tess, including Ad gotiated the origina ld not object to in functions in the Committee such prot

other hand, Army a roles and missions

to freeze organi ommittee to provid

'FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE'

future. "Naval opinion," Forrestal wrote in was thrown into a state of alarm."

il 15 meeting with Maryland Sen. Millard. restal allowed himself to be persuaded to essional protagonists of naval aviation and the to insert protective clauses in the legislation. pudiation of his pledge to President Truman Patterson found him making this apology in I said this did not conform with the policy istration and that I myself did not think they ry although I would have to confess I was ken by the recurring evidence of the Army's in regard to the chain-of-command concept matter of fact, during this war they had not issue a single order to MacArthur-and they

ANDEGRIFT: "I desire to discuss certain feaending measure. I have never approved of f unification."

s were privately exchanged when Marine s Vandegrift and Edson told the Senate t Marine Corps roles and missions ought to the legislation. Clark Clifford phoned Forain of this violation of the verbal agreement. ne Forrestal Diaries, the Navy Secretary "inhe testimony of Eisenhower and Royall "rehe Navy's fears." A showdown luncheon on ced a deadlock. Almost every Navy-Marine including Admiral Sherman who had perted the original compromise, either testified not object to including a statement of roles, nctions in the law, or specifically urged ittee such protective clauses in the legisla

CONT

naval aviation and the Marine Corps, with specific ass missions to be left for the President, the Command Chief of the armed forces.

As we know, the congressional friends of the Navy such strong and detailed protection into the law tha miral King, over the years perhaps the most cons opponent of any hint of unification, "was now ready dorse the Senate Bill," according to Forrestal.

Looking back at these hectic events of a decade e President Eisenhower told a press conference in May of his "preaching and praying" for unification whi thought we could bring . . . about. Well, I encounte very fierce opposition," he said. As a result, unifi "never did take place quite in the form that I thou should be."

Symington and Spaatz were also deeply disappo At this late date, they were faced with the alternat dropping the fight for a stronger bill until the next se or accepting the weak compromise which still cont provisions for a coequal Air Force. They decided o bird in hand.

President Truman first offered the job of Secreta Defense to Patterson who turned it down because of cial hardship. Forrestal accepted. The President als gested that it would be a good idea if Forrestal would his headquarters over to the Pentagon from the Building. The President hoped that propinquity help bring the services together.

On July 26, 1947, President Truman signed the bi National Security Act of 1947, into Public Law 25 also signed the concurrent Executive Order 9877, included a statement of the service roles and mi However, the National Military Establishment (lat named Department of Defense) that came into bei September 17, 1947, was, to speak in Churchillian p an end of the beginning rather than a beginning of th of interservice controversy.

Shortly thereafter new battle cries sounded forth issue this time was consolidation within the framew the reorganization act and the Executive Order.

Military air transport was an obvious choice as unification project because the services performed b Air Transport Command and the Naval Air Tra Services were almost identical. ATC and NATS had up huge organizations during the war. According to consolidation report:

"ATC and NATS both operate a transcontinent route from New York to San Francisco through the ern part of the United States. However, these rou not utilize the same stops, although the air rout identical."

In the San Francisco area, the report noted, ATO Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Base, and NATS used M Field a few miles away. Each agency maintained se maintenance, spare parts, and supplies for identical a which they called by different names-C-47 vs. R3) C-54 vs. R4D, for example.

Beginning in October 1947, Air Secretary Symingt Navy Secretary John L. Sullivan held a series of ind sive hearings which broke up on their disagreement merger which Symington desired under Air Force au Symington cited the presidential Executive Order, made no specific provision for the Navy to run a con transport operation in competition with the Air Sullivan quoted the reorganization act, which vaguel

on that the Navy would be sole of its air transport. He said he did on of the Executive Order binding it was not in consonance with the

, there was in fact a merger of today is one of the most important of unification.

st year of "unification" drove Seco distraction. The many disputes t what he termed "minor changes" stated in the Executive Order to the National Security Act. The ected them because, as Secretary t, the proposed changes embodied h might be construed to extend nto the area of conflicts with the ington and Royall proposed that ecommend to Secretary Forrestal fic roles and missions to be incorutive Order.

ites came to the attention of the ation Policy (Brewster-Hinshaw) an a year had been studying the airpower. Its report, released on n part:

ets the law to permit it to develop to base its plans and requirements weapon. The Navy contends that law in disregarding the Executive cause the law and the Executive orce, exclusively, certain missions. basic difference of interpretation ecessity for immediate clarifica

quest for interservice "peace" led at conference at Key West, Fla., arification at a conference at Neworrestal agreed to, and even suprengthening his own powers as local Washington newspaper put e form: "Forrestal Bumps into

Administration began in January decided that Forrestal could not and called in Louis Johnson. On he retired, Forrestal went farther ong central authority than he had o Senator Tydings, the new Chaired Services Committee, Forrestal onsistencies and weaknesses in the en foreseen. He judged himself to vo years earlier he had supported current arguments that the prold give the Secretary of Defense tal wrote:

that a failure to endow this official to control effectively the conduct I force upon us far greater security se if singleness of control and re

porters had already discounted him nd Eberstadt denounced the proablish a Chairman of the JCS as an oncentration of power in the hands said a wrong decision could be a the House Armed Services Comof the proposed amendment was

“a shotgun, not a rifle approach” to the problem of strength ening the powers of the Secretary of Defense.

So it went. The amendments to the National Secunt Act which became effective in August 1949 were dilute to accommodate the objections of opponents to any chang When the new law, in turn, was found inadequate to t job at hand, it was revised, first by Reorganization Ple #6 of 1953, and second 1958's Reorganization Act. 1 December 1960, the Symington Committee found these reforms did not go far enough to ensure the nation. defense structure that will be required to get us safel through the '60s.

As we look back upon the struggle for unification £ date, the focus seems clear. The Navy did not then, no does it now, accept any disagreement with its vision itself as "the nation's first line of defense." In 1946-4 with the help of strong supporters in key congression positions, the Navy methodically set about taking much the substance out of the bill which all had agreed was become the core of the National Security Act. When bill passed in 1947, it only enjoined the services to ge together, but forbade them to merge, and was unclear to where one mission ended and another began.

Navy Secretary Forrestal, who became the first Secretar of Defense, had loyally argued the Navy's case before the bill became law. When it did, he was torn between hi previous affiliations and his desire to administer fair what he himself was to call an organizational "monstrosity, The impossibility of his task and his sensitivity to personal criticism drove James Forrestal out of office and possibly to his death.

The essential problems which troubled Forrestal com tinue to bother us a dozen years after he left public office There is a basic conflict within our military establishment One system would provide careful checks and balances permit one point of view to cancel out another. In respect, it represents an ideal transfer of the form of our political democracy to the military sphere. The other sy tem would require single responsibility and complete authority. It rejects the idea that the officer in charge can o should take a vote of his platoon leaders before a decision is made to "go over the top."

We have not yet been able, except under the duress of war, to settle the argument between need for a complete authority and diffused patterns of peacetime control. I the peacetime of another era now past, established organi zations had the weight of tradition and strength of vested interest to throw against any proposal for change. In the "peacetime" of 1961, we no longer can afford this luxury. We are engaged in a struggle for survival in which we must fully utilize our resources and armed strength.

And, today, our entire nation-educational system, economy, traditions, spiritual values, industrial potential, diplo matic competence, armed forces-make up our “first line of defense."-END

The author, Murray Green, is a civilian aide at Headquar ters USAF. This is his fifth article in AIR FORCE/SPACE DIGEST. Most recent previous contribution was an authori tative piece on French missilry in October '60. The first installment of this analysis of unification appeared in the June issue of this magazine. Dr. Green holds B.S. and M.S. degrees from the City College of New York and a Ph.D. from American University, Washington, D. C., in history and international relations. A Reserve major in Air Force intelligence, he served as a naval officer aboard an aircraft carrier in the Pacific in the second World War.