Knowing Other MindsAnita Avramides, Matthew Parrott We all take it for granted that we are typically in a position to know about the thoughts and feelings of other people. But we might naturally wonder how we acquire this kind of knowledge. Knowing Other Minds brings together ten original chapters, written by internationally renowned researchers, on questions that arise from our everyday social interaction with others. Can we have direct perceptual knowledge of another person's thoughts? How do we acquire general conceptions of mental states? What lessons can be drawn from experimental work in developmental psychology? Are there fundamental differences between the ways in which we acquire knowledge of our own minds and the ways in which we acquire knowledge of someone else's mind? What sort of cognitive processing underlies our everyday social understanding? How should we best think of the relationship between our complex social life and moral value? The chapters in this volume convey a variety of different perspectives and make a number of novel contributions to the existing literature on these questions, thereby opening up new avenues of inquiry. Furthermore, they illustrate how questions in philosophy and questions from empirical cognitive science overlap and mutually inform one another. |
Contents
| 1 | |
The Problem of Other Minds Some Preliminaries | 20 |
Knowledge Belief and the Asymmetry Thesis | 41 |
Being Pluralist About Understanding Others Contexts and Communicative Practices | 63 |
Challenging the Twosystems Model of Mindreading | 79 |
Perception Reliability and Other Minds | 107 |
Embodiment and Social Perception | 127 |
Perception Evidence and Our Expressive Knowledge of Others Minds | 148 |
Expressions Looks andOthers Minds | 173 |
Other Minds Facts and Values | 200 |
| 219 | |
| 235 | |
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action agent anger angry another's mental Apperly apple argue aspects asymmetry thesis attributions autism aware based on evidence basic looks properties basis beliefs capacity Cassam change-of-location false-belief tasks claim cognitive science conceptual problem condition confirmation holism debate discussion distinction Dretske Dretske’s Duddington Embodiment emotions epistemic epistemological example explicit expressive behaviour fact fact-value distinction false feelings Fiebich first-person full-blown mindreading Gallagher happy human idea inference inferential instrumental action interaction involved Jane Heal Looks View McNeill mental lives mental state concepts minds minimal mindreading mirror neurons nature object observation one’s Overgaard P-predicates pain participants perceive perceptual account perceptual knowledge person philosophers plausible possible propositional attitudes psychological question reason registration relation relevant represent the contents role scepticism self-knowledge sense Shaun Gallagher simple-seeing simulation social cognition someone St Hilda’s College Strawson suggest SUP+ theory theory-theory things third-person tion two-systems model understanding universal quantification Wikforss