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overcome these problems at a faster pace. I cannot overemphasize the importance of your support to this vital area.
In addition to the heightened appeal of service in an improved force, the Army must possess a comprehensive, systematic method of attracting and bringing into its ranks both the quality and number of volunteers its mission requires. The major points of our program are:
Increasing the size of the recruiting force.
Before leaving the subject of people, I would like to acknowledge that our discipline and leadership-like those of all institutions--have been, on occasion, less than perfect. However, the publicity afforded the few exceptions or aberrations has unfairly maligned the vast majority--the very fine soldiers in our ranks, Many of the programs I have described to you are designed to further strengthen our performance in the areas of discipline and leadership. I am certain we are moving in the right direction.
Although it may be a little too early to assess the situation accurately, several of the traditional statistical indicators of discipline are now showing improvement. A case in point is absenteeism, which has been and continues to be a significant problem. During the six-month period ending in September 1971, our absentee incident rate was lower than for the previous six-month period. Likewise, our desertion rates decreased during the same period.
The 1973 budget has been characterized as a soldier-oriented budget; however, continued effort and adequate funding are vital in the field of materiel. I highlighted earlier in my presentation our goal of a fully manned 13-active-division force. Implied in my discussion was a 13-active-division force fully equipped with weapons, equipment, and ammunition having a qualitative advantage over those of our potential enemies. It is abundantly clear that, in view of our current and projected force levels, the need to maintain this advantage is critical.
As in the past, we are concentrating on a number of systems which will make greatest contribution to the effectiveness and combat capability of the Army. In short, we are continuing the programs which have been initiated in past years. No problems of any magnitude have been uncovered and we are progressing satisfactorily.
The Advanced Attack Helicopter continues to be one of the Army's highest priority development programs. The Army's position for the past two years has been, and continues to be, that alternate approaches to meeting this requirement would be considered objectively on a cost and effectiveness basis and that a production decision must be based on selection of the weapons system which is the best buy. The Army has, for the past two years, been involved in an analytical study examining in detail the basic requirement for an advanced attack helicopter: We now have a unique situation in that we have available industry sponsored experimental aircraft that are proposed to meet this requirement.
During the next six months, the Army will complete an analytical and flight evaluation of these aircraft. This evaluation and continued testing of Cheyenne will provide the basis for a sound decision on the Advanced Attack Helicopter Program before the end of the year. If the presently stated performance requirement is validated the Cheyenne program will continue as currently budgeted. The Army is not married to the Cheyenne. If we select an alternative qther than Cheyenne a determination will be made at that time as to what portion of the FÝ 73 funds will be required to complete sufficient of the Cheyenne program to capitalize on the technologies gained and applicable to any future helicopter program. Determination must also be made of the funds required in FÝ 73 to be reprogramed to initiate the new attack helicopter program.
FUTURE ORGANIZATIONS AND DOCTRINE When I last appeared before you, I told you of our planned "TRICAP” Division which was to bring together, for the first time in one division, the triple capabilities of an armored brigade, an airmobile brigade, and an air cavalry combat brigade. On 5 May 1971, the 1st Cavalry Division was activated at Fort Hood as the Army's TRICAP Division.
The purpose of the TRICAP test program is to evaluate proposed organizational sconcepts and doctrine, to determine additional requirements for doctrine, and
to evaluate our triple capability concept in mid- and high-intensity warfare environments. The first TRICAP test is scheduled for February 1972. The program is expected to provide us information for major force structure decisions.
IN REVIEW The Army's commitment to Vietnam during my four year tenure as Army Chief of Staff has placed enormous strains on our resources. I pay tribute to our many officers and men who served there with honor and distinction and at great personal sacrifice.
The most significant problem before the Army today is to assure the continuing accession and retention of quality manpower. We may soon enter a unique period in our history-a total volunteer military establishment. Our first goal in the 70's must be to offer our young men and women a challenging career in which there is room to grow in an environment that is compatible with that which they would expect to find in the civilian community. This we can do without sacrifice of discipline. Increased MPA funds, which Congress has provided, and a significant increase in OMA outlays will be required to improve living conditions and support challenging training, in order to attract and retain the type of men we need.
