Admiral BLANDY. It would be feasible to put up the structures, Senator Brewster, but we wouldn't get any satisfactory information because the distance would be too great.

We hoped that we could get the target ships close enough to Bikini Atoll to test the effect of the bomb on the ships and the structures at the same time, but, unfortunately, the water was so shallow near the islands that we could not do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions of Dr. Compton by the committee?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Compton, we thank you.

Dr. COMPTON. Might I add one thing, Senator Walsh, speaking as one who is not a member of Task Force 1?

I would like to bear testimony for the civilian members of our evaluation board as to the excellent spirit of cooperation that we have seen between the various elements that are operating under Admiral Blandy. I, personally, have not seen the slightest indication anywhere of any maneuvering for relative position as between one service or another.

Senator BREWSTER. You think we had to have the atomic bomb in order to have that harmony?

Dr. COMPTON. Well, sometimes it takes danger to weld a group together.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Even the scientists?

Dr. COMPTON. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Compton.

Admiral Blandy, do you have anything further to make by way of statement?

Admiral BLANDY. Yes, sir.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. WILLIAM H. BLANDY-Resumed

Admiral BLANDY. I would like to make a statement with regard to the purposes of the tests and the reasons for conducting them at an early date.

The main purpose is to test the effect of the atomic bomb against naval vessels in order to gain information upon possible required changes in (1) ship design; (2) tactical formations at sea, and anchoring distances in port; (3) number and location of operating bases and repair yards; and (4) strategic disposition of ships.

II. SECONDARY PURPOSES

1. To test the effect of the atomic bomb against aircraft, both air-borne and grounded, and upon a wide variety of military ground weapons and equipment in order to learn what redesign of any items may be necessary, and what may be needed in the way of dispersal, to minimize the effects of the bomb.

2. To learn more of the various effects of the atomic bomb against living beings in order to provide much needed information upon protection, early disagnosis, and treatment of personnel who may hereafter be exposed to atomic explosions, either in war or in peace.

With regard to diagnosis, I might interpolate there that there was not an opportunity to make an early diagnosis in the case of Japan because the medical officers did not arrive in time, the war was not over soon enough for our men to arrive.

3. To gain information regarding the relative value of atomicbomb attack against naval vessels, as compared with other types of targets, to see what the effect would be in the event ships may be attacked, as compared with cities or industrial centers.

4. To gain further information of general scientific value upon phenomena accompanying atomic explosions.

III. IMPORTANT POINTS

1. Types of effects: Considering all three tests-air burst, surface or shallow underwater burst, and deep underwater burst-the bomb can produce against a ship and her crew the following types of effects: (a) Air blast, tending to crush the above-water structure and kill or maim personnel.

(b) Intense heat, affecting the ship's structure, the crew, and possibly the ammunition and fuel.

(c) Radioactivity, affecting the personnel, and certain types of equipment, such as, perhaps, radio and radar.

(d) High waves, endangering both the safety of the ship, especially at anchor, and the lives or health of the crew by throwing "green water" or spray, contaminated by radioactive fission products upon the ships.

("Green water" is the nautical expression for a heavy quantity of unbroken water, as distinguished from spray. I might add that the presence of radioactive water might render the ships uninhabitable for a matter of weeks, or perhaps longer, thereby making it impracticable to use the ships for a considerable period thereafter, even with a relief crew.)

(e) Underwater shock, tending to loosen equipment attached to fixed parts of the ship, and turn all loose objects into projectiles, endangering the personnel.

(f) Underwater pressure, tending to rupture the hull and sink the ship.

2. Importance of various tests: Each of the three tests will produce two or more of the above effects. While the third test is commonly believed to be the most important, it is by no means certain that it will prove so. The surface or shallow underwater burst may readily turn out to be more effective in its combined effects upon ship and crew-especially since this attack can be made either at sea or in port, and the bomb can be quickly brought to the desired exploding position; that is, on the surface or slightly below it.

The deep underwater explosion, on the other hand, can be brought into effect only on the high seas, and the weapon itself must be placed thousands of feet below the surface. To so place an atomic depth bomb, which must be specially constructed to withstand terrific underwater pressures, under a naval task force free to maneuver at high speed, is a job which will certainly challenge the ingenuity and engineering skill of the most experienced designers of underwater weapons and the skill of our best tacticians.

3. Inadequacy of existing data on battle damage: While we learned much about damage to our ships and injury to our men, from orthodox weapons during the war, we cannot afford merely to extrapolate from these lessons to deduce the effects of the atomic bomb, which are of far greater magnitude and, in some respects, of an entirely different nature. 4. Necessity for prompt information: Scientists have said that any moderately industrialized nation can produce the atomic bomb in a few years; yet it is not expected by the best informed on the subject that a positive guaranty against the use of atomic weapons can be accomplished except through a step-by-step process over an indefinite period. In the absence of such a guaranty, it is therefore essential that our designers, tacticians, strategists, and medical officers learn as much as possible now, regarding the effects of this new and revolutionary weapon upon naval and other targets not thus far exposed to it. Without the information which can be gained from these experiments, these men will be groping their way along a dark road which might lead to another and worse "Pearl Harbor."

5. Cost of tests: It has been stated by people not too well informed that the tests will cost $425,000,000 for the target ships, and another $100,000,000 for other expenses. Such figures are excessive. The first figure is the approximate total of the original cost of the ships. Many are obsolete, and a great majority had already been declared surplus to the postwar Navy and were scheduled to be disposed of in some manner, before planning for "Crossroads" began. By no means will all of these ships be destroyed in the tests, as it is intended to learn the distances at which light damage will be incurred, as well as the lethal range of the bomb, against various types of ships. But even if all ships were to be sunk, the cost of the taxpayer, for at least 90 percent of the ships, would be only their scrap value. And this value, with the present high labor costs involved in scrapping, is estimated to be less than 1 percent of the original cost of the ships.

In other words, we would be fortunate to get $4,000,000 for the $450,000,000 original cost.

The other figure, $100,000,000, has no foundation whatsoever, as neither the War and Navy Departments nor the joint Army-Navy task force which is to carry out the tests, has ever published an estimate of the operating costs.

I might say we are having an estimate made now. It could not be done earlier in the planning, because we did not know what would be the extent of the plan.

The actual principal elements of cost are (1) the pay and food, for about 6 months, of the crews of the target ships and a few operating ships previously scheduled for the inactive fleet; (2) the maintenance of these ships for the same period; (3) the scrap value of those obsolete or otherwise surplus ships actually destroyed in the tests, plus the value, as fighting ships, of the few modern vessels sunk, if any; (4) the cost of repairs to a few modern ships damaged; (5) the ammunition and fuel destroyed by fire or explosion; (6) the fuel and transportation costs of the operation; and (7) the cost of special instrumentation.

I do not say that those are all the elements of cost, but they are the principal ones.

The total cost of the tests will only be a few percent of the annual naval appropriation, and will probably not exceed the total cost of

one large new ship; while the lessons learned may save many lives, many ships, and many millions of dollars by guiding future naval expenditures into the most productive and efficient channels.

I would like to add that the harsher critics of the military in peacetime contend that the generals and admirals are busily engaged in preparing for the last preceding war instead of the next one.

Well, here is a case wherein the services are attempting to prepare for a possible future war, in the unfortunate event that there should be and in the more unfortunate event that the atomic bomb should be used in that future war.

one,

Senator BREWSTER. Your estimate of the cost, Admiral, as I gather it, might go to the extent of $100,000,000?

Admiral BLANDY. I think it would not exceed that. I do not know yet exactly what the cost will be, but I believe it will be very much less than that.

Senator BREWSTER. You do not think it will run into any such figure as that?

Admiral BLANDY. I don't think it will.

Senator BREWSTER. That is not in contemplation. I notice that you only have one cargo ship. Do you have any merchant-marine ships? Admiral BLANDY. I will give you the number of transports. Those are ships of merchant type, merchant hull construction; so that we do get a test on the merchant type.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, you have one cargo ship and assault transports; those are merchant-type construction, I understand.

Admiral BLANDY. There are in the first test 19 transports. Senator BREWSTER. Those transports are all of merchant-type construction?

Admiral BLANDY. Merchant-type construction, built by the Maritime Commission.

Senator BREWSTER. You think it will be a fair test of what would happen to merchant vessels?

Admiral BLANDY. Yes, sir; they are typical merchant construction. The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything further to say, Admiral? Admiral BLANDY. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. I would like to ask the admiral some questions and make a few remarks.

As I understand it, there will be 98 ships, American ships, in the experiment?

Admiral BLANDY. No, sir; there are 61 United States commissioned naval vessels, of which only 33 are of combatant type. Taking the 61 United States naval vessels, there are in addition 10 small selfpropelled barges used in amphibious operations; there are 3 captured enemy vessels; there are 3 concrete structures-one small drydock and two oil barges-they are non-self-propelled.

The CHAIRMAN. The original figure, Senator, has been changed. Senator MORSE. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been testified to this morning, before you came in.

Senator MORSE. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. At the suggestion of the committee, there was a restudy of the number of ships; it was reduced to the present number. Admiral BLANDY. The only ships among the whole target array which would normally be retained in the postwar Navy are the carrier Independence and five submarines of modern construction.

The reason for using the carrier Independence is, as was explained in the letter that the Secretary wrote to the chairman, that we had only one other carrier available, which was obsolete. There were two tests; we wished to get a thorough test of carrier construction in both of them.

Now, then, the Independence was one of 10 light aircraft carriers, obtained by converting light cruisers under construction, which was done in order to get more carriers, just as we converted a number of slow merchant-type ships to escort-type carriers. They were not as satisfactory as the larger Essex type of aircraft carrier.

They did do good service, but they were not so valuable as the Essex class and, therefore, not so important for retention. But it is important to learn the effect of the bomb on the carrier's flight deck structure.

Then, there are five submarines, which are used only because they have a heavy hull construction. The officers responsible for our submarine design are most anxious to test this type of hull. The other submarines of lighter design will not be adequate for the purposes desired.

It is not expected that all of these submarines will be lost; they will be placed at various distances.

Senator MORSE. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that if the number of ships to be used in the test has been cut down, and I find that it has been, then it only strengthens my position with regard to the

cost.

I have with me pertinent data on that point which I was going to put into the record but which I will not put into the record now, I do not deem it necessary.

As I understood it, 98 ships were going to be used, many of which were obsolete anyway.

With reference to the argument about the value of the ships as scrap iron or scrap metal, even if I use the original estimate, there would only be about 140,000 tons that could be salvaged and the value of that metal, taking an average of $10 per ton, would only be about $1,500,000.

The argument that these original vessels were worth $480,000,000 will certainly not stand up in the analysis now, in the light of the present value; that figure was based, the $480,000,000 figure, as I understand it, on the original cost.

It seems to me, if it is agreed that we ought to try to find out all the scientific information that we can about the effect of this atomic bomb on ships, that now is the time to do it, before we proceed here, in the Committee on Naval Affairs, to make a great many expenditures in the next decade preparing for a future war, without having any facts.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to read into the committee record a statement made by the President of the United States on the forthcoming atomic bomb tests, the statement bearing date of April 12, 1946.