Knowing Other Minds
Anita Avramides, Matthew Parrott
Oxford University Press, Sep 5, 2019 - Philosophy - 256 pages
We all take it for granted that we are typically in a position to know about the thoughts and feelings of other people. But we might naturally wonder how we acquire this kind of knowledge. Knowing Other Minds brings together ten original chapters, written by internationally renowned researchers, on questions that arise from our everyday social interaction with others. Can we have direct perceptual knowledge of another person's thoughts? How do we acquire general conceptions of mental states? What lessons can be drawn from experimental work in developmental psychology? Are there fundamental differences between the ways in which we acquire knowledge of our own minds and the ways in which we acquire knowledge of someone else's mind? What sort of cognitive processing underlies our everyday social understanding? How should we best think of the relationship between our complex social life and moral value? The chapters in this volume convey a variety of different perspectives and make a number of novel contributions to the existing literature on these questions, thereby opening up new avenues of inquiry. Furthermore, they illustrate how questions in philosophy and questions from empirical cognitive science overlap and mutually inform one another.
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The Problem of Other Minds Some Preliminaries
Knowledge Belief and the Asymmetry Thesis
Being Pluralist About Understanding Others Contexts and Communicative Practices
Challenging the Twosystems Model of Mindreading
Perception Reliability and Other Minds
Embodiment and Social Perception
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