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ennedy found his interview with Preev in Vienna a sobering experience. oss of temper, he told the nation upon re were no threats or ultimatums. But e meeting was somber. Progress? None dor pretended, although the two K.s effective cease-fire is essential in Laos. e President was speaking the Soviets eir rebel allies in that country, and the ell to the Reds. It is evident that Mr. as described himself as the locomotive tention of either slowing down or being ng.

es discussed in Vienna the tinderbox is lin, but anyone even halfway familiar of Russian negotiations would hesitate . Our opponents are masters at the art tion. The very fact that this technique n ploy lends, in our opinion, more than e to the major issue on the Vienna ot involve somebody else's geography. was said about the negotiations on a parently is that Russia no longer wants is area, if it ever did.

lear test agreement, obviously bogged va conversations and not made more a cherished ambition of Mr. Kennedy nent members of his Administration. d, it would be a basic first step toward nament or arms control program they During the presidential campaign Mr. have created his own quandary of today t he, if elected, would make one last ing fruitful out of the Geneva meetings, nder way since 1958.

d his try and it has been rebuffed. It y as did Padong. This could have been ieve, from the facts as recorded by the mmission in its annual report to ConCC made it clear that it is almost imè an effective control system-basic to a t. The United States suspended tests he Geneva talks in October of 1958, a ed as not necessarily halting our techon nuclear weapons but which certainly - all practical purposes our development ar weapons stands at the 1958 level. ban, self-imposed, unpoliced. AEC did ere is real national peril in the probahas made substantial nuclear progress

and better weapons while we have been leaning on hop Military observers have been present at all of the gotiations to date, but there appears to have been a min mum reliance on US military intelligence and judgment There is no record, to our knowledge, of the views of th Joint Chiefs of Staff. If they are known, they have not be made public. The late Thomas E. Murray, an AEC me ber for about seven years, has written that "if the Join Chiefs of Staff were asked-and the American people a entitled to pose this question-whether our test policy endangering our over-all national defense position, the answer would be yes." The reference here, of course, is our failure to press on with improved nuclear weapon Another aspect of the matter is our evident policy determ nation to prepare a deterrent force of ICBM capabilitie while defense against ICBMs remains a major myster Further nuclear tests are essential for intelligent researc work designed to solve this mystery. It is clear that a breakthrough in this area alone, which the Russians could achieve while we observe our self-imposed discipline, could be the most important development since the perfection of the ICBM itself.

Likewise, our future deterrent force will rely heavily on Polaris and Minuteman. Each of these has a much smaller warhead than Atlas or Titan, a situation which could con ceivably be corrected through further research and testing

It is mid-June, at this writing, and indications are that the United States has not abandoned hope of an agree ment, despite Russian intransigence. Russia, by its own statement, now considers that communism is on top in the world struggle and there no longer is any reason to ne gotiate seriously with us on arms limitation, test bans, or anything else. In the face of this President Kennedy is determined to continue the test-ban talks, undoubtedly for the purpose of making it clear to all the world that the USSR, and not the US, is responsible if they fail.

This is not a situation that we can live with as freedom continues to fall back on a dozen fronts from Havana Hanoi. If it turns out further that the enemy has not bee wasting these three years, that he has developed and pr duced a Sputnik of the weapon world for his arsenal, will know why our announced determination to fight d not deter him. Mr. Kennedy is the man who must mak up his mind when and whether we will end the moratorium on nuclear tests. The peril of delay is not just the per to hopes of future agreement with Mr. Khrushchev. The real problem is whether we are heading for the day whe a Summit Conference to determine the fate of the work may not even include the United States on the list o conferees.-END

AIR FORCE Magazine July 19ng and manu