The buildup of Army forces in Vietnam was accomplished at the expense of much needed Army modernization. Procurement of authorized levels of some critical equipment was deferred, and development and procurement of other modernization items have been marginally funded. The Army has identified capabilities that require modernization in order to maintain our qualitative advantage, which is essential. We may not be able to afford the largest Armed Forces in the world, but we must have the very best.
I have stressed our key goals for the 70's, those which I feel are essential to strength and readiness. How well we perform in these areas during this period of transition will decide how viable an institution the Army will be in the future. I am confident, as I believe you are, that the Army will perform well. Much of the freedom that is enjoved in the world today is directly a result of the stability that our military strength provides. If we are to maintain our position as a world leader, and until our national interests or commitments change, our Army must be made strong and ready, whatever its size may be. Our citizens should neither expect nor receive any less.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen. You have good statements. I am going to go over them.
With the pressures we are under now, especially since we have morning and afternoon sessions, it is a great help to us to have these abbreviated statements from you and get right into the questions anyone might have.
Gentlemen, as we noted in the little discussion before we started, your budget in a way, is rather lean. The ABM is just a little over 30 percent of the moner that is in here under the Army heading. I really think the ABMI is a national institution and ought not to be charged to the Army-altogether to the Army, although it shows up in your budget.
I had someone who is realls familiar with the Army- but no longer in it give me a little memorandum here about your budget, noticing, as I say, that there was not much machinery in it-hardware, guns, airplanes, helicopters, and so forth.
I am a little old-fashioned, marbe greatly old-fashioned but I still believe in discipline. I happen to have been blessed with it when I was a youngster and I do not know which jail I would be in if I had not had it: I know I would not be in the Senate if I had not had good discipline at home. I know you are up against a different situation
than I was when I was coming along but I basically believe that you will not have much of a military unit unless there is some way that you can instill a lot of discipline although you do it in a different way from the old days. But I still think you have to have it and I judge that you gentlemen think so, too.
This will be the year when you will have a chance to work on these personnel programs. It is an experiment about the so-called volunteer Army. Senator Hatfield has filed an amendment terminating the draft at the end of June 1972. It is going to be offered to this bill. Now, I am not fighting the volunteer Army, you understand, but if you keep on putting out these rosy reports about how well it is working, it makes it more likely that that amendment will pick up more and more votes. That is what we had up here last year. There were so many rosy predictions about what it would do that the people in the country got sold on the idea of not having any draft at all, or just have it 1 more year.
So that is one of the clouds on the horizon. I am not afraid of it, you understand, but I call it to your attention.
CHEYENNE VERSUS A-X
There is a matter here that we have been trying to get to and we shall have a special hearing on it and there is going to be a report on it soon. I am going to take up my time just talking a little about itthis Cheyenne, A-X—those two.
I do not know what the report is going to be. I am not trying to anticipate the report, I am not committed one way or another. There is a thought, though, that I would like to nail down-neither the A-X nor the Cheyenne—will be left out of the bill this year, and it is understood we are going on to a prototype of each one of them. Some group, highly competent, will not make a decision for us, but will help us make a decision as to whether it will be one, and if only one, which one.
I am not asking you to commit yourself to anything now, because it might be held against you later-but if you and the Air Force could follow a course to get to that position, I think, it would clear the atmosphere a good deal.
I want to hear what my colleagues have to say, though, before I reach any firm conclusion.'
I will put that before you. I do not feel like pressing you for an answer 1011.
VIr. Secretary, we had the Air Force up yesterday and talked to the same point. They did not want to waive anything, of course, but they said that there is a lot of sense in a proposal like that; you know, they did not finally agree to it, but as a general thought they went along with it.
Mr. Secretary, what about you? I do not want to surprise you. Are you ready to respond to this?
Secretary FROEHLKE. In a general way, Vir. Chairman.
Secretary FROEHLKE. I do agree with you that now is the time to have a thorough testing of the weapons. As you know, with the
Cheyenne at the present time we are running tests of its survivability in various climates and intensities of war, and also as to its lethality. We also are getting the advanced rotor system developed. So, as far as these tests are concerned, they are more tests of the requirementswhat is the ideal type of aircraft, rather than determining which specific aircraft.
As to the second part of your question, the A-X versus the Cherenne, I am not well versed in that area and I think maybe General Westmoreland would like to comment. But my impiession now is that it is not a question of which is the better but, for differing situations, both might very well be needed. And, as of the moment, I would be inclined to say that they both are intended to meet different situations; both situations would most likely develop on the battlefield, and, therefore, ideally both aircraft should be utilized for close air support.
General, do you have anything?
General WESTMORELAND. Mr. Chairman, we feel that there is a requirement for both. We do not believe it is a matter of either or because we do not feel that the A-X and the Cheyenne are competitive. We feel they are complementary.
The A-X is an entirely different type of craft from the Cheyenne. The A-X is more akin to the A-7; it is a fixed-wing aircraft; it can deliver bombs or machinegun fire for troop support, which is very much needed by the Army from the Air Force.
On the other hand, the Cheyenne is an organic aircraft; it belongs to the Army. In other words, by virtue of the helicopter technology we can now move our machineguns and move our antitank weapons into the third dimension, move them along the nap of the earth.
Yes, we will still have our machineguns and antitank weapons on the ground and have our movable forces that move on the ground by foot and by armored personnel carrier; but the helicopter now gives us the capability of moving through the air on the nap of the earth. The Chevenne gives us a machinegun and an antitank capability to support the ground commander as a part of his integrated tactical fires. Mr. Packard had a board which studied this matter in considerable detail, and came to the conclusion that the systems are complementary and that both are needed.
In this particular budget, we have $17.1 million to complete R. & D and then we have $36.5 million to fabricate three preproduction prototypes. One of those will be a hard-tooled production-type helicopter. We will not finish all of our tests, particularly a test that Mr. Packard asked us to run, involving greater details with respect to the survivability of the Chevenne, until August.
In August we will have finished our tests of the Cheyenne; we will have studied the other two helicopters that have been put forth by the other manufacturers; and we will then be in a position to determine what direction we will go. If we decide that the Army needs the Chevenne and it is cost effective, the $36.5 million will permit us to proceed with those preproduction prototypes, one of which will be a hard-tooled item.
I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance that the Army places on improving and developing an advanced helicopter gunship. We feel that the Cheyenne combines the latest of several technologies;
it is an aircraft that is far more advanced than anything the Russians could possibly develop. (Deleted.]
Finally, I would put in a plea for the infantryman who takes the majority of the casualties. I believe that we should devote our technology and our industrial capacity to giving that infantryman the best possible support that we can. It is with this philosophy in mind, the Army has developed the Cheyenne helicopter. This is our No. 1 priority materiel item.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. My time has elapsed. I will say now for the benefit of those who have just come in, yesterday we got into this matter with the Air Force. I would rather have held off until our subcommittee reported, but these gentlemen are here and the hearings are on and we just have to take up some things.
For your information, my idea is that when our subcommittee reports, I want us to have a meeting ard receive the present collective and individual views on these aircraft. We have to formulate something when this bill is written up that we can take to the floor and that will be a partial guideline for the future.
I think, in the interest of both weapons, that is the way to try to get something that will show what we are doing to bring this thing into focus and the committee will at least have more before us than just a piece of paper.
All right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, advertising costs have gone up, increased steadily from year to year. Has any comparative study been made of the recruiting advertising between the effectiveness and the cost, between the Marines and the Army?
Secretary FROEHLKE. Senator Smith, I believe the answer is no; I know of no comparison.
General WESTMORELAND. I know of none, but it is conceivable that Mr. Kelley has made such a comparison, Senatof Smith. We could research that and provide it for the record.
Senator Smith. I wish you would give us something for the record on this. There seems to be a difference of approach and probably necessarily so, and the increase in costs apparently is necessary.
There has been no specific study made of the Army and Marine recruiting advertising costs and effectiveness. A study was conducted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to evaluate the effectiveness of the Army's paid broadcast campaign. One of the findings of this study compared the level of target audience (17-21 year old men) awareness of the various services' advertising. Of the young men interviewed, 76% were aware of the Army's paid campaign while only 30% were aware of the Marine Corps public service advertising.
Secretary FROEHLKE. May I comment on the approach?
Secretary Froehlke. You certainly are correct, there is a difference of approach and the primary reason is the number of men we are try