a general officer. As a matter of fact, all of our general officer billets in Europe are not filled.

Let's take a division as an example. A division has a division commander, a major general, and two brigadier generals. Yes, we can get along with one brigadier general; but it is desirable to have two because running a division of 16,000 men is a tremendous responsibility. In consideration of the tactical plans, the training requirements, the management of personnel, the personnel problems, we always look to the commander. And with only one general officer as an assistant, that division commander, in my opinion, is overextended.

I feel that for our troops stationed overseas we should try to fully man our general officer billets.

To reduce below the level, we would have to have certain general officer billets manned by colonels.

Senator CANNON. I was thinking more in terms of the various headquarters rather than divisions themselves, because it does seem like there are an awful lot assigned there.

General WESTMORELAND. The manning tables for the headquarters do have general officers in charge of the major staff divisions of the headquarters. Now, some of those billets can be manned with colonels and some of them are manned with colonels; but, of course, the staff responsibilities are substantial and very broad and we need, of course, our most experienced personnel to handle the extensive staff assignments. So we would prefer to have general officers assuming this magnitude of responsibility.

Senator CANNON. I am advised that only 17 percent of the personnel in the Army Headquarters at Heidelberg would report to the NATO Central Army Group Headquarters in time of war. What would happen to the remaining 83 percent of headquarters personnel in wartime?

General WESTMORELAND. They would man the U.S. Army-Europe 7th Army. You see, we eliminated the 7th Army about 3 years ago and combined 7th Army and U.S. Army-Europe. U.S. Army-Europe is not only an administrative headquarters responsible for administration and logistics of all Army troops in Europe, but it is also a tactical headquarters, which is the function formerly carried on by 7th Army.

The actual fighting of the battle would be handled by the Central Army Group, but they would give merely broad instructions as to the deployment of Army troops; then 7th Army which is also U.S. ArmyEurope, would have the job of carrying out those instructions and supervising the deployment of troops, the logistics and the various elements that go into fighting a battle.

ANNUAL VOLUNTEER NEED

Senator CANNON. How many Army volunteers, officers and enlisted men, will you need annually?

General WESTMORELAND. Annually? We need, as far as enlisted acquisitions are concerned, about 20,000 a month, an average of about 20,000 a month; so this amounts to about 240,000 a year. This will vary year by year, depending upon the number of losses that will occur during a given year. But I would say between 200,000 and 250,000, as we level off with a 13-division force, would be the annual acquisition requirement. This is for enlisted men.

For officers, it would be small, relatively, and this will involve the acquisition of second lieutenants. The annual acquisition of second Heutenants, I would estimate to be about 10,000 a year.

Senator CANNON. Do you believe you will be able to meet your annual quotas?

General WESTMORELAND. With the draft on the books-in other words, by moving toward a zero draft situation as opposed to no draft, I believe that if we continue the upward movement that we now see, and place greater emphasis on recruiting, by the target date for a volunteer Army of 1 July 1973, we will be very close to our objective. I cannot give any assurance that we will achieve that objective but in my opinion we will be very close. I would say within 10 percent of that objective for enlisted men and for officers.

Senator CANNON. Why will you need an average manpower of 870,000 when your beginning strength at July 1, 1972, will be 861,000 and your ending strength in June 1973, will be 841,000?

General WESTMORELAND. It is because of the losses that we will be incurring this year. This is a very complex matter and it is associated with gains and losses. Because of the early release this year and the tremendous phasedown, we will be reducing the Army by 21 percent this year. Before the 50,000 man-year cut was imposed by Congress, we had imposed ourselves a 203,000 man-year cut. We will be actually reducing by about 263,000 man-years, during this fiscal year. Because of these great losses [deleted],