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30% of the equipment, including small vehicles, of a typical Army unit will fit in a standard container. While an additional 30% of the Army's vehicles could be moved on special “flat rack” container frames much like the frame of car transporters these flat racks are not in common use in the industry and would have to be provided by DOD.
All of the Army's tanks and self-propelled guns are greater than 8 ft in width thus they cannot be transported by container. The deployment of the equipment of a unit hy two different types of ships would result in a delay at the overseas port areas when the unit is reconstituted. The lack of unit integrity during movement could result in a major loss of unit effectiveness if any portion of the units' equipment was lost, delayed or damaged in transit.
Question. The Army intends to reduce its end strength from 861,000 in fiscal year 1972 to 841,000 in fiscal year 1973. Will this be a gradual drawdown or will there be perturbations in the drawdown such that there will actually be greater numbers on actwe duty at a later time in fiscal year 1973 than at an earlier period in fiscal 19731 If there will be perturbations in the system, please provide a full explanation.
Answer. To achieve the average strength of 974,309 in FY 72 an extended early release program was developed which accelerated losses for first term soldiers, planned for the last half of FY 72. Additionally some 86,500 first term personnel programmed for separation the first half of FY 73 are being separated the last half of FY 72. The acceleration of losses for first term soldiers from first half F Y 73 into the last half FY 72 causes unusually low losses in early FY 73 and therefore causes gains to exceed losses with a resultant increase in strength. In the last half of FY 73 losses return to normal and the total strength declines in the remainder of FY 73.
The input of new soldiers into the Army the last half of FY 72 has been held to a minimum as part of the management actions to remain within this man-year ceiling. Therefore beginning in FY 73 it is necessary to have accessions of new soldiers at a level which will overcome the deficit from FY 72 and considering training lead time of 5 months, replace normal losses the last half of FY 73.
The unusually low losses the first half FY 73 combined with the requirement for a level of accessions of new soldiers in the same period causes the Army strength to increase until November. Thereafter when losses return to normal, strength decreases until the end of FY 73.
Question. You indicate on page 12 of your statement that “Military Pay will be 42% of the Army Budget.” Would you provide what percentage of the Army Budget is related to manpower costs? This would require a broader definition of manpower costs than Military Pay and might include such things as funding for soldier oriented programs, and so on.
Answer. When taking into consideration Personnel Related Costs, to include: Military Pay, Civilian Pay, Retired Pay, CHAMPUS, certain Soldier Oriented Programs, and Military Family Housing, sixty two percent (62%) of the TOA for the FÝ 73 Budget is attributable to manpower and/or manpower related costs. Comparable data for FY 64 shows 59% of the TOA attributable to manpower and/or manpower related costs.
Question. The Army will discharge 480,000 military personnel in fiscal year 1972, with a net reduction of 262,000. How can the Army hope to maintain any continuity of force structure with this tremendous turnover? Specifically, how has this affected current Army readiness?
Answer. It is extremely difficult to maintain effective continuity of force structure with the current and projected personnel turnover rate during FY 1972.
Army readiness, world-wide, has been adversely affected by personnel turbulence. Specifically, a high turnover rate causes units to compress and in some cases repeat training cycles. This recycling obviates conduct of the continuous progressive training programs which are essential to attaining and maintaining à sound readiness posture. Additionally, the turnover rate aggravates certain critical MOS shortages and MOS imbalances within the enlisted strength which further deters effective training. Following attainment of FY 72 year-end strength, personnel turbulence will be reduced, permitting resumption of meaningful training which will enhance the readiness posture of Army forces.
Question. On page of your statement you state that, "the chart on the opposing page graphically depicts the vital contribution of our Reserve components to NATO.”
On the chart you refer to a requirement for (deleted). What is the basis of the chart you have referred to and how realistic do you think it is in terms of Reserve forces getting to Europe in the time designated?
Answer. The chart opposite page 9 represents our program objective in the FY 73 budget [deleted] that we can realistically provide to meet General Goodpaster's requirement (deleted). Our assigned resources limit meeting the requirement totally, and also dictate the amount of reliance we must place on the Reserves. Referring to the chart, the (deleted) are supporting elements of battalion size or smaller that are required to support our force already in Europe. The majority of these elements will be airlifted to Europe. (Deleted) together with their supporting increments, and additional supporting increments required to round out support to the active structure. We plan that personnel will be airlifted while most of the bulk supply and materiel items will be moved by surface.
We realize that there is a greater reliance on the Reserves to meet this contingency than at any time in our history, and I emphasize that the chart depicts our best effort within our constrained dollar and manpower resources. The [deleted] have been issued first line equipment and we are giving a great deal of attention to their readiness. How realistic this reliance proves to be depends on how well the Reserve Components [deleted] move to meet this requirement, the timeliness of political decision, and how effectively we will be able to assemble and dispatch the units. (Additional classified information was furnished to the committee.)
Question. On page 10 of your statement, you state that, "a major challenge to the Reserve Components is the recruiting of personnel with no prior service and the retention of prior-service personnel in order to maintain authorized strength levels in a volunteer Army environment." The Army National Guard, from June through December 1971, decreased in a steady trend from 402,175 to 380,742 and during the same period the L.S. Army Reserve decreased from 263,299 to 249,351. Given these serious trends and shortfalls, what are you presently doing to correct this situation? What is your prognosis for success!
Answer. A major consideration in the present shortfall in strength was the high rate of potential losses faced by the Reserve Component during FY 72 due to heavy input of nonprior-service personnel six years previously. This potential loss, coupled with the draft moratorium and the current low draft calls, created a most difficult situation within the Reserve Components.
Strong and viable recruiting programs, with or without enlistment/reenlistment incentives appear to be the major requisite for maintaining strength of the Reserve Components. Initial steps to improve the recruiting and retention capability of the Reserve Components were taken before strength shortfalls occurred. The Army Guard and Army Reserve began developing aggressive recruiting programs, such as the Guard's "Try One" campaign, aimed primarily at prior-service veterans, and started structuring recruiter forces to carry out what was recognized as a major task. Trained recruiters are now being assigned at all echelons of command to include both full-time technician personnel and part-time recruiters who are actively recruiting through the use of additional training man-day allocations. Additional full-time USAR recruiters are provided for in the FY 73 budget. Additional man-days for recruiting activities are programmed for both components.
Command emphasis has been placed on the retention of Army Guardsmen and Army Reservists and unit commanders are charged with making every effort to retain current members of their units. Reports for the past several months indicate promising increases in the retention rates of nonprior-service personnel for both components. To insure that the recruiter forces are properly manned, concentrated programs were launched to provide training for the individuals assigned to recruiting duties.
Various schools and seminars and conferences on recruiting have been conducted and plans finalized for a continuing program of education to maintain qualified recruiters at all levels. A one-week resident course for unit recruiters has been planned which tentatively calls for an input of 800 ARNG and USAR personnel during FY 73. A nonresident 14-hour course has been prepared for use in training future recruiters. Command-wide and state-wide seminars are now a permanent feature of recruiter training for the components.
The Army also established an Active Army Reserve Components In-Service Recruiting Program designed to attract active duty separatees into the unit
programs of the Army Guard and Army Reserve. During the pilot portion of the program, which was conducted primarily at Fort Lewis, Wash. and Fort Knox, Ky., between August and December 1971, a total of 1,398 prior-service men were enlisted. The program was expanded on 3 January 1972 for limited duration world-wide in extension of the Army's early release program. An additional 18,929 soldiers received Reserve Component assignments between 3 January and 24 February 1972. Reserve Component recruiter/counselors are assigned to fulltime duty at 24 CONUS installations and one in Hawaii to interview individuals scheduled for separation from the Active Army and to enlist those desiring to affiliate with the Reserve Components.
Another major effort to arrest the drop in strength is being made in the recruiting advertising and publicity field. New recruiting literature and audiovisual materials have been developed to appeal to the full range of prospective enlistees and to current members of the Army Guard and Army Reserve. Particular emphasis is being placed on the development of materials which will appeal to minority groups. FY 72 and FY 73 budgets have been formulated to support these increased requirements. In another area, the Army has recommended or endorsed a number of incentives which could contribute to maintaining the strength of the Reserve Components. We are cautiously optimistic at this time that, with improved recruiting organizations, expanded publicity and advertising programs and some productive incentives, the Reserve Components will be able to regain and maintain authorized strengths in the volunteer environment.
Question. You have stressed the importance of readiness for the Army and yet you indicate on page 7 of your statement that “Army readiness continues to be less than desirable and the prospect for improvement on a wordwide basis is not good when considering the current and projected personnel situation.” Would you elaborate on this? Also, provide for each of the [deleted] combat divisions and 8 reserve divisions a readiness profile using an appropriate rating system. How long will it take those divisions which are not presently combat ready to become so?
Answer. Trained strength shortfalls caused by early release programs required to meet end strengths for FY 72 and the effort to maintain forces in SEA, Europe, and certain high priority CONUS units [deleted) at authorized strengths, have resulted in a trained strength shortfall in other Army units. Based on the FY 73 Manpower Authorization Program, these units are projected to be back to aythorized strength levels during the first half of FY 73.
The readiness status of the [deleted) active divisions as of 20 January 1972 was as follows: (Table classified and retained in committee files.)
Assuming qualified personnel and equipment are provided in a timely and progressive manner for initiation and completion of an intensive training
Question. On page 8 of your statement you indicate that “U.S. Army, Europe (deleted). What precisely do you mean by [deleted). In this regard, what are the number of troops that you are returning from and replacing to Europe in fiscal year 1972? Also, is it true that as of September 1971 that (deleted). Given the rsonnel turbulence and [deleted]. Why do you state that U.S. Army, Europe [deleted).
Answer. The readiness condition of a command is based upon the readiness status of the majority of units within the command. Thus, the statement that US Army, Europe is (deleted] relates to the average condition of its assigned units. (Deleted.] These figures, however, do not necessarily relate to the total combat effectiveness of the command because within the grouping, the readiness status of a company or detachment is compared to that of a division. Many of the units that are currently rated in the "Not” or “Marginally" combat ready category are small combat support and combat service support units whose readiness is affected by slight personnel strength and skill fluctuations.
Question. You state on page 17 of your statement that, "absenteeism has been and continues to be a significant problem” in the Army. What has been the absenteeism and desertion rates for the past six months? How has this affected readiness?
Answer. For the first five months of fiscal year 1972, absentee and desertion rates were 71.3 and 29.2 respectively. This compares with rates of 72.1 and 32.6 for the first five months of fiscal year 1971. December statistics processed to date show a significant drop from the same month a year previous, and support a downward trend in fiscal year 1972 absentee and desertion rates.
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The highest rates of absenteeism occur in the continental United States, particularly among personnel in basic training and in transit. Permanent party absentee rates are low, as are the rates for troops stationed overseas. Therefore the effect on readiness of the present level of absenteeism is minimal.
Question. On page 19 of your statement you state that, "we have [deleted]. What significance do you attach to it?
Answer. The information is classified and was furnished to the committee separately.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Senator SYMINGTON. General, I become worried about the casualty aspect, from the standpoint of stressing what is the best system. When I first came into Government, some of the Army generals said the great tribute General MacArthur would get in history was the fact he captured so many thousand square miles with, relatively, so few casualties; leapfrogging places like Truk instead of going in with a frontal attack. Against that, we have this question of whether they deserve it because they have the most casualties.
I was Secretary of the Air Force when the Key West agreement was reached. General Spaats and General Norstad represented the Air Force at Key West. I think, if you analyze it, the casualty list is not a solid argument. It almost gives one a feeling that the Navy and Air Force are not performing. Their casualties have been less in Vietnam. It worries me to hear that stressed. I submit that thought respectfully for your consideration.
General WESTMORELAND. Senator Symington, you have given it a connotation, of course, that was not intended. What I was pointing out is that the Army has to carry the major burden of the ground combat, combat on the ground, which is a nasty type of war and where the casualties have been substantially greater throughout all wars than combat on the sea or combat in the air. I am not suggesting that being on a fighting ship at sea or an aircraft over the enemy is not a hazardous mission. It is hazardous for the pilot, not for the great bulk of the people in the Air Force, the major number being behind the lines supporting that pilot.
But we have a higher percentage of our people who are in a dangerous environment and, therefore, we take greater casualties.
The Army is a great believer in maneuver, as you well know; this is ingrained in all officers. We do not believe in the frontal attack. If you
look at our casualties in consideration of the enemies we have faced and the terrain we have had to conquer, you will find that our casualty rate compares very favorably with other ground elements, to include the Marines and our allies. This is because of our ability to maneuver. We put great emphasis on maneuverability but also we put great emphasis on firepower and firepower saves lives on the ground battlefield.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do not misunderstand me. My answer is defensive. This has been discussed considerably by members of this committee. Again, I do not think casualties per se are a reason for taking a position on a future weapons system.
General Gavin, several years ago, sold me completely on the advisability of helicopters. He wrote an article that is epic on this subject, called “Cavalry, and I don't mean Horses”. But the Cheyenne, to my way of thinking, goes beyond that concept of modern reconnaissance, or even back in the days of the cavalry of Sheridan or Stewart.
It hit a sour note a bit. Previously we have had emphasis on relative casualties. I submit this to you for what it is worth.
I would ask a question about Safeguard.
You say system integration of all the major components except the perimeter acquisition is in progress at Meck Island in the Pacific. I think Dr. Foster told us, Mr. Secretary, that the software in the computers was not installed. Am I wrong on that?
Secretary FROEHLKE. I am going to defer on that. I believe the software is in New Jersey. but Phil Leber, our Safeguard system manager, is here.
Phil, would you come up for this?
General LEBER. The software is installed, Senator, at Meck Island or we could not carry out the tests that we are carrying out there, because the system is under control of a computer when it is being used. Those tests have been quite successful.
Senator SYMINGTON. I understand that. My question is, is the computer now the way that you would have it, complete, if you were operating the system?
General LEBER. For the tests, yes; but that is not the same as the one for the tactical site which we are now building for the first site at Grand Forks, N. Dak.
Senator SYMINGTON. I do not want to quibble with you about it, but think it important for us, if we are to adopt a philosphy of fly before buy, that if the computer, the most complicated aspect of the system, is still only, in a test situation, that ought to be pointed out, especially inasmuch as you have singled out the Pesimeter Acquisition Radar not being ready for actual operation. That was my point.
General LEBER. The computer is in operation. The hardware has been fully checked, accepted, and is being integrated. The software for that data processor has been installed and used at Meck Island. The software for the tactical system is now being developed at Madison, N.J., at the Bell Telephone Laboratories. It will be ready when the site is ready.
Senator SYMINGTON. So you say your computer is different from your PAR because it is now in a position where it can operate? Correct?
General LEBER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Goldwater, excuse me just a minute. I have just received a letter from Senator Cannon with reference to the report. Senator, I had not known about your letter until a few minutes ago. That is very fine.
All right. Proceed, Senator Goldwater